Diplomacy & Crisis News

Summary and Key Points: The F-16 Fighting Falcon, first developed in the 1970s as an air-superiority fighter, has become one of the most widely produced and versatile combat aircraft in history.

-Originally designed with the Energy-Maneuverability Theory to maximize agility, the F-16 has been continuously upgraded with advanced avionics, sensors, and more powerful engines, making it a formidable opponent in modern air combat. With its 11 external hardpoints and advanced radar systems, the F-16 remains highly relevant despite being a fourth-generation fighter.

-As Ukraine receives F-16s from Denmark and the Netherlands, these aircraft are expected to significantly enhance the Ukrainian Air Force's capabilities against Russian forces. 

First conceived in the 1970s as a day air-superiority fighter, the F-16 Fighting Falcon has gone on to become one of the most widely produced combat aircraft ever. The brainchild of Col. John Boyd and the “Fighter Mafia,” the F-16 was designed to maneuver with minimal energy loss. It was the first fighter to take advantage of the new Energy-Maneuverability Theory of dogfighting. 

From these beginnings, the F-16 has been progressively upgraded, gaining Beyond Visual Range capabilities, improved sensors and avionics, and more powerful engines. The jet can remain in the air longer than enemy near-peers due to its superior combat radius. 

Older F-16 variants feature nine hardpoints for weapon payloads and can carry the AIM-9 Sidewinder, Raytheon AMRAAM, Raytheon Sparrow, and other air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.

Many nations outside the U.S. recognize the value of the F-16 – there are over 30 current, former, and future operators. F-16s headed to Ukraine now are being supplied by Denmark and the Netherlands. 

Stealth aircraft are the future but there is still a place for non-stealthy, fourth-generation fighters. Modern stealth fighter aircraft are relatively limited in their payload, since they must carry weapons internally to maintain a small radar cross section. By contrast, modern F-16s have 11 external hardpoints. The inclusion of the AN/APG-80 AESA radar and IRST give upgraded F-16s sensors with capabilities similar to the most modern fighters. 

Currently, the Ukrainian Air Force fights Russia with Soviet-era Su-27s and Mig-29s, compared to Russia’s newer Su-30s and Su-35s. F-16s are at least on par with these aircraft. Opponents of providing F-16s to Ukraine have argued that Russia’s advanced S-400 SAM system would easily outclass these fighters.

But those who applaud the transfer of F-16s point to the platform's potential integration with Western weapons systems. If Western aid continues and provides more advanced weaponry to Ukraine such as the AIM-120 air-to-air missile, it is far easier to equip those weapons on F-16s which have already been approved for their use. Any weapons the U.S. or other supply must be jury-rigged onto Soviet aircraft that were not designed to carry them, which hinders their utility. 

Although F-16s are older, they are still highly capable combat aircraft and, with all their upgrades, very relevant on the modern battlefield. While it’s unlikely they will rapidly shift the tide in the air war over Ukraine, they represent a valuable asset that strengthens Ukraine’s overall position and gives them much room to grow. 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The United States has provided over $56 billion in military aid to Ukraine, including $55.4 billion since Russia's large-scale invasion in February 2022. This support has focused heavily on artillery, with the U.S. sending more than 200 M-777 howitzers, 40 M142 HIMARS systems, and millions of shells, including precision-guided munitions. The U.S. has also supplied Ukraine with 400 million bullets and anti-tank weapons.

-While the U.S. leads in support, key allies have also played vital roles. The U.K. was the first to send main battle tanks and long-range cruise missiles, inspiring similar contributions from Germany and France.

-Germany has also provided critical air defense systems, while a coalition of European nations pushed for the delivery of F-16 fighter jets, which Ukraine recently received. The U.S., along with its allies, continues to provide essential military aid, bolstering Ukraine's defense against Russian aggression.

The United States has committed over $56 billion in military aid to Ukraine over the past four years, including $55.4 billion since the Kremlin launched its large-scale invasion on February 24, 2022. 

A few facts stand out about America’s support of the Ukrainian military. 

Artillery is the king of the battle. Most casualties in the war have been caused by artillery fire. As such, the U.S. has made sure to send guns and shells to Ukraine in bulk. 

Specifically, the Pentagon has sent or committed to sending to Kyiv more than 200 M-777 155 mm howitzers, 72 105 mm howitzers, 40 M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems, and close to 4.5 million 203 mm, 155 mm, 152 mm, 130 mm, 122 mm, and 105 mm shells. 

Among these artillery rounds are some specialized munitions like the M982 155 mm Excalibur precision-guided shell, the 155 mm Remote Anti-Armor Mine system, and cluster munitions. The demands of the conflict are high, and the Ukrainian forces need more artillery still. 

When it comes to small arms and anti-tank weapons, the U.S. has provided over 400 million bullets, 40,000 grenade launchers, and approximately 140,000 anti-tank weapons, including FGM-148 Javelins, AT-4s, and Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided missiles. 

