Diplomacy & Crisis News

Summary and Key Points: The USS Pierre (LCS-38), the final Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), has been launched, marking the end of this controversial program.

-Despite being touted for their speed and versatility in near-shore waters, the LCS fleet has faced criticism due to frequent breakdowns and the cancellation of planned mission modules.

-The U.S. Navy has already started retiring some of these ships ahead of schedule, and there are discussions about transferring them to allies for roles like drug interdiction or regional defense.

The United States Navy's Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) program has been seen as one of the sea service's biggest missteps since the end of the Cold War – perhaps only second to the Zumwalt-class destroyers. Both the LCS and the stealth destroyers were seen as failures for being the wrong ships at the wrong time, and while the U.S. Navy cut the Zumwalt-class program to just three ships – which made it a very costly mistake – the service has continued to accept delivery of brand new LCS vessels even as the oldest were retired years ahead of schedule.

This week, Mobile, Alabama-based Austal USA announced that it launched the future USS Pierre (LCS-38), the final vessel of the Independence-variant of the LCS program. Christened in May, LCS-38 is the nineteenth vessel of the class to be built by Austal and is on track to begin sea trials later this year.

"Meeting this ship milestone in such a safe and timely manner demonstrates how well our Austal USA launch team, transporter operators, and tug pilots have learned to work together over the last thirteen years, seamlessly executing this technical launch process," said Austal USA Vice President of New Construction, Dave Growden. "Our industry teams work methodically alongside our Navy partners to improve this innovative process with each launch evolution, guaranteeing the Navy a quality product delivered on time and budget."

After the future USS Pierre enters service, she will be homeported in San Diego.

LCS 38 is only the second U.S. Navy warship to be named for the South Dakota capital, while the first USS Pierre was a PC-class submarine chaser that was commissioned in 1943 during the Second World War, and decommissioned in 1958.

The launch of the future USS Pierre comes just days after Lockheed Martin subsidiary Fincantieri Marinette Marine delivered the Freedom-variant USS Nantucket (LCS-27) to the United States Navy at its shipyard in Marinette, Wisconsin.

Two additional Freedom-class LCSs are now under construction – the future USS Beloit (LCS-29) and future USS Cleveland (LCS-31) – the final warships of the program. Both are expected to be handed over to the U.S. Navy by the end of the year. With their delivery, it will mark the end of the construction phase for the troubled LCS program – although it is unclear how long the fleet of LCSs will remain in service.

It was three years ago that the U.S. Navy began to retire the oldest of vessels of the respective variants – even as some of the ships have served in the fleet for less than half the expected twenty-five-year service life. To date, five have been decommissioned, while two more Independence-class variants are expected to be retired from service this year. In addition, the United States Navy has considered offering some of its LCS to allies and partners via the Pentagon's foreign military sales.

Though the warships were touted to emphasize speed and could operate in littoral or near-shore waters, such as those of the South China Sea, the LCS suffered from breakdowns while Congressional lawmakers cut the funding for the planned mission modules that were meant to provide flexible capabilities for the warships.

That has left the U.S. Navy with a lightly armed vessel that isn't ideally suited to a confrontation with a near-peer adversary such as China. As a result, there have been calls to transfer them to partner nations in South America, where the warships could be employed in a drug interdiction role, or to the Middle East where they could bolster the navies of regional allies.

It was only in April, that testing began on a Mine Countermeasure Mission Package (MCM MP) aboard the Independence-variant USS Canberra (LCS-30), which could finally give the LCS program purpose. The MCM package, made up of an integrated suite of unmanned maritime systems sensors, was developed to locate, identify, and destroy mines in littoral waters.

However, it would seem that module is too little and it comes too late for the warships that have earned the scorn of sailors and senior naval officials alike.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Summary and Key Points: The F-16XL was an advanced variant of the F-16 designed for supercruise capabilities and increased payload, initially considered as a potential replacement for the F-111 Aardvark.

-Despite its enhanced features, including greater range, payload capacity, and reduced radar signature, it lost out to the F-15E Strike Eagle.

-The F-16XL's technology contributed to later advancements in fighter jets, including the F-22 Raptor.

Two prototypes were used in various NASA experiments before being retired to museums.

America’s formidable fourth-generation F-16 fighter platform made headlines last year when the White House gave Ukraine the green light to fly them in war.

Since February 2022, Kyiv has asserted that without more advanced aerial capabilities, it would be unable to thwart Russia’s advances.

Initially, the Biden administration was adamant that it would not provide F-16 Fighting Falcon airframes to aid Ukraine’s defensive efforts. However, the training of Ukrainian pilots on these airframes was ultimately okayed.

American Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said that the U.S. would actually head up the coalition of nations that will train Ukraine’s pilots and crews to properly operate the Fighting Falcons last month. 

The General Dynamics F-16 was designed nearly five decades ago to fulfill the U.S. Air Force’s need for an air superiority fighter.

Following the Vietnam War, military officials understood the need for airframes better equipped to maneuver with minimum possible energy loss

By the 1970’s, the Fighting Falcon was born out of the Lightweight Fighter program.

The compact, multi-role jet is highly maneuverable and can operate in both air-to-surface and air-to-air combat.

Over the years, the F-16 platform has achieved an honorable combat record and continues to fly for the USAF as well as a litany of foreign militaries. 

While the F-16 has an honorable legacy, not all of its subsequent variants have made it to the service phase.

Shortly after winning the Lightweight Fighter program contract, General Dynamics worked on several prototypes, including two variants it later delivered to NASA’s Langely Research Center.

Referred to by their serial numbers #849 and #848, these jets were both used in a litany of experiments that only concluded in the late 1990s.

Notably, F-16XL #849 participated in a 1995 sonic boom study where it flew 200 feet behind a NASA SR-71 to ascertain the boundary of a SR-71’s supersonic shockwave.

As Peter Suciu explained on additional F-16XL studies conducted by NASA: “The two-seat F-16XL was extensively modified by NASA Dryden for the Supersonic Boundary Layer Control research project in the mid-1990s. A turbine-driven suction system was installed in the aircraft’s fuselage while a modified, thickened left-wing pulled in boundary layer air flowing over the wing to enable laminar, or smooth, airflow over the wing. The aircraft last flew in 1996 and is reportedly no longer airworthy.”

While these variants are now sitting in storage at the Air Force Flight Center Museum at Edwards and on display at the Museum Air Park, they are highly respected by aviation buffs and industry experts alike. 

The resulting F-16XL design was conceptualized to potentially replace the F-111 Aardvark. Ultimately, however, McDonnell Douglas’ F-15E jet was awarded the contract. The two constructed F-16XL fighters were then relegated to Edwards Air Force Base.

The main concept driving the F-16XL was supercruise (sustained supersonic cruising without afterburner) capability. The culminating prototype did indeed have a longer range while still saving on fuel.

Despite the F-16XL’s trajectory, the fighter is widely recognized by aviation experts as a powerhouse.

According to Military.com, this variant would carry twice the payload of the original Fighting Falcon variant and fly as much as 44% further.

Furthermore, the F-16XL could accomplish this without external fuel tanks and while sporting a full suite of air-to-air weapons including four AMRAAMs and two AIM-9 Sidewinders. 

Additional capabilities have been outlined by Air and Space Forces: “As for penetration and survivability, the F-16XL can dash supersonically with a load of bombs at either high or low altitude. It can climb at high rates with the bombs aboard. And it has a speed advantage of up to eighty-three knots over the F-16A at sea level at military power setting and 311 knots on afterburner at altitude while carrying a bomb load.

Two additional capabilities of the F-16XL contribute to survivability. First is improved instantaneous maneuver ability coupled with greatly expanded flight operating limits (with bombs), and second is reduced radar signature resulting from the configuration shaping.” 

While the Strike Eagle platform that did eventually enter service with the USAF proved to be highly capable, the F-16XL would have undoubtedly enhanced the service’s prowess if accepted alongside the F-15 back in the day.

Nonetheless, the F-16 has contributed to modern aerial concepts. In fact, the variant would even aid in the development of the supercruise capability of the first-ever fifth generation airframe to take to the skies- the F-22 Raptor. 

Maya Carlin is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

Summary and Key Points: The F-16XL was an experimental variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon, designed with cranked-arrow delta wings to enhance lift, range, and payload.

-Developed under the U.S. Air Force's Enhanced Tactical Fighter program, the F-16XL competed against the F-15E Strike Eagle to replace the F-111 Aardvark.

-Despite its innovative design, the F-16XL lost to the F-15E due to cost and survivability considerations.

-Though not adopted, the F-16XL's design influenced future F-16 variants.

The F-16XL is an experimental variant of the F-16 Fighting Falcon, a single-engine multirole fighter aircraft originally developed by General Dynamics (now Lockheed Martin) for the United States Air Force. America’s F-16XL was designed to explore the benefits of a cranked-arrow delta wing, which was intended to improve the aircraft’s lift, range, and payload capabilities. 

Designers of this unique bird developed it with an additional two fuselage sections near the front and back of the aircraft, thereby extending its length to around 56 inches.

Not only were the cranked-arrow wings a new and innovative turn by the designers of the XL, but they also added a new wing skin of carbon fiber that reduced the bird’s weight by 600 pounds. Here, by the way, you can see the mosaic that is military aerospace engineering. Because obviously the designers were borrowing cutting-edge concepts from other projects, such as stealth planes, with the carbon fiber skin, and toying with them in the context of a souped-up F-16. 

Between the new wings and the lighter overall weight, the XL could outfly a conventional F-16 by leaps-and-bounds. Not only that, though, the new design allowed for so much spare room that the F-16XL could carry 27 hardpoints for armaments!

Engineering is so cool, isn’t it?

In fact, the F-16XL was based on earlier, even more radical F-16 prototype design, the F-16 SCAMP (Supersonic Cruise and Maneuver Prototype) from 1977. The SCAMP was a truly brilliant concept. 

On first glance, bean counters might be upset that, as Alex Hollings wrote for Military.com, “The effort wasn’t about fielding another production fighter—General Dynamics had no intention of trying to sell SCAMP once it was complete.” But it was actually a rare example of deft stewardship of the taxpayer’s money by the Pentagon.

