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VIENNA, 25 September 2025 – The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Ambassador Jan Braathu concluded his first official visit to Greece yesterday.

During his visit, Representative Braathu discussed current challenges to media freedom and the safety of journalists with Minister of Justice Georgios Floridis, Deputy Minister to the Prime Minister and Government Spokesman Pavlos Marinakis, as well as Secretary General for Communication and Information Dimitris Kirmikiroglu. Braathu also held consultations with investigative journalists, representatives of journalists’ unions, academia and members of Greece’s Delegation to the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.

“Greece has made significant strides since 2022 in enhancing journalist safety through a range of policy initiatives, training and capacity-building programmes,” Representative Braathu underlined. “I was informed of an ambitious and multi-faceted approach by the Government and I urge continued efforts together with representatives of journalists and media. I look forward to the implementation of the government Action Plan for media freedom and safety of journalists and stand ready to provide support and assistance to this end,” Braathu said.

One of the topics addressed was the ongoing work by the government task force, including representatives of journalists’ unions, on draft legislation to counter Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation (SLAPPs).

“It is important not only to transpose the EU Anti-SLAPP Directive, which addresses cross-border cases, but also to adopt legislation countering domestic SLAPPs,” the Representative noted. He added that this development would represent a highly positive step and place Greece among the very few OSCE participating States that have a progressive legal framework aimed at countering all cases of SLAPPs.

Representative Braathu welcomed the legislative measures undertaken by Greece to strengthen the safety and legal protection of journalists and media professionals, including the decriminalization of defamation and the adoption of a collective labor agreement for public sector media and expressed the hope that the private sector media would follow this example as well. It was agreed to explore further co-operation with the International Training Center for the Safety of Journalists and Media Professionals in Thessaloniki. He also stated support for ongoing discussions on the creation of a self-regulatory Media Council in Greece.

The Representative raised the topic of the 2022 surveillance case, “Predatorgate”, as well as the murder of veteran crime reporter Giorgos Karaivaz in 2021, encouraging authorities to continue investigations and reiterating the importance of preventing impunity for crimes against journalists. Braathu underlined the importance of adhering to the 2018 OSCE Ministerial Council Decision on the Safety of Journalists.

In various meetings, Braathu stressed the importance of editorial independence, promoting transparency in media ownership, and safeguarding media pluralism. Regarding the allocation of state advertising and support, he underlined that allocation should be based on objective and transparent criteria.

In line with his mandate, Representative Braathu reaffirmed his readiness to support Greek authorities at all levels in advancing reforms that promote media freedom and safety of journalists.

The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. He provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom

Public Affairs Unit, OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights Katya Andrusz

The OSCE Moscow Mechanism mission of experts undertaken by Professor Hervé Ascensio, Professor Veronika Bílková and Professor Mark Klamberg presented their findings to the OSCE Permanent Council on 25 September 2025, collected in the report entitled ‘Report on Possible Violations and Abuses of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, Related to the Treatment of Ukrainian POWs by the Russian Federation’.

The three experts were selected after 41 OSCE participating States, following consultation with Ukraine, invoked the OSCE’s Moscow Mechanism on 24 July 2025 to “build upon previous findings, and: [t]o establish the facts and circumstances surrounding possible contraventions of relevant OSCE commitments; violations and abuses of human rights; and violations of IHL, including possible cases of war crimes and crimes against humanity, related to the treatment of Ukrainian POWs by the Russian Federation; [t]o collect, consolidate, and analyze this information including to determine if there is a pattern of widespread and systematic torture, ill-treatment and execution of Ukrainian POWs and soldiers hors de combat and/or at detention facilities by the Russian Federation in the temporarily occupied territories and in Russia; and [t]o offer recommendations on relevant accountability mechanisms”.

The Mechanism, established by all OSCE participating States in 1991, allows for one or more participating States to request ODIHR to “inquire of another participating State whether it would agree to invite a mission of experts to address a particular, clearly defined question on its territory relating to the human dimension”.

The Permanent Council is one of the OSCE’s main decision-making bodies, and convenes each week in Vienna to discuss developments in the OSCE area and make decisions on future activities.

The observations of the mission of experts are available here.

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Women stand in a damaged displacement settlement in Khan Younis, Gaza. Credit: UNFPA/Media Clinic

By the Peace Research Institute Oslo
OSLO, Norway, Sep 25 2025 (IPS)

The battlefield is no longer distant; for millions of women, it’s next door. An estimated 676 million women – nearly 17 percent of the global female population – lived within 50 kilometres of a deadly conflict last year, according to a new report from the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO). That is the highest figure recorded since the end of the Cold War.

https://www.prio.org/about

Women at risk

2024 marked a historic peak in women’s exposure to armed conflict. The number of women living in conflict zones has more than doubled compared to 1990, reflecting both the rising scale of global violence and the increasing reach of conflicts into densely populated areas.

The study found that last year, around 245 million women lived in areas where conflict caused more than 25 battle-related deaths, while 113 million women were located in zones with over 100 deaths.

Bangladesh recorded the highest absolute number of women exposed, with nearly 75 million living within 50 kilometres of conflict. The violence was primarily linked to nationwide protests in July and August, which culminated in the ousting of former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina.

In Syria, Lebanon, Israel and Palestine, all women were affected, meaning entire female populations were directly exposed to deadly violence.

Living near conflict zones has severe consequences for women’s lives. Armed conflict undermines inclusion, justice and security, and is consistently associated with higher maternal mortality, greater risks of gender-based violence, reduced access to education for girls, and widening gender gaps in employment.

These impacts threaten women’s immediate safety, but also their long-term wellbeing and economic prospects, weakening the foundations needed for recovery.

‘Conflict doesn’t just happen on the battlefield – it reaches into women’s homes, schools and workplaces, disrupting the very foundations of their lives,’ said PRIO Research Director Siri Aas Rustad, who is the author of the report. ‘While some may find new roles in crisis, these opportunities are fragile. The hard truth is that war widens gender inequalities and leaves women at greater risk.’

Regional variation

The report highlights striking regional and national differences. In Lebanon in 2024, 100 percent of the female population lived within 50 kilometres of a conflict event where the death toll exceeded 100 – this means that all women in Lebanon are exposed to high-intensity conflict.

In the Palestinian territories, nearly 80 percent of women reside near areas with more than 100 fatalities, with the other 20 percent living in conflict areas with between 1 and 99 killed. Over one third of women live close to zones with more than 1,000 deaths. Syria shows a similarly severe pattern, with most women exposed to medium- and high-intensity conflict.

In Nigeria, the report reveals that women in Borno State face particularly high-intensity violence linked to Boko Haram and the Islamic State, while women in the South-South region are increasingly affected by separatist violence.