By the numbers, America is by far Ukraine’s biggest supporter, but several other countries have provided important security assistance. Sometimes, these countries provide new types of weapons and munitions even before the U.S. 

The United Kingdom was the first to commit main battle tanks to Ukraine. When it committed to sending Challenger 2 MBTs, London broke through a debate among NATO members and inspired Germany to send Leopard MBTs, while the U.S. sent the M1 Abrams. 

Moreover, London was the first to commit long-range cruise missiles to Ukraine (Storm Shadows), which finally allowed for precision strikes against Russian targets deep behind the frontlines. France followed soon thereafter by sending its own SCALP-EG cruise missiles to Ukraine.

In addition, Germany has provided important air defense capabilities to Ukraine. These help defend against countless missile and drone attacks against Ukrainian urban centers and critical infrastructure. Berlin has provided three MIM-104 Patriot and six IRIS-T air defense systems with the necessary munitions and sensors. 

Furthermore, a group of countries including the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway pushed hard for the delivery of F-16 Fighting Falcon fighter jets to the Ukrainian Air Force, despite reservations in the U.S. After many months of debate, Kyiv received its first F-16s this week, with more on the way. 

The U.S. has been leading the international effort to provide Ukraine with the necessary tools to fight Russia’s invasion, but it is lucky to have strong allies and partners in its efforts.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

All images are Creative Commons or from Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Ford-class aircraft carriers, like the USS Gerald R. Ford, are the latest nuclear-powered carriers in the U.S. Navy, designed to replace the aging Nimitz-class. Despite advanced technologies like the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), the Ford-class faces significant challenges.

-Reliability issues with these systems, coupled with untested weapons elevators and jet blast deflectors, raise concerns about their combat effectiveness and high costs.

-With increasing threats from enemy A2/AD capabilities, the Ford-class carriers may struggle to justify their investment.

America’s great love affair with the aircraft carrier continues unabated, with the creation of the Ford-class aircraft carrier. Its namesake, the USS Gerald R. Ford, named after America’s thirty-eighth president, is the latest class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in service to the United States Navy. These boats are intended to slowly replace the ten Nimitz-class carriers that have been in operation since the 1970s. The USS Gerald R. Ford was commissioned in 2017.

Ford-class carriers are equipped with two Bechtel A1B nuclear reactors, which provide the ship with an astonishing speed of over 35 miles per hour. This is comparable to the speed of the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier. For a warship of this size, that is an incredible feat. However, given that the Nimitz-class carriers can do the same—and they’re cheaper to build and maintain than the Ford-class—it begs the question as to why the Navy really needed the Ford-class carriers.

The Navy says that the Ford-class carriers are designed to be more efficient and have a higher sortie generation rate than their Nimitz-class predecessors. The ship’s design allows for a more efficient flow of aircraft, fuel, and ordnance, which helps to increase the number of aircraft that can be launched and recovered in a given time period. 

Yet, the real challenge to U.S. aircraft carriers today, regardless of their class, is enemy anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities that are meant to blunt the power projection capabilities of U.S. aircraft carriers by keeping them outside of the operational range of their air wings (meaning that they are rendered combat ineffective).

The Ford-class carriers are equipped with a bevy of new, advanced technologies meant to augment their operations, including things like the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) and the Advanced Arresting Gear (AAG), which are designed to improve the efficiency and safety of aircraft launch and recovery operations. 

A single Ford-class carrier costs more than $13 billion to build. It will cost hundreds of millions of dollars more to maintain over the course of its service. The Navy insists that the maintenance costs for the Ford-class will be lower than those of the older Nimitz-class carriers. 

But that remains very much in doubt. 

Because of the inclusion of so many advanced, and frankly untested, systems supporting the new carrier’s operations, the USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) has already faced several issues since its commissioning in 2017. Such issues have increased the cost of the warship and even delayed its entry into service, creating significant strategic gaps in the Navy’s surface fleet disposition and capabilities. 

Some notable problems included reliability issues afflicting the aforementioned EMALS and AAG launch systems. The EMALS has had a failure rate that places it well below expectations and the AAG, designed to catch landing aircraft, has experienced similar reliability issues. This, of course, means that the safety of naval aviators—and their expensive aircraft—is put in significant jeopardy. 

Meanwhile, the Ford-class weapons elevators have malfunctioned more than they have performed as expected. There are eleven advanced weapons elevators (AWEs) meant to rapidly move bombs and missiles from the ship’s magazines to the flight deck. In a heavy firefight, in which the safety of the warship itself was in question—or in which the ship’s airwing was called upon to engage in massive deployments—failure of these AWEs could lead to the destruction of the warship in battle and the defeat of the United States Navy.

Jet Blast Deflectors (JBD) protect the flight deck from the intense heat generated by aircraft engines during takeoff. These systems have struggled with reliability problems, notably regarding their electromechanical actuator subsystems. Again, even without the threat of enemy A2/AD fire damaging the carrier’s critical flight deck, if the deck is not protected from the wear-and-tear of combat operations, it won’t last long in combat, making the carrier a wasting asset. 

