Diplomacy & Crisis News

Un dossier, piloté par Robert Chaouad, interroge la notion d'intérêt national. Si les théories de dépérissement de l'État sont invalidées, l'intérêt national se redéfinit pour tenir compte des nouveaux acteurs internationaux et de la multiplication de questions à portée mondiale. (N° 105, printemps, trimestriel, 20 euros. — IRIS, Paris.)

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La revue de l'International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) réfléchit à la manière dont l'accord sur le nucléaire iranien de juillet 2015 pourrait servir de référence en matière de non-prolifération d'armes non conventionnelles. (Vol. 59, n° 2, mai, bimestriel. — Washington, DC, États-Unis.)

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La jeunesse africaine est confrontée à la crise des systèmes éducatifs, au chômage et aux ratés de la démocratisation. Pourtant, des progrès apparaissent : entrepreneuriat féminin, innovations dans l'enseignement des technologies, reconversion des enfants-soldats, etc. (Numéro spécial jeunesse, gratuit. — Nations unies, New York, États-Unis.)

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Retour sur l'élection américaine de novembre 2016, notamment grâce à une analyse fouillée de Perry Anderson, cinglant envers les démocrates. Également au sommaire, l'Italie après l'échec référendaire de M. Matteo Renzi. (N° 103, janvier-février, bimestriel, 12 euros. — Londres, Royaume-Uni.)

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Consacrée à l'économie politique de l'Iran, cette livraison s'intéresse au rôle des gardiens de la révolution (pasdarans). Également, une analyse des déterminants du fondamentalisme religieux au Proche-Orient. (N° 229, avril, trimestriel, 20 euros. — Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris.)

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Le Centre d'analyse, de prévision et de stratégie examine les liens entre radicalisation et djihadisme, ainsi que leurs racines respectives. (N° 24, printemps, trimestriel, prix non indiqué. — Ministère des affaires étrangères, Paris.)

http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr

Hostilité au libre-échange, contrôle accru des migrations, programme de construction d'infrastructures grâce à des partenariats public-privé : l'économiste Leo Panitch décortique le programme économique de M. Donald Trump. Également au sommaire : une petite histoire du Parti républicain et de son aile droite. (N° 24, hiver, trimestriel, 12,95 dollars. — New York, États-Unis.)

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Le sexisme dans les entreprises de la Silicon Valley ; le déclin de la foi et ses conséquences sur la vie politique américaine ; les avocats seront-ils eux aussi remplacés par des robots ? (Avril, mensuel, 4,95 dollars. — Washington, DC, États-Unis.)

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Les artistes américains pendant la première guerre mondiale ; pourrissement de la situation en Ukraine ; mathématiques, astronomie, espace : ces Américaines qui ont contribué à des percées scientifiques. (Vol. LXIV, n° 9, 25 mai, bimensuel, 7,95 dollars. — New York, États-Unis.)

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Plusieurs articles fustigent le président Donald Trump, jugé insuffisamment attaché au rôle impérial des États-Unis et trop protectionniste, mais dont la ligne dure envers l'Iran est saluée. Également au sommaire, des affaires de corruption qui n'en finissent pas au Brésil. (Vol. 96, n° 3, mai-juin, bimestriel, 89,95 dollars par an. — New York, États-Unis.)

http://www.foreignaffairs.org

Dossier sur la transformation des logiques agricoles : l'impact du soja transgénique en Argentine, la question de l'accès à la terre et la dynamique des identités collectives dans le changement d'échelle des circuits courts. (N° 18, 1er semestre, semestriel, 25 euros. — Paris.)

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Un dossier sur les dettes privées illégitimes : celles des étudiants, des paysans, des ménages ; celles aussi engendrées par le microcrédit, « nouvel outil de transfert des richesses des pauvres vers les riches ». (N° 71, avril, trimestriel, 5 euros. — Liège, Belgique.)

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Femmes sans enfant : ultime libération ou triomphe de la société de marché ? En ex-Allemagne de l'Est, travail et maternité se conjuguaient plus facilement qu'à l'Ouest : en 1990, 56 % des enfants de 0 à 2 ans allaient en crèche, contre 2 % des nourrissons occidentaux. (N° 37, avril, semestriel, 25 euros. — La Découverte, Paris.)

