Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

After Turkey received delegations from Sweden and Finland on Wednesday for talks on their NATO membership applications, Turkey continues to object to the admission of the two Nordic countries. It accuses both countries, but particularly Sweden, of harbouring terrorists on their lands and providing armaments to the People’s Defense Units (YPG), which Turkey considers as the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), and thus designates it as a terrorist organisation. Although the US and the EU consider the PKK a terror organisation, they regard the YPG as a separate organisation and do not include it on their terror lists.

Turkey’s ulterior motive in objecting to Swedish and Finnish accession to NATO is probably to get certain concessions from NATO countries regarding its defence industry, rather than preventing Sweden’s or Finland’s alleged support of terrorism. These concessions include US approval for the modernisation of Turkey’s F-16s and the lifting of all official and informal arms embargos imposed by NATO member countries. Negotiations are already ongoing behind closed doors. However, since Turkey has raised terrorism-related arguments publicly, these allegations also need to be addressed by European public officials.

Definition of terrorism in Turkey?

Accusations of terrorism is quite pervasive in Turkish political discourse. President Tayyip Erdoğan routinely claims that members of the opposition are in alliance with various terror organisations. Aside from politics, Turkey’s legal system contains an unacceptably vague and extremely broad definition of terrorism. Civil society activism, participating in political demonstrations or even writing a tweet can lead to terrorism complaints. Just between 2016 and 2020, 1.6 million people in Turkey were investigated after being accused of terrorism. In a country of 80 million people, this number alone testifies to the fact that terrorism is an ill-defined concept in the Turkish legal system and is routinely used to suppress political opposition and silence critics.

The European Union does not accept Turkey’s definition of terror and instead is demanding a clear approach to terrorism that would be in line with democratic principles. Until that point, not only Sweden but all European countries should continue to ignore Turkish demands for the extradition of “terrorists”.

How to define the YPG?

Turkey’s second objection – focussing on the YPG-PKK connection – constitutes a grey zone due to the ambiguous nature of the relationship between the YPG and the PKK. The YPG is clearly linked with the PKK in terms of ideology, and there is a certain level of exchange between the two organisations in terms of personnel and munitions. However, the YPG remains a separate organisation with its own command structure and priorities. Furthermore, the YPG has been very careful not to launch any attacks against Turkey.

In fact, Turkey’s own approach to the YPG during the early 2010s reflected this ambiguity, even though Turkey defined the YPG as a terrorist organisation. For instance, in 2013 and 2014, Turkey invited Salih Muslim, then head of the YPG’s political branch, to Ankara on several occasions for diplomatic negotiations. Even the idea of the YPG opening a branch in Ankara was discussed during these meetings. In 2015, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) conducted a small-scale military operation in Northern Syria in which the YPG claimed to participate and support the TAF. Although Turkey rejected the claims of a joint operation, they admitted that Turkey informed the YPG ahead of the operation. As late as the summer of 2015, sources close to government circles claimed that Turkey was considering the YPG as a potential partner in Northern Syria. All these formal and informal communications and negotiations point to the fact that Turkey did not consider the YPG and the PKK to be on the same ground back then.

Turkey’s actions towards the YPG became harsher only after Erdoğan enacted a dramatic shift in his domestic politics following the June 2015 elections. Failing to secure Kurdish support for his long-cherished desire to switch to a presidential system, which would have concentrated all power in his hands, Erdoğan went from being a peacemaker with the Kurds to an aggressive Turkish nationalist. Only after this policy shift did Ankara start to target YPG forces in Syria and seriously object to Western support for the YPG.

Moreover, Western support for the YPG crystallised in 2014 during the war against the “Islamic State” (IS) and was partly the result of Turkey’s unwillingness to fight against the IS. In that context, the YPG appeared as the most capable and reliable ally for the US-led Western coalition. Thus, it was Turkey’s miscalculations and unstable policies that opened the way for the YPG’s dominance in northeastern Syria and the enduring YPG-US alliance.

Given this context, Europe should not accept Turkey’s categorical and unconditional description of the YPG as a terror organisation. First of all, relations between the PKK and the YPG are not definitively uniform. Second, unlike the PKK, the YPG does not constitute a direct security threat to Turkey, as it has refrained from targeting Turkish territory. Third, such a declaration would further complicate the solution to the Kurdish question, as it would deny legitimacy to the most strongly organised Kurdish group in Syria. However, the EU may negotiate with Turkey in order to develop well-defined parameters to better assess the PKK-YPG relationship and to determine whether, and at what point, these relations would suffice in describing the YPG as a terror organisation. Here, the EU can move closer to some of Turkey’s arguments, such as Turkey’s demand for the prevention of logistical connections and arms transfers between the YPG and the PKK.

All in all, Europe and NATO should be ready to address Turkey’s concerns while pushing Turkey to be clearer about its arguments and demands. Public displays and effective communication of this position remain important in order not to alienate the Turkish public.

Mit steigender Inflation sind laut Statistischem Bundesamt die Reallöhne im ersten Quartal 2022 um 1,8 Prozent gesunken. Welche Maßnahmen die Politik nun ergreifen muss, um die Auswirkungen vor allem für die unteren Einkommensschichten abzumildern, kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die Inflation in Deutschland ist so hoch wie seit 50 Jahren nicht mehr, und dies lässt nun auch die Reallöhne sinken. Wir erleben eine höchst unsoziale Inflation, da gerade Menschen mit geringen Einkommen besonders stark durch höhere Preise für Energie und Lebensmittel belastet werden. Eine Studie am DIW Berlin zeigt, dass sich für Menschen mit sehr geringen Einkommen die steigenden Energiepreise relativ zu ihrem Einkommen drei- bis viermal so stark niederschlagen wie für Menschen mit hohen Einkommen.

