Diplomacy & Crisis News

A working group of the United Nations agency which coordinates telecommunication services throughout the world completed today a cycle of studies on key performance requirements of the next generation mobile networks (5G) for the International Mobile Telecommunications-2020 systems.

Amid renewed violence that has led to “successive gross violations” of international humanitarian law in two north-eastern provinces of the Central African Republic (CAR), the most senior United Nations relief official in the country has called for free and unhindered access to civilians impacted by the clashes between rival armed groups.

Wrapping up the opening of the intra-Syrian negotiations in Geneva this evening, United Nations Special Envoy Staffan de Mistura said he would hold bilateral meetings with participants on Friday to decide on a work plan, as Secretary-General António Guterres said he was encouraged the Syrian parties held face-to-face talks.

Ahead of a major donors conference in the Norwegian capital, Oslo, seeking to generate global action to tackle the complex crisis in Africa’s Lake Chad Basin, the top United Nations relief official highlighted that investing in support for the region will in turn help strengthen broader security around the world for all to benefit.

Depression is the leading cause of disability worldwide, the United Nations health agency today reported, estimating that it affects more than 300 million people worldwide – the majority of them women, young people and the elderly.

By Alireza Jafarzadeh

Barely a week after President Donald Trump was sworn in as U.S. president, Iran commenced another round of ballistic missiles to test his tough campaign rhetoric. The most recent launch took place even after the administration officially put the regime “on notice.” In doing so, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) continues to lead the charge in defying international will.

Under United Nations Security Council resolution 2231, which coincided with the Iran nuclear deal, the Iranian regime is called upon to refrain from work on such weapons. Accordingly, Iran is barred from launching ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear material.

The missile launches were preceded by half a dozen others that also took place after the conclusion of nuclear negotiations. The regime faced little to no consequence for those provocative acts, but the latest launch was the first one to be carried out on President Trump’s watch.

As should have been expected from Trump’s statements on the campaign trail, the Iranian regime can expect a far less deferent response from the current administration. Some commentators also speculated that the IRGC carried out the test so early in the new presidency to gauge how the administration would respond to subsequent acts of defiance.

The answer was made abundantly clear when recently-resigned National Security Advisor Michael Flynn issued a statement condemning the missile test as being not only in defiance of UNSC resolution 2231, but also part of a long string of confrontational and destabilizing behaviors, including forced close encounters between US Navy ships and IRGC vessels, as well as the targeting of the U.S. and its allies by IRGC proxy groups elsewhere in the region, chiefly the Yemeni Houthi rebels. This statement was backed by Sean Spicer and Donald Trump, and continues to stand following his resignation late Monday.

The statement was equally straightforward in its criticism of the previous administration, noting that it had “failed to respond adequately to Tehran’s malign actions—including weapons transfers, support for terrorism, and other violations of international norms.” Similarly, on Capitol Hill, House Speaker Paul Ryan said Washington should stop “appeasing” Iran. The message is clear that this permissiveness is at an end. This clear statement from Washington was promptly followed by a new round of sanctions issued from the White House.

These responses—both in rhetoric and action—seems to answer significant questions about whether President Trump would stay true to the tough talk that had become a familiar feature of his campaign. But other questions certainly remain, particularly those having to do with exactly what steps the administration will now take to transform tough talk into firm policy.

The natural first step is to impose additional new and relevant sanctions, as well as tightening those that already exist. The push to include additional regime entities on the list of sanctions is a good start.

It has been noted that in opening up Iran to international investment, the Iran deal also opened the door to indirect financing of the IRGC, the organization that is the main driving force behind the missile tests, the provocations in the Persian Gulf, and a wide variety of Iran’s worst behaviors at home and abroad. The worsening of these activities helps to underscore the fact that it is long past time to restrain the influence and activities of the IRGC.

Currently, Western businesses are free to invest in Iranian firms in which the IRGC is only a minority stakeholder, or in which its interests are concealed behind front companies or proxies in the Iranian business world.  It is, therefore, essential for the administration to isolate the IRGC completely from Western funds and business dealings by designating it as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO).

What the Trump administration cannot do is repeat the mistakes of its predecessor. These include not only the laxity that was referenced in former National Security Advisor Michael Flynn’s statement, but also a tendency to look toward certain factions of the Iranian government as a source of hope for internal moderation. The experience of the past several years has proven the folly of this approach. The IRGC has only grown more deeply integrated into the Iranian system, having gotten more financing and no serious challenge from so-called moderate President Hassan Rouhani. In fact, the armed forces budget has increased dramatically.