Long-term toll

The developmental costs of the impact on women are profound. Countries with a high proportion of women living near conflict consistently score lower on the United Nations Human Development Index, underlining the long-term effects of violence on education, health and livelihoods.

Protracted conflicts, often overshadowed by more visible wars, steadily erode social and economic structures. At the same time, cuts in international aid threaten to further weaken infrastructure and deepen vulnerabilities

The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) is a world-leading institute for the study of peace and conflict. Through cutting-edge research, PRIO examines the drivers of violence and the conditions that enable peaceful relations between states, groups and individuals.

IPS UN Bureau

 

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On 24 and 25 September 2025, the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat, with support from the OSCE Secretariat’s Action Against Terrorism Unit, held a training course on media and information literacy in preventing and countering violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism (P/CVERLT) in Ashgabat, Turkmenistan

The training supported the Centre’s P/CVERLT efforts by addressing the challenges stemming from the digital ‘information disorder’, in the context of P/CVERLT. Over the two days, participants discussed and were introduced to tools that can help increase media literacy and thinking skills, incl. regarding Artificial Intelligence (AI), and build resilience to violent extremist and other harmful content. The training also focused on ways to address violent extremist and other illegal content online, while upholding fundamental human rights, including freedom of expression. The training course brough together over twenty participants, including students from universities in Ashgabat as well as representatives of the Youth Union, the National Red Crescent Society of Turkmenistan and a number of local public organizations and media.

Through presentations from international and local experts as well as a number of hands-on exercises in working groups, the training fostered multi-stakeholder co-operation while providing participants with the tools and practical skills to address the misuse of online platforms for VERLT.

“In the context of global information flows and emerging new technologies, the rapidly changing information environment create a source of serious security threats,” said William Leaf, Head of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“Being active users of internet resources, teenagers and youth, may become an easy target for manipulation and aggressive influence by extremist groups,” added Leaf.

“The aim of this project is to increase youth resilience to violent extremism by enhancing their knowledge about media and information security,” he stressed.

The event follows the OSCE-organized training course on media literacy for representatives of Turkmenistan’s national media and state institutions, which took place on 16 and 17 September in Ashgabat and focused on current trends in the modern media environment. It builds on a curriculum developed under “INFORMED: Information and Media Literacy in Preventing Violent Extremism. Human Rights and Gender-Sensitive Approaches to Addressing the Digital Information Disorder".

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Spyros Blavoukos, Professor at the Athens University of Economics & Business; Head of ELIAMEP’s EU Institutions & Policies Programme and Panos Politis Lamprou, Junior Research Fellow, ELIAMEP outline the broader framework of the EU defence cooperation, seeking to provide a concise overview of the Union’s key initiatives that shape its actions in the fields of defence (industrial) policy.

Read the ELIAMEP Explainer here (in Greek).

• The creation of additional fiscal space (NEC) and the provision of low cost lending (SAFE) of ReArm Europe will enhance Greece’s defence expenditures as well as demand for weapon systems throughout the EU.
• The Greek defence industry will exploit these growing opportunities due to its integration in pan-European supply chains, an outcome of the offset agreements of the 1990s and 2000s.
• With three additional policies the Greek defence industry can position itself with even greater effectiveness in this new environment.
• First, build further on the government’s ongoing energetic management of defence-related assets under state ownership, primarily with the exit of the Hellenic Aerospace Company from tight state control.
• Second, reform defence procurement so that the need for speed is addressed which is necessary for realizing Civil-Military Fusion (CMF), including through the transition of the Hellenic Court of Audit from ex ante to ex post review of defence procurement contracts.
• Third, strengthen the Hellenic Center for Defence Innovation (HCDI) with additional financial resources and appointment to its Board of distinguished Greek diaspora scientists so that HCDI can catalyse the participation of diaspora start-ups and diaspora scientific talent in the generation, by the Greek defence industry, of asymmetric force to counter the Turkish threat.

Read here (in Greek) the Policy paper by Antonis Kamaras, Research Associate, ELIAMEP.

Towards the 2025 EU–CELAC Summit: Academics and diplomats debate the future of the bi-regional partnership[1]

On 9–10 November 2025, the 4th European Union (EU)–Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) Summit is taking place in Santa Marta, Colombia, bringing together European, Latin American and Caribbean Heads of State and Goverment to  strengthen bi-regional relations. This mechanism constitutes the main forum for dialogue and cooperation between Europe and the states of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and is the continuation of the EU–LAC summits held since 1999.

Today, EU–LAC relations unfold within the context of a structural crisis of the international system, marked by the decline of the liberal international order, the fragmentation of global trade, and growing strategic rivalry between the United States (US) and China in key sectors such as technology, energy and supply chains. Since the 2008 financial crisis and the 2015 Brexit referendum, illiberal and protectionist trends have intensified, while Donald Trump’s second term has deepened these dynamics through unilateral tariffs on countries and strategic sectors. The EU has responded with an “open strategic autonomy” agenda, combining the green and digital transitions with industrial policies and economic security, while LAC seeks to diversify its ties and advance green and digital reindustrialisation processes, despite structural fragilities and a recent decline in foreign direct investment[2]. This scenario presents both challenges and opportunities to revitalise a bi-regional relationship that, despite a long-standing record of cooperation and political dialogue, has gone through extended periods of stagnation and mutual loss of relevance compared with other actors such as China and Russia[3].

To foster debate ahead of this high-level meeting, on 23 May 2025, the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) hosted a roundtable entitled Beyond the 2025 EU–CELAC Summit: Shaping the Future of EU–Latin America Relations. The event aimed to encourage dialogue between researchers and policymakers, bringing together academics who participated in the European Union in International Affairs (EUIA) conference, along with EU officials and LAC diplomats.

Organised by Arantza Gomez Arana (Northumbria University, UK), Bruno Theodoro Luciano (ULB and UNU-CRIS, Belgium) and Damián Rodríguez (University of the Republic, Uruguay), and with the support of the University Association of Contemporary European Studies (UACES), the event opened with a keynote by Professor José Antonio Sanahuja (Complutense University of Madrid, Spain), who analysed the complex geopolitical and geoeconomic context surrounding the 2025 EU-CELAC Summit. He stressed that, after a period of “polycrisis” within the EU and accelerated change in the international system, Donald Trump’s re-election has brought a dynamic of contestation to the liberal order, affecting both transatlantic alliances and the development strategies of both regions. In this context, the EU faces the challenge of redefining its integration model and external projection, while simultaneously advancing the green and digital transitions, reinforcing strategic autonomy, and strengthening the resilience of its value chains. However, this process takes place amid internal tensions and macroeconomic constraints, as well as a global environment marked by intensifying US-China rivalry and the risk of economic fragmentation and trade wars.