Die Politik ist in der Pflicht und muss deutlich mehr tun, um die sozialen Härten der Inflation abzufedern. Die EZB sollte sehr bald die Zinsen erhöhen, auch wenn dies in diesem und nächsten Jahr nur wenig an der hohen Inflation ändern wird. Die Bundesregierung wiederum muss sehr viel zielgenauer als bisher die am härtesten betroffenen Menschen unterstützen und entlasten. Das Entlastungspaket der Bundesregierung war bisher nicht zielgenau genug und teilweise sogar kontraproduktiv. Die Spritpreisbremse ist eine Umverteilung von Arm zu Reich und konterkariert den Klimaschutz. Außerdem erhalten zu viele bedürftige Menschen, allen voran Rentnerinnen und Rentner, kaum Unterstützung.

Die Bundesregierung sollte nun ein kluges Entlastungspaket planen, mit dem ausschließlich Menschen mit geringen und mittleren Einkommen entlastet werden. Familien mit geringen Einkommen sollten nicht nur einmalig, sondern permanent entlastet werden. Ein Anstieg des Mindestlohns auf zwölf Euro ist das wichtigste Instrument für die zehn Millionen Beschäftigten im Niedriglohnbereich, auch um sich gegen die steigenden Preise zu schützen. Der Staat muss zudem dringend die Sozialleistungen erhöhen und beispielsweise den Hartz-IV-Satz sowie die Grundsicherung um 100 bis 150 Euro monatlich anheben. Den Spielraum hat sie, da sich mit steigender Inflation auch die Steuereinahmen erhöhen.

Und wir sollten uns darüber im Klaren sein, dass die Spitze des Inflationsanstiegs vermutlich noch nicht erreicht ist. Ich befürchte, dass wir das Risiko einer weiteren Eskalation des Krieges ebenso unterschätzen wie die Gefahr einer weiteren Corona-Welle.

In the early hours of 18 April, Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) launched a military opera­tion inside Northern Iraq dubbed Claw-Lock. Simultaneously, Turkey intensified its military activities in Syria. Furthermore, on 23 May, President Tayyip Erdoğan an­nounced that Turkey will soon start a new military operation in Syria. These moves reflect Turkey’s new military strategy, based on area control, against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). So far, this new approach has yielded military success. How­ever, it is precisely military success that is reinforcing the tendency to deal with the Kurdish problem only in terms of security and military solutions and to rule out any long-term political solution to the problem. Europe should continue to support efforts towards seeking a solution that also addresses the political dimensions of the problem.

#LieferkettenSorgfaltspflichtenGesetz

Russland hat noch bis zum Mai 2023 den Vorsitz im Arktischen Rat. Aufgrund der russischen Kriegspolitik haben aber sieben der acht Arktisstaaten ihre Mitwirkung im Rat vorläufig eingestellt. Moskau ist davon in mehrfacher Hinsicht betroffen: Politisch wird damit ein Politikfeld beschädigt, in dem die internationale Bedeutung Russlands noch ungebrochen war. Wirtschaftlich steht die Zukunft wichtiger Industrieprojekte und Absatzmärkte Russlands auf dem Spiel. Außerdem tangiert die Unterbrechung der Rats­arbeit auch Interessen anderer Staaten wie China und wirkt sich nachteilig auf die russische Position in der Arktis aus. In Wissenschaft und Forschung haben alle west­lichen Part­ner ihre Kooperation ausgesetzt. Zwar leidet Russland in besonderem Maße unter den Folgen des Klimawandels in der Arktis, doch schadet der zeitweilige Stopp klima­relevanter Forschung letztlich der ganzen Welt. Militärisch suchen Finn­land und Schweden ihren Schutz in der Nato. Das konter­kariert die ursprüngliche Absicht des Kremls, den Einflussbereich der transatlantischen Allianz zurückzudrängen. Zudem wäre Russlands Grenze mit Nato-Staaten dann doppelt so lang wie zuvor.

»Russland darf nicht gewinnen«, sagt Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz. Doch die Ziele der Bundesregierung in diesem Krieg sind unklar. Was will Deutschland für die Ukraine – und wie will es in Zukunft mit Russland umgehen?

Cinquante jours après le deuxième tour de l'élection présidentielle, les Français sont de nouveau appelés aux urnes les 12 et 19 juin prochains pour renouveler les 577 membres de l'Assemblée nationale, chambre basse du Parlement. Le chef de l'Etat, Emmanuel Macron (Renaissance), réélu le 24 avril de...

There are currently a significant number of protracted armed conflicts worldwide. Illicit economies and their links to violent actors are frequently cited as reasons for their persistence. Drug cultivation, production, and trafficking in places as diverse as Afghanistan, Colombia, and Myanmar have been garnering attention recently since they can undermine peace processes and contribute toward rising levels of insecurity. Nevertheless, it is particularly difficult to grasp the situation in conflict zones and understand the networks of internal and external actors linked to illicit economies due to the limited information base. This also holds true for the violent conflicts in Mali, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and the Central African Republic (CAR) that have been going on for extended periods of time. However, since United Nations (UN) sanctions apply in all three contexts, there are extensive and regularly available sources of information provided by the reports of the UN Panels of Experts that moni­tor sanctions implementation. These investigative teams provide valuable insights into illicit economies in conflict zones and their links to peace and security. Looking at the reports for Mali, the DRC, and CAR from the last five years helps to identify some common patterns that defy simple solutions, but that can also show entry points for action.