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« Torchon palaisien » ou « zone de publication libre », les habitants de Palaiseau se feront leur idée en découvrant ce numéro bien informé sur les caméras de surveillance, l'armement de la police municipale ou la résistance des parents d'élèves à une fermeture d'école. (N° 4, printemps, trimestriel, prix libre. — Palaiseau.)

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The situation facing children in Yemen is &#8220extremely dire,&#8221 a senior United Nations Children&#39s Fund (UNICEF) official warned today, citing a dramatic increase in cases of malnutrition and a massive outbreak of cholera across the war-torn country.

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres today congratulated the people of the Kingdom of Lesotho on the conclusion of a peaceful National Assembly election.

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres said today that he has been &#8220encouraged&#8221 by the progress in Colombian peace process and called on the Government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC-EP) to continue to implement their respective commitments under the accord.

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres today appointed Liu Zhenmin of China as the next Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs.

By Fred Johnston

In April, a clandestine meeting took place in New Zealand that included attendees from representatives of the FBI, CIA and National Security Agency plus the United Kingdom’s MI5 and MI6, amongst others. They were brought together to discuss and facilitate intelligence sharing between the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, colloquially known as the Five Eyes network.

These nations have been coming together since an alliance was established in 1946 through the UKUSA agreement, with the other three countries joining the collective over the following ten years. The partnership was established on mutual trust and potential advantages for each country, coming at a time when the looming threat of communism from the Soviet Union swept through sections of Asia during the Cold War.

During said period, the alliance paid dividends. In the 1970s, Anglo-American operations were essential in tracking Soviet submarines using a variety of means, while the United States relied heavily for decades on listening posts lying in former British imperial territories. Half the cost of running the Cypriot site was paid for by the US, demonstrating its significance in acquiring intelligence from the Middle East with this post.

The merits of a shared surveillance alliance are plain to see, though one could argue the future of Five Eyes could be jeopardy. In March, former CIA analyst Larry C. Johnson claimed Britain’s intelligence agency, the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) had intercepted communications within Trump Tower during the 2016 Presidential election.

His evidence for such sensational claims? GCHQ Director Robert Hannigan had resigned three days after Trump’s inauguration. Hannigan said he was to care for his ill wife and elderly parents, but Johnson declared he “doesn’t believe in coincidences”. The real reason for the resignation, he surmised, was clear: The British government had been gathering intelligence on the Trump administration, and once Trump was made aware of this, Hannigan was forced to step down.

Unfortunately, this unproven claim became tangled in the echo chamber of the media—Johnson’s theory were soon picked up by Andrew Napolitano, a Trump confidant and pundit for Fox News. Two days later, White House Press Secretary Sean Spicer cited Napolitano’s comments at a briefing, which evoked a forceful denial from their British allies.

One would think maintaining a positive relationship with like-minded, democratic allies with whom intelligence information has being shared for decades would be seen as a priority for the United States. Yet with the Trump administration demonstrating distrust for the UK in recent months, doubts grow around whether such arrangements will continue in the future.

Ties with traditional US allies have not only grown fractured with Britain. At the conclusion of bruising meetings with NATO and G7 countries, Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel remarked at an election rally, “The times in which we could completely depend on others are, to a certain extent, over. I’ve experienced that in the last few days. We Europeans truly have to take fate into our own hands.”

A not-so subtle commentary on the degeneration of Germany-US relations, which really began to slide with George W. Bush and Gerhard Schroeder’s split decision on the Iraq war in 2003. It also signals the level of diplomatic success experienced by Trump during these meetings—if the head of state of arguably Europe’s biggest economy is losing faith, it does not bode well for the US.

While Trump’s actions are a cause for concern on the diplomacy front, he has also made strong accusations against the intelligence community—his own, that is. In February, Trump took to Twitter with the following claim, “Information is being illegally given to the failing NY Times and Washington Post by the intelligence community (NSA & FBI). Just like Russia.”

This was in response to the resignation of national security advisor Michael Flynn over potentially illegal contacts with the Russian ambassador during the 2016 Presidential campaign. Whether or not the contact took place is a different matter of debate—Trump’s public comments toward the intelligence community undermines the work this industry has performed for many decades (in a Tweet, no less). If Trump treats his own reconnaissance agencies with such disregard, it would be understandable for other nations to be weary of sharing sensitive information with Donald at the helm.

