Diplomacy & Crisis News

The United Nations Latin America commission has reported that foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to the region declined by 7.9 per cent to $167.043 billion in 2016, due to low commodity prices, sluggish economic growth and global trend of shifting investment in developed economies.

United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres announced today the appointment of Horst Köhler, former President of Germany, as his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara.

Condemning a series of terrorist attacks in north-eastern Nigeria, United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres has called for those responsible for these &#8220repeated heinous acts&#8221 to be brought to justice.

The lack of democracy and minority rights in Bangladesh hinder prosperity and stability within the country.

According to former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, “If a country does not recognize minority rights, you will not have the kind of prosperity and stability that is possible.” The present reality in Bangladesh highlights that Clinton is correct about this. Former US Ambassador Samantha Power has argued that there is a connection between the economic situation being bad and the horrendous plight of minorities but Bangladesh shows that even if the economic situation is improving, without democracy and minority rights, the plight of the citizens living in that country will continue to be horrendous.

No one disputes that the economic situation has improved recently in Bangladesh with the World Bank calling the Bangladeshi economy stable and claiming that its growth continues to reduce poverty. In fact, some even argue that the plight of the poor in Bangladesh is said to be better than it is in India right now. However, the lack of minority rights and democracy within the country as highlighted by the sham 2014 election results, which illustrates that the country is far less stable and prosperous than it could be given this recent economic growth.

The root of Bangladesh’s ills rests with the lack of democracy. As the East Asia Forum observed in 2014, “The incumbent prime minister has always lost — until now. But now Bangladesh is entering a new phase. In a farce of an election on 5 January, Sheikh Hasina won a second consecutive term as prime minister. She laid the ground for this victory in 2011, by junking a provision added to the constitution in 1996 which had called for neutral, ‘caretaker’ governments to oversee elections. So Zia’s BNP, sitting in opposition, boycotted the poll. For the 20 million-odd voters who showed up (out of 92 million eligible), the choice was even more limited than usual: the only candidates were either in the ruling party or beholden to it. In the majority of seats, no voting took place at all. There is a big difference between two lousy candidates and just one.”

“Nor was the boycott the only problem,” they added. “Before the polling, the government had put Zia under house arrest. Ershad, who leads the third largest party, was held at an army hospital. The next-biggest party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, had been banned from taking part on the ground that its overtly Islamic charter is in breach of Bangladesh’s secular constitution. On the world stage, Sheikh Hasina has joined a short list of leaders who have been elected technically but without an electoral mandate. Like the rest, she has silenced critics in the media, captured the courts and ensured that only her supporters are entitled to a fair hearing.” Shipan Kumer Basu, the head of the Hindu Struggle Committee, stressed that Sheikh Hasina has destroyed Bangladeshi democracy: “153 MP’s was selected out of 300 MP’s and they were not elected. It was just a joke within the nation.”

Alongside the suppression of Bangladeshi democracy, Sheikh Hasina’s government has been persecuting Hindus and Christians within the country. According to Basu, “After being elected in 1996, Sheikh Hasina made clear her stance regarding the minority issue that she’ll also follow her father Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s ideology to wipe out the minorities from Bangladesh.” He claimed that the conspiracy to wipe out the minorities from Bangladesh was initiated by Sheikh Hasina’s father during the Liberation War in 1971: “He first started to grab the lands of the minorities. A major portion of the Ramna Kali Temple’s (Hindu Temple) property were declared as government property and renamed ‘Ramna park’. Minority people were threatened and unnecessarily prosecuted. Women and girls were targeted during Sheikh Mujibur Rahman’s reign.”

Under Sheikh Hasina, he stressed that the Bangladeshi leader has initiated a policy to wipe out the country’s minorities within a decade or two: “Atrocities, terror, political suppression, rape, land grabbing and destroying places of worship belonging to the minorities is increasing day by day. The Awami League activists and the leaders are doing the evil deeds with the acknowledgement of Sheikh Hasina. It has become quite intolerable especially after the so-called election in 2014. The present government has become quite reckless. You’ll find both the local print and electronic media containing news of killings, rape, land grabbing, death threats, and abductions by the law enforcement agencies as well as judicial harassment, etc. There is no democratic atmosphere at all in our country now.”