Sanahuja argued that the bi-regional relationship must be reframed around mutual interests and tangible results, moving away from the traditional asymmetric logic. Through initiatives such as the Global Gateway initiative and the conclusion and implementation of trade agreements -including the EU–Mercosur, EU–Mexico[4] and EU–Chile agreements- the EU seeks to diversify partnerships and secure critical inputs, while LAC requires access to finance, technology transfer and industrialisation. He warned that the success of this agenda will depend on the ability to coordinate positions in multilateral forums, avoid having CELAC’s internal divisions undermine the relationship, and seize the current window of opportunity to build shared strategic autonomy. In his view, the Santa Marta Summit should not be framed as “against” Trump, but rather as an opportunity to avoid falling into his polarising game and to project an open space based on rules and mutual benefits for both regions.

The second part of the event brought together high-level academic and diplomatic voices. Participants included Anyurivet Daza Cuervo, Minister Plenipotentiary of the Embassy of Colombia; Detlef Nolte, Professor at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA); María García, Professor at the University of Bath (UK); Renata Zilli, Researcher at the European Centre for International Political Economy (ECIPE); and Eduardo Pereira e Ferreira, Minister-Counsellor at the Mission of Brazil to the EU. Each contributed with complementary perspectives on the challenges and opportunities in the bi-regional relationship, from diplomacy and trade to global governance and sustainable development strategies.

The roundtable concluded with an exchange between speakers and participants (academics and students from different nationalities), allowing for a deeper exploration of areas of convergence and the pending challenges to strengthening EU-LAC relations. Participants agreed on the importance of promoting sustained dialogue, encouraging bi-regional research, and exploring synergies between academia and policymaking. The organising team expressed its interest in continuing work on this agenda and in assembling panels for future conferences and international events. Those interested in engaging with these topics or collaborating are warmly invited to get in touch with the organisers, as we aim to expand the network of experts and stakeholders committed to the future of EU-LAC relations.

 

[1]García, M.J. and Gomez Arana, A., 2022. Latin America-European Union relations in the twenty-first century.

[2] Sebastião D. and Luciano B.T.(2023). ‘Moving from EU-centrisms: Lessons from the polycrisis for EU studies and Global South regionalism’ inJournal of Contemporary European Research,19(2): 226-245.https://doi.org/10.30950/jcer.v19i2.1297

[3]Sanahuja, J.A. and Rodríguez, J.D., 2022. Twenty years of EU–MERCOSUR negotiations: Inter-regionalism and the crisis of globalisation. In Latin America–European Union relations in the twenty-first century (pp. 117-153). Manchester University Press.

[4] Proposed for adoption by the European Commission on the 3rd of September https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_1644

The post Towards the 2025 EU–CELAC Summit: Academics and diplomats debate the future of the bi-regional partnership appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

An article, published on 8 September 2025 in the Kyiv Independent, brandished the headline: ‘Russia’s gains speed up in Ukraine ahead of high-stakes autumn’. Relying on open-source data, the analysis showed how the average pace of Russia’s advances in Ukraine in 2025 far outweigh those in 2024. Indicatively, Russia captured 363 km2 of Ukrainian territory in August 2024 as opposed to 464 km2 last month, in August 2025.

Figure 1 – The infographic summarising Russia’s monthly advances, as shared in the Kyiv Independent article published on 8 September 2025.

To make matters worse, according to some intel from the battlefield, the Russian armed forces are moving 150,000 troops, backed by columns of armour, to the frontline in Pokrovsk. These valuable reinforcements will inevitably lead to the deterioration of the situation at the front, with dispatches from the besieged stronghold of Pokrovsk suggesting the Ukrainian forces ‘are almost encircled’. The collapse of Pokrovsk, a strategic logistics and economic hub, would put pressures both on the Ukrainian military and the embattled Ukrainian economy.

Non-experts on the Eastern Mediterranean would be bemused to hear that this region, which only neighbours the Black Sea, maintains decisive influence on the course of events in the Ukrainian battlefield. Yet the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained a critical, even if overlooked, role in influencing the fate of military operations on the Ukrainian theatre. How could this be? I hear you asking.

The main connecting link lies in the trade of energy. Recent evidence shows the significant extent to which the European Union has subsidised the Russian wartime economy, and, therefore by proxy, the Russian armed forces. These statistics show that EU member states alone have funnelled more than €210 billion into Russia through the purchase of fossil fuels between 24 February 2022 and 24 July 2025.

By comparison, the EU plus the UK and EFTA (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland) contributed €167 billion to Ukraine in the form of military and financial assistance in a similar period, from 24 January 2022 to 30 June 2025.

These valuable revenue flows have enabled Russia to sustain its push on the battlefield. They have enabled the Kremlin to purchase valuable defence components on the global market, replace lost equipment, accelerate the development of weapon innovations, and source domestic and foreign hired guns. The latter has meant that, while Russia has been losing personnel at exorbitant rates, the Russian military has been able to replenish those loses and keep pushing in the battlefield. Best attesting to this is the fact that the Kremlin has avoided the need for a second partial, let alone a full, mobilisation, which would threaten regime stability.

The Eastern Mediterranean has played a crucial role in these energy flows’ continuity. While additional jurisdictions, like China and India, have become important intermediaries in the sale of Russian fossil fuels amidst western sanctions, the Eastern Mediterranean state of Türkiye has best leveraged the region’s proximity to the European market.

Benefiting from reduced logistics costs due to the short distance, Türkiye emerged as the world’s largest buyer of Russian oil products in 2023. With increases in domestic consumption being unable to account for such surges in fuel imports, the safe conclusion is that Türkiye has been a ‘strategic pitstop’ enabling the circumvention of western sanctions. Concurrently, the TurkStream pipeline remains the sole active pipeline feeding Russian natural gas into Europe.

This explains why the US President, Donald Trump, has proposed placing American secondary sanctions on Russian oil if Europe initiates. While some have called this a stalling tactic, a unilateral US sanction would likely do more to harm the American economy while Europe continues to buy vast volumes of Russian fossil fuels.

The fact that this proposal come from the US also reveals the precarious position Europe has placed itself in. While European leaders have been quick to pronounce that they are ready to do ‘whatever it takes’ for Ukraine, in reality they have failed to heed to a US warning that emerged as early as 2014.

