U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson visiting Chinese President Xi Jinping in Beijing.
U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson recently concluded a trip to Asia which included visits to Japan, South Korea, and China. With respect to the Chinese leg of the tour, the North Korean crisis and trade were among the many issues discussed between the two sides. As the North Korean situation has proved particularly intractable over several decades, perhaps more novel solutions need to be investigated. One of these solutions may be a proposal for a permanent, non-aligned stance for a unified Korea in order to allay the security concerns of the great powers within the region.
Ghosts of Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD)To combat the increasing range of North Korean ballistic missiles following the most recent test, the U.S. has begun deployment of its THAAD system to not only better protect itself from possible attack, but also to protect its South Korean and Japanese allies as well. However, THAAD deployment has been highly controversial due to the capability of its X-band radar component to surveil deep into both Chinese and Russian territory. This ability not only has the potential to upset the existing regional balance of power within Northeast Asia itself, but global security as a whole as the THAAD radar would impact both Chinese and Russian missile strike capabilities against the U.S. proper.
Most likely, this will simply lead to an accelerated arms race by both China and Russia focused on newer missile technology in order compensate for the THAAD radar capabilities. This security dilemma reflects China’s stance that it simply is not possible to have “perfect” security for oneself, while simultaneously denying the legitimate security concerns of others. Additionally, this stance was a major impetus behind China’s endorsement of Kazakhstan’s Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia (CICA) initiative.
China has also proposed its own “double cancellation” deal in order to resolve the North Korean dilemma. This proposal would involve the cessation of North Korean missile tests in exchange for the termination of joint U.S.-South Korean military drills in the region. Unfortunately, the proposal is considered infeasible by the U.S. as it wouldn’t allow it to fulfill its treaty obligations to South Korea. These regional drills affect Russia’s security interests in the area as well and are surely a factor in Russia’s recent deployment of troops to the Kuril Islands, further inflaming ties with both Japan and the U.S.
The Cold War Never Truly EndedPivoting back to Europe, yet another security dilemma affecting Russia may hold an answer to the North Korean situation, namely the Ukraine Crisis. While the Ukraine Crisis may not have lasted as long as the situation on the North Korean peninsula, it is sure as equally intractable. The two situations are also similar in other ways. Whereas the Six-Party Talks have failed to provide a permanent solution with respect to North Korea, the Minsk Agreements have had little to no effect in resolving the underlying security concerns of the parties involved. Additionally, both situations are legacies of the Cold War, further proving that a war’s end can have long-lasting effects on both “winners” and “losers” alike.
Several advocates of realism in international relations have proposed that only a Ukraine that professes permanent neutrality between The West and Russia can hope to solve the Ukraine Crisis. These advocates, including Dr. John Mearsheimer of The University of Chicago, maintain that only such a solution will permanently address the underlying strategic issues currently dividing The West and Russia. There is historical precedent here as well, as neutrality for a re-unified Germany was the original condition proposed by the Former Soviet Union during the waning days of the Cold War.
While such a corresponding solution to the North Korean situation may indeed be labelled as “radical”, with details sketchy, surely now is the time for radical thinking given that the U.S. has clearly stated that its policy of “strategic patience” with North Korea is now over and is also stating that “all options are on the table”. In theory, such a solution has the potential to allay the legitimate security concerns of China, Russia, Japan, and the U.S. Both China and the South Korean people as a whole have repeatedly favored continued dialogue with North Korea as opposed to “other options”.
Lastly, and most importantly, a unified and permanently neutral Korea may not only be the key to Korea’s re-emergence as a great power within the region itself, but ultimately is a question that the Korean people (and no one else) have to decide for themselves.
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Cette recension a été publiée dans le numéro de printemps de Politique étrangère (n°1/2017). Hans Stark, secrétaire général du Comité d’études des relations franco-allemandes à l’Ifri, propose une analyse de l’ouvrage dirigé par Alexander Häusler, Die Alternative für Deutschland. Programmatik, Entwicklung und politische Verortung (Springer Verlag, 2016, 256 pages).