Because of these issues, there have been significant cost overruns and delays, prompting many analysts to question whether the investment into the Ford class was even worth the price tag. It likely was not.

There are currently three Ford-class carriers being built, with two more planned for the future. Of those carriers, the USS Gerald R. Ford is actively serving in the fleet, even recently being deployed to the Eastern Mediterranean in response to the horrific Hamas attacks against Israel on October 7, 2023. The USS John F. Kennedy (CVN-79), the USS Enterprise (CVN-8), and the USS Doris Miller (CVN-81) are all in the construction pipeline. 

Higher sortie rates, greater technology, and an impressive flanking speed make these carriers appealing to the U.S. Navy. It remains to be seen, however, whether these carriers will overcome the serious—and growing—A2/AD challenge posed by America’s rivals, notably China. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

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The Biden administration and a bicameral, bipartisan majority of Congress are working to promote semiconductor production in the United States. This would be news to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which is opening an investigation into American chip darling Nvidia. Antitrust scrutiny of Nvidia detracts from American efforts to promote economic and national security regarding semiconductor production, undermining the administration’s priorities. Such a course should be abandoned.

The federal government has undertaken two significant efforts to foster investment and security in the American semiconductor industry. One is the CHIPS and Science Act, which allocated $52.7 billion to incentivize companies to produce semiconductors in the United States. Complementing CHIPS, the U.S. Department of Commerce has imposed export controls on advanced semiconductors to prevent foreign adversaries and their domestic firms from acquiring advanced chips. Even with the law’s shortcomings, semiconductor investment has boomed alongside investments in AI.

Yet the DOJ is taking a different approach to the American semiconductor sector. Recent reporting revealed that the DOJ and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will investigate several leading AI companies, including Nvidia. The DOJ has yet to release any information on what prompted the investigation, but there are some clues.

Earlier this year, the FTC’s Office of Technology’s Tech Summit devoted an entire panel to issues related to AI, chips, and cloud computing. U.S., EU, and UK competition enforcers recently signed a joint statement articulating their approach to issues concerning generative AI foundation models and AI products, including specialized chips for AI training, Nvidia’s specialty.

While the Biden administration has enabled a more aggressive approach to antitrust enforcement, particularly in nascent markets, legislative and regulatory action on technology has prioritized promoting domestic production or protecting national security, not expanding antitrust tools. The DOJ’s investigation would undermine its own administration’s priorities to the detriment of American firms, citizens, and sovereignty.

An antitrust investigation of Nvidia would impose costs in the short term and create long-term legal uncertainty. Nvidia is no pauper; it can afford a lawsuit. However, the opportunity cost of litigation should not be ignored. One of the largest beneficiaries of CHIPS funding is Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC). Nvidia is dependent on TSMC for manufacturing key chips. With CHIPS Act projects encountering difficulties, forcing Nvidia to reallocate capital away from designing chips and driving demand for TSMC’s services is counterproductive. Nvidia is already dealing with lost revenue after redesigning chips for the Chinese market to comply with export controls. An antitrust suit is unlikely to be resolved quickly, and while the cost may not be debilitating, the uncertainty and potential risk are detrimental to U.S. priorities.

Further, Nvidia’s strength comes from its market-leading product offerings, but it is not guaranteed that its dominance will continue. Nvidia was already dealt an antitrust blow when the FTC blocked the firm’s attempted acquisition of AMD, a competing semiconductor design firm. The FTC’s move proved prescient, as AMD is now gunning for Nvidia’s silicon crown. Big tech companies that are building custom chips to create alternatives to Nvidia present another challenge. One cannot ignore Intel; the legacy chipmaker was awarded nearly $20 billion through the CHIPS Act and now argues that Nvidia should watch the throne. 

Beyond hardware, Nvidia is also facing challenges to its integrated software stack. The open-sourcing of Pytorch 2.0, a software library that helps engineers avoid using Nvidia’s proprietary software language when working with its hardware, could lower barriers to entry and switching costs for AI developers and deployers. Another challenge comes from a group creating standards for interconnect in AI chips, the technology which links together multiple servers to power cutting-edge AI applications. Nvidia is absent from this group, which is spearheaded by the company’s competitors and some of its largest customers. Firms are responding to market realities by promoting interoperability and open standards to spur competition and innovation.

The Biden administration and Congress have enacted a plan to expand domestic semiconductor manufacturing capacity, flawed as it may be. A DOJ antitrust investigation into Nvidia undermines such efforts by targeting a critical component of America’s advanced semiconductor sector. The administration’s inability to order policy preferences and promote a predictable regulatory environment is a self-inflicted error. The DOJ should reconsider its investigation or at least refresh itself on the administration’s priorities next time. 

Joshua Levine is the Manager for Technology Policy at the Foundation for American Innovation.

Image: JamesonWu1972 / Shutterstock.com.