Following Russia’s annexation of Crimea, (most) NATO member states (re)securitised Russia as a national security threat. This prompted the US to publicly encourage Europe to close its most significant security vulnerability: the continent’s dependence on Russian energy. One of the core propositions that accompanied the US position on European energy security has been to exploit the Eastern Mediterranean as a most suitable alternative supplier. This position became codified in 2019 in the ‘Menendez-Rubo Act’, co-sponsored by then Senator and current Secretary of State, Marco Rubio. Beyond the region’s proximity to the European market, two EU member states – Cyprus and Greece –, amongst others in the region, maintain sizable hydrocarbon reserves. This reaffirms the Eastern Mediterranean’s suitability.

Yet, at the face of military threats by no other than Türkiye, the EU has been unable to offer the protective umbrella to Cyprus and Greece necessary to salvage European energy security.

As a result, the EU has failed to arrest its energy imports from Russia even after nearly four years since Russia begun its invasion. The REPowerEU policy – EU’s response to this conundrum – only emerged three months after the full-scale invasion commenced and does not envisage the full phasing out of Russian energy until at least 2027. By that time, if the war drags on, Russia will have been waging an effectively EU-subsidised war on Ukraine for five years.

In the absence of decisive action to leverage the Eastern Mediterranean hydrocarbon reserves, the EU will continue to situate itself between rock and a hard place. Instantly stopping Russian energy imports would cripple the embattled European economies. Before Germany bypassed its own sanctions by indirectly importing Russian gas mainly through France, key German executives spoke of the ‘permanent damage’ to Germany’s economy from the energy crisis. Continuing to buy Russian fuel will of course lead to more Ukrainian deaths in the battlefield and beyond.

Yet, despite the challenges and the collective EU’s inaction, some, but nonetheless important, progress has been made in the Eastern Mediterranean, which further reaffirms the region’s potential. The Greek Alexandroupolis LNG terminal’s construction has enabled non-Russian gas to flow into Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe, including Ukraine.

The logistics of the endeavour further reiterate the prospect for energy to play a necessary role in bringing about lasting stability and peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. While Egypt is the world’s seventh largest natural gas producer, domestic demand means that it heavily relies on Israeli imports to conduct its exporting business. Amidst interminable turmoil in the Eastern Mediterranean, this is an encouraging sign for the region. Importantly, it builds on the East Mediterranean Gas Forum’s establishment in 2021, which includes both Israel and the Palestinian Authority along with six other regional states. The Gaza Marine hydrocarbon reserves, which remain intact, mean that they can be used to reconstruct Gaza and develop the West Bank once hostilities end.

Undoubtedly, the continued use of fossil fuels leads to environmental concerns. Paradoxically, exploiting these natural gas reserves can lead to an end to highly polluting instances of warfare. It could have also prevented warfare in the past. Beyond rescuing European energy security and the war in Ukraine, unleashing the Eastern Mediterranean’s energy potential will reaffirm its potential as a global strategic conduit.

A memorandum signed at the G20 in New Delhi in 2023 between the US, Saudi Arabia, the EU, the UAE, France, Germany, Italy, and India resolves to establish the ‘India-Middle East-Europe Corridor’ (IMEC). The Eastern Mediterranean is a critical and necessary conduit in this strategic initiative to counter China’s economic, cultural, and political influence through the parallel Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Similarly, energy constitutes an important, albeit merely one, IMEC dimension.

Figure 2 – A visualisation of the strategic projects associated with ‘IMEC’, which includes energy infrastructure passing through the Eastern Mediterranean

If the EU is seriously interested in doing whatever it takes, then ensuring the development of the Eastern Mediterranean plan occurs unimpeded is the best next step. For academics, the highly consequential linkages between the Eastern Mediterranean, European energy security, and Ukrainian military security expose the increasing interconnectedness between security sectors and regions in a globalised world where international competition is on the rise.

The post How energy streams via the Eastern Mediterranean have been shaping the fate of the Ukraine war to Europe’s oblivion appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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Representatives of the State Energy Institute of Turkmenistan discussed best practices of establishing technological energy parks during an OSCE-organized study visit to Milan, Italy, that took place from 22 to 24 September 2025.

The experts from Turkmenistan held meetings with their counterparts from the EU Commission’s Joint Research Centre “Energy Efficiency and Renewables and the Polytechnic University of Milan. They discussed with their Italian counterparts the organizational, legal, engineering and technological dimensions related to the establishment and operation of technological energy parks.

“The OSCE Centre in Ashgabat organized this study visit as part of its co-operation with the government of Turkmenistan in the area of developing the renewable energy sector and energy-saving technologies,” said Olivera Zurovac-Kuzman, Economic and Environmental Officer of the OSCE Centre in Ashgabat.

“We anticipate this visit offered a comprehensive platform for detailed discussions on various aspects of establishing technological energy parks and enhance the capacities of Turkmenistan’s experts in this cutting-edge field,” she added.

The delegation members had an opportunity to gain first-hand experiences of the operation of a technological energy park during a site visit to the Environment Park “Parco Scientifico Tecnologico per l’Ambiente” in Turin.

“This activity is particularly relevant, as Turkmenistan adopted the Law on Energy Saving and Energy Efficiency and is committed to implementing these measures,” emphasized Zurovac-Kuzman. “In this context, the visit to the technological energy parks serves as an extension of our ongoing support to the host country in advancing sustainable energy initiatives.”

The study visit was organized in co-operation with the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities.

This publication builds on the paper “Sustainable Finance at an Inflection Point: The EU Taxonomy and its Impact” presented at the “EU Law and Policymaking” panel of the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference, held at Panteion University of Social and Political Sciences, Athens, Greece (29–30 May 2025). The support of UACES in organising and facilitating my participation in the conference is gratefully acknowledged.

Abstract

What counts as “sustainable” in the EU? The answer is not just political, but increasingly codified through technocratic tools. This article examines the EU Taxonomy for Sustainable Activities as a key instrument of sustainability governance. Originally developed to steer green finance and prevent greenwashing, the taxonomy now plays a constitutive role by establishing the fundamental classification system that defines Europe’s green technological trajectory. Its scientific and technical logic, designed to create market clarity, provides a coordinative framework that aligns investment, industrial policy, and research priorities. Drawing on debates in innovation studies and institutional economics, this article argues that the EU Taxonomy functions as a de facto industrial policy instrument, creating a coordinated selection environment that shapes Europe’s green technological trajectory.