Rather than SCAMP being the next warplane for the Air Force in the late 1970s, instead, as Hollings assessed, “the entire premise behind the program was to quickly (and cheaply) field a platform [the USAF] could use to test the concept behind supersonic cruising, or as we’ve come to call it today, ‘supercruising.’”

From there, the F-16 SCAMP became the basis of the F-16XL. 

The F-16XL was designed to explore the benefits of a cranked-arrow delta wing, which was intended to improve the aircraft’s lift, range, and payload capabilities. This bird was considered to be part of the Air Force’s Enhanced Tactical Fighter (ETF) program.

America’s EFT program was an initiative for the Air Force in the early 1980s. It was aimed at developing a replacement for what was then the aging F-111 Aardvark. The program sought to procure an aircraft that could perform both air-to-air and air-to-ground missions effectively.

Two main contenders emerged: the General Dynamics F-16XL and the McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle. As you’ve read the F-16XL was a derivative of the F-16 Fighting Falcon while the F-15E was a derivative of the F-15 Eagle that was merely designed to carry a larger payload and have extended range compared to its predecessors. 

Ultimately, by 1984, the Air Force selected the F-15E Strike Eagle over the F-16XL. 

Key factors in the Air Force’s decision included the F-15E’s lower development costs, perceived future growth potential, and advantage of having two engines for increased survivability and payload capacity. When the F-16XL lost out to the F-15E Strike Eagle, the two F-16XL prototype aircraft were transferred to NASA for greater aeronautical research. 

As for why the Air Force was originally interested in the F-16XL as a replacement for the aging F-111 Aardvark, that comes down strategic and tactical needs. The F-111’s mission sets involved attack, strategic bombing, reconnaissance, and electronic warfare (EW). The F-111 was also known for its innovative variable-sweep wing design, which allowed it to adjust its wing configuration for optimal performance at different speeds and altitudes. 

So, the designers of the F-16XL knew that they needed to create a bird that was as versatile as had been the F-111 Aardvark. It would seem as though the designers of the XL focused on the Aardvark’s unique wing design. Hence, why General Dynamics built the F-16XL had its own unique wing configuration—the aforementioned cranked-arrow delta wing.

The F-16XL made its inaugural flight on July 14, 1982. After that, the innovative bird went through a wide range of testing and evaluation by the USAF. Although the Air Force ultimately chose to go with the F-15E Strike Eagle as the replacement for the ailing Aardvark, the development of the F-16XL was not an entirely useless exercise. 

After all, the Air Force would incorporate the warbird’s innovative design and other features into later versions of the F-16, such as the F-16C/D the F-16 E/F Desert Falcon variants which continue proving their worth today (only now being slowly supplanted by America’s fleet of fifth-generation warplanes). 

It’s too bad that the F-16XL was not embraced by the Air Force, as it was undeniably a better plane than the F-15E and would have been more innovative than the F-15E. Ultimately, the Air Force chose to go with the F-15E because of how its production line was established and maintained. 

Still, it’s fun to imagine what might have been. A light, supercruising, F-16 with 27 different kinds of armaments on it would have been one lethal warbird.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

The Russian military and pro-Russian separatist forces continue to lose thousands of men to the fighting in Ukraine every day.

However, the Russian political and military leadership is willing to take big losses to achieve its goals in Ukraine.

In July, the Russian forces suffered approximately 36,000 men killed, wounded, and captured. These casualties are in line with those of June (around 35,000) and slightly lower than those of May (around 40,000).

“The average daily Russian casualties (killed and wounded) in Ukraine has fallen over the past two months from a conflict high of over 1,262 per day in May to 1,140 in July 2024,” the British Military Intelligence assessed in one of its latest estimates of the war.

“Despite this reduction, the last three months have been the costliest for the Russian forces since February 2022, according to Ukrainian General Staff reporting,” the British Military Intelligence added.

The Ukrainian Ministry of Defense has been one of the main sources of Russian casualty data. Despite the obvious bias, Kyiv has largely provided accurate reporting since it has been largely corroborated by Western military and intelligence sources. However, the casualty data coming out of Kyiv seem to be more accurate when it concerns manpower losses than materiel losses. For example, the Ukrainian military estimates that the Russian military has lost over 8,000 main battle tanks, whereas Western assessments put that number closer to 3,000 tanks—still a significant blow to Moscow’s combat power as it represents the Russian military’s entire prewar arsenal.

A good portion of the losses of the prior two months were the result of a large-scale offensive against Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest urban center in the east. The operation failed, and the Ukrainian military regained much of the lost territory.

“The reduction in daily average is likely indicative of Russian forces consolidating positions on the Kharkiv axis. Although this new approach has increased the pressure on the frontline, an effective Ukrainian defense and a lack of Russian training reduces Russia’s ability to exploit any tactical successes into wider operational gains,” the British Military Intelligence stated.

In the absence of the requisite combat power and ability to leverage tactical successes, Moscow is forced to pursue a strategy of attrition. Russian president Vladimir Putin seems to be content with sacrificing over 1,000 of his men on a daily basis in order to exhaust the Ukrainians. The dictatorial nature of Russian politics and the lack of any meaningful opposition to Putin means that this strategy of attrition will continue.

“Russia’s casualty rate will likely continue to average above 1,000 a day throughout August 2024 as Russia continues offensive operations on a wide front from Kharkiv in the north to Robotyne in the south of Ukraine,” the British Military Intelligence concluded.

With the current rate of casualties and a possible Ukrainian counteroffensive during the fall, it is likely that the Russian forces are going to reach 700,000 casualties by the end of the year.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summer is the main fighting season in Ukraine, and as it slowly wanes, it is worth doing a tour of the battlefield to assess the situation.

Overall, the situation remains relatively the same. The Russian forces continue to be on the offensive, but they lack the requisite combat power to breach the Ukrainian defenses and achieve an operational breakthrough. On the other end, the Ukrainians are holding fast across the contact line, building their combat capability for a future large-scale counteroffensive.

In the east, the situation remains largely stagnant, with small-scale action on both sides.

“Positional engagements continued in northern Kharkiv Oblast on August 5, but there were no confirmed changes to the frontline,” the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) assessed in its latest operational estimate.

There is active fighting north and northeast of Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-largest city in eastern Ukraine. The Russian forces maintain two pockets in the area, but they don’t present a serious threat to Kharkiv.

In May, the Russian forces tried to capture the city, launching a large-scale offensive. However, the Ukrainian defenses held, and the Russian forces lost much of their tactical gains to subsequent Ukrainian counterattacks. Moreover, the Russian military lost over 40,000 men in the operation.

The Donbas remains the center of fighting.

“Russian forces continued ground attacks along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on August 5 but did not make any confirmed advances. A Russian military blogger claimed that Russian forces seized several Ukrainian strongholds along the Berestove-Pishchane line (southeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of this claim,” the Institute for the Study of War stated.

The Russian forces continued with their small-scale offensive operations in the direction of Siversk and Chasiv Yar but without any significant success or confirmed advances.

However, in the direction of Toretsk in the southern part of the Donbas, the Russian forces have had more success, making significant tactical advances.

“Russian forces reportedly continue to advance east of Pokrovsk on August 5, and Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are closer to completing a tactical encirclement of Ukrainian forces near the T-0511 (O-054) road southeast of Pokrovsk,” the Institute for the Study of War estimated.

The Ukrainian forces usually won’t retreat until they have to, falling back to better-defended positions.

In the southern part of Ukraine, the Russian forces have made some small gains around Robotyne, in the western part of the Zaporizhzhia Oblast. Last year, the Ukrainian military launched its promising large-scale counteroffensive in the area. However, the Russian forces were well-entrenched and managed to absorb most of the Ukrainian offensive push.

Meanwhile, the Russian forces continue to take serious losses on a daily basis. According to the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense, over the past twenty-four hours, the Kremlin lost approximately 1,050 men killed, wounded, or captured, as well as fifty-four tactical vehicles and fuel trucks, thirty-nine artillery pieces and multiple launch rocket systems, thirty-six unmanned aerial systems, eight infantry fighting vehicles and armored personnel carriers, six cruise missiles, four main battle tanks, and one piece of special equipment.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The arrival of American-made F-16 fighter jets in Ukraine is seen as a significant boost to the country's air defense and support capabilities. However, while these jets offer advanced air-to-air and air-to-ground weaponry, including the AIM-120 AMRAAM and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles, their impact on the war is likely to be limited by their numbers and lack of stealth capabilities.

-Ukraine's F-16s, while a valuable addition, face significant risks from Russian air defenses and will not single-handedly change the course of the conflict.

More than two years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began, F-16 Fighting Falcons have officially begun arriving in the country, marking what many hope will be a shift in the embattled nation’s air defense and air support capabilities. These Western fighters represent what promises to be a significant increase in combat capability for the Ukrainian Air Force, but despite the potential these aircraft have to tip the balance toward Ukraine’s favor, it’s also important to keep in mind that the war for Ukraine’s future is far too large to be decided by any single platform or weapon system.

“F-16s in Ukraine. We ensured this. I am proud of all our guys who are skillfully mastering these aircraft and have already started using them for our country. I thank our team for this result. I thank all the partners who are truly helping with the F-16s, and the first countries that accepted our request for aircraft – Denmark, the Netherlands, the United States, – and all our partners, – we value your support,” Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said during a ceremony at an undisclosed location. “I wish our Air Force and all our warriors to feel the pride of Ukrainians in our combat aviation and to bring Ukraine the combat results that will bring our victory closer – our just peace for Ukraine.

But while we need to keep our expectations for these aircraft grounded in reality, these images of Ukraine’s first operational F-16s do offer us a promising glimpse at how these aircraft will be employed (at least early on) and, in turn, how they might affect the fight moving forward.

In images and video released by the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence, these F-16s were armed with air-to-air focused load-outs comprised of AIM-120 Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air missiles (AMRAAMs) and AIM-9M Sidewinder infrared-guided air-to-air missiles.

The AIM-120, which serves as America’s primary beyond-visual-range (BVR) air-to-air weapon, comes in multiple forms, including the AIM-120C, which is optimized for internal carriage in stealth fighters like the F-35, and the AIM-120D — which is among the most capable iterations of the missile ever to reach service. The AIM-120D boasts GPS guidance, anti-jam capabilities, and a maximum engagement range that extends out beyond 110 miles. It isn’t entirely clear which version of the AMRAAM these aircraft are carrying, but previous statements from Ukrainian officials suggest it likely is the AIM-120D.