When examining the US approach towards shared intelligence, one may assume there are doubts on the legitimacy and significance of such agreements. After all, this agreement was sought at the beginning of the Cold War; we no longer exist in a bipolar world of “us and them”, where the threat to Western society lying on the other side of the wall. Does Western society still require joint intelligence and security arrangements, like the Five Eyes network, or are such agreements obsolete?

Firstly, the current manifestations of Five Eyes’ traditional threats, demonstrating their prioritization of military and defense, is a worrying trend. Throughout history, access to the Mediterranean Sea had been crucial to Russia.

Earlier this year, Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu said the “Mediterranean region was the core of all essential dangers to Russia’s national interest”, which shows a reigniting of interest from Moscow. Along with Russia’s intervention in Syria, Five Eyes member countries must be concerned with Moscow’s military expansion intentions.

Meanwhile, China’s provocative military build-up, its assertive behavior in the South China Sea and its power of persuasion to garner political influence from states within the region should also be under close attention from Five Eyes.

A study by the RAND Corporation, titled “War with China: Thinking Through the Unthinkable” found that, “improvements in Chinese military capabilities mean that a war would not necessarily go the way US war planners plan it. Whereas a clear U.S. victory once seemed probable, it is increasingly likely that a conflict could involve inconclusive fighting with steep loses on both sides.”

Secondly, the alliance faces an ever-evolving threat from terrorism. Through groups such as al-Qaeda and more recently Islamic State, extremism has become harder to monitor and is increasingly prevalent in the societies of the Five Eyes and their partners. One study has found that ISIS publishes 38 unique pieces of content per day. This, along with the advent of social media to inspire and influence citizens in the West, has shown the pressure to disrupt would-be attackers has never been greater.

Finally, the recent Wannacry attacks shone a light on a growing problem in the technology sector—cyber crime. In the attacks, over 160,000 internet-connected computer systems were infected and forced the user to pay a $300 U.S. “ransom” in order to retrieve information from the affected system. Although reports showed the hackers made less than $100,000, a paltry sum when one considers the hysteria it caused, the cost of cyber crime on society is growing.

One study showed that by 2021, the damage of data, stolen money, theft of personal and financial data, amongst other acts, would cost up to $6 trillion. An eye-watering figure such as this should be the impetus for the majority of world leaders to take action on cyber crime, let alone the Five Eyes collective.

The Five Eyes surveillance network has served a great benefit to its member countries since its inception 70 years ago. With an inexperienced politician as Head of State in the U.S., the status quo of diplomacy and how to approach intelligence gathering have dramatically altered with his presence. His actions prove to undermine the intelligence community, not just in the US but also multilaterally.

In this day and age however, do we really need such integrated surveillance and intelligence operations? In one word—yes.

Fred is a Central Australian who works as a schoolteacher in Bogota, Colombia by day and aspiring social commentator by night. His interests mainly lay in social injustices carried out by those who have misplaced their moral compass—usually politicians and big business. You can follow him on Twitter @FreddyKuma.

The post Is The Five Eyes Network Still Relevant Today? appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

By Col. Tomasz K. Kowalik and Dominik P. Jankowski

It all started with a military exercise in 2008. “Today, Georgia. Tomorrow, Ukraine. The day after, the Baltic states—and later perhaps the time will come for my country, Poland!” Those words were uttered 5 August 2008 by Poland’s late president, Lech Kaczyński, in the presence of five European heads of state who had come to Tbilisi in a gesture of solidarity with the just-invaded Georgia. Almost 10 years later, this statement anticipates Europe’s current security dilemma.

These days, pundits are increasingly speculating on what Russia’s next large-scale military exercise—code-named Zapad-2017—may bring. Will it be just another saber-rattling event that will once again lower the security threshold by adding uncertainty and unpredictability—and make us increasingly numb and desensitized to those large-scale exercises?

This time, will a Russian ally have to reluctantly accept the stationing of more foreign troops on its territory? Or will it lead to yet another Russian military incursion into a neighboring country? Which security Rubicon will be crossed this time?