 

Introduction: Defining Sustainability, the EU Way

The global financial landscape is undergoing a profound transformation: concerns about climate change and environmental degradation are increasingly redirecting capital towards sustainable investment. This shift is particularly striking in Europe. The European Union (EU) aims to achieve net zero by 2050 under the European Green Deal, with member-states rallying behind this vision. The EU Taxonomy has emerged as “a cornerstone of the European Union’s sustainable finance framework and an important market transparency tool.” Enacted through Regulation (EU) 2020/852 in 2020, the green rulebook establishes a rigorous, science-based system to classify environmentally sustainable economic activities. Yet the sustainability classification system’s influence extends far beyond its original financial transparency mandate. What began as a tool to prevent greenwashing in capital markets has gradually evolved into an instrument that shapes innovation priorities, industrial policy, and research funding across Europe

This analytical puzzle raises a fundamental question: How does the EU Taxonomy shape technological innovation and industrial development in Europe? This article argues that the EU Taxonomy exerts its influence by structuring a “coordinated selection environment” (Nelson & Winter, 1982) – a framework of incentives and signals that guides the decisions of innovators, investors, and policymakers. It does so by establishing the foundational technical criteria that regulations like the Sustainable Finance Disclosure Regulation (SFDR), institutions like the European Investment Bank (EIB), and policies like the Net Zero Industry Act (NZIA) incorporate. In doing so, it creates a coordinated selection environment that powerfully structures economic and innovative activity around its classification of sustainability.

The discussion argues that by defining the boundaries of “sustainable” activity, the Taxonomy shapes “technological paradigms”: the shared cognitive frameworks that guide search activities within innovation communities (Dosi, 1982). This science-based classification system aligns the incentives of investors, firms, and policymakers, thereby structuring the development and selection of green technologies and fundamentally orienting Europe’s industrial trajectory.

 

What Is the EU Taxonomy, and Why Was It Created?

The concept of sustainable finance has long faced definitional challenges. In 2008, Sandberg et. al. identified fundamental heterogeneity in Socially Responsible Investment (SRI), describing it as “terminological, definitional, strategic and practical.” While acknowledging that SRI was the predominant term for investments integrating social, ethical, environmental, and corporate governance concerns, the scholars expressed scepticism about standardization unless implemented through top-down regulation. This definitional ambiguity persisted, with Strauß noting in 2021 that “the discussion about SF lacks consistency and a common understanding of SF.”

The European Commission (EC) acknowledged that achieving sustainable finance objectives required “a common language and a clear definition of what is ‘sustainable'” (EU, 2020). EUR-Lex (2021) offered a broad definition of sustainable finance as “the process of taking due account of environmental, social and governance (ESG) considerations when making investment decisions in the financial sector, leading to increased longer-term investments into sustainable economic activities and projects.” However, this definition, while highlighting the importance of environmental factors in investment decisions, lacked specific criteria for measuring sustainability.

The introduction of the EU Taxonomy marked a significant shift toward technical precision. As outlined in Regulation (EU) 2020/852, this classification system establishes concrete criteria for environmentally sustainable economic activities. The regulation targets six key environmental goals: mitigating climate change, adapting to its effects, ensuring the sustainable management of water and marine ecosystems, advancing a circular economy, preventing and controlling pollution, and protecting and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems. To qualify, an activity must meet four key criteria: it must make a substantial contribution to one of the environmental goals, avoid significant harm to the others, comply with safeguards, and meet technical screening criteria. This transformation represents a fundamental shift from principles-based to rules-based regulation, replacing interpretative flexibility with science-based technical specifications. The EU sustainability assessment framework functions as a comprehensive checklist that defines what counts as an “environmentally sustainable activity” for investment and policy purposes – a seemingly technical exercise with far-reaching consequences.

The shift in terminology from “sustainable finance” to “EU Taxonomy” represents a significant rhetorical evolution with important implications for governance approaches. The term “sustainable finance” evokes normative goals and principles, emphasizing the purpose of financial activities. In contrast, “taxonomy” carries scientific and technical connotations, suggesting objective classification based on empirical criteria. However, despite the technical framing, normative judgments remain embedded throughout the taxonomy. The selection of environmental objectives, the thresholds for “substantial contribution,” and the accommodation of transitional activities all reflect value judgments about environmental priorities and the appropriate pace of sustainability transitions.

 

From Finance to Innovation: When Classification Becomes Direction

The expansion of EU’s sustainability assessment tool from financial classification to broader policy influence is significant, because it demonstrates how technical standards can become powerful instruments of economic steering. Rather than remaining neutral tools, classification systems like the Taxonomy actively shape which technologies receive investment, which research priorities get funded, and which industrial strategies governments pursue.

 

Capital Coordination and Market Formation

The EU Taxonomy’s most direct impact lies in its capacity to align investment flows across public and private sectors. Originally designed to provide clarity for financial market participants under the SFDR, the green classification system has established mandatory disclosure requirements for large financial institutions. The European Banking Authority has noted substantial engagement with the green rulebook’s criteria across the EU banking sector, with institutions reporting significant exposure to both green rulebook-aligned and non-aligned activities in their climate risk assessments. EIB has integrated sustainability assessment tool’s criteria into its lending decisions, effectively making compliance a prerequisite for accessing Europe’s largest source of public investment capital. This alignment mechanism transforms the green rulebook from a mere classification tool into what a “market-shaping” instrument that actively constructs the boundaries of legitimate sustainable investment (Mazzucato, 2021).

 

The New Architecture of Industrial Policy

While the EU Taxonomy was originally designed as a classification system for environmentally sustainable economic activities, its influence extends beyond financial markets into broader policy and research frameworks. The Green Deal Industrial Plan, unveiled in February 2023, does not directly cite the EU sustainability assessment framework. Yet, its entire architecture is built upon the same strategic logic and targets the same sectors. The Plan identifies “net-zero technologies” – including batteries, windmills, heat pumps, solar, electrolysers, and carbon capture and storage – as its core priorities. This list is not arbitrary; it is a direct reflection of the economic activities designated for climate change mitigation within the EU green rulebook (Annex I to Regulation 2020/852). The Plan operates on this pre-defined policy environment, focusing on accelerating production and competitiveness in sectors already validated by the Taxonomy’s scientific screening criteria. This alignment demonstrates how the sustainability assessment framework has helped establish a common understanding of strategic green technologies, which indirectly informs the selection of sectors for industrial development.

NZIA (2023) and the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA) (2024) similarly focus on key technologies and raw materials that underpin decarbonization and green innovation. While these policies do not explicitly cite the Taxonomy, they operate within the same sustainability-oriented policy environment that the Taxonomy helps define. The Net Zero Industry Act (2023) establishes manufacturing targets for “net-zero technologies” that closely mirror the green rulebook’s-eligible activities. CRMA aims to ensure a secure and sustainable supply of raw materials critical for strategic technologies. The list of these technologies: permanent magnets, batteries, fuel cells, solar panels, wind turbines, and electrolysers, directly mirrors the technologies and economic activities deemed strategic and sustainable under the Taxonomy’s climate mitigation objectives (Annex I to Regulation 2020/852). In these cases, the sustainability assessment framework functions less as a legal mandate and more as a normative and technical reference point, shaping the boundaries of strategic industrial and technological activity in Europe.