The AIM-120D is capable of hitting targets further out than the radar on Ukraine’s F-16s could likely identify them, and the weapon itself is network capable, meaning it could get target data from other assets in the battlespace, but it remains unclear as to whether Ukrainian forces will be able to leverage that capability at this point. This also points to the possibility that Ukrainian officials being quoted about the range of the weapons they were receiving could simply have been mistaken, and Ukraine may actually be receiving a less advanced (and long-ranged) iteration of the AMRAAM.

Regardless of which AMRAAM Ukraine’s F-16s fly with, it will represent a significant improvement over the R-27 semi-active radar-guided air-to-air missiles employed by Ukrainian fighter jets today. The R-27 has a maximum range of better than 60 miles, but is much more difficult to employ against enemy fighters due to its lack of onboard radar guidance. Unlike the AMRAAM, which can transition to its own onboard radar seeker as it approaches its target to close the remaining distance unassisted, Ukraine’s R-27s require continued guidance from the fighter’s onboard radar. This means Ukrainian pilots attempting long-range engagements need to chase the missiles they launch, maintaining a lock on their targets until the missiles make impact.

“After all, these aircraft have powerful airborne radars, technological equipment and, most importantly, missiles with active homing heads,” Col. Yuri Bulavka, a Ukrainian Su-27 pilot, said in April when asked why Ukraine needs Western fighters to say viable in the air war.

Russian forces have been attempting extremely long-range engagements against Ukrainian fighters using R-37M radar-guided missiles launched at high altitude by MiG-31BMs, which have a claimed maximum range of around 250 miles — though in practice, Russian aircraft have primarily been employing these missiles from inside of 80 miles — outside the reach of Ukraine’s R-27s, but well within the reach of AIM-120Ds if Ukraine’s F-16s are indeed carrying them.

The AIM-9M Sidewinder seen in these pictures is not quite as advanced and capable as the latest variants of the AIM-9X in use for the U.S. but is nonetheless seen as an extremely potent short-range weapon. The AIM-9M uses a traditional infrared seeker and control surfaces and is limited to engaging targets within the pilot’s forward field of view (as opposed to the AIM-9X’s high off-boresight targeting capability). Like much of the technology found within the F-16AMs being employed by Ukraine, the AIM-9M was cutting-edge in the early 1990s — being credited with at least 10 air-to-air kills in Operation Desert Storm alone.

However, according to reports from the Wall Street Journal, Ukraine will indeed be receiving AIM-9X variants of the Sidewinder missile, which will further increase the close-quarters combat capabilities of these F-16s. The AIM-9X not only boasts a significantly improved guidance system to better see through the tricks of common missile countermeasures like flares, but it also offers a massive increase in aerobatic maneuverability. The AIM-9X is famously so maneuverable, thanks to its thrust-vectoring rocket nozzle, that it can even engage enemy aircraft flying behind the launching aircraft — targetable through the helmet-cued targeting system Ukrainian pilots have already been seen training on.

Both the AMRAAM and the Sidewinder (in various iterations for each) will prove valuable not just for air-to-air combat, however — they’ll also be essential for expanding Ukraine’s air defense capabilities. Both AMRAAMs and Sidewinders are capable of downing long-range subsonic cruise missiles like Russia’s air-launched Kh-101, and the Sidewinder is a relatively low-cost option for engaging larger enemy drones than Patriot interceptors.

One of the most important air-to-ground munitions these F-16s will leverage is America’s AGM-88 HARM, or High-speed Anti-Radiation Missile.

Ukrainian forces have already been using the HARM since August of 2022 or earlier, but because these weapons were being launched by dated Soviet jets that were never intended to use them, their utility has been dramatically limited.

Anti-radiation missiles like the HARM work by honing on the electromagnetic radiation broadcast by radar arrays – in other words, radar waves – making them uniquely suited for the suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD) role. American Wild Weasel pilots often fly their aircraft into contested airspace, waiting for enemy air defense systems to power up in an attempt to target them or their wingmen. Once the air defense systems are broadcasting radar waves, Wild Weasel pilots launch their HARM missiles to hone in on those radar waves and destroy the air defense equipment.

Ukraine’s Soviet-era fighters are only able to leverage the HARM missile in what many call the “pre-briefed” mode. In effect, the missile is pre-programmed with a target area and then launched by an aircraft, often at a fairly long distance. The missile flies toward its intended target area, using its seeker to look for any air defense systems powering up and broadcasting radar waves for it to then close with and destroy.

This method can be very effective, especially when launching these missiles in volume, as even if they don’t ultimately destroy enemy radar sites, their presence alone will often prompt air defense crews to power down their arrays. This effectively amounts to suppression of air defenses, as those powered-down arrays allow aircraft to operate inside the contested area for a short time, but of course, once the HARM threat has passed, these arrays can power back up and begin hunting for Ukrainian jets all over again.

However, if operated by an aircraft carrying NATO-standard busses, like Ukraine’s new F-16s, pilots can leverage the HARM’s full capability set, including two more operational modes that can be very handy in a fight: “Self-protect” mode and “target of opportunity” mode.

In self-protect mode, the aircraft’s onboard radar warning receiver identifies an enemy radar array that’s broadcasting. It then passes that target data over to the HARM, which can hone in on either the broadcasting radar or the specific location that waves were coming from in the event the enemy powers the system down. The target of opportunity mode is similar but allows the AGM-88’s onboard seeker to spot enemy radar arrays powering up, which then alerts the pilot to launch the weapon.

Another very important weapon system we can expect to see these F-16s leverage is the extender range iteration of America’s long-serving Joint Direct Attack Munition, or JDAM. JDAM kits are, effectively, guidance systems that can be installed on conventional “dumb bombs” to turn them into GPS-guided precision munitions, usually capable of engaging targets from ranges of 15 miles or so. In February 2023, however, the U.S. announced its plans to equip Ukraine with the JDAM-ER, which adds a deployable set of wings to the system to triple its engagement range out to 45 miles or better. Russian forces have seen a great deal of success in recent months using a very similar glide-bomb system, meaning Ukraine should soon be able to give them a taste of their own medicine in that regard.

Ukraine’s new (old) fighters are being transferred from the inventories of Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Norway — and while these aircraft do share the same design as America’s in-service F-16s, the hardware and software found onboard is often quite a bit more dated. These F-16AMs were built and delivered in the 1970s, before undergoing what’s called a “Mid Life Update” (MLU) in the early 2000s to bring them more-or-less on par with the Block 50/52 F-16Cs and Ds operated by the United States during Operation Desert Storm in the early 1990s.

One of the most important elements of this update was the inclusion of the Texas Instruments Modular Mission Computer (MMC), which in conjunction with a cockpit refresh helped to bring these 1970s hotrods into the digital age, making it possible to leverage a breadth of new weapons and auxiliary systems through an improved pilot interface.

While Ukraine’s F-16s do lack the Active Electronically Scanned Array radar found in many American F-16s, they do carry the updated AN/APG-66(V2) Fire Control Radar, which is a medium-range pulse-doppler planar array said to offer a 25% improvement in detection range over the aircraft’s original array. This system is capable of tracking up to ten targets simultaneously while scanning the area and offers what’s commonly called a “six on six” AMRAAM capability — which means the radar can support long-range engagements of up to six targets at once using an onboard complement of AIM-120 radar-guided air-to-air missiles.

The original AN/APG-66 was said to have a target detection range out beyond 90 miles (150 km) and the ability to track fighter-sized targets at ranges of roughly 35+ miles (60 km), but the APG-66v2 found in Ukraine’s new F-16s is said to boast a roughly 25% improvement in detection and tracking performance. That pushes those ranges out to roughly 110+ miles for detection and a bit north of 43 miles for targeting fighters, though it should be noted that these are unclassified figures and should be taken with a hearty helping of salt.

As first reported by The Warzone, Ukraine’s F-16s shown in recent images and videos seem to be equipped with Denmark’s Pylon Integrated Dispensing System Plus (PIDS+) and possibly with the Electronic Combat Integrated Pylon System Plus (ECIPS+). These systems, which you can see in the images look sort of like weapon pylons with optical sensors, include integrated radar-warning receivers to notify the pilot of nearby threats and missile approach warning sensors (MAWS) to let them know when trouble’s coming. This will be of particular value in attack and air defense suppression missions, as the Su-25s employed by Ukraine to date don’t even have radar-warning receivers onboard to speak of.

“Our jets don’t have a system to warn about [Russian rocket] launches,” said a Ukranian Su-25 pilot with the call sign Pumba. “It’s all visual-based. If you see them, then you just try to escape by firing off heat traps and maneuvering.”

Depending on the system in use, these integrated systems can either provide additional flares and chaff to confuse inbound missiles or more advanced Northrop Grumman-sourced electronic warfare capabilities.

Put simply, these are fairly modern F-16s with all the bells and whistles you might expect to find in such a fighter operated by nations without top-tier funding for the latest and greatest gadgets, making them a significant threat to Russian aviators, but not necessarily the technological overmatch one might expect in an engagement between American F-16s and Russian fighters. In practical terms, Ukraine will soon be operating between 60 and 80 total F-16s, which is certainly a significant development but is far from enough to offset the numerical advantage represented by Russia’s fighter fleets.

The F-16 is a highly survivable fighter, as demonstrated by its performance in conflicts like Operation Desert Storm, where one F-16 managed to dodge six incoming surface-to-air missiles in rapid succession without the use of countermeasures at one point — but it’s important to remember that Russia’s S-300 and S-400 air defense systems are the most advanced these fighters have ever squared off against in modern warfare. The F-16 is not a stealth fighter, and as such, is still very vulnerable to being detected and targeted by Russian air defenses, just as the rest of Ukraine’s fighters have been throughout this conflict. But more than that, Russia will be making it their business to engage and destroy as many F-16s as they can as quickly as they can to limit the positive effect these fighters can have on Ukrainian morale and Western support.

Russia’s emphasis on managing the perceptions of the world at large through concerted disinformation campaigns tightly interwoven with real and manufactured news out of the battlefield is sure to be working overtime to find ways to portray these F-16s as ineffectual or highly vulnerable, and that will almost certainly will come with a heavy allocation of resources meant to down these jets for the sake of that narrative (and of course, to minimize their actual strategic impact). These fighters are most vulnerable on the ground, meaning Russian airstrikes will be placing a large emphasis on not just destroying the jets, but runways and support facilities required to operate them.