Detaining UN and NGO workers, intensifying attacks on global shipping, and earning the ire of regional and global powers. Are these the behaviors of a state acting out of desperation or the machinations of non-state actors consolidating power and flexing unchecked local military prowess? This is precisely the question being debated by analysts regarding the actions of the Houthi rebel movement in Yemen.

Over the past month, militias affiliated with the Houthis have increased attacks on Red Sea shipping, launched increasingly deadly drone attacks toward Israel, and detained more than fifty Yemenis working with foreign organizations. These were the immediate reactions to a recent financial crisis precipitated by the closure of the Central Bank in Sana’a, which has placed additional obstacles to currency transfers and civil servant salaries in Houthi-held territory in northern Yemen. The liquidity of the bifurcated Central Bank, with its other branch in Aden, had been maintained by Saudi financing since the onset of the conflict in 2015, affording the kingdom a degree of leverage over the Sana’a-based Houthi government. Irregular payments to public sector salaries in Sana’a, a consequence of periodic economic sanctions and continued restrictions, have long contributed to the decline of healthcare, sanitation, and other services across the country.

The decision to escalate the Red Sea crisis might be an act of revenge against the United States and Saudi Arabia for targeting Houthi military and financial capabilities. However, the Houthis might instead be perceiving the closure of the Sana’a Central Bank as Saudi Arabia abandoning the last form of leverage over the Houthi territory. After initially hedging their bets, the Houthis appear to have shifted almost entirely toward the Iranian camp, assuming that Iran and its allies can guarantee future state finances. Rather than pursue reconciliation with the internationally recognized government in Aden, the Houthi leadership has sought to isolate itself from the region further.

The Bab al-Mandeb Strait, the southern gate to the Red Sea, has historically been a source of global commerce and prosperity for states in South Arabia. Not only have the Houthis neglected this territorial treasure, but they have transformed it into Bab al-Mawt, or the gates of death, for shipping companies daring to cross the waters approximate to Yemeni territory. On June 12, the Houthis claimed their first successful drone boat attack against a Greek-owned carrier on the coast of Yemen. This has only encouraged a precipitous increase in the number of attacks, further threatening commercial shipping in the Red Sea region.

The proverbial gates were also closed to international organizations previously operating in Sana’a and its environs. Yemeni staff affiliated with the World Food Program, the National Democratic Institute, and others were spuriously charged with espionage and arrested, effectively closing one of the world’s last remaining windows into an increasingly isolated society. The innocuous gathering of population statistics and the coordination of foreign humanitarian aid were depicted by Houthi media as malicious intelligence gathering and as attempts to subvert government control.

These policy directions are typical of other Iranian proxies around the region, especially Hezbollah and Hamas, who have prioritized self-interested short-term destruction of society rather than focus on long-term development. In a country often dubbed as the greatest manmade humanitarian crisis, the Houthis have consolidated their political power at the expense of exacerbating the suffering of the country’s population. They have done so by drawing Yemen into a regional conflict with Israel and moving the country closer to Iran, making it difficult for Saudi Arabia and Yemeni opposition parties to reconvene the negotiations that appeared on the verge of ending the conflict as late as September 2023.

Rather than weaken the Houthi government, aerial bombing of Houthi military targets by American and British aircraft has only inflated the Houthi sense of self-prominence in regional affairs. What was once an empty slogan of “Death to American! Death to Israel!” has become an actionable policy. Furthermore, allied forces can’t hope to win a war from the air, especially against an enemy terrain well-known for its mountainous caverns that traverse the northern highlands of the country. 

This same terrain withstood centuries of Ottoman imperial wars, five years of intensive Egyptian bombing raids during the 1960s, and, most recently, a 2015 Saudi bombing campaign and blockade. The Houthi militias that fought the Saudis to a standstill and descended from the same tribes that clashed with the Ottomans and the Egyptians know well the futility of aerial campaigns. Accordingly, they are prepared to wait out the conflict in perpetuity. If the Biden administration is hoping to outlast the Houthis in a war of attrition, then they have already lost. While the Houthis have the luxury of time, the Biden administration is under pressure to “solve” the Yemen crisis before November.

After nearly a decade of civil war, a conflict that international interests have overrun is no closer to being solved than it was in 2014. If anything, the opposing sides have become even more entrenched, with the Houthis isolating themselves and their population from the outside world. The war in Yemen will not be solved by external actors forcing a particular model on the country but ultimately by Yemeni groups themselves. 

Unfortunately for the region and the Yemeni people, it looks as if the Houthis have garnered sufficient legitimacy and internal support to declare sole political control over the northern regions of the country. It remains, however, unlikely that Houthi governance could spread to the southern regions surrounding Aden or the eastern regions of Hadramawt. A potential outcome for Yemen remains a federalist state with at least three distinct regions, ultimately granting the Houthis a degree of autonomy in the north while dividing power up in the rest of the country. The international community must work to sever Iranian support for the group and force the Houthi leadership to assume responsibility for its own citizens and abandon extremist ideology in exchange for non-Iranian international support.