Thus, critical raw materials strategies, renewable energy deployment targets, and clean technology manufacturing incentives are increasingly aligned with the same environmental objectives that the EU Taxonomy codifies, creating a powerful ‘landscape pressure’ – a broad macro-level impetus – that shapes industrial development pathways (Geels, 2014). While these policies do not formally reference the green rulebook, they operate within the broader sustainability framework that the sustainability assessment framework defines.

The Taxonomy contributes towards shaping norms and expectations around sustainable activity that anchor the EU’s industrial strategy. Policies may not reference it directly, because they are already operating within the framework of sustainable economic activity that the EU sustainability framework codified into law. This integration represents a significant departure from traditional industrial policy approaches, where governments typically selected strategic sectors based on economic competitiveness or national security considerations. Instead, the Taxonomy’s technical criteria now provide the scientific and regulatory foundation for industrial strategy.

 

Shaping Technological Paradigms and Innovation Pathways

Beyond capital and policy, the Taxonomy also influences research and innovation funding. Horizon Europe, the EU’s flagship research program, prioritizes projects that contribute to climate action, environmental sustainability, and the Green Deal objectives. Its strategic plan (2025–2027) earmarks significant shares of funding for climate-related activities and biodiversity projects, effectively incentivizing research aligned with EU environmental objectives. While the program does not explicitly require applicants to reference the green framework, its priorities reflect the broader sustainability and Green Deal framework.

In practice, this means that successful proposals increasingly need to demonstrate how their activities contribute to decarbonization, ecosystem preservation, or the circular economy, echoing the classification logic of the Taxonomy. In this sense, the green rulebook functions as a definitional framework that indirectly guides the direction of EU-funded research, shaping innovation priorities even at the earliest stages of project conception. This creates a powerful “selection environment” (Nelson & Winter, 1982) that steers R&D toward Taxonomy-eligible pathways. The alignment also illustrates a broader pattern: the EU is using technical standards not just to regulate markets but to actively steer research and innovation trajectories, creating positive feedback loops between policy, funding, and technological development.

Yet, this function is dual-edged. While it creates momentum for aligned technologies (e.g., stimulating R&D in green hydrogen, which meets the Technical Screening Criteria (TSC)), it also risks creating path dependency. The novel classification system is in not only “opening up,” but also “closing down” innovation pathways (Stirling, 2008). Despite rhetoric about technology neutrality, the Taxonomy’s specific criteria inevitably privilege certain technical solutions over others. Technologies that are not (yet) recognized by the EU sustainability framework, or that represent a more radical departure from the status quo, may find it harder to attract funding and attention. Furthermore, the contentious inclusion of nuclear power demonstrates that achieving green rulebook alignment is a key strategy for technologies to secure long-term viability, influencing not just current investment but future R&D portfolios.

 

Conclusion: Classifications That Shape Futures

The EU Taxonomy’s journey from a narrow financial tool to a broad-based governance instrument reveals a core mechanism of modern economic steering: the use of technical standards to orchestrate complex transitions. This analysis has argued that the sustainability classification system’s power derives not from direct mandate but from its role as a constitutive framework – one that actively creates new realities and categories – that creates a coordinated selection environment. By providing a coherent and sanctioned guidance on sustainable activity, it aligns the incentives of investors, public banks, and industrial policymakers. This environment, in turn, shapes technological paradigms (Dosi, 1982), steering R&D and industrial strategy toward Taxonomy-aligned pathways.

Ultimately, the EU Taxonomy demonstrates that today governance is increasingly exercised through the quiet power of classification. The ongoing evolution of its TSC will therefore remain a central, and intensely political, process in determining the structure of the European green economy

The post Technical Standards, Political Effects: The EU Taxonomy’s Expanding Role in Industrial Policy appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

The Arctic is an exceptional venue for undisputed international cooperation against climate-induced threats. Due to this exceptionalism, it has long been an exceptional venue for undisputed international cooperation, i.e. ‘a zone of peace’. The contestations over the Arctic’s economic and security-related potential, however, seem to transform this region into a future Middle East.  While the region is under the dire pressure of climate-induced threats, the possibility of unlocking new opportunities for resource extraction and transport routes due to melting frost has fuelled the geopolitical race between major powers such as China and the EU.

Until the early 2010s, the EU and China disregarded each other in the Arctic due to the absence of a functional relationship. Due to its geographical position, the EU’s policy preferences have always been closely linked to the developments in its northern neighbourhood. Nevertheless, the Union’s regulatory influence, known as the Brussels effect, has been limited in Arctic affairs.  Moreover, the EU’s concerns over the involvement of a major power in the region were primarily about Russia. The 2007 headlines picturing the Russian flag on the Arctic seabed alarmed the Union against possible security implications of ‘the ongoing race for natural resources in the Arctic, which may lead to security threats for the EU and overall international instability’. Likewise, in those years, the Chinese interest in the region was primarily scientific. While China solidified its position as a key player in Arctic research through scientific expeditions in the late 1990s, Beijing maintained a low-key political approach, avoiding conflicts with the coastal states. By steering clear of sensitive topics like resource exploration, China was able to engage in constructive cooperation with these states.

Since the mid-2010s, however, the increasing presence of China in the Arctic has encouraged the EU to revise its Arctic policy. China’s shifting of its Arctic priorities towards the Barents, known to be the most prosperous sub-Arctic region in terms of resource endowment, has prompted the Union to add resource-related ambitions to the traditional pillars of its Arctic policy (fighting against climate change, scientific research and sustainability). In its 2012 joint communication on the Arctic region, the Commission stated that, as a priority within the scope of Raw Materials Strategy, the EU would ‘actively pursue a raw materials diplomacy with relevant Arctic states to secure access to raw materials notably through strategic partnerships and policy dialogues’.

China’s announcement of its Polar Silk Road plan in 2018 was another critical juncture. In its 2018 White Paper on Arctic strategy, China defined itself as a ‘Near-Arctic State’ as ‘one of the continental States closest to the Arctic Circle’. China also declared its objectives to include utilising Arctic resources (oil, gas, minerals, and other non-living resources) in a ‘lawful and rational manner’. Accordingly, Chinese policymakers focused on mineral resources while encouraging Chinese enterprises to explore and utilise Arctic resources. In this sense, their cooperation with Greenland for the mining operations in Kvanefjeld was a concrete example.