There are countless examples of this within Bangladesh. One recent case is that of Haji Ishak Miyan, who was given land to be developed by 3 Christian women. Miyan decided to take the land without paying these women for developing it. To make matters worse, he has threatened to shoot the three Christian ladies like birds with the help of the local Awami League. According to Basu, the ladies have given him a legal notice but got no response and now, they have nowhere to turn to. Also recently, a 12-year-old minority girl was raped by Eliyas Mallik and most of the murderers of Bishwajit Das were either acquitted or received reduced sentences following appeals. Das was a 26-year-old tailor who was murdered by student activists of the Awami League merely for walking by an anti-government demonstration on his way to work.

However, Basu emphasized that the opposition is not much better than the Awami League. According to him, when they controlled Bangladesh, they took revenge on the minority communities for they generally supported the Awami League even though they got nothing in return for their support: “One of the widely discussed persecutions occurred in Bagerhat district (my home district). The local BNP leaders conducted land grabbing, fish project looting, killing missions, destroyed Hindu temples and the Hindu girls and women were raped, which was led by the local MP of BNP named Silver Salem and his younger brother Salam. Mr. Salam is now the District President of BNP. So, BNP can never be the safe shelter for the minorities of Bangladesh.”

Given this reality, one might ponder, what should the minorities of Bangladesh do? Basu argues that the Bangladeshi minorities have to explore fresh options: “They should realize that both the Awami League and BNP are the same for them. Fleeing to India to save themselves is not the solution. Do they have a better life in India? The answer is no.

People accept changes when they find better opportunities. But fleeing to India, leaving their beloved motherland, is not a solution at all. They have to live as refugees of India as long as they live. The minorities will have to fight back. We must live equally and practice our rights and religious freedoms simultaneously as the majority of the nation. The ideology of communal harmony should be strong where all should live together and practice their religions side by side. We want a political party that will protect us from this dreadful situation that we are living now. We will have to choose a party that supports our cause of living in peace and harmony in our own motherland. This is the only option left for the minorities of Bangladesh.”

The post The Persecution of Christians and Hindus in Bangladesh appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Calling on the Kenyan authorities to avoid violence, the United Nations human rights chief today urged the Government to make an immediate announcement that it will cooperate and ensure accountability for reported abuse by security forces which has led to deaths and injures, including among children.

More than 1,500 Congolese refugees who have fled violence and ethnic tensions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have been relocated from reception centres in northern Angola to a newly established settlement, the United Nations refugee agency today said.

After learning Monday that devastating floods and mudslides left hundreds dead in Sierra Leone, the United Nations migration agency released $150,000 in emergency, first-response aid relief for the West African country.

The Central African Republic (CAR) has spiralled into violence and remains one of the worst countries in the world to be a child and &#8220right now there are few eyes looking at them and few hands trying to help,&#8221 the United Nations children&#39s agency said today.

The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) has been activated in Nepal to support response efforts in the aftermath of severe floods that have hit the nation, the office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator in the country has said.

Over the past three days, the UN migration agency has found more survivors and victims&#39 remains from last week&#39s tragedy &#8211 when hundreds of migrants were forced from two boats into the sea off the coast of Yemen.

China is plagued by a growing water security crisis and its current solutions are far from sufficient. The reverberations of this crisis have already had global implications, notably encouraging the Arab Spring. Further, as the crisis worsens, national, regional, and global political and economic instability will grow.

China has an age-old imbalance. Its agricultural core is in the North whilst its water resource is in the South. As of 2014, North China holds two thirds of Chinese agriculture but only one fifth of its water.  The rise of Mao in 1952 and an interventionist political ideology has cemented this chronic structural issue in the Chinese economy.

The crisis grows

Contemporary developments are further pressuring China’s water economy as rapid economic growth has sucked-in water. Agriculture and industry account for 85% of water usage. China has 20% of the world’s population but only 7% of its freshwater resource and a rapidly growing middle class with water-demanding lifestyles; the average hamburger takes 2400 litres to produce. In 2014, eleven out of thirty-one Chinese provinces did not meet the World Bank’s water needs criteria of 1500m3 per person; in 2015 in Beijing for example, water provisions amounted to only 100m3.

China’s artificially low pricing of water has encouraged poor water management by creating a disjuncture between actual and market water prices, promoting highly inefficient use in industry and agriculture, and persistent pollution of scarce freshwater supplies. A 2009 World Bank report stated that China was using ten times more water per unit of production than the average industrialised country, and that pollution has made the water in 19% of main rivers and 35% of reservoirs useless for agriculture and industry.