To put it simply, these aircraft will be operating with a big target on their back, and the nature of warfare all but assures that some of them will go down fighting or likely, be destroyed on their runways. These losses will be framed in the media as a significant development — for the sake of driving clicks in the West, and for the sake of driving narrative out of Russia — but losing aircraft is just what happens in the war-fighting business.

F-16s will not win this war for Ukraine, but they could play a vital part in a broader strategy aimed at doing so — and to use them effectively to that end, risk will be an inherent part of the job. So, as these jets slowly start getting into the fight, it’s important to maintain a realistic perspective about what they are and what they can do… But just as importantly, what they can’t. F-16s are incredible jets that can do some positively mind-bending things, but at the end of the day, they’re not invulnerable, especially when sitting on the tarmac.

Of course, there will be some pro-Russian commenters who will pretend this sort of pragmatic realism is a new development, as Western analysts try to hide their fear that NATO’s super fighters might not be as invincible as we once claimed… But let’s not fall for that tired old narrative either, folks. There’s no such thing as an invincible fighter, tank, or anything else for that matter. There are only tools, strategies, and incredibly brave men and women tasked with employing the first for the sake of the second.

Warfare is a dirty business, and while the F-16 won’t end that for Ukraine, it will equip them to fight just a little bit dirtier than ever before.

And that’s really what transferring these jets has always been about.

Alex Hollings is a writer, dad, and Marine veteran.

This article was first published by Sandboxx News.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. Navy's investment in Directed Energy Weapons (DEW) like the HELIOS laser system reflects its urgent need for advanced defense against evolving threats such as hypersonic missiles and drone swarms.

-Despite decades of research and significant funding, these systems are still under development, with the Navy facing challenges in integrating DEWs into existing platforms like the Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

-Waiting for the DDG(X) warships to be built for DEW deployment could be a strategic error, and the Navy should focus on integrating these technologies into current systems and unmanned platforms.

For almost 20 years, the U.S. Navy (as well as the Air Force) has worked on various concepts for directed energy weapons (DEW), or lasers. 

Gobs of U.S. tax dollars have been spent on the technology, and many promises have been made by the military. And, as U.S. Navy Adm. Fred Pyle told reporters earlier this summer, “Sometimes [the Navy has] a tendency to over promise and under deliver.”

That is an understatement. 

To be clear: The U.S. military needs to possess a reliable and robust DEW capability. The reason it has lacked this capacity is not because the technology is not there yet. It surely is. But there has been a lack of direction, funding, and initiative over the course of many decades on this technology. 

As Adm. Pyle had to admit, the Navy needs these weapons more now than ever. 

China is ascendant. Russia is resurgent. Iran appears poised to upend the U.S.-led Mideast order. Latin America is aflame as Venezuela implodes. And North Korea is, well, who really knows these days? 

Pyle wants the Navy to concentrate on developing DEW for surface warfare purposes. He’s right to fixate on that like a laser. That’s because America’s enemies are overcoming the strategic advantages that ballistic missile defense (BMD) and other missile defense systems have conferred upon the countries employing these capabilities. Israel’s Iron Dome, for example, has allowed for that country to mitigate what could be catastrophic damage from Hamas, Hezbollah, and Houthi rockets fired at the country. 

Similarly, U.S. Navy warships employ a coterie of systems meant to defend against incoming missiles. This allows for those Navy warships to operate with relative impunity near enemy shores while knocking those enemies around with their offensive systems. 

But these times, they are a-changin’, as Dylan warned us so long ago. 

Ultimately, conventional ballistic missile defenses run out of ammunition with which to fire at incoming rockets and missiles. These systems can be overwhelmed by swarming tactics that fast-moving drones and modern anti-ship ballistic missiles employ. 

What’s more, hypersonic weapons completely circumvent the ability of conventional missile defenses to protect the ship or territory they are charged with defending. 

So a U.S. aircraft carrier and its attendant battle group could soon be in the unenviable position of its defensive systems either being totally overwhelmed in the early phase of a conflict – or they will be rendered obsolete with a small batch of hypersonic weapons systems. Sure, the Americans are always building better systems. The Pentagon is supposedly prioritizing the creation of hypersonic weapons of their own, as well as defenses against them. 

Sadly, for now, China and Russia have the Americans beat in this domain.

That leaves the U.S. military with a limited set of options in the near term. That’s where DEW comes. If the American military can make DEW work reliably – and scale it up – it’s an additional layer of defense for U.S. surface warships or bases that could overwhelm the swarming tactics that America’s enemies are preparing to deploy against U.S. assets in war. 

There are two DEW systems the Navy is investing in. The first is the High-Energy Laser with Integrated Optical-Dazzler and Surveillance system (HELIOS). Navy leaders claim that the system can “blast more than 60 kilowatts of directed energy at targets up to five miles away,” and these systems were being tested on Flight IIA Arleigh Burke-class destroyers.

As if trying to justify the cost of such systems, the Navy is trying to marry these new innovations to a platform that has yet to materialize: the replacement for the Navy’s Ticonderoga-class destroyers, the mythical DDG(X) warship. Whatever the Navy says about the timelines for the DDG(X), it is all up in the air, as the US economy struggles, politicians are distracted, and America’s industrial base is all but broken. 

Hoping and waiting for the DDG(X) to be delivered in any meaningful numbers so that they can utilize the Navy’s lasers is strategic malpractice on the part of American war planners. 

Of course, the Navy needs DEW to ensure its surface fleet is not a total wasting asset in the age of A2/AD. Thus far, however, the Navy has failed to accomplish even its baseline goals for achieving real DEW capabilities and then having a platform that can deploy them in combat. The Navy should rededicate its resources toward building its lasers. But it must merge these systems with existing platforms. 

As for platforms that are still being built, it would be wiser to place such weapons on large unmanned undersea vehicles.

Wasting time and money trying to do everything at once, as the Navy is currently doing, will ensure nothing is done on time or properly. Without the DEW capability, Navy warships risk being destroyed, or at least forced to stay out of any fight with an A2/AD-wielding enemy.

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

The first presidential debate between Joe Biden and Donald Trump resulted in a media blitzkrieg of hysteria about Biden’s performance, which continued through the Republican convention and led to Biden’s eventual withdrawal from the race. The New York Times editorial board and other prestige media sites, supported by some leading Democratic fundraisers and politicians, including from the Democratic Senate and House leaders, called for Biden to withdraw from the race for the White House. It’s understandable to some extent that the media, whose professional obsession is with communication, and the many Democratic members of the House and Senate, who are concerned about their own elections, would declare Biden’s performance a disaster. On the other hand, with respect to the substance of policy, as opposed to the optics of stage performance, the debate was one blip in a journey that will require more months of campaigning and electioneering between former President Donald Trump and Vice President Kamala Harris to sort out.

Of particular importance in this regard are the candidates’ and parties’ respective positions on foreign policy and U.S. military strategy. The world is transforming an immediate post-Cold War euphoria of American triumphalism and liberal democratic hubris to a more complicated picture. The return of wars and other conflicts among major powers, especially with respect to the rising capabilities and aspirations of China and Russia, creates uncertainty about the United States’ political objectives and military readiness in Europe and Asia. In addition, unprecedented challenges in climate change and pandemics; efforts to dethrone the dollar as the benchmark currency for international transactions; mass migration in unprecedented numbers; and new technologies for cyberwar, artificial intelligence, and the military uses of space all contribute to a possible bow wave of political regime destabilization and military planning vexation. Today’s certainties for politicians and their military advisors are tomorrow’s guesswork. 

Therefore, in choosing among competing presidential candidates, we need to understand their perspectives on this international environment of political complexity and military uncertainty. No country has unlimited resources, and even the United States, facing a cumulative deficit of more than $35 trillion, cannot continue unrestrained binge spending on domestic and foreign policy priorities. What, going forward, is America’s preferred geopolitical orientation or grand strategy? What military commitments and obligations derive from that grand strategy? And third, what assumptions should drive military preparedness for deterring wars and, if necessary, for fighting them?

Broadly speaking, the options for U.S. grand strategy include: (1) Godzilla Rex, or what has sometimes been termed “liberal hegemony”; (2) offshore balancing; (3) globalization unlimited; and (4) selective engagement and enlargement. Isolationism is eliminated as an option because, in today’s world of complex interdependence and media saturation, it would not be possible, even if deemed desirable by some.

Godzilla Rex was the U.S. position in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union. An end to history and the perpetual triumph of liberal democracy was assumed by optimists about the post-Soviet world. The United States was a singular global superpower with no serious military rival. However, President Clinton reduced national focus on security and defense, including intelligence, which came back to haunt us after the attacks on 9/11. Nonetheless, the United States invaded Afghanistan to depose the Taliban in 2001 and struck down the regime of Saddam Hussein in Iraq in 2003. A Global War on Terror was declared, and both conflicts became “forever wars” that lasted well into the second decade of the present century. 

Offshore balancing was an alternative grand strategy favored by some academics and prominent policy analysts. From this perspective, the United States should limit large-scale military intervention to threats by a hostile power to dominate an essential region in ways inimical to U.S. and allied vital interests. Regional rivals would include a resurgent Russia in Europe, a rising China in Asia, and lesser but still dangerous disruptors in Asia (North Korea) or the Middle East (Iran). Under this approach, the United States would first seek to rely on regional allies to take the lead if they were prepared to do so, although the United States would otherwise act if our vital interests were threatened.

A third grand strategy, favored by many postmodern politicians and a worldwide community of activists, would emphasize transnational challenges over national rivalries and argue for moving issues such as climate change, poverty, migration, urbanization, pandemics, and disarmament to the front end of national policy agendas. From this perspective, great power rivalries and wars for hegemony are outdated relics of hyper-nationalism and excessive military influence over policy. Resources spent on defense and war-fighting should be diverted to international scientific collaboration and peacekeeping overseen by the United Nations or other international bodies. 