In addition to sanctions and the terrorist designation of the IRGC, the Trump administration also has an extraordinary opportunity to stop Western appeasement of the extremist regime and start engaging the freedom-loving people of Iran. The regime has already been isolated inside Iran and is only surviving through gross human rights violations and executions. It is time for America to support democratic Iranian opposition movements as the strongest strategic deterrent to the regime’s destabilizing behavior.

Alireza Jafarzadeh, the deputy director of the Washington office of the National Council of Resistance of Iran, is credited with exposing Iranian nuclear sites in Natanz and Arak in 2002, triggering International Atomic Energy Agency inspections. He is the author of “The Iran Threat” (Palgrave MacMillan: 2008). His email is Jafarzadeh@ncrius.org.

The post Trump Administration Puts Iran “on Notice” & Issues Sanctions. What’s Next?  appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Recent tensions between Russia and Belarus seemed to display the Kremlin’s shattering dreams for integration across the countries of the former Soviet Union. The Moscow-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), developed as a rival to the European Union, seemed failing short of its goals, with friendly countries drifting away amidst Russia’s alleged weakness.

Fumes flared up after statements of Alexander Lukashenko Belarus’ strongman leader, who has been in charge of the nation for over 26 years witnessing major historical shifts in the Kremlin’s foreign policy, launched a fierce diatribe during a 7-hour long conference.

He blamed the Kremlin for violating a two decades old bilateral agreement after the FSB established a security zone on the shared border previously free of any regulations. The decision came as a response to Minsk announcing a five-day visa waivers for citizens from 79 countries—including the United States, a gesture deeply disliked by the Kremlin.

Lukashenko also accused Russia of blackmail by cutting oil exports to Belarus by half. He further asked to file a criminal case against the head of Rosselkhoznadzor, a Russian federal service for veterinary surveillance, for inflicting damage on Belarus by restring the export of goods. Over the past years, the country had grown into a major illegal supplier of sanctioned goods to Russia.

Despite unabashedly emotional and critical, Lukashenko made it clear that Minsk will remain within the EEU. His speech, however, raised rumors of the union with Russia entering a bumpy road.

Continuous disputes between the two EEU members might culminate with Minsk drifting away from Moscow’s orbit. Meanwhile, current hurdles seem troubling and unlikely to get resolved any time soon. Rather, they underscore the complex nature of the union that is sweepingly misinterpreted in the West.

As the leadership from countries in the EEU comes from the legacy of the Soviet communist party, treating Moscow as the central authority is not unusual. But, with the acquired sovereignty after the Soviet collapse, the elites of the independent nations have grown increasingly reluctant to share power.

Most of the EEU nations face acute problems with corruption, bloated bureaucracies and authoritarian leadership. Unlike the West, nations do not lecture each other on human rights and democracy promotion, treating the current situation as the norm.

A range of factors from economic dependence to shared cultures and borders make it further impossible for the former Soviet republics to break ties with the Kremlin without shooting themselves in the foot.

The Kremlin foresees this and does not want to repeat the radical backlashes against its influence as in the case of Ukraine. Hence, the only format in which the former Soviet space could coexist and benefit economically is one in which the maintenance of international relations is founded on equality.

Therefore, the Kremlin tries to stay above political incursions into domestic affairs as long as each country maintain its position within the Moscow-led union. In return, freedom of movement across borders and economic benefits remain among key tenets of the EEU along with a certain degree of political autonomy in foreign policy.

Meanwhile, Moscow would be happy to see more support of its actions internationally from the EEU members. In recent years, it has become evident that the economic interests overweight political solidarity—no political support will emerge if it goes against interests of an individual member country.

During the Ukrainian crisis, neither Minsk nor Astana expressed support to Russia’s actions and instead maintained neutrality. At some point, both even criticized its actions in Ukraine, concerned with their own sovereignty and security. Similarly, neither legally recognizes statuses of the so-called People’s Republics in eastern Ukraine or South Ossetia and Abkhazia in Georgia.

Kazakhstan is the only country that has a stable economy across the EEU. Ruled by the 76-year-old president Nursultan Nazarbayev, its political position balances between pro-Russian, pro-Chinese and even pro-American stances when needed. Regardless of whether Putin and Trump eventually get along, Astana is set to benefit from the new administration with Rex Tillerson as secretary of state possibly championing ties and investments into local oil fields.