Climate change exacerbates this situation. The melt-water from the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau significantly feeds the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers; the Yangtze alone supports 584 million people and serves an economic zone that constitutes 42% of GDP. According to The State Laboratory of Cryospheric Sciences in China, run off into the Yangtze decreased by 13.9% during the 1990s.

Problem solved?

China’s principal solution has been to commission the very high profile South-North Water Diversion Project, inspired by Chairman Mao. In 1952, Mao stated, “[The country’s] South has lots of water, the North has less, if it were possible, it could borrow a little”.  The core of the project is a 1200 km canal stretching from the Yangtze to Beijing.  It is a political showcase that is temporarily averting crisis by addressing the symptoms rather than the cause, but at a cost of $62 billion, it is an expensive breather that will not resolve the problem.

By facilitating massive water transportation, China is reinforcing an artificial economy. It is encouraging water-intensive industry and agriculture, and promoting a downward spiral of strengthening an insatiable demand whilst failing to combat system inefficiencies.  Long term, this project, combined with state-induced low water prices, climate change, and population and economic growth, will perpetuate economic and water scarcity in Northern China.

China has made strides to find innovative solutions to its water issues. Since April 2015, it has experimented with pioneering urban designs to solve flooding and water shortages, launching a‘sponge city’ program in 16 cities and districts to retain rain water. The Water Pollution Prevention and Control Action Plan, announced in 2015, set targets to improve specific polluting industries and has had some success; 50,000 offending companies have shut down or halted operations.  Nonetheless, critics have questioned the effectiveness of enforcement. Ma Jun, Director of the Institute of Public and Environmental Affairs, said many factories did not comply and local governments carried out the easier aspects of the legislation rather than tackling larger, more complex problems.  However, these are small solutions to a very major problem.  Experts predict that, if China carries on with business as usual, water supply will outstrip demand by 2030.

Implications

Water security issues will have a severe impact on domestic economic stability in the long term. In China, 45% of GDP is in regions that have a similar water resource per capita as the Middle East. China’s electricity generation is reliant on water, as it is estimated that 45% of fresh-water reliant power generation facilities are in water-stressed provinces.  Further, many water-intensive industries, such as fibres and metals, generate 51% of their output in water scarce regions. China’s global competitiveness will likely be affected as industry, agriculture, and municipal use compete internally and with each other.  Businesses should contemplate a future of water price hikes, supply disruptions, pollution, and increased regulation, and seek the opportunities presented by innovative business solutions to solve Chinese water-security issues.

As throughout history, any water-induced economic instability will have significant political implications, nationally, regionally, and, given China’s significance, globally. This has already occurred. The 2011 winter-drought in China’s Eastern wheat-growing province forced China to purchase vast volumes of wheat on international markets. This caused a doubling of global wheat prices. Quickly, a hungry Middle East and North Africa were convulsing in the Arab Spring; in Tunisia, Yemen, and Jordan, protesters waved baguettes in protest, while in Egypt, people were crying out for “bread, freedom, and social justice” (it rhymes in Arabic).

As China moves rapidly away from staple food self-sufficiency, the globalisation of China’s water-security crisis is a serious issue. Such a danger has not gone unnoticed; a report by the USA’s National Intelligence Council registered Chinese water and food shortages, predicted to occur by 2030, as a threat. The implications for the global economy if China’s economy stutters, given it is predicted to account for 17.2% of it by 2025, are self-evident.

As politicians, leaders, investors, and businesses, but ultimately as people, China will wrestle with this challenge, but the world must also take heed of China’s water-security.  The dry throat of the Chinese dragon may induce more than just a sneeze.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by Ben Abbs.

The post Domestic and Global Shocks of the Growing Water Crisis in China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). Antoine Bondaz propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Jieun Baek, North Korean’s Hidden Revolution: How the Information Underground Is Transforming a Closed Society (Yale University Press, 2016, 312 pages).

Jieun Baek s’attache à analyser l’impact d’un accès croissant à l’information sur la société nord-coréenne. Sa thèse principale est que cette « révolution cachée » déstabilise en profondeur le régime nord-coréen. Alors que les récents événements ont tourné les projecteurs sur le problème nucléaire et balistique et le risque de frappes préventives américaines, cet ouvrage a le mérite de nous rappeler la tragédie humaine en Corée du Nord.