Asher Orkaby is a research fellow in Near Eastern Studies at Harvard University and the author of Beyond the Arab Cold War: The International History of the Yemen Civil War, 1962–68, published by Oxford University Press. Follow him on X: @AsherOrkaby.

Image: MhmdArt / Shutterstock.com.

Former President Donald Trump has said little about what he might do on nuclear weapons policy if he gets back into the White House. This is surprising for someone who spent so much time talking about the bomb when he was in office. But if we look at his past policies and what he and his allies are saying, we can get a pretty good idea about what he might do. And it is not a pretty picture.

While in office, Trump threatened to “totally destroy” North Korea and then tried (and failed) to get a nuclear deal with its leader, Kim Jong Un. Trump walked away from a successful deal with Iran, only to see Tehran then accelerate its nuclear program. He withdrew from one arms control treaty with Russia and then refused to extend another. He considered resuming US nuclear testing, which would have violated yet another global pact. In short, Trump did on nuclear policy what he did on so much else: create chaos and undermine the rule of law.

With four more years, Trump could do even more damage, wreaking havoc on an already weakened network of treaties and agreements that have reduced the risk of nuclear proliferation and war.

In his speech at the GOP convention, Trump had just one clear proposal related to nuclear policy: “We will replenish our military and build an Iron Dome missile defense system to ensure that no enemy can strike our homeland.” Short on details, this looks like a throwback to former President Ronald Reagan’s 1983 proposal—called the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and derided as “Star Wars”—to build a system of space- and ground-based interceptors to make nuclear weapons “impotent and obsolete.” It made for great slogans, but after forty years and some $400 billion, the technology is still not up to the challenge. Israel’s Iron Dome system has had success because it has a limited mission: defend a small country (the size of New Jersey) from short-range missiles. But if you try to scale that up and cover a country the size of the United States against hundreds of Russian and Chinese long-range missiles, it just won’t work.

But it could set off a new nuclear arms race. If Moscow and Beijing take Trump’s plans seriously, their likely response would be to build hundreds of additional nuclear-armed missiles to overwhelm the new defense.

Trump might provoke a new arms competition even without his Iron Dome on steroids. Robert O’Brien, Trump’s last national security advisor (2019-2021), wrote a recent article in Foreign Affairs calling for the United States, “to maintain technical and numerical superiority to the combined Chinese and Russian nuclear stockpiles.” The idea here, popular among conservatives at the Heritage Foundation and Project 2025, including Christopher Miller, Trump’s last defense secretary, is that Washington needs to have more nuclear weapons than Moscow and Beijing combined.

This is a terrible idea. Firstly, there is every reason to believe that Russia and China are already deterred from attacking the United States based on the current arsenal we have, which is about 3,748 nuclear weapons. Building more than we need is a waste of money. Second, guess what Moscow and Beijing will do if Washington suddenly builds more bombs? They will do the same, and we will be worse off since we will now be in the middle of a race for ever more deadly nuclear arms. Third, a US buildup would doom any chances of saving the US-Russian arms reduction process. The last remaining treaty, New START, expires in 2026 and unless we replace it there will be no legal limits on US and Russian warheads for the first time in fifty years.

In the same article, former national security advisor O’Brien also writes that “Washington must test new nuclear weapons for reliability and safety in the real world for the first time since 1992—not just by using computer models.” The United States ended nuclear testing three decades ago (under President George H.W. Bush) and then signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in 1996, banning all nuclear tests. Washington has conducted more nuclear tests (1,030) than all other nations combined. As long as the United States does not develop new types of nuclear weapons it has no need to test. But if we resume testing other nations would too, like Russia and China, and Beijing has only conducted forty-five tests. Imagine how much China could learn if Trump gives it an excuse to resume testing? The only state in the world today that is still conducting nuclear tests in North Korea (six tests); we should be pressuring Pyongyang to stop, not reopening this Pandora’s box.

Whoever wins in November, the next president will make decisions that could reshape US and global nuclear policy for decades to come. Under Trump, we could see billions spent on ineffective long-range missile defenses, the end of arms control the start of a new nuclear arms race, and new nuclear testing. All of this would make the world a more dangerous place and increase the risk of nuclear conflict. If Trump wins, get ready for a wild ride.

Tom Z. Collina is a national security expert and award-winning author. He is the former Director of Policy at Ploughshares Fund and an author, with former Defense Secretary William Perry, of “The Button: The New Nuclear Arms Race and Presidential Power from Truman to Trump.”

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

As a matter of practice, military contractors have overcharged the Pentagon for years—at the expense of both taxpayers and the military.

However, several members of Congress are working to end the practice. Last year, Senators Warren (D-MA), Braun (R-IN), and Grassley (R-IA) teamed up with Reps. Garamendi (D-CA) and Deluzio (D-PA) to introduce legislation that will address the legal loopholes that enable military price gouging.