Kyrgyzstan, another nation of the EEU, has recently launched a more active policy towards China amidst the Kremlin’s inability to fund a promised dam project of Kambarata-1 and the Upper Naryn cascade. The country’s President Atambayev was as harsh as Lukashenko in accusing Moscow over the racist treatment of Kyrgyz migrant workers during the May 9 requiem event for the 71st anniversary of the Soviet victory in World War II.

While criticism might pinpoint to the crippling EEU, it rather displays a decentralized partnership encompassing and tolerating internal contradictions, and even democratic forms of interactions among its members. The later comes as a surprise given prevailing authoritarian forms of governance with little tolerance towards dissent domestically. However, it seems that the Kremlin has no choice how to uphold its grip but to maintain such equality in order to keep its Eurasian dream afloat.

The post Despite Hurdles, Russia’s Eurasian Dream Lives On appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.

Proponents say it’s overdue. Opponents say it’s all too soon.

Forget the conspiracy theories. Something much more dangerous is seeking to gut our government and change the character of our society.

Unless the world undertakes 'major transformations' to address world hunger.

It’s precisely because of the ways that the Constitution actively shapes our lives as a military family that Trump’s challenges to the Constitution feel like hostile acts.

The article puts forward information that very much corresponds to reality.

What does this mean? You tell me.

Without the United States, will the EU and Asia Pacific trade toward trading with each other?

By FP Staff and Adam Rawnsley Traveling in the Middle East — One of the options the Pentagon is weighing for the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria is sending more U.S. troops, the head of U.S. Central Command said Wednesday. Speaking with reporters while traveling overseas to confer with regional allies, ...

Le blog Reflets du Temps, qui consacre une large place aux questions internationales, a publié le 18 février dernier un article mettant à l’honneur le dossier du numéro d’hiver (n°4/2016-2017) de Politique étrangère : « Méditerranée, mer de toutes les crises ? ».

 

« Méditerranée, une idée d’empire. Du Mare Nostrum romain à l’empire européen sans frontière, qui s’imagine aujourd’hui rongé par les vagues de migrants ».

Formidable sujet que celui de la revue d’hiver. Un espace maritime et ses rives, brassant toute l’Histoire au carrefour de civilisations de première importance, comportant les zones sensibles où bat le plus dangereusement le pouls de la Géopolitique actuelle, charriant les flux de populations, migrants fuyant les guerres ou émigrés clandestins, par voies de terres et bien plus de mer, qui donnent à la Méditerranée cette représentation de tombeau – 10000 morts depuis 2014 – qui pour la plupart d’entre nous signe indéfectiblement cet espace géographique. Méditerranée, zone de tous les dangers, malheurs, et, pour certains, menaces ? Réalité, qui, comme tout ce qui porte un tel niveau de crises, véhicule son lot de fantasmes et de représentations approximatives ou fallacieuses.

Aussi pouvons-nous être particulièrement reconnaissants à la revue PE, qui, tout en mettant sur la table l’état le plus pointu des savoirs géographiques, historiques, géopolitiques, aborde également ce sujet, vaste et mouvant, par des faces moins connues, pour autant parfaitement pertinentes, et garantes de mieux armer nos connaissances. Méditerranée ; a priori, du « connu » ? A voir.

6 solides et copieux articles se partagent ces regards croisés sur La Méditerranée, mer de toutes les crises ? Le point d’interrogation n’étant pas rien dans la problématique. Jean-François Daguzan place d’utiles jalons d’entrée :« Les politiques méditerranéennes de l’Europe : trente ans d’occasions manquées ».

« Jamais le fossé n’a été  plus profond entre les rives de la Méditerranée alors que se dresse un mur physique et mental qui a pour nom : terrorisme, réfugiés, conflits ». L’auteur place le sommet de Barcelone 1995 comme l’ambition type et le ratage classique d’unir le destin de l’UE en plein élargissement et de certains pays riverains, s’étendant jusqu’à Israël, la Palestine, la Mauritanie, la Jordanie, excluant la Libye. Objectifs de paix, dans cette après-guerre froide, et de coopération économique, se donnant à l’horizon 2020 la possibilité d’une zone méditerranéenne de libre échange (Shimon Pérès en était l’un des inspirateurs, au nom du « New Middle East »). L’échec à venir à bout du conflit Israélo-Palestinien fut une des grandes raisons de sa paralysie. L’UE se rabattit sur « une politique de voisinage » en 2003, ensemble de partenariats bilatéraux entre l’Europe et les pays de la zone méditerranéenne. Dès son arrivée au pouvoir en 2007, N. Sarkozy mena « L’Union pour la Méditerranée », dont l’échec vint d’une volonté affichée de contourner la domination allemande, et de repousser aux calendes l’adhésion de la Turquie. Comme on descendrait des marches, ces stratégies passent, voit-on, d’ambitions de haute voilure, à de « simples » et habituels contrats de coopération entre l’UE et les États. Les Révolutions arabes de 2011 changent totalement la donne – les interlocuteurs ont changé, le terrorisme islamiste, et son volet sécurité, colorent tout. En 2016, une nouvelle politique méditerranéenne est amorcée ; on baigne encore dans cette séquence. Plus large, elle s’ouvre vers le Golfe et le Sahel, plus attentive aux nouvelles donnes, le défi démographique, les migrations, le climatique. L’article souligne les défauts réitérés d’une UE menant le bal, dans un modèle de toute puissance, n’ayant pas suffisamment saisi les changements structuraux de ses partenaires méditerranéens (ainsi, d’Israël bunkerisé, de l’Egypte paralysée, de la Tunisie aux prises à ses équilibres, de la Turquie renvoyée dans un rôle de frontière). La puissance supposée de l’UE s’effrite du coup en Méditerranée, et montent les voix des pays du Golfe, notamment, sans compter la Chine.