La spécificité de l’ouvrage, et son principal intérêt, sont qu’il repose sur de nombreux entretiens réalisés avec des transfuges nord-coréens en Corée du Sud et aux États-Unis. La démarche s’inscrit dans la tradition des livres de témoignages, à l’instar de Les Aquariums de Pyongyang (2000) de Kang Chol-Hwan et Pierre Rigoulot, ou de Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea (2009) de la journaliste du Los Angeles Times Barbara Demick. Il offre une perspective unique sur l’intérieur du pays et souligne les évolutions sociales telles que vécues par les transfuges. Les portraits et scènes de vie touchent, notamment la ­mention des kotjebis, ces enfants des rues apparus lors de la famine du milieu des années 1990.

Comme dans tout ouvrage se basant sur des témoignages, plusieurs ques­tions se posent, d’autant que la méthodologie des entretiens n’est pas clairement présentée. La première est celle du potentiel biais de l’auteur qui réalise des entretiens très personnels, avec des transfuges pour la plupart présentés comme étant devenus des amis. La deuxième tient à l’intérêt scientifique du témoignage de transfuges ayant fait défection au début des années 1990 pour comprendre la situation actuelle. La troisième se pose quant à leur représentativité, malgré la diversité de leurs profils : ils viennent pour la plupart des provinces frontalières de la Chine.

L’ouvrage conserve un intérêt évident en ce qu’il documente avec précision les moyens d’accès à l’information des Nord-Coréens, ce que l’auteur appelle « la révolution de l’information », mais aussi le système de contrôle et de répression chargé de limiter cet accès. On découvre ainsi successivement les réseaux clandestins permettant aux transfuges d’aider leur famille restée en Corée du Nord, la forte exposition de la population aux séries et films sud-coréens, le rôle des ONG sud-coréennes, le rôle parfois plus ambigu des associations religieuses, etc.

Cependant, et allant partiellement à l’encontre de la thèse initiale, certains transfuges rappellent que le problème principal du pays n’est pas tant l’accès à l’information que la peur qui hante chaque Nord-Coréen, ainsi que l’attachement véritable à un pays, à un réseau social et à un ancrage local qui limitent de fait toute opposition au régime. On retiendra notamment le témoignage du jeune Jeong Gwang, qui explique de façon pragmatique pourquoi la grande majorité des Nord-Coréens ne considère même pas la défection comme une possibilité.

Une grande qualité de l’ouvrage est enfin d’aborder la question de l’économie souterraine dans le pays, traitée ici sous l’angle de la vie quotidienne, ce qui n’est pas sans rappeler les travaux du Peterson Institute for International Economics. Sont ainsi mentionnés, tour à tour, le rôle crucial des marchés informels, les jangmadang, leur dépendance très forte aux trafics avec la Chine, leur impact sur la jeune génération, etc.

Antoine Bondaz

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

Trump once labelled NAFTA, “the worst trade deal maybe ever signed anywhere”. This month, he unveiled the NAFTA negotiating agenda, providing a template for trade negotiations yet to occur with other countries – such as China, Germany, and Japan. With an emphasis on tackling tax systems and removing barriers to the US agriculture and manufacturing industries, Asian negotiators will be watching closely.

As the United States Customs and Border Protection prepares to begin construction on the first segment of President Trump’s infamous border wall with Mexico, his administration is anticipating raising trade barriers with their beleaguered southern neighbor.

Trump’s blunt mercantilism, however, risks pushing both Mexico and Canada into China’s open arms. Both countries have already expressed interest in signing a deal with China, and China has reciprocated. With North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations set to begin in August, they have the potential to tilt the global trade balance even further away from Trump.

Given that Trump has defined his mantle, in terms of reducing deficits with a number of major trade partners, including China, Japan, and the EU, the negotiations provide a crucial glimpse into US trade policy moving forward. The US currently runs trade deficits with nine of its 10 top trading partners; last year, it ran a trade deficit of USD 728 billion, ranging from USD 347 billion with China and USD 146 billion with the EU, to USD 63 billion with Mexico.

According to Trump, the deficits are undoubtedly tied to exploitative trading partners, a misplaced trust on the part of an open US economy, and widespread currency manipulation. Earlier this month, the Trump administration released its broad goals for a new and improved NAFTA, demanding increased exports of its dairy products, wine and grains; opened trade in telecommunications and online purchases; an entirely new dispute settlement mechanism; greater access for US banks abroad; and new guidelines for currency manipulation.

There is much riding on an equitable outcome from the negotiations: over 80 percent of Mexico’s trade is with the US, for Canada the figure is closer to 70 percent. There can be no doubt that Canadian and Mexican negotiations face a long, drawn-out battle ahead.