A fourth grand strategy is selective engagement and enlargement. This approach was supported by some in the Bill Clinton administration and emphasized economic growth through international cooperation and investment. Although there was broad agreement among Democrats and Republicans in the 1990s that liberalized free trade would be a rising tide that lifted all boats, it eventually became clear that some states would benefit much more directly than others. Military interventions were undertaken in the wake of a famine in Somalia in order to curb the power of warlords, resulting in the “Blackhawk Down” episode that led to a U.S. military withdrawal from that failed state. Elsewhere, the United States and NATO intervened to restore order in Bosnia in 1995 and waged war against Serbia in 1999 in order to prevent ethnic cleansing and sectarian strife in Europe. NATO’s attacks on Serbia in 1999 enraged the Russian government and its otherwise U.S.-friendly President Boris Yeltsin, a precursor of later objections to NATO enlargement by his successor, Vladimir Putin.

Among these competing grand strategies, the foreign and defense policies of the Biden administration have included some elements from each of the first three options. A Harris administration would most likely expand them. Growing defense budgets and robust U.S. and NATO military support for Ukraine against Russian invasion show that Godzilla Rex remains aspirational among both Democrats and many Republicans in Washington. U.S. support for Israel in the Middle East is close to offshore balancing against dangerous regional rivals (Iran and its proxies). Also, it reflects the historical American commitment to defending Israeli sovereignty against regional enemies. 

But so-called progressives in the Biden administration, including globalists as described above, have objected to Israel’s military tactics in the war against Hamas in Gaza. With regard to China, the Biden policy has been divided between options one and two: emphasizing a U.S. defense buildup and greater preparedness for an attempted Chinese military takeover of Taiwan or seeing China as more of an economic and informational competitor than an immediate military threat—although China’s growing capabilities for cyberwar and in space are admittedly of major concern. Still, others see China’s rise as a science and technology challenge that does not have to evolve into an arms race or war, which is more like option three. 

Where would a second Trump administration place itself in selecting among these grand strategies (or others)? It’s unknowable at the moment because Trump relies on his personal ability to engage with other heads of state in order to resolve international disputes. Some of his comments seem to endorse option one, Godzilla Rex. Still, he also prizes his ability to woo hostile leaders into more favorable alignments by grand summitry and selective engagement. Trump promises to crack down on illegal migration and on trade deals that disadvantage U.S. producers and manufacturers. 

In this respect, he combines old-style nationalism with an aggressive globalism turned upside down. He claimed credit for keeping the United States out of major wars during his administration, although he did authorize selective strikes against terrorists and rogue regimes. In public events during this year, he asserted that he would end the war in Ukraine between the time of his election in November 2024 and his inauguration in January 2025. Whether Ukrainian president Zelensky and Russian president Putin are on board with this timetable remains to be seen. In addition, during his term in the White House, some members of Congress and other commentators worried about Trump’s finger on the nuclear button should a Cold War-style nuclear crisis present itself. However, others noted that the U.S. decision-making process has safeguards against any presidential impetuosity.

Stephen Cimbala is a Distinguished Professor of Political Science at Penn State Brandywine and the author of numerous books and articles on international security issues. 

Lawrence Korb, a retired Navy Captain, has held national security positions at several think tanks and served in the Pentagon in the Reagan administration.

Image: GreenOak / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The railgun, an advanced artillery system using electromagnetic force to launch projectiles at high velocities, has faced significant challenges, leading to the U.S. Navy canceling its program in 2021.

-The main issues included durability, integration with ship power systems, and underperformance in tests. Despite this, China claims to be advancing its railgun technology, potentially incorporating it into their naval forces.

-While some analysts believe China may be bluffing to provoke U.S. spending, others worry about China's genuine progress in this field.

When the catapult was introduced into warfare, it changed history forever. Empires were built or destroyed by this ingenious weapon. They seem antiquated today, but the concept of taking an object and hurling it at enemy formation or fortification keeps its appeal. 

We are obviously well beyond the era of catapults. But the U.S. military and others have toyed with a more high-tech version of this artillery piece: the railgun.

Basically, a railgun uses electromagnetic force to propel an object toward a target at an extremely high velocity. The innovation is that the railgun uses electricity rather than chemicals to give the projectiles their speed.

The speed we are talking about leaves little time to react. There is in theory little defense against this type of attack. 

But while this technology was the great dream of many U.S. military engineers, it never came to fruition. 

According to ExecutiveGov, the Navy canceled the program because “the rails could easily experience wear and tear from firing multiple projectiles, resulting in a very high surface temperature, which can magnify durability issues even more.” 

Further, these weapons are power hogs, and their inability to integrate into the warship’s electrical grid made them useless as weapons. 

Finally, when railguns were tested at the U.S. Army’s Dugway Proving Ground in the Utah desert, they didn’t hit the range their designers had promised. 

All of this left the Navy with nothing to show for over a decade of work and hundreds of millions of dollars invested. In 2021, the Navy canceled the program and redirected its resources to more conventional defenses as well as its hypersonic weapons program.

The Navy couldn’t make it work, and we were told that it wasn’t that big of a deal. If the Navy couldn’t do it, certainly no one else, especially a foreign power, could ever attain this radical technology.

But China claims it is proving these Western leaders wrong. 

With China becoming a wealthy and modernizing nation-state, it is inevitable that they would enhance their military capabilities. As part of the effort, China is working on some radical, advanced new military technologies. One such new capability, they claim, is the railgun. 

Beijing announced the existence of their program just two years after the Pentagon abandoned theirs. 

Some in Washington, such as the analysts at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS), don’t think that the Chinese have the railgun. They believe China is bluffing on the topic. They see a sort of reverse-Reagan approach to handling the U.S. threat to China. U.S. President Ronald Reagan got the USSR to spend itself into oblivion partly by lying about what new systems the Americans were building, and China is doing that to the U.S. today.

But after every Chinese advance, the Western press enters the scene to downplay the threat and disparage anyone who would believe such sophistry. Beijing is undoubtedly turning some variation of the Reagan plan against the U.S. Yet China is also truly developing some advanced – and fearsome – technologies to combat the Americans.

Enter the Chinese railgun. They purportedly have a rudimentary version of the one the Americans had been developing. Chinese strategists also claim that the new railguns are being easily incorporated into their warships to give their naval force added protection and power-projection capabilities. 

The United States military, meanwhile, is struggling with all these problems. If China can build a railgun when the U.S. cannot, that is good reason to worry. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is due October 22 from Encounter Books. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

All images are Creative Commons or Shutterstock. All photos are of various submarine styles. 

From the Vault

Russia Freaked Out: Why the U.S. Navy 'Unretired' the Iowa-Class Battleships

Battleship vs. Battlecruiser: Iowa-Class vs. Russia's Kirov-Class (Who Wins?)

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock.

Summary and Key Points: China's People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is reportedly developing a "jam-resistant" Yu-10 torpedo, designed to effectively strike moving targets with high accuracy. This torpedo, launched from a Type-039B submarine, was demonstrated in a test that reportedly sunk a retired landing vessel.

-The Yu-10's capabilities are seen as a significant threat to large naval targets, including aircraft carriers.

-The ongoing development of such advanced torpedoes highlights China's efforts to enhance its submarine warfare capabilities, posing a growing challenge to U.S. naval forces.

China Developed Jam-Resistant Torpedo

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has repeatedly touted the capabilities of its DF-21D and DF-26B "carrier killer" missiles that can be fired by land-based mobile launchers. Beijing's deployment of such weapons could deny access to a potential adversary in the East and South China Seas, but now it seems that the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) could have in its arsenal a weapon that could be employed anywhere its submarines can travel.

China state media broadcaster China Central Television (CCTV) highlighted the capabilities of what was believed to be the PLAN's Yu-10 torpedo. In a video presented on the media outlet last month to mark the 70th anniversary of the founding of the PLAN's submarine, a Type-039B diesel-electric submarine (NATO reporting name Yuan class) fired the torpedo at a Type 074 amphibious landing vessel.

"Its stern was lifted out of the water by the explosion shock wave, accompanied by a column of water nearly 100 meters (328 feet) high," reported The South China Morning Post, adding that the Yu-10 is believed to have entered service around 2015, quoting an article in the Ordnance Industry Science Technology, a Chinese military magazine.

"From the CCTV video, the power of this torpedo means even an aircraft carrier could hardly escape the fate of sinking, let alone destroyers or landing docks. Even if not sunk, they would be essentially out of operation," the Chinese military publication had stated. "This technology uses the wake generated by the target vessel to correct the torpedo’s orientation to better track and effectively strike moving targets, which greatly improves the responsiveness and accuracy of the torpedo, making it more resistant to jamming."

Though the report from The China Morning Post claimed the Yu-10 has an estimated range of fifty km (thirty miles), which is comparable to the U.S. Navy's MK-48 Mod 7, the exact specifications of the Yu-10 torpedo have not been published, nor has its use in sinking the amphibious landing vessel been independently verified.

The apparent sinking of a retired Type 074 amphibious landing vessel was likely conducted in response to a pair of Sinking Excercise (SINKEX) drills carried out during the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2024 multinational exercises, and follows a similar event in June in which the amphibious transport dock ex-USS Cleveland (LPD-7) was sunk during the Valiant Shield (VS) 2024.

The Austin-class amphibious transport dock – the third ship of the U.S. Navy to be named for the Ohio city – had been maintained at the Naval Inactive Ship Maintenance Facility at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, since November 2017. The retired vessel was sunk as a target on June 17, during a naval-fire exercise.

During RIMPAC 2024, a U.S. Air Force B-2 Spirit bomber successfully sank the ex-USS Dubuque (LPD-8) – another Austin-class amphibious transport dock – with a GPS-guided bomb. Even more impressively, the decommissioned U.S. Navy amphibious assault ship USS Tarawa (LHA-1) was sunk after being hit by a Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM) from a U.S. Navy F/A-18F Super Hornet.

These recent U.S. and Chinese exercises highlight that sinking a warship may be the easy part, at least with the right ordnance. The trick would be getting through the vast screen of guided-missile destroyers and other defenses.

The danger for the U.S. Navy is that submarines like the PLAN's Type 039B are noted for employing an air-independent power (AIP) system that can allow them to remain submerged for long periods, operating quietly and stealthily.

As previously reported, several U.S. carriers have been notionally "sunk" in exercises by similar submarines, raising concerns about the safety of the floating air bases against such threats. Coupled with a "jam-resistant" submarine could make for a dangerous threat indeed.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu.