[…]

Les autres articles posent sur le lieu méditerranéen d’utiles regards, de nature à affiner l’analyse. Plus latéraux que centraux, non moins essentiels. Ainsi, des « industries de la migration » de Marseille à la plaque tournante Stambouliote (« Le commerce migratoire », Michel Peraldi), des formes si différentes des « Diplomaties navales » (Fernando Del Pozo, Ferdinando Santefelice di Monteforte, Patrick Hebrard), permettant avec d’excellents rappels historiques de mesurer l’état géopolitique des influences – celle des USA se retirant ; celle de la Russie poutinienne s’avançant, comme on sait. Richesses et notamment celles des énergies font évidemment partie de l’état des lieux. Ainsi, du Gaz trouvé en quantités de plus en plus importantes dans la partie orientale. C’est l’occasion de connaître le cas d’Israël en la matière : « De l’eau dans le gaz » (David Amsellem). Enfin, pages informatives au plus haut point, que cet article sur« La Chine en méditerranée ». Patronne de plus d’un port, dont Le Pirée, grande alliée de la Grèce, bâtissant une stratégie de partenariats saute-mouton – discussions actuelles avec la France – la Chine met « naturellement » le pied en Méditerranée.

Revenons en conclusion à l’éditorial de ce numéro PE : c’est bien « une Méditerranée réceptacle, réservoir de contradictions et de conflits… une des lignes de partage démographique de la planète » que présente la revue. Mais « définir aujourd’hui la Méditerranée, c’est s’interroger sur ce que nous voulons être, Européens, dans notre environnement ». « Un objet introuvable ? » cette Méditerranée ? Pas sûr.

Pour lire l’article dans son intégralité, cliquez ici.

S’abonner à Politique étrangère.

Despite the president’s threats, Mexico City also has leverage when it comes to immigration and border security.

(Own report) - The Mexican government is pushing to rapidly modernize its free trade agreement with the EU and has declared its "close affinity" to Germany, following US President Trump's threats of massive reprisals by building a wall at the border and imposing punitive tariffs. Because of its extreme dependence on the USA, Mexico can only hold its ground by intensifying its relations with other countries, according to Mexican Foreign Minister Luis Videgaray. Mexico's enticements are greeted with sympathy by German business circles. The majority of German firms active in Mexico had already decided on new investments and is planning to carry these out, despite expected disadvantages from the projected US trade policy. Experts assume that the US administration cannot afford excessive punitive tariffs or other exorbitant escalations. At an appearance last week in Mexico, Siemens CEO Joe Kaeser ostentatiously announced investments worth US $200 million and signed an agreement of intent with Mexico's Minster of Economics for infrastructure and industrial projects with a possible volume of up to US $36 billion.

But is America's largest state ready for the wars that would follow?

 

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On February 1, Rex Tillerson was sworn in as President Donald Trump’s secretary of state—a role which is shaping up to be one of the toughest jobs in the world. The former CEO of Exxon Mobil, who will help guide the new administration’s “America first” foreign policy, was confirmed by the Senate in a narrow 56 to 43 vote, in part due to concerns over his ties to Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Mr. Tillerson will not only be dealing with “combined Russian-separatist forces” in the Ukraine, but also with a rebellion of dissenters at the U.S. State Department who oppose the temporary travel ban on seven majority Muslim nations. He will also need to reexamine Obama’s refugee deal with close ally Australia, economic ties with Mexico, and consider drawing a line in the sand with Iran. With all these issues on his plate, Tillerson and his State Department may soon be overwhelmed as more countries choose to test the new administration’s foreign policy, including China in the East and South China Seas.