Acquisition experts understand these loopholes well, but unfortunately, most lawmakers are still unaware of how common it is for contractors to overcharge the military. Without a better understanding of the true scale of military price gouging, Congress is unlikely to pass legislation to prevent it.

That’s why Congress should include in the final FY 2025 defense policy bill Rep. Doggett’s (D-TX) provision to investigate potential overcharging by sole-source suppliers of military products and services. Due to unchallenged market power, sole-source contractors are well positioned to profiteer. Doggett’s provision would establish a panel to review sole-source military contracts and “determine whether the Department of Defense paid fair and reasonable prices.” By focusing on sole-source contracts, the panel would shine much-needed light on the issue of military price gouging writ large, the scale of which is near impossible to discern because so much of it is legal.

Over the course of decades, military contractors have consolidated and harnessed market power to slowly obscure military price gouging. Industry consolidation began when the Cold War ended, and the Clinton administration slashed defense spending. However, as Richard Loeb—former Executive Secretary and Counsel of the Cost Accounting Standards Board in the Office of Management and Budget—has pointed out, the administration simultaneously catalyzed an era of “acquisition reform” to protect contractor profits even as defense spending plummeted and the number of prime military contractors shrank from over fifty to just five. Merger mania has continued, further concentrating market power among the few. Military contractors wield that power on Capitol Hill, lobbying Congress to gradually chip away at acquisition laws designed to protect the government from unfair pricing schemes on military contracts. In so doing, lawmakers have left the Pentagon in the dark about contract negotiations with the defense industry.

Acquisition reform and industry consolidation have helped contractors overbill the military in pursuit of excess profits. As a result, military contractors have overcharged the Pentagon to the tune of hundreds of millions of dollars on a single program, generating nearly 40 percent in excess profits. Indeed, a CBS investigation last year revealed that the Pentagon saved $550 million on the Patriot PAC-3 missile after conducting a 2015 cost review of Lockheed Martin and Boeing’s previous work on the program. Both contractors are repeat offenders, and they have long been among the top five prime contractors dominating the defense industry. The Pentagon’s internal watchdog exposed Boeing for inflating prices on spare parts in 2013 and 2011. In one case, the company charged over 177,000 percent above the fair and reasonable price for a helicopter spare part—$71.01 for a tiny metal pin worth 4 cents at the time. The trend continues. Just last month, two Lockheed subsidiaries agreed to a $70 million settlement with the Navy for doing the same thing—inflating prices on spare parts.

The Pentagon can’t negotiate reasonable prices with military contractors because it doesn’t have sufficient bargaining power. Contractors are often exempt from providing the Pentagon with “certified cost or pricing data.” Without this information, the Pentagon has little idea what companies’ costs are and, thus, what their profit margins might look like. Contracts may be valued below the mandatory disclosure threshold. Contractors may also produce a product that’s considered commercial—and theoretically, price competitive. However, the statutory definition of “commercial” is overly broad, encompassing products that aren’t sold to the public and sometimes never have been. Lawmakers expanded the commercial definition and raised the mandatory disclosure threshold for certified data at the behest of industry and under the guise of cutting red tape.

Without legal requirements for certified data, the Pentagon may ask contractors for historic or uncertified cost and pricing data. Yet, the Pentagon has few tools to ensure that this data meets requisite standards; among them, that they include “the minimum information necessary to permit a determination that the proposed price is fair and reasonable.” According to the Pentagon, current statutory and regulatory requirements discourage officials from requesting uncertified data. Instead, contracting officers often rely on historical cost and pricing data. Still, according to the Pentagon Inspector General, the department cannot evaluate price reasonableness “based solely on historical price comparison.” This is particularly concerning given the watchdog’s extensive analysis of contract pricing in recent years, which shows that price analysis methods like historical cost comparison enable “sole source contractors to earn excess profits without detection by contracting officers.” Effectively, military contractors can provide the Pentagon with any cost figures without consequence—even if they give zero indication of how reasonable current prices are. In other words, contractors can price gouge the military legally, likely under the government’s radar.

Still, the defense industry appears to resist almost any attempt by the Pentagon to evaluate contract price reasonableness. “Sweeping” is a process through which contractors overwhelm the Pentagon with cost and pricing data that was “reasonably available at the time of price agreement” but submitted after the fact. According to Senator Warren, contractors often sweep the Pentagon after price agreements and before contract awards to absolve themselves of the liabilities associated with breaking acquisition law and potentially “to hide data that might give the [Pentagon] a better price.” In other cases, contractors outright refuse to provide the Pentagon cost and pricing data, claim they can’t share it, or delay the provision of such data to the extent that the Pentagon may blindly agree to a contract price due to time sensitivity. So, the Pentagon doesn’t just struggle to obtain certified cost and pricing data. It’s a challenge to get any cost and pricing data—even from sole-source contractors, which are relatively uninhibited by the forces driving price competition.