You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points - F/A-18 Fighters for Ukraine?: While Ukraine's receipt of F-16 fighter jets is seen as a significant boost, the limited number of these non-stealth aircraft may restrict their impact in the ongoing conflict.

-The F/A-18 Super Hornet, though versatile and capable, would face similar challenges, such as detectability by advanced Russian air defenses.

-Both aircraft would likely be used defensively, offering improvements but not dramatically altering the conflict's course. The war is expected to continue as it has for nearly three years.

Would the Ukrainians benefit from the gifting of Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet?

The Ukrainians are celebrating the arrival of the F-16 fighter jet – a gift from the Americans that has been billed as a potential game changer in the two-and-a-half-year-old conflict. But does the F-16 provide the Ukrainians with game-changing capabilities? And was the F-16 the best airframe for the Ukrainians?

Despite making its first flight fifty years ago in 1974, the F-16 is still a reliable and capable fighter. This single-engine fighter is equipped to operate in all weather conditions and a variety of different roles, making the F-16 well-suited for the volatile conditions of conflict. The F-16 is distinct for its frameless bubble canopy, which permits the pilot an exceptional, unobstructed field of vision. In production (almost) continuously since 1973, the F-16 is numerous, with 4,604 airframes built.

Yet only a handful of the F-16s have been sent to Ukraine, where officials believe at least 130 F-16s will be needed to neutralize Russian air power. The Ukrainians have not disclosed exactly how many F-16s they received, but it has been estimated that the number does not come close to approaching 130, meaning the effectiveness of the F-16 will be limited – in large part because the jet will be used conservatively in account of how finite the resource is.

Also limiting the effectiveness of the F-16 is the lack of stealth capabilities. Whereas modern fighters have minuscule radar cross sections, which permit operations in contested air space, the F-16 was designed before such stealth technology had been developed, and thus is easily detectable with modern air defense systems. The result is a jet that would have limited use in the conflict’s front lines. Instead, the F-16 would likely be used primarily in defensive situations.

As the F/A designation suggests, the F/A-18 is a versatile aircraft, offering impressive capabilities in both offensive and defensive situations. And while the F/A-18 is commonly associated with carrier operations, the jet is of course capable of operating from land, as well.

The F/A-18 has been built in far fewer quantities (1.480) than the F-16 and has been distributed far less (just three countries operate the F/A-18, whereas about twenty-five operate the F-16), meaning the Ukrainians are not going to receive the F/A-18 in quantities exceeding that of the F-16.

The F/A-18, also designed in the 1970s, is equally lacking in stealth technology. The result would be similar: the F/A-18 would struggle to survive against Russia’s advanced air defense systems and would likely be confined to a purely defensive role.

To be clear, the Ukrainian’s circumstances will be improved with the addition of the F-16 – and would be improved with the addition of the F/A-18; both airframes offer a quantity and quality increase over the existing Ukrainian inventory. But the improvements yielded won’t be sufficient to expel the Russian invaders, or to force Putin into some sort of peace agreement, or capitulation. The war will likely persist in much the same way it has persisted for nearly three years.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The delivery of American-made F-16 fighter jets to Ukraine is a significant development, but their impact on the war might be limited. Ukraine needs around 130 F-16s to neutralize Russian air power, but the number received is much lower. The F-16, like the JAS 39 Gripen, is non-stealth, making it vulnerable to Russian air defenses.

-While both aircraft could be valuable in defensive roles, neither is likely to change the conflict's dynamics significantly without more substantial numbers and capabilities.

The big news out of Ukraine is the delivery of American-made F-16 fighter jets to Kyiv’s forces. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy spent months lobbying for the fourth-generation fighters. Now the jets are finally ready for deployment against Russian aggressors.

“F-16s are in Ukraine. We did it. I am proud of our guys who are mastering these jets and have already started using them for our country,” Zelenskyy said. “These jets are in our sky and today you see them. It’s good that they are here and that we can put them to use.”

But the F-16 is unlikely to impact the war as much as Zelenskyy has advertised. Ukrainian officials have said Ukraine would need 130 F-16s just to neutralize Russia’s existing air assets. While the precise number of F-16s delivered to Ukraine has not been disclosed, we can be fairly certain that number is not 130. The result will be an F-16 force that is vulnerable to Russia’s air defense systems. 

Would another jet be more effective? Could Ukraine add something else in the NATO inventory, like the JAS 39 Gripen?

The F-16 has two shortcomings in Ukraine. First, the jet has not been supplied in numbers sufficient to tip the balance. Second, the F-16 is not a stealth aircraft. 

Let’s consider the supply issue first. To date, 4,604 F-16s have been built. They are in service with the United States and 25 other operating entities. The jet is prolific. The JAS 39, meanwhile, has been produced less than 300 times and is in service with just four air forces, two of them from NATO member-states. Ukraine could not turn to the JAS 39 to find the 130 airframes needed to neutralize Russian air power. That number would constitute nearly 50% of the type ever made and would need to come exclusively from Hungary and Sweden. That won’t happen. 

The F-16 is numerous and has long since proliferated throughout the NATO air force network, and Ukraine is still nowhere close to procuring the amount of F-16s needed to really make a difference against Russian air power. If Ukraine were to inherit the JAS 39, the limited numbers procured would make it a precious commodity, inspiring the kind of cautious use that would limit the jet’s impact on the outcome of the conflict.  

The second problem is that the JAS 39, like the F-16, is a non-stealth fighter. The Russian military has many deficiencies, but air defense does not seem to be one of them. Non-stealth fighters would not be survivable against Russian air defenses, meaning the JAS 39 would need to avoid frontline and behind-frontline operations. 

The JAS 39, like the F-16, would be limited to a more defensive role. This is valuable, of course, but unlikely to lead Russian forces to abandon Ukrainian territory.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.  

Image Credit: Creative Commons and/or Shutterstock. 

When Donald Trump picked JD Vance as his running mate, he whiffed. Overconfident in victory, he doubled down on the MAGA base. Has Kamala Harris now made the same mistake in choosing the sixty-year-old Minnesota Governor Tim Walz, a hero to the progressive wing of the Democratic party who popularized the term “weird” to describe Trump and co.?

Pundits such as Jonathan Chait are fretting that Harris missed an opportunity to move to the center. “What the selection does,” he wrote, “is forfeit her best opportunity to send a message that she is a moderate.” But there are good reasons to suspect that Walz, whose hard-hitting, no-nonsense, straight-talking speaking style has turned him into a social media sensation, might be able to compensate for some of Harris’ weaknesses in attracting voters in the Midwest.

Walz, who was born in 1964, grew up in Nebraska. After moving to Minnesota in the 1990s, he taught social studies at Mankato West High School and coached the football team, which won several championships. Walz has served in the National Guard for several decades and went on to push for veterans’ benefits. He has also served multiple terms in Congress, where he voted against intervening in Syria in 2013. He has also called for a “working” ceasefire in the Gaza war and should be able to bring many of those who voted “uncommitted” back into the Democratic fold. Choosing Pennsylvania Governor Josh Shapiro, by contrast, would have ensured that Harris had inflamed the disputes among Democrats surrounding Israel and the Gaza war.

Walz can speak effectively about the social issues that are proving to be an albatross around the Trump campaign’s neck—specifically, the issue of IVF. As Vance’s unbridled statements about women are being unearthed on what seems like almost a daily basis, Walz will surely focus on his own family’s experiences. He and his wife, Gwen, tried to have a child for seven years before fertility treatments finally succeeded. “It’s not by chance that we named our daughter Hope,” Walz has said. Vance voted against a Senate bill to protect IVF, prompting Walz to declare on MSNBC, “I don’t need him to tell me about my family. I don’t need him to tell me about my wife’s healthcare and her reproductive rights.” The only thing he and Vance apparently have in common is a taste for Diet Mountain Dew. Perhaps the loser of the election can send the winner a case of it.

No doubt Walz will be pummeled for the rioting that took place in May 2020 in the Twin Cities after the murder of George Floyd. The Trump campaign is licking its chops at the thought of depicting Harris and Walz as radicals who are unfit, if not incapable, of governing America. The rap on Walz is that when the Black Lives Matter riots took place, he froze, failing to send in the National Guard in a timely fashion to end the looting and violence. Walz needs to provide a clear and compelling account of why he waited three days to dispatch the National Guard—the best way to do that is probably by highlighting his own service in it. If he debates JD Vance, Trump’s running mate, this episode is sure to be a major line of attack.

Still, even as Walz and Vance joust, it’s reasonable to wonder whether any of it will really matter. Speaking at the National Association of Black Journalists convention last week, Trump himself responded to a question about Vance by observing, “Historically, the vice-president—in terms of the election—does not have any impact. I mean, virtually no impact.” It’s not clear that it will be any different in 2024 than in the past.

Jacob Heilbrunn is editor of The National Interest and is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. He has written on both foreign and domestic issues for numerous publications, including The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, Financial Times, Foreign Affairs, Reuters, Washington Monthly, and The Weekly Standard. He has also written for German publications such as Cicero, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, and Der Tagesspiegel. In 2008, his book They Knew They Were Right: the Rise of the Neocons was published by Doubleday. It was named one of the one hundred notable books of the year by The New York Times. He is the author of America Last: The Right’s Century-Long Romance with Foreign Dictators.

Image: Rebekah Zemansky / Shutterstock.com.

Summary and Key Points: The U.S. must prepare for the possibility that Russia successfully deploys nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapons, which could destabilize global security and disrupt conventional military operations reliant on satellites.

-While arms control efforts are crucial, the U.S. should also focus on ensuring its military can operate in a "denied space" environment. This includes wargaming scenarios where satellites are compromised and training to maintain strike capabilities without satellite support.

-Such preparations would reinforce deterrence and ensure varied response options to any potential nuclear aggression in space.

In February, it was revealed that Russia has been developing a nuclear-armed anti-satellite weapon. The Biden administration's response has focused mainly on arms control efforts aimed at preventing Russia from acquiring a space-based nuclear weapon in the first place. These efforts are important, but they are also insufficient. Steps must be taken now to prepare for the possibility that diplomacy fails. Nuclear anti-satellite weapons have the potential to fundamentally alter existing nuclear paradigms, creating a much more destabilizing environment than exists today. The U.S. must take action now to ensure it is ready to deal with the challenges posed by nuclear weapons in space. By preparing now, before nukes are put in orbit, the U.S. can better work to prevent such a day from ever happening at all.