What Trump may have failed to take into account, however, is China’s rising attractiveness as a global consumer and trading partner. As one of the world’s largest oil importers, China is is keen to start talks with Canada over a free trade deal. At the same time, Canada is reaching out to Asian economies in an effort to reduce its trade dependence on the US, as Trump’s unpredictable brand of protectionism keeps economists and corporations guessing.

During a recent visit to Beijing, Canadian Governor General vowed to boost bilateral cooperation between the two countries; and the Ontario Premier has already scheduled her third trade mission to China for November this year. Last month, the two countries signed a bilateral security agreement regarding intellectual property, trade secrets and other confidential commercial information, an agreement may indicate a greater commercial alignment to come.

Mexico has been more explicit about its options regarding the NAFTA negotiations, pointing to an upcoming visit by Mexican officials to China as a sign that the dance card of Latin America’s second largest economy is far from waning. China’s ambassador to Mexico has also hinted at the possibility of a future free-trade agreement with Mexico, citing “no difficulty” from China’s side in broadening ties between the two countries.

Though a trade deal between the two countries would result in lower tariffs, which is a tough sell for Mexican manufacturing jobs, uncertainty over US-Mexico relations would mean that Mexico is accelerating trade talks with other partners, and China might just want a piece of the action.

As the Trump administration goes after China’s trade practices, they risk alienation, as world leaders appear determined to forge ahead with global trade liberalization. The potential impact on major US industries, and the corresponding opportunities for Chinese trade negotiators, is incalculable.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by Joanna Eva.

The post NAFTA Negotiations will Extend China’s Influence in North America appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro d’été de Politique étrangère (n°2/2017). Corentin Sellin propose une analyse de l’ouvrage de Justin Gest, The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality (Oxford University Press, 2016, 272 pages).

L’élection de Donald Trump s’est forgée dans trois États à majorité blanche de la Rust Belt industrielle (Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvanie) dont aucun n’avait voté pour un républicain après 1988. Ce basculement parmi les électeurs de la working class blanche a suffi. Dans ce contexte, et après le Brexit, le livre de Justin Gest sur l’identité politique de la working class blanche était attendu. Le jeune politiste fut d’ailleurs l’un des premiers à noter les affinités paradoxales entre Trump et l’électorat populaire blanc dès l’été 2015.

L’ouvrage présente une double ambition : établir théoriquement, à l’aide de sondages quantitatifs, comment le déclin social des individus de la working class blanche aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni détermine leur comportement politique ; mieux saisir la perception qu’ont les individus de ce déclin. Pour cela, l’auteur a mené un véritable travail ethnographique, au travers d’entretiens individuels dans les quartiers de Barking et Dagenham, sites historiques des usines Ford au Royaume-Uni, et à Youngstown, ancienne capitale de l’acier dans l’Ohio.

Justin Gest dégage une relation nette entre la perception qu’ont les Blancs de la working class de leur déclin social et un comportement politique anti-système. Plus le déclassement social est fort, plus les individus sont susce­ptibles d’adopter une position politique de rejet et de violence. Si la marginalité par rapport à la hiérarchie sociale est complète et admise, le Blanc de la working class sera plus enclin à se retirer totalement de l’action politique.

De plus, l’auteur dessine un tableau saisissant de groupes sociaux en déshérence et marginalisés. Dans l’est de Londres comme à Youngstown, il décrit des Blancs de la working class affaiblis dans leur identité collective par le chômage, la désyndicalisation et sans représentation politique car prisonniers d’un « monopartisme ». Il veille cependant à distinguer l’identité de la working class blanche britannique, construite sur le statut hérité des parents, et celle, américaine, méritocratique et fondée sur la hiérarchie des revenus.

Si l’auteur insiste sur la « racialisation » blanche de l’identité collective du fait de l’effacement des marqueurs sociaux de « classe », il différencie l’est de Londres et Youngstown quant au positionnement vis-à-vis des groupes perçus comme « ennemis ». À Barking et Dagenham, les Blancs de la ­working class ont reconstruit leur identité par opposition à des migrants venus du monde entier et qui semblent concurrencer leur position dans la hiérarchie sociale. Aux États-Unis, nation d’immigrants, les Afro-Américains, autrefois différenciés par la position subalterne dans l’appareil de production, sont associés à l’assistance (welfare) pour conserver la valeur identitaire du travail à la seule working class blanche.