La naissance, en 2013, du parti Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, Alternative pour l’Allemagne), sa montée en puissance dans les sondages et son entrée aux parlements de 10 des 16 Länder allemands (au 1er février 2017) ont provoqué un intérêt très vif pour cette formation, d’autant que sa progression s’inscrivait évidemment dans le contexte des succès électoraux de partis dits « populistes de droite » en Europe, le Brexit et la victoire de Trump. Sans parler de l’ombre omniprésente du IIIe Reich. C’est donc à point nommé qu’un collectif de chercheurs allemands, spécialistes de l’extrême droite d’outre-Rhin, a réalisé une première étude d’ensemble, sous le titre : L’Alternative pour l’Allemagne. Programme, évolution et positionnement politique.
L’ouvrage retrace les origines de ce parti de 2013 jusqu’à l’éviction de son président-fondateur Bernd Lucke, en juillet 2015. Il ne prend donc pas en compte l’évolution des 18 derniers mois qui ont vu une poussée incontestable vers l’extrême droite de l’AfD ; mais les auteurs l’avaient prédite, comme en témoigne la conclusion du directeur de l’ouvrage Alexander Häusler.
Sa première partie est consacrée à la place de l’AfD dans le paysage politique allemand, et aux contradictions internes d’un parti qui prône à la fois un néolibéralisme souverainiste eurosceptique et un « populisme de droite » qui se dit « proche du peuple », et donc aussi de gauche… La deuxième partie propose une comparaison entre l’idéologie de l’AfD et celle des autres partis dits populistes en Europe, puis analyse les liens entre l’AfD et les partis d’extrême droite issus des pays membres de l’UE. La troisième partie de l’ouvrage analyse les idéaux fondamentaux de l’AfD au plan sociétal, tant en ce qui concerne le rôle de la femme dans la société allemande, que la position adoptée face aux minorités sexuelles, ou quant à certaines valeurs traditionnelles (famille, IVG). Dans une quatrième partie, les auteurs s’intéressent au phénomène PEGIDA (Patriotes européens contre l’islamisation de l’Occident), et aux liens multiples entre ce mouvement et l’AfD, avant d’aborder les questions, devenues centrales depuis 2015, de l’islam, de l’immigration et des réfugiés. La cinquième partie s’ouvre au champ plus vaste de la nébuleuse d’extrême droite en Allemagne, et étudie les rapports entre l’AfD et la « Nouvelle Droite », avant d’analyser l’évolution interne du mouvement de jeunesse de l’AfD, la Junge Alternative, dont les acteurs, qui prendront des responsabilités au sein de l’AfD dans les années à venir, se positionnent d’ores et déjà à l’extrême droite du paysage politique allemand. Enfin, l’ouvrage accorde aussi une importance particulière à la place que l’AfD a à l’est de l’Allemagne, avec un chapitre consacré à l’AfD du Land de Brandebourg.
Voici donc un ouvrage, informatif et analytique, qui nous en apprend beaucoup sur ce nouveau parti. Et ce que l’on apprend n’est pas très rassurant.
Hans Stark
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Ever since Poland’s Law and Justice Party (PiS) rose to power in November 2015 on a conservative ticket, the country’s institutions have been mercilessly assaulted. From gagging state media to gridlocking the constitutional court, the PiS government has managed to turn one of the EU’s success stories into a backwater.
That reckless behavior was on full display last week when Donald Tusk was re-elected as President of the European Council in spite of raving opposition from Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydlo who tried to oust her political opponent.
While Poland is still nominally obliged to respect democratic principles regarding the rule of law as a member state, and the European Commission has been “forcefully” expressing its displeasure with the country’s course of action, PiS has so far been unstoppable.
Brussels’ muted response stems mostly from the toothlessness of Europe’s options for sanctioning misbehaving members. Article 7, for example, was added to the Treaty of the European Union in the late 1990s as a way of holding members accountable for rights violations, enabling the Council to issue a formal warning before revoking the voting rights of the violating country. Even after the Commission triggered the pre-Article 7 process last year, Warsaw’s response was little more than a shrug.