The Pentagon has admitted that data denials “may be more prevalent [than reported], particularly with respect to sole source commercial items.” This is especially nefarious in a market that looks like a monopsony but operates like a monopoly, where sole-source contractors reign as kings. They have a documented history of refusing to provide even uncertified cost and pricing information. Since 1998, the Pentagon’s Inspector General has published several reports detailing data denials by sole-source contractors. TransDigm, Inc. is the most recent example and perhaps the most notorious. According to the Pentagon, the company “accounted for all Defense Logistics Agency cost and pricing data denials” in FY 2022. The company failed to respond to 401 requests for cost and pricing data from the agency, and that was after the Pentagon Inspector General exposed TransDigm for twice price gouging the Pentagon. The contractor generated a total of nearly $40 million in excess profits.

Ultimately, withholding cost and pricing data bolsters a contractor’s ability to increase profits by charging the Pentagon unfair and unreasonable prices. However, the defense industry already significantly outperforms other industries financially, and this is not just because the United States spends over a trillion dollars annually on national security. In many cases, the Pentagon reimburses contractors for research and development costs. It will even cover some capital costs, including those associated with the depreciation of assets like machinery and equipment. As a result, military contractors enjoy returns on assets and invested capital that are difficult to achieve in other industries where companies make those investments themselves. Still, military contractors leverage special treatment from the government to increase executive compensation and cash paid to shareholders, even at the expense of capital investment and internal research and development.

If the defense industry continues to consolidate, it will only get harder for the Pentagon to negotiate fair prices with military contractors. The department will have to rely on more and more sole-source contractors, which not only increases the risk of overcharging but also presents national security risks,  like supply chain vulnerability and reduced availability of certain resources. The entire nuclear triad is already dependent on one company, Northrop Grumman. As far as U.S. contractors go, General Dynamics manufactures a significant portion of tracked combat vehicles. Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman produce the military’s fixed-wing aircraft. The distillation of the defense industry to a handful of companies bodes poorly for both the military and taxpayer because it produces waste, not to mention a strong profit incentive for war.

As the defense industry’s primary customer and a steward of taxpayer dollars, the Pentagon needs to be a stronger buyer. However, never-ending acquisition reform continues to prevent that. Current laws are insufficient even to document price gouging by military contractors, much less prevent or remedy it. If retained in the final defense policy bill, Rep. Doggett’s provision would help the Pentagon better understand the scope of overcharging by sole source contractors—and ultimately, give lawmakers the information they need to hold industry accountable for overcharging the government at the expense of the taxpayer.

Julia Gledhill is a Research Associate for the National Security Reform Program at The Stimson Center. She focuses her research and writing on Pentagon spending, military contracting, and acquisition. In previous roles at the Project On Government Oversight and the Friends Committee on National Legislation, Julia worked on various national security issues related to Pentagon accountability, war powers, civilian protection, drone policy, the torture program, and U.S. lethal strikes.

Image: Mehmet Ali Poyraz / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The USS Florida (SSGN-78), an Ohio-class guided-missile submarine, recently completed a record-breaking 727-day deployment across the 5th, 6th, and 7th Fleet areas of operations, returning to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia.

-The submarine, one of four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines converted to carry conventional cruise missiles, operated with two alternating crews, maximizing its strategic availability.

-Over the deployment, the USS Florida conducted vital national security missions, traveling over 60,000 nautical miles and visiting ports in Greece, Guam, Diego Garcia, and the United Kingdom. Despite the SSGNs' proven capabilities, the U.S. Navy plans to retire these submarines between 2026 and 2028.

Life on a submarine is likely never easy, which is why the United States Navy's Ohio-class boats are assigned two crews that allow the subs to increase their deployments and average sixty-six percent of their time at sea. The Ohio-class guided-missile submarine USS Florida (SSGN-78) recently completed a 727-day deployment to the 5th, 6th, and 7th fleet areas of operations, the United States Navy announced Wednesday.

The Ohio-Class SSGN returned to Naval Submarine Base Kings Bay, Georgia, late last month.

SSGN-78, one of the four Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) converted to an SSGN, was assigned to Commander, Submarine Group Ten, and began her deployment in August 2022. Over the past two years, the boat conducted five crew swaps. According to the U.S. Navy, employing two crews – each with its own captain – maximizes the "strategic availability, reduces the number of submarines required to meet strategic requirements, and allows for proper crew training, readiness, and morale."

"We have demonstrated the versatility of the SSGN platform to operate anywhere at any time," said Capt. Peter French, blue crew commanding officer. "We operated in several different oceans. It's very uncommon for East Coast submarines to deploy to the West Coast, but we managed to do an exceptional job completing the mission."

The Ohio-class SSBNs were developed to serve as a virtually undetectable undersea launch platform for the U.S. military's intercontinental missiles, and the boats became a key component of America's nuclear triad during President Ronald Reagan's time in office.

As the largest subs ever constructed for the U.S. Navy, and the third-largest submarine ever built, the boats were designed to carry the concurrently developed Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles. A total of eighteen of the Ohio-class submarines were constructed by the Electric Boat Division of General Dynamics between 1981 and 1997.