Although much of his testimony during the confirmation process focused on Tillerson’s ties to Russia, the former oil executive also sent confrontational messages to leaders in Beijing, including the ominous: “We’re going to have to send China a clear signal that, first, the island-building stops and, second, your access to those islands also is not going to be allowed.”

Tillerson also reiterated Beijing’s building and placing military equipment on the contested South China Sea islands were “illegal actions” and “extremely worrisome,” arguing “They’re taking territory or control, or declaring control of territories that are not rightfully China’s,” while adding the territorial grabs were “akin to Russia’s taking Crimea” from Ukraine.

Tillerson has also shown a strong tendency to distance himself from the previous administration’s foreign policy toward China, blaming the continued Chinese aggression on a soft Washington: “The failure of a response has allowed them just to keep pushing the envelope on this,” Tillerson said, adding, “The way we’ve got to deal with this is we’ve got to show back up in the region with our traditional allies in Southeast Asia.” To be fair, the Obama Administration, under its “pivot to Asia,” did deploy greater military assets in the region, but their actions were limited to bomber flyovers, breaches by fighter jets of Beijing’s self-declared “air defense identification zones” and naval patrols to assert the right of free navigation.

Tillerson also commented on Beijing’s relationship with North Korea, arguing for the U.S. not to rely on empty promises from China to pressure Pyongyang over its nuclear and missile programs – saying “It has not been a reliable partner in using its full influence to curb North Korea.” Tillerson also made the case for secondary sanctions to be imposed on Chinese entities found to be violating existing U.N. sanctions.

Some of Tillerson’s other prepared comments on China (59:10 on C-Span) include:

“We should also acknowledge the realities about China. China’s island-building in the South China Sea is an illegal taking of disputed areas without regard for international norms.”

“China’s economic and trade practices have not always followed its commitments to global agreements. It steals our intellectual property, and is aggressive and expansionist in the digital realm.”

“China has proven a willingness to act with abandon in the pursuit of its own goals, which at times has put it in conflict with America’s interests. We have to deal with what we see, not what we hope. But we need to see the positive dimensions in our relationship with China as well. The economic well-being of our two nations is deeply intertwined. China has been a valuable ally in curtailing certain elements of radical Islam. We should not let disagreements over other issues exclude areas for productive partnership.”

While Mr. Tillerson has seemingly stayed on message with President-elect Trump’s hawkish views on China, exactly how the Pentagon would preclude China from accessing the islands it has built and now controls was not made clear. What is clear is Beijing’s reaction to the statement. In an editorial by the state-owned China Daily, Tillerson’s remarks were “not worth taking seriously because they are a mish-mash of naivety, shortsightedness, worn-out prejudices, and unrealistic political fantasies. Should he act on them in the real world, it would be disastrous.” An editorial in the Global Times, another state-run nationalistic newspaper, warned of a “large-scale war” should the U.S. attempt to block China from the islands, arguing:

“China has enough determination and strength to make sure that his rabble-rousing will not succeed.” 

In the election runup and with the nomination of cabinet posts we have certainly heard some heated rhetoric thrown at China, and Tillerson is no exception. Yet until the new administration develops and agrees upon any plan of action, we still have no idea whether or how these “unrealistic political fantasies” will become reality (or lost in contentious debate) – or merely intended to appease an aggrieved nationalistic audience at home.

In a recent and lengthy letter (PDF) to Senator Ben Cardin, Tillerson seemed to back off from his threat of force to prevent China from accessing islands it occupies, saying:

“To expand on the discussion of U.S. policy options in the South China Sea, the United States seeks peaceful resolution of disputes and does not take a position on overlapping sovereignty claims, but the United States also does not recognize China’s excessive claims to the waters and airspace of the South China Sea. China cannot be allowed to use its artificial islands to coerce its neighbors or limit freedom of navigation or overflight in the South China Sea. The United States will uphold freedom of navigation and overflight by continuing to fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows. If a contingency occurs, the United States and its allies and partners must be capable of limiting China’s access to and use of its artificial islands to pose a threat to the United States or its allies and partners.”

His latest statements largely reflect previous U.S. State Department and U.S. Navy policy under the Obama administration, but leave room for action following a “contingency.” How the new Trump administration defines and reacts to this future “contingency” we can only hope will be heavily debated among all the concerned parties.

The post Rex Tillerson On China appeared first on Foreign Policy Blogs.