U.S. deterrence strategy has long centered on its ability to tailor both conventional and nuclear response options to a wide range of different contingencies, as well as deliberate ambiguity surrounding when it would use nuclear weapons. Both these concepts would be thrown out the window if a nuclear anti-satellite weapon were detonated today. While the exact capabilities of Russia's space weapon are unknown, it is likely to pose as much a threat to its own satellites as it is those of the United States.

In May, then-Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy John Plumb testified that Russia's weapon would be "indiscriminate," and "pose a threat to all satellites operated by countries and companies around the globe." The U.S. would therefore likely be left without the ability to retaliate against Russia in space if it detonated its weapon. The only option would be to strike targets on the ground. At present, conventional U.S. forces rely heavily on access to satellite-provided GPS, intelligence, and communications. A conventional strike in this environment would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to carry out. A nuclear strike would be more feasible (though also challenging). A serious conversation should address whether a surface nuclear strike would be an appropriate response to a nuclear attack that does not directly kill people on Earth.

However, it is still critical that the president retain a variety of options to respond to the use of such a weapon. Thus, central to deterrence in a world of nuclear anti-satellite weapons will be the ability of conventional military forces to operate without access to satellites.

If satellites went down in the aftermath of the detonation of a nuclear space weapon, the ability of long-range strike fighter aircraft and bombers to carry out non-nuclear surface attacks against enemy targets would be crucial to maintaining the option of a conventional response to such an action. There have been some efforts to improve the ability of U.S. forces to fight in an environment without access to space, but these have been limited compared to activities aimed at maintaining such access. The latter efforts are important, but they will likely not be options once a nuclear anti-satellite weapon goes off.

The Navy and Air Force, with support from the Space Force, should wargame different "denied space" contingencies aimed at learning how to operate in an environment without access to satellites. The lessons from these wargames should then be applied and continued in actual live military exercises. These exercises would be aimed both at training pilots, aircrews, and commanders to conduct operations in a denied space environment but would also demonstrate to Russia and other potential U.S. adversaries that it will always have the option of retaliating with varying degrees of force to any type of nuclear aggression.

The U.S. should continue pursuing arms control efforts aimed at preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons in space. However, it must also be prepared for the possibility that these efforts fail. By preparing conventional strike fighter assets to conduct operations in a denied space environment, the U.S. will be adequately ready for a world where nuclear weapons are orbiting the Earth.

Luke Widenhouse is a research assistant at the Yorktown Institute and rising senior at St. John’s College in Annapolis, MD.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

Summary and Key Points - What will a 7th Generation Fighter Do in the Sky?: The future of military aviation is focused on evolutionary advancements rather than revolutionary leaps. The B-21 Raider builds on the B-2 Spirit's successes, and sixth-generation fighters are advancing current technologies.

-The concept of aircraft "generations" was popularized as a marketing tool by Lockheed Martin with the F-35.

-While the seventh generation isn't yet defined, it may feature autonomous capabilities, advanced materials, and multinational collaboration. However, such advancements could be decades away, possibly emerging in the 2070s or later.

The future is always around the corner, so we can always expect something new. Sometimes it will be small steps forward, while other times, it will be great leaps ahead. With military hardware, we've really reached a point where most of the advances are evolutionary, building on past successes and proven features rather than revolutionary – which could take designers in an entirely new direction.

Such is the case with the B-21 Raider, which is now in development. It is mainly building on the successes of the B-2 Spirit, and both feature a flying wing design. Likewise, most sixth-generation fighter designs have focused on what worked with fifth-generation aircraft and have taken it much further.

The question then is what we can expect with the "next-generation" beyond what is already in the prototype stage? Yet, even aviation experts can only ponder what we could expect to see.

"To be honest, I've not really heard anyone even mention 7th generation," explained Gareth Jennings, aviation editor at Janes, told me months back.

"Most 'Tier 2' nations that are building aircraft – Turkey, South Korea, etc. – are building their own fifth-generation jets, while Tier 1 nations (US, UK [and partners], France [and partners]) are looking at sixth generation. 7th Generation isn't really 'a thing' as yet," added Jennings. "That said; it is possible to look at the progression of previous generations and extrapolate that forward to take an educated stab at what might be features in a 7th generation jet."

However, Jennings further continued that even our concept of the generations of such wasn't set in stone. In fact, until the development of today's most modern fighters, there was no talk of a particular aircraft falling into a particular generation.

"It's important to first note that 'generations' don't really exist – they have only come into being as a way of classifying aircraft since Lockheed Martin used the term 'fifth-generation' to describe its F-35, and all older aircraft were kind of backfilled into what previous generation they were determined to best fit – so the F-4 became a third-generation aircraft, and the Eurofighter a fourth generation aircraft, etc.," said Jennings. "Lockheed Martin will readily admit that it was a marketing gimmick to make their product stand out, but it has stuck and is now in widespread use."

Even though the designations were actually only retroactively created, the U.S. Air Force has since broken down the respective capabilities of the generational designations:

*First-Generation: Jet propulsion

*Second-Generation: Swept wings, range-finding radar, and infrared-guided missiles

*Third-Generation: Supersonic flight, pulse radar, and missiles that can engage opponents from beyond visual range

*Fourth-Generation: High levels of agility, some degree of sensor fusion, pulse-doppler radar, reduced radar signature, fly-by-wire, look down/shoot down missiles, and more.

"So the thing about generations is that each new generation focuses on a number of key performance attributes while retaining the key performance attributes that defined the generations before it," Jennings suggested. "As an example, the third-generation F-4 Phantom retained the supersonic speed that largely defined the previous generation, but added to that advanced (for its day) mission computing and guided missiles."

In addition, the fourth-generation aircraft then took all of this and added fly-by-wire and advanced avionics, whilst the fifth-generation took all of this and added stealth, sensor fusion, and supercruise, Jennings noted.

"The sixth-generation will take this and add capabilities that haven't yet been publicly defined, but which are understood to include flexible payloads; an adaptable airframe; long-range sensing; analytics and computing; laser directed-energy weapons; advanced materials; intelligent maintenance; dynamically reconfigurable architecture; cyber protection; manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T); trusted artificial intelligence (AI) reasoning; airspace integration; hypersonic-propulsion technologies; space technologies; and a future 'wearable' cockpit," he further explained. "Added to these technological attributes, the sixth-generation is designed to be affordable and to utilize futuristic manufacturing processes and methods."

It is also important to note that aircraft have been unique in that they have been so steadily upgraded over the past 80 years. By contrast, the United States military is still fielding its M1 Abrams, a "third-generation" main battle tank (MBT). Two factors need to be considered, however. First, it was indeed a revolutionary leap forward, rather than evolutionary – and thus it may have reached a level of armored perfection, at least until some new technology is developed.

Second, and more importantly, the M1 Abrams has been steadily improved in a way that fighter aircraft generally aren't. However, the Cold War-era B-52 Stratofortress remains a capable bomber that will remain in service even as the aforementioned B-21 Raider comes into service. By the time the B-52 is finally retired, it could have served for nearly 100 years – and few military platforms have seen such longevity. This has been made possible due to the improvements it has received.

Jet fighters, which have increasingly become multirole aircraft, have continued to evolve – and will continue to do so. That explains why the 70-year-old B-52 and 50-year-old M1 Abrams tank remain in service, while efforts are already underway to replace the fifth-generation F-22 Raptor, which only entered service in 2005!

All that said, it is likely that some in the aerospace sector are thinking well beyond the currently-in-development aircraft to what can come next. The question becomes what could the next generation actually look like. We need only look to other technological developments in our civilian world today to see what the next great leap forward could bring.

"With the advent of the Metaverse, 3D metal printing, and the increasing capabilities of realistic simulation, our ability to create new weapons, including fighters quickly, is advancing significantly," explained technology analyst Rob Enderle of the Enderle Group.

"At the same time, autonomous technology is becoming more viable, and the concept of human digital twins is creating the opportunity for a next-generation fighter not limited by human frailties," Enderle told this reporter. "While it often takes a war to force a legacy process, like aircraft creation, to adjust to the speed of current technology, there is no reason why the next generation of high-performance fighters couldn't be created in months rather than years, and be configured to be flown by a digital twin of a top gun pilot."

The 7th generation fighter thus may not be decades in development and could be a response, even a reaction, to what the sixth-generation may offer.

"It can reasonably be supposed that the 7th generation will again take all of these facets, and add some as yet undefined/unknown technological capabilities that will define it as being different and more advanced than all that have gone before it," said Jennings. "What these will be is hard to say, as anything we can now imagine as being a viable and desirable technology and capability is already being addressed in the sixth-generation, and it's hard to imagine what hasn't yet been conceptualized or invented. My personal feeling, however, is that by the time we start to get to thinking about the 7th generation, the technology will be there to remove the pilot altogether and for the platform to be fully unmanned (not just remotely piloted, but autonomous in its own right). The issues, however, won't be technological, but will be more ethical, moral, and/or even legal as to the extent society is comfortable with the idea of such capabilities being developed and deployed."

However, what is also likely is that multinational efforts may be required to design, develop and, most importantly, produce the next generation.

"In terms of programmatics, as with the fourth, fifth and sixth generation, it is likely that any 7th generation program will be an effort in multinational collaboration (in the West at least), due largely to the costs involved in such an undertaking, as well as the need for common requirements, and to maximize the exports that will help pay for it," Jennings added.

While Enderle suggested the time gaps could come down, Jennings isn't as confident. It is true that technology is rapidly increasing, which can allow for materials to be printed – advancing prototyping and even production – while computer-aided design (CAD) can also speed the development; yet, the cost will remain a factor.

"For timelines, the gap between each generation has progressively lengthened as technologies have become more complex (at the same time as becoming more stable – the big jumps we saw in aviation technology and innovation at the dawn of the jet age are now much more incremental), while development, manufacturing, procurement, operating, and sustainment costs have risen to the extent that most nations would prefer to continue to use older aircraft which they can upgrade at a quicker pace and lower cost to keep pace with (most of) their peers and near-peers," he noted.

"As such, I wouldn't expect 7th generation to enter the discourse until probably the 2070s or even later."

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer who has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

This piece has been updated extensively since its first publication. 