Understanding Russia’s modus operandi in recent years, and what its large-scale military exercises are designed to accomplish, could offer answers and highlight areas that the international community should closely watch. It also indicates a way ahead for the West.

Train with a purpose

In the last decade, Russia has expanded its military capabilities through regular and specific exercises that have often involved offensive, aggressive and anti-Western scenarios. Such maneuvers enhanced troop readiness status and effectiveness, especially since Russian forces train as they fight.

Those drills also served concrete political and strategic communications purposes as a show of force and a narrative for the national leadership. They intimidate and threaten countries against whom the exercises were designed, but also, in some cases, they disguise military movements—helping Russia prepare and subsequently conduct real military operations.

Timing and geographic proximity are useful. In early August 2008, when Russian troops invaded Georgian territory, they surprised the rest of the world, which was following the Summer Olympics in Beijing. Russia’s 58th Army had just finished its Kavkaz-2008 military exercise, coincidentally occurring just ahead of the invasion (15-31 July) and located just north of the Georgian border.

Fast-forward five years to 2013. Russia re-introduced a military training concept known as the snap exercise. These occur with no-notice and often involve large numbers of troops. After putting into motion four such snap alerts in 2013, Russia conducted another such exercise from 26 February to 3 March 2014. That exercise engaged not only large numbers of airborne troops and transport planes but also long-range aircraft. Officially, the exercise also involved 1,200 amphibious combat vehicles, 880 battle tanks and 120 attack helicopters.

Yet there was more. Under the guise of that exercise, Russia deployed a large contingent of troops to Crimea and its vicinity. The next step was Crimea’s effective capture by troops which officially had taken part in a regular military exercise. The result was Russia’s illegal annexation of Ukrainian territory.

Now comes 2017. Another large-scale Russian exercise is scheduled for September. Unlike previous snap exercises, Zapad (West) takes place every four years and is announced well in advance. It also encompasses several preparatory episodes and smaller exercises—some of them usually occur with no advance notice—and all of which culminate in these Russian-led multinational maneuvers.

This year’s exercise—set to take place both in Belarus and in western Russia (including the Kaliningrad oblast)—might be among the largest since 1991.

As a possible indicator of Zapad’s size, Russia has ordered more than 4,000 railcars to transport its troops. Based on this, up to two Russian armored/mechanized divisions (around 30,000 military personnel) could be deployed to Belarusian territory.

Along with troops already moved there, the anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) assets brought to Kaliningrad over the last few years, troops traditionally flown into the area during such exercises, and those stationed along Russia’s border with the Baltic states (numbering three new Russian divisions in the Western Military District), it’s clear that Russia can, if it so decides, easily exert significant pressure on its neighbors.

Thanks to this military build-up, all under the pretext of the Zapad exercise, Russia’s options are many. It could, with little or no warning, launch a limited or provocative hybrid operation (to see what happens), test responses on NATO’s eastern flank, or present a security threat to Ukraine where the Russo-Ukraine conflict remains in full swing.

What to watch

Considering this grim view, what are some significant indicators and warnings to watch for? Observers should pay attention to three elements regarding Zapad-2017.

The first is a military deception or maskirovka. Russia has learned to deceive the West by masking and disguising its movements effectively. It continues to hone this technique by mastering novel elements. A recent case in point was last year’s shipment of SS-26 Iskander-M missile launchers—under the guise of a logistics exercise—aboard a civilian cargo ship to Kaliningrad.

Here, Russia’s chronic lack of transparency in continually sending false messages while pretending to be open—essentially offering a mixture of lies and disinformation—aims to encourage the idea that it is actually benign and seeks a true partnership with the West. But the West should be able to distinguish empty gestures from real offers of military transparency.

The second area of concern is Russia’s inclination to train its troops in the use of its nuclear arsenal during these large-scale exercises. According to numerous media reports, during both Zapad-2009 and Zapad-2013, nuclear attacks on NATO member countries were allegedly considered—to the West’s amazement.

Imagine NATO troops training for a nuclear strike on Russian cities. Now consider the many tactical nuclear weapons in Russia’s arsenal and recent developments in doctrine that allow for an easy transition from conventional to nuclear warfare during military operations. Nuclear forces are a factor of consideration for Russia’s neighbors.