According to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II), which was agreed in June 1992, the number of U.S. Navy strategic missile submarines was limited to fourteen beginning in 2002. Rather than simply phasing out or decommissioning four of the boats, the U.S. Navy opted to convert them to conventionally armed nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs).

Electric Boat was awarded a contract in September 2002 to convert the four oldest of the class including USS Ohio (SSBN-726), Michigan (SSBN-727), Florida (SSBN-728), and Georgia (SSBN-729); and each of those boats were refitted with vertical launching systems, which allow the submarines to carry up to 154 Tomahawk TLAM (land attack) or Tactical Tomahawk (block IV) missiles. According to Naval Technology, the conversion also allowed the nuclear-powered SSGNs to deploy special operations forces via Northrop Grumman's Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), while the boats were also fitted with a mission control center. The modifications required converting two of the twenty-four vertical payload tubes into a lockout, which could be used by special operators such as the Navy SEALs.

The SSGN Program Office was able to refuel and convert the four ballistic missile subs (SSBN) to SSGNs in just over five years, and more importantly for U.S. taxpayers for considerably less cost and at less time than it would take to build a new platform. All four of the vessels had completed their conversion by December 2007.

Despite the proven capabilities of the SSGNs, the U.S. Navy has announced plans to retire the four converted Ohio-class boats between 2026 and 2028.

Exactly where SSGN spent her time at sea hasn't been disclosed, but the U.S. Navy only confirmed, "The crews conducted vital missions crucial to national security, enhancing operational capabilities and reinforcing deterrence effort, while traveling more than 60,000 nautical miles. The crews also had the opportunity to visit Greece, Guam, Diego Garcia, and the United Kingdom, as part of routine port calls."

At a media round table that included international military analyst firm Janes on July 25, Captain French praised the SSGN's "unprecedented strike capability," and acknowledged that "Missions change depending on what the combatant commander needs day to day."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The A-12 Oxcart, predecessor to the famed SR-71 Blackbird, was a groundbreaking reconnaissance aircraft developed by Lockheed's Skunk Works in the late 1950s.

-Designed to gather intelligence at speeds up to Mach 3.5 and altitudes of 90,000 feet, the A-12 was faster and flew higher than its successor.

-Despite its impressive capabilities, the A-12's operational history was brief. It primarily served in Vietnam and played a crucial role during the USS Pueblo incident.

-The A-12 was retired in 1968 after just a year of service, overshadowed by the SR-71, which went on to become the more well-known aircraft. Today, the remaining A-12s are displayed in museums across the United States.

Aviation enthusiasts know the SR-71 Blackbird, America’s lightning-fast reconnaissance plane. They are not as familiar with its predecessor, the A-12 Oxcart. Despite its plodding name, the Oxcart could fly faster and higher than the Blackbird.

The U.S. in the 1950s was locked in a military-technological race with the Soviet Union and wanted every scrap of information it could source from behind the Iron Curtain. The U-2 spy plane, capable of flight above 70,000 feet, offered the first real look deep inside Soviet territory. 

But the high-flying U-2 was vulnerable to technological developments in surface-to-air missiles. After failed attempts to reduce the radar cross section of the U-2, designers at Lockheed met with the CIA and agreed to produce another reconnaissance aircraft. 

Skunk Works, the secretive Lockheed division dedicated to highly classified equipment for government programs, got to work. Lockheed had to compete with Convair’s Kingfish design, which incorporated a number of stealthy features. But the success of the U-2 program contrasted with Convair’s struggles with the B-58 Hustler. This swayed the CIA to select Lockheed’s design, the A-12.

The A-12 is visually similar to its better-known successor, the SR-71. It has a long fuselage with hard chines and blended delta wings topped by two inward-canted vertical stabilizers. The Oxcart is smaller than the SR-71 and has only one crewmember. Reports differ, but Lockheed has said it was designed to fly at 90,000 feet and Mach 3.5 – higher and faster than the Blackbird. 

Development began in the late 1950s, but the Oxcart wasn’t operational until 1967. The process was so drawn out in part because new technologies and materials were needed to support this ambitious aircraft. The platform made heavy use of titanium, and few companies had experience working with that material. Other advances in radar absorbing materials were included in the A-12, making it more stealthy.

The Oxcart was designed to spy on the Soviet Union, but after the loss of Gary Powers’ U-2 in 1960, seven years before the A-12 entered service, leaders deemed these missions too risky. Instead, the A-12’s first missions were over Vietnam. 

The A-12 program was actually canceled in 1966, before its missions over Vietnam even began. The aircraft flew for about a year in that theater. Perhaps its most significant contributions came during the USS Pueblo incident, when a Navy intelligence ship was captured by North Korea. A-12s dispatched to the region were able to locate and identify where Pueblo was being held. 

In June of 1968, the A-12 was retired. At that point, the SR-71 was operational and would go on to steal the spotlight. The nine remaining A-12s were placed into storage and eventually loaned out to museums across the country, where they can be viewed today. 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.