By failing to coerce Warsaw into changing its way, the move instead exposed the EU’s practical inability to enforce the rule of law in member states. As is the case with many of Europe’s rules and procedures, the systemic rule of law mechanism presupposes a willingness to cooperate from the affected national governments. Warsaw has considered the dispute closed since submitting a detailed response regarding its views to the European Commission, allowing Poland to stonewall the Commission from taking repercussive measures for almost a year now.
Making matters worse, actually going through with invoking Article 7—the “nuclear option”—is nearly impossible because this would require a unanimous vote from EU member states. Hungary’s Viktor Orban, who is himself busy upending Hungarian democracy, has already expressed his opposition to employing Article 7 against Poland and has no interest in seeing Law and Justice reprimanded for following his lead. Between them, Budapest and Warsaw have exposed the ineffective enforcement of the EC’s mechanisms. Absent the “spirit of cooperation,” national governments can stall Europe’s legislative process to their own ends.
Faced with this dilemma, European Commissioner for Justice Vera Jourová has drawn inspiration from the US Congress and its “power of the purse” by proposing to make the distribution of EU funding dependent on whether states uphold fundamental EU principles like the rule of law.
In the U.S., the federal government uses funding it provides to the states as leverage when the two sides find themselves at odds. Washington has, for example, used federal highway funding to force states into adopting laws on speed limits and drinking age. Seeing how countless projects within the EU member states and the surrounding European neighborhood rely on money from Brussels, the funds Europe provides (and recipients take for granted) could very well be turned into an effective enforcement tool.
Countries like Poland and Hungary, where derogations from EU standards are the most egregious, also happen to be most susceptible to any kind of budget pressure. The Polish government heavily relies on EU funding, to the tune of €104.8 billion between 2014 and 2020. Losing that support would drastically impact the Polish economy and the functioning of the national government, offering a powerful incentive for Poland to comply with the EU’s rule of law principles.
This approach can also be easily applied to aspiring EU members, which enjoy billions of euros in funding under the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), which falls under the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP). In the Western Balkans, the EU is the largest investor committed to improving governance and rule of law—areas that are notoriously lacking. Montenegro, for example, is one of the leading candidates for EU ascension and yet it faces rising concerns over corruption and insufficient judicial independence. Freedom House noted a declining trend in Montenegro’s governance, especially since the 2016 election.
That election’s troubling aftermath saw opposition figures arrested, with parties opposed to the continued rule of long-time leader Milo Dukanovic boycotting parliament in a political crisis that exposed the fragility of Montenegro’s rule of law. These developments make the EU’s €270.5 million in funding, €99.2 million of which are supposed to be used for improving the judiciary and fighting corruption and organized crime, appear like wasted money.
Dukanovic, who has placed an ally in the premiership but is still leader of the ruling party, is notorious for his links to mafia organizations and cigarette smuggling. Of course, that IPA funding can be seen in a very different light: combined with the carrot of eventual EU membership, it gives Brussels an important tool for pushing Montenegro towards real reform.
The stakes are even higher in Serbia. Despite being an EU candidate country, Serbia has begun to fuel tensions between neighboring Balkan states by taking an aggressive nationalist stance on a variety of issues. Relations have notably declined between Serbia and Bosnia over a genocide appeal, leading to significant delays in the reform efforts. Even so, the Serbs depend on €1.5 billion worth of ENP allocations for infrastructure improvements and economic transition. Thus far, the worst they have seen from the EU are verbal reprimands which are clearly not doing the job.
With the rise of the far-right and nationalist sentiments across the continent, it is more important than ever to enforce the fundamental principles of the European Union and make the EU a coherent, consistent voice for democratic values and good governance. The EC’s existing mechanisms to enforce compliance have been exposed as paper tigers, but Europe still needs to be able to bring unruly member and prospective states to heel. By leveraging the billions of Euros it sends to these countries, the Union can make sure its rules and principles are no longer trampled underfoot.
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