Beijing’s declaration of China as a ‘Near-Arctic State’ as well as its far-reaching projects and initiatives in the region, with the ambition of becoming a “polar power”, is seen as ‘cause of great concern’ by the EU. Particularly after the adoption of the European Green Deal and the subsequent strategies, such as the Clean Industrial Deal, China’s drive for Arctic resources has become a challenge for the EU’s green transition. The EU’s ambitious (internal) climate and energy policies are likely to have significant consequences with regard to its growing need for minerals essential for renewable energy technologies, batteries and the overall move towards more environmentally friendly operations. It is anticipated that there will be a substantial increase in the demand for numerous minerals extracted in the Arctic, and only Greenland possesses 25 per cent of the global reserves of rare earth minerals, which are essential to the transition of European industry.

Beijing’s drive for access to Arctic resources and strategic leverage in the region consequently has profound ramifications on the EU’s ability to deliver the European Green Deal. Particularly, the geopolitical competition over the extraction and flow of minerals becomes a matter of strategic autonomy for the EU. That is why, the Commission have occasionally raised concerns over the potential tensions that could ‘arise from competition in contested areas, such as space or the Arctic’. The concerns over China’s growing interest in the Arctic’s vast reserve of rare-earth minerals, ‘which would help the EU to reduce its dependency on China’, are shared by the other EU institutions. Indeed, strategic foresight studies reveal that the EU is overdependent on China for the supply for critical raw materials required particularly for the production and storage of solar and wind energy. Chinese firms’ dominance in the extraction and refining of these materials leaves minimal margin for supply diversification, making it more imperative for the EU to access Arctic resources.

All in all, the long-held perception of the Arctic as a peace zone is no longer valid. Rather, it has become an area for increasing rivalry, in which the EU’s economic security and strategic autonomy are at stake. In the context of the green (industrial) transition, the EU’s engagement in the Arctic matters has not only become ‘a geopolitical necessity’ to fulfil its ambitions, but also a matter of security. The tone of the EU’s current Arctic strategy reflects the EU’s security-related concerns over the ‘upturn in the activities of other actors, including China and growing interest in areas like ownership of critical infrastructure’. In this vein, the EU needs to revise its current Arctic policy based on pragmatic and strategic assessments. After all, navigating in a geopolitical race with a major power like China requires a more assertive and security-conscious approach to protect the Union’s vital interests in the High North.

 

The post The EU in the Arctic: How China’s Polar Ambitions Became a Challenge for the Green Transition appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

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A two-day OSCE workshop in Baku, held on 24 and 25 September, brought together regulators, supervisory authorities, prosecutors, investigators, and other professionals to address money laundering risks linked to virtual assets and blockchain-based finance. The event aimed to strengthen Azerbaijan’s regulatory and enforcement capacities, while equipping participants with practical skills to respond to challenges in this rapidly evolving field.

The workshop combined introductory lectures with hands-on exercises. Participants opened and managed cryptocurrency wallets, traced simulated transactions, examined real case studies, and discussed legislative steps needed to strengthen regulation in Azerbaijan.

“Virtual assets and crypto currencies offer lots of benefits but they also can be used for criminal purposes that threaten the integrity of financial markets and the public interest,“ said Vera Strobachova-Budway, Head of the Economic Governance Unit at the OSCE Office of the Co-ordinator of Economic and Environmental Activities (OCEEA), in her opening remarks.

“What makes these risks particularly complex is that they are cross-cutting and borderless. No single country or institution can address them alone. So, gatherings like today’s workshop are critical: they allow us to share perspectives, align approaches and build trust,” highlighted Fergus Auld OBE, His Majesty’s Ambassador to the Republic of Azerbaijan.

OSCE experts introduced blockchain analytics tools, shared insights on emerging trends in virtual asset-related crime, and demonstrated how justice and regulatory institutions can better tackle these challenges.

The workshop concluded with a forward-looking discussion on Azerbaijan’s next steps in regulating virtual assets. Participants received OSCE certificates of completion.

The event was organized as part of the OSCE extrabudgetary project, “Innovative policy solutions to mitigate money-laundering risks of virtual assets”, implemented by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities. The project receives financial support from Germany, Italy, Poland, Romania, the United Kingdom and the United States.

Blog article adapted from ‘Shadows of a Nation: History, Identity, and the Transnistrian Question’ working paper presented at the UACES Graduate Forum Research Conference at the Panteion University, Athens on 30 May 2025. Will Kingston-Cox is a political researcher and postgraduate in Russian and East European Studies at the University of Oxford, specialising in Moldova, nationalism, and post-Soviet separatism.

Pridnestrovie[1] rarely makes international headlines. When it does, the region is reductively portrayed as a frozen conflict zone in Moldova’s eastern periphery, a relict quirk of Soviet collapse, or a pawn in Russia’s geopolitical manoeuvring. Since its de facto separation from Moldova in 1990, it has operated with its own borders, government, army, and currency, but without international recognition. To reduce Pridnestrovie simply to a geopolitical anomaly obscures the ways in which history, memory, and identity converge to produce a distinctive political community on Europe’s edge.

The war in Ukraine has once again thrown Pridnestrovie into sharper focus. Around 1,500 Russian “peacekeepers” remain stationed there, and the unresolved status of the territory consistently overshadows Moldova’s aspirations for closer integration with the European Union. In January 2025, a regional gas crisis starkly revealed Pridnestrovie’s vulnerability. When Ukraine halted the transit of Russian gas, the region, long dependent on Moscow’s subsidies and infrastructure, entered a severe humanitarian crisis. Heating, schools, and factories shut down. Yet it was not Russia but Moldova, supported by the EU, that assisted in with emergency gas supplies. For the first time, Pridnestrovie’s economic survival depended on its western neighbour rather than its eastern patron.

To understand why this mattered so profoundly, it is necessary to look at how Pridnestrovie’s identity has developed vis-a-vis Russia and Moldova across five formative historical episodes.

The first is rooted in the imperial period. The lands east of the Dniester River (today’s Pridnestrovie) were annexed by the Russian Empire in 1792, two decades before Russia also absorbed Bessarabia, the territory that would later become modern Moldova. Whereas Bessarabian identity was shaped through alternating Romanian, Ottoman, and Russian influences, Pridnestrovie’s trajectory was unambiguously Russian imperial. It was settled largely by Russian and Ukrainian populations and became a multiethnic Slavic frontier embedded firmly in imperial administration. By the late nineteenth century, Pridnestrovie functioned as a Russian stronghold against a culturally and linguistically Romanian Bessarabia.