Dans un dernier chapitre, Justin Gest pose la question de la représentation politique d’une working class blanche recluse dans des mobilisations anti-système ou hors du champ électoral. Il offre des pistes pour comprendre comment Trump a su capter dans les urnes la radicalité de la working class blanche en s’adressant à son sentiment de perte de statut social. Le livre est touffu, d’un anglais raffiné et complexe, mais il offre la première étude scientifique rigoureuse de l’expression politique de la working class blanche aux États-Unis et au Royaume-Uni.

Corentin Sellin

Pour vous abonner à Politique étrangère, cliquez ici.

Since the 1990s, numerous Islamist groups have emerged in Algeria, but over the years their allegiances and identities have shifted according to geopolitical trends. The Islamic State is the latest group to gain a presence in the country, but it has faced a pushback as the Algerian authorities are no strangers to counterterrorism.

On June 1st, south of the capital Algiers, gunmen attacked a gendarmerie wounding four policemen. It was reported that the attack was orchestrated by individuals acting on behalf of the Islamic State. It was just the latest in a string of incidents which have occurred in Algeria this year. Other high profile attacks claimed by the group include a thwarted suicide attack by two men in the city of Constantine in April, and two months before this a jihadist tried to enter a police station in the centre of the city. On this occasion, a police man on duty succeeded to disarm the bomber’s suicide device by firing on it and the perpetrator was shot.

Algeria: A hotspot for radical Islamist groups

According to a 2015 report by the US Department of State, some of the most active Islamist groups operating within Algeria include: Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM); the Mali-based organisation Movement for United and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO); al-Murabitoun, which was responsible for the 2013 attack on the In Amenas gas facility in southern Algeria and Jund al-Khilafa (Soldiers of the Caliphate), which has declared its allegiance ISIS. However, it is estimated that there are many small groups scattered across Algeria´s southern and eastern borders, which each to varying degrees have declared their loyalty to ISIS.

In light of the Islamic State defeats in Iraq and Syria, many foreign fighters are seeking to return home. Unlike in Tunisia or Morocco, where hundreds of young men have been drawn to the fighting, Algerians have proven less susceptible. In fact less than 200 are said to have travelled to the region to fight under Islamic State´s banner. In Algeria, those who have chosen to align themselves with ISIS have often spent years in the field fighting. The group’s operations faced a setback last year after 332 people were arrested across the country for belonging to recruitment and support networks. Nevertheless dampening the desire for young Algerian men to take up radical causes can be difficult given the high rate of unemployment and social inequity that has beset the country for decades. One commentator has noted that Algeria’s only hope going forward is that there is a surge in the price of oil. Currently, the government is required to pay $30 billion USD in subsidies which cover everything from food to education.

Algerian counter-terrorist experience

However many contend that what is helping to undermine the threat of the Islamic State is that many Algerians carry the memory of the brutal civil war of the 1990s in which an estimated 200,000 people died. The might of the security force also plays a significant role, as the Algerian military consists of over half a million active service members and a national police force of 210,000. They have learnt to cope with the ‘residual’ terrorism that has continued despite efforts in the early 2000s to grant amnesty to Islamist fighters. The country´s Ministry of National Defense denies publicity to militants by purposely refusing to list group affiliations in communiques regarding arms seizures or anti-terror operations. More broadly, the Algerian government is working to support young Algerians by providing tuition, job placements and paid internships, which is part of a deradicalization program.

While the government continues to address the threat internally, the challenge for the Algerian security forces is controlling the country’s porous 4000 mile border and the mountainous terrain in the north east, which has proven ideal since the early 1990s for Islamist guerrillas. To counter this, Algeria actively participates in the US-backed Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP), which aims to strengthen counterterrorism capabilities among states in the Maghreb and the Pan Sahel region. While such programs are certainly designed to assess the changing nature of the threat across North Africa, for the government of Algeria, what remains certain for the foreseeable future is whether Algerian mujahideen choose to fight under the banner of the Islamic State or Al-Qaeda, the tactics and strategies they adopt remain the same.

This article was originally published by Global Risk Insights and written by Emily Boulter.

The post Algeria’s Battle Against Terror appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Preliminary results show incumbent President Uhuru Kenyatta winning easily. But the opposition has rejected the results, raising the specter of post-election violence.

Donald Trump can whine all he wants, but we're now living in a world where American power is less relevant than ever.

The candidate who once warned America about Hillary Clinton's hawkishness is turning into a war machine.

Rafa Marquez, Mexico’s captain, allegedly linked to Flores narco ring.

If Trump wants to put pressure on North Korea or China, he's going to need to have good friends in Asia.