Add to that Russia’s obvious violation of the 1987 INF Treaty—which eliminated all short-range and intermediate-range nuclear and conventional missiles, as well as their launchers—and one could conclude that Russia has the potential to be on a collision course with the West.

In that context, Russia’s planned training of Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear defense (CBRN) troops should be closely watched. If indeed large CBRN formations engage in such an exercise, it could imply that Russia is getting ready for a potential nuclear development.

The third and final element to monitor is Russia’s long-term military build-up and regional stability. How will Belarus—Russia’s only ally in the region—react and behave during the exercise?

On one hand, it provides a de facto Russian military forward presence, as some Russian units are already permanently stationed there. On the other hand, what if Russia suddenly decides not to leave Belarus with its military build-up after Zapad-2017? This not so improbable scenario might further destabilize the region’s already tense situation. What would NATO and the West do?

What now

In advance of the Zapad exercises, three things should be considered. First, we need to stay the course with the decisions taken at NATO’s Warsaw Summit and make sure the Alliance’s enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) is fully implemented, along with a Multinational Divisional HQ in Poland to better coordinate multinational efforts. The eFP—defensive in nature—should be properly trained and equipped to fulfill its mission of providing deterrence and defense in allied states.

NATO should also make sure the follow-on forces are more regularly exercised, including in a non-permissive environment. Moreover, NATO should keep working on a comprehensive strategy to counter Russia’s A2/AD systems. This should be closely linked with enhancing the NATO Defense Planning Process and investing in the right kinds of military capabilities that can defend alliance territory.

Second, we need better and more robust intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and situational awareness. NATO requires a proper reporting mechanism at the highest political and military levels to function across the alliance.

In essence, NATO members need a solid multinational tool to provide reliable, accurate, measured and sober analysis of intelligence and capabilities along the alliance’s eastern border from Norway in the north, via the Baltic states and the Suwałki gap, down to Romania and Turkey in the south. In today’s security environment, a well-functioning indicator and warning mechanism that can distinguish true posture and intentions from a maskirovka is crucial.

Third, reciprocal transparency is key in avoiding an uncontrollable military escalation or “spillover” effect. Russia frequently violates the provisions of the OSCE Vienna Document, which was designed to ensure transparency in military exercises. Russia often intentionally lowers the number of troops involved in its exercises or splits them—either by providing a small gap in time between events or holding them in different training areas simultaneously under joint command—with the goal of avoiding notification or observation thresholds. Let’s be blunt: essentially, the Russians are trying to dupe the West.

Finally, a growing lack of transparency on the Russian side, combined with an increase in Russian snap exercises (four in 2013, eight in 2014; 20 in 2015 and 11 in 2016) limits room to maneuver with a genuine dialogue and puts political pressure on Western decision-makers.

Since 2016, Poland, along with numerous allies, has strived to avoid situations in which a military incident or a snap exercise might unexpectedly spark armed conflict. Three Polish proposals are now on the table: modernization of the Vienna Document (Chapter III on risk reduction); reciprocal, advanced briefings in the NATO-Russia Council on one Allied and one Russian exercise (preferably Zapad-2017) this year; and voluntary briefings on national exercises in 2017 in the OSCE (Forum for Security Co-operation). Not surprisingly, we are still waiting for Russia to engage on a basis of reciprocity regarding any of these proposals.

Conclusion

Russian military exercises have become a dangerous tool, politically and militarily. The “train as you fight” approach—especially when nuclear attacks are an option—poses a serious threat to the West. It’s not enough that we be prepared to respond militarily. We must also be able to send clear unambiguous messages of unity, cohesion and readiness. As long as Zapad-2017 style exercises are a tool of coercion, no one can take regional stability for granted.

All in all, the West needs to send Russia an unequivocal message that it is ready to engage in confidence-building measures. At the same time we must verify Russia’s actions. We should undoubtedly make efforts to build reciprocal trust, but that will not come immediately.

Finally, Russia needs to understand that if it messes with the alliance, it will pay dearly.

All opinions are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent. Col. Tomasz K. Kowalik, PhD, is director of the Military Foreign Affairs Department at the Polish Ministry of National Defense. Dominik P. Jankowski is head of the OSCE and Eastern Security Unit at the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

This article was originally published by Center for European Policy Analysis.

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