The second episode came in 1924 with the establishment of the Moldavian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) within the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. Far from recognising Moldovan distinctiveness, this was a calculated act of Soviet identity engineering. The MASSR was designed to manufacture a “Moldovan” nationality that would both counteract Romanian nationalism across the river and provide a justification for future Soviet claims to Bessarabia. A Cyrillic-script “Moldovan” language was institutionalised, Soviet cultural production reinforced the distinction, and loyal political cadres were installed. What emerged was an artificial but enduring sense of divergence between the left and right banks of the Dniester.

The third moment of rupture was the Second World War. Between 1941 and 1944, Romanian and Nazi German occupation transformed Pridnestrovie into a killing ground for Jews and Roma. More than 120,000 were deported, interned, or killed in ghettos and forced labour camps. While Moldova west of the Dniester also experienced wartime violence, Pridnestrovie’s direct subjection to Romanian rule created a distinct political memory. Romania became remembered as an aggressor, a narrative later reinforced by Soviet historiography and subsequently instrumentalised by Pridnestrovian elites in the 1990s. The memory of wartime occupation continues to shape identity today. When Moldova renamed its state language from “Moldovan” to “Romanian” in 2023, this was read in Tiraspol as confirmation of Moldova’s equation with Romania, a symbolic threat to the idea of Pridnestrovian separateness.

The fourth episode unfolded during the Soviet period. Pridnestrovie became the industrial powerhouse of the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic (MSSR), producing an estimated 80 per cent of its industrial output. It hosted the Soviet 14th Army and was integrated into the wider Odessa Military District as a hub for heavy industry and arms production. The region attracted large-scale migration from Russia and Ukraine, diluting the proportion of ethnic Moldovans and reinforcing a multi-ethnic demographic profile. Politically, Pridnestrovians dominated: by 1989, no Bessarabian Moldovan had ever served as First Secretary of the Moldovan Communist Party. For many inhabitants, their livelihoods and identity were tied to the Soviet system.

Ultimately, the final rupture came in 1990–1992. Moldova’s nationalist turn, especially the elevation of Romanian language and symbols, was perceived on the left bank not as liberation but as existential threat. Pridnestrovian separatists mobilised to preserve their Soviet-era privileges and resist “Moldovanisation,” which they equated with Romanian unification. The war claimed over 3,000 lives and ended with a ceasefire in July 1992 that left Moldova without control over Pridnestrovie. Since then, the self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR) has existed as a de facto state. Its institutions are entrenched, but it remains internationally unrecognised.

The central question today is whether this de facto state has also generated a nation. Evidence suggests that it has, though in contested and pragmatic forms. Identity is cultivated through the memorialisation of the 1992 war, the memory of Romanian occupation, and loyalty to the PMR’s institutions. It is multiethnic by necessity: Russians, Ukrainians, and Moldovans coexist under the shared label of “Pridnestrovian.” As one young respondent explained: “I call myself Pridnestrovian because I was born here, but what does that actually mean?” Belonging is shaped less by ethnicity than by residence, political loyalty, and a sense of historical separation from Moldova.

This produces a paradoxical identity. On the surface it is inclusive, but it is also forged through trauma and external dependence. The PMR promotes itself as a multiethnic national polity, yet Russia sustains the system through subsidies, media influence, and symbolic gestures, whilst avoiding the step of formal recognition or annexation. As Moldova pursues its European trajectory and wrestles with its own divided polity over identity and geopolitical alignment, it is wholly conceivable that the ambiguity of Pridnestrovian identity and the longstanding unsettled political conflict will be reconciled. The unresolved conflict is not only a question of borders or recognition, but of competing identities and contested pasts: shadows that continue to shape Europe’s eastern edge.

[1] Pridnestrovie is the endonym for the region commonly known as Transnistria in English

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Au Malawi, le président Lazarus Chakwera, a reconnu ce mercredi dans une allocution à la nation sa défaite à l'élection présidentielle de la semaine dernière, au profit de son rival et prédécesseur Peter Mutharika. La situation économique du pays et sa gestion de la crise a précipité sa chute. Les précisions de notre correspondante Caroline Dumay.

Le projet de nouvelle Constitution en Guinée a été approuvé à 89 % lors du référendum organisé dimanche, selon les résultats provisoires officiels annoncés mardi soir. Les résultats provisoires ont été annoncés tard dans la nuit de mardi par les autorités guinéennes. Des résultats rejetés par le principal opposant en exil Cellou Dalein Diallo qui avait appelé au boycott du scrutin.

Event Video 
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In an age of crises and armed conflicts, women continue to play a central role in preventing conflicts, maintaining peace and security, protecting civilians, and strengthening societal resilience and recovery. They do so as political leaders, negotiators, mediators, peacekeepers, humanitarian workers, or civil society representatives—both on the ground and on the international stage. Their contribution is recognised in several mandates that promote the integration of gender perspectives in peacekeeping, as well as in the work of the UN peacebuilding architecture (UNSCR 2282).

At the same time, women and girls are increasingly bearing the brunt of crises and conflicts. Their exposure to armed conflicts has risen by 50% over the past decade, and the number of UN-verified cases of conflict-related sexual violence—primarily targeting women and girls—has steadily increased in recent years. Attacks on women’s rights are multiplying, while negotiations on gender issues at the UN have become increasingly contentious, threatening hard-won progress.

This challenging context is further compounded by severe financial constraints facing the UN and the urgent need for reforms aimed at efficient multilateralism, as highlighted by the ongoing UN80 reform initiative.

On September 25th, IPI together with the Permanent Missions of Colombia and France to the United Nations, cohosted a ministerial-level event taking place at UN Headquarters on “Women Building Peace in an Age of Crises and Armed Conflicts: How Feminist Approaches to Foreign Policy Can Advance Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding.” Phoebe Donnelly, IPI Senior Fellow and Head of Women, Peace, and Security, moderated the conversation.

This event highlighted the “peace dividends” of women’s leadership—in other words, the essential roles women play in achieving sustainable and lasting peace at every stage of conflict: before, during, and after. The event offered an opportunity to showcase the role of feminist and gender-based approaches as drivers of democracy, human rights, equality, sustainability and lasting peace. Integrating a gender perspective is not just an added value—it is a key driver of sustainable peace. It also reflects our collective commitment to reinforcing the participation and representation of women, in the spirit of CEDAW Committee General Recommendations n°30 and n°40.

The event welcomed four new members to the FFP+ (Morocco, Nepal, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom) and recognized their exceptional commitment to gender equality, women’s rights, and women’s empowerment in their foreign policy agendas. It also build momentum for the upcoming 4th Feminist Foreign Policy Ministerial Conference, which will take place in Paris in October 2025, following the successful conference hosted by Mexico in 2024.

Participants reflected upon national, regional, and international experiences that underscore the peace, security, democracy, and social dividends of women’s and girls’ agency and leadership.

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