Summary and Key Points: On April 15, 2024, the U.S. Air Force conducted its largest "elephant walk" involving B-2 Spirit bombers at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri.

-A dozen B-2s, representing nearly two-thirds of the entire fleet, participated in this show of force as part of the Spirit Vigilance exercise.

-The event demonstrated the readiness and strategic importance of the B-2 in the nuclear triad, especially after the fleet was grounded for part of 2023.

Nearly two-thirds of the entire United States Air Force's fleet of Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirit bombers took part in a show of force like no other on Monday, April 15, 2024. A dozen of the stealth bombers assigned to the 509th Bomb Wing lined up on the runway at Whiteman Air Force Base (AFB), Missouri, and executed a mass fly-off to cap off the annual Spirit Vigilance exercise.

It was the largest "elephant walk" – the term for the close formation of aircraft that taxi en masse prior to takeoff – involving the long-range strategic B-2 Spirits to date.

"This is a reminder that the B-2 Spirit bomber is the visible leg of nuclear triad," Col. Geoffrey Steeves, 509th Operations Group commander, had previously said of Spirit Vigilance. "Simply put, the B-2 is the world's most strategic aircraft. It is the only aircraft on the planet that combines stealth, payload, and long-range strike. We are charged with delivering the nation’s most powerful weapons for our most important missions."

While the B-2 regularly makes the rounds at high-profile events, including a flyover of the Rose Bowl college football matchup in California, it is rare to see more than a single of the flying wings. The previous record for mass fly-offs of B-2s occurred during the Spirit Vigilance 2022 exercise and involved eight bombers.

That display of power included about 40% of the total Spirit fleet. With eight bombers on the runway at roughly $2 Billion a piece, it drew approximately $16 billion in stealth bombers to a single location. On April 15 – somewhat fitting in that it was "Tax Day" – the price tag for the show of force had a $24 billion price tag. Yet, as a reminder to America's adversaries, these are truly "priceless moments."

It also was meant to serve as a reminder of the capabilities of the B-2 Spirit, which had been grounded for the first half of 2023, following an accident that closed Whiteman's runway. Though the Air Force maintained that the bombers could be employed if absolutely necessary in response to a major crisis the Spirit's wings were clipped for almost six months.

Putting 60% in the air in a single fly-off made it clear the Spirit is back in the sky.

The first elephant walks occurred during the Second World War when large fleets of allied bombers massed for attacks – and observers on the ground noted that as the aircraft lined up, it resembled the nose-to-tail formations of elephants walking to a watering hole.

Today, the U.S. Air Force employs elephant walks to show the capability of a unit as well as the teamwork that is required to conduct such an operation. It also can help pilots prepare for the launching of fully armed aircraft in a mass event if needed

The elephant walk involving the dozen B-2 Spirits also came just days after the U.S. Air Force demonstrated its formidable air power at Kadena Air Base, Japan, by performing a strategic lineup of diverse military planes including F-15 Eagles, F-16 Fighting Falcons, F-22 Raptors, and F-35 Lighting IIs fighters, as well as RC-135, P-8, E-3, and RC-135 aircraft.

"This gathering of air power comes as we welcome our new rotational units, bringing F-16Cs and F-22As to the Keystone of the Pacific, while also saying arigatou and farewell to our F-35As and Air National Guard F-15Cs," Kadena Air Base announced via a statement.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image Credit: U.S. Air Force. 

The characterization, by Donald Trump and his surrogates, of Vice President Kamala Harris’s alleged failings concerning border security is an amalgam of willful ignorance and bad faith. The many lies and half-truths are often spewed by Brandon Judd, the president of the Border Patrol Union who sometimes “opens” for the former President at some of his many rallies. Judd, it seems, is much more interested in parroting the Trump orthodoxy on Border Security than serving as a leader with the integrity that the men and women of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) deserve.

Unlike Trump and his cronies, The Biden-Harris Administration has known all along that no matter how many physical or legal barriers are erected in the name of border security, migrants will continue to seek asylum in the United States as long as conditions in their home countries are intolerable. President Biden wisely charged Vice President Harris with leading the diplomatic efforts (not “Border Czar”) to help reduce crime, violence, poverty and corruption in those nations responsible for the greatest percentage of migrants… and she made significant progress.

While Republicans were admiring the “Wall”, mugging for the cameras in their boots and jeans, Kamala Harris was doing the hard, time-consuming, frustrating, behind-the-scenes diplomacy. Working with the Northern Triangle countries of Central America, she was able to enlist the aid of over 50 American companies who invested $5 billion in those countries. Following this, migration from the targeted nations dropped by 50-60%. Conditions in the Northern Triangle nations are not going to improve over night. What is required is a long-term, multi-national effort to eliminate those factors that cause desperate people to flee their homeland. Fortunately, a future Harris administration understands that.

Trump relishes blaming Vice President Harris for what he asserts is chaos at the border and I, for one, agree that there is much to be done to improve unacceptable conditions at our borders.  The facts are, however, that the Biden-Harris Administration has made significant strides in improving border security even without the vital resources that would have been deployed under the bipartisan border bill; resources that would have drastically improved both the force strength and the effectiveness of CBP.  

The Biden-Harris Administration instituted tough restrictions on asylum claims that have, arguably, been instrumental in reducing illegal crossings to their lowest level since 2020. The Administration also deserves considerable credit for the recent evisceration of the leadership of the notorious Sinaloa Cartel with the arrest of cartel leaders “El Mayo” Garcia and Joaquin Guzman Loera, son of the infamous “El Chapo” Guzman. Additionally, in June 2021, under the leadership of Vice President Harris, Task Force Alpha, a law enforcement task force was established with the cooperation of Mexico and the Northern Triangle nations to combat smuggling and human trafficking.

Border Security is one of the most difficult, divisive, politically fraught and complicated national security issues facing our nation. It is irresponsible, in the extreme, for members of either party to use the border and its many related issues as a political weapon. But that is where we are today; particularly as it pertains to the GOP, its platform and the rantings of its presidential candidate and his surrogates.

Instead of focusing on meaningful, long-term solutions to a complex problem, like Vice President Harris has been doing, Trump and his minions engage in “Border Security Theater.” Over the course of the past six years, Trump and his surrogates (including the recently selected ice presidential candidate J.D. Vance) have periodically flocked to the Southwest border to stage photo ops in front of Trump’s “Wall.” Continuation of the supremely ineffective wall and the mass deportation of migrants are what pass, these days, for the heart of Trump’s “Border Policy.” The approach is breathtaking in its cynicism and emptiness.

In a feat of ethical gymnastics truly worthy of a gold medal, it is riveting to watch Brandon Judd laud the former President for his inspired leadership on border security, all the while knowing  that Trump bullied the GOP leadership into torpedoing the first tough, bi-partisan and meaningful border bill in generations. It was a bill that he and his union enthusiastically endorsed. That’s some chutzpah.

The nation was finally on the cusp of being able to bring meaningful change to our badly broken border and immigration programs, including more CBP Agents, advanced technology for detecting concealed contraband, more immigration judges, and much else. Trump, of course, initially favorable to it, had the deal killed when he realized he needed to preserve it as a campaign issue. This was unconscionable.

In November, the electorate will have a clear choice as to who is likely to bring positive, meaningful change to our troubled borders. With Trump, it will be more of the same – walls, rhetoric, threats, and bluster. With Kamala Harris, we have a chance to address the root causes driving migration and, perhaps, for the first time, focus on a permanent solution. For me, that’s an easy call.

Robert Kelly is the former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Drug Enforcement and former Deputy Chairman of the government’s Border Interdiction Committee. 

Image Credit: Shutterstock. 

Summary and Key Points: The Russian military has reportedly deployed the T-14 Armata tank in Ukraine months back, but it remains unconfirmed if these tanks are engaging in combat.

-The T-14, despite being a highly advanced main battle tank, has faced production delays and is considered too costly to deploy widely.

-The Kremlin may be hesitant to risk the T-14 in combat due to the potential damage to its reputation if it were destroyed. This suggests that Russia lacks confidence in the tank’s performance under battlefield conditions.

Is the Russian military finally deploying its latest T-14 Armata main battle tanks into Ukraine? 

Recent footage from months back indicates that the T-14 Armata is working and is in operational condition, but it won’t be seeing actual combat any time soon. 

The T-14 Amrata has been years in the making.

Weighing 55 tons and with a crew of three (commander, driver, and gunner), the T-14 Armata tank packs a 125mm main gun with an automatic loading system. 

Despite years of promotional fanfare, the tank has suffered production delays and manufacturing issues. 

In March, Sergey Chemezov, who leads the Russian defense giant Rostec, confirmed prior Western intelligence assessments and our coverage here at The National Interest that the Russian military hasn’t deployed the T-14 Armata tank in Ukraine. 

Chemezov said that the T-14 Armata is simply too expensive to deploy in the fighting in Ukraine, adding that the T-90 main battle tank is a more efficient option. 

Previously, the TASS state news agency had stated that the Russian military had used the T-14 Armata in Ukraine several times. The state-controlled media outlet has been known to push the Kremlin’s narrative, regardless of its accuracy. 

For all terms and purposes, the T-14 Armata should be considered a failed project. 

Russia has been engaged in the largest conflict since the end of World War II. It has lost between 450,000 and 320,000 men killed, wounded, and captured. The Ukrainian forces have also destroyed tens of thousands of heavy weapon systems. In more than 25 months of combat, the Russian forces have little to actually show for these devastating casualties. 

If the Kremlin is hesitant to deploy its most technologically advanced main battle tank even in the face of so many challenges, then it clearly doesn’t have any faith in it and doesn’t believe that it can perform under operational conditions. 

Claims about exorbitant costs are for domestic consumption. Despite the heavy international sanctions on Russia in response to its illegal invasion of Ukraine, the high energy prices have made the Kremlin billions of dollars. Moscow has the money to spend on its defense. 

An additional explanation as to why the Kremlin isn’t deploying the T-14 Armata is marketing. Moscow knows that it is vey likely the Ukrainian forces with their Western anti-tank systems would have a field day against the T-14 Armata.

Footage of smoldering T-14 Armata tanks in the fields and ditches of Ukraine would make it very marketable to foreign customers. Despite the overall questionable quality of Russian military hardware, Moscow is still a big player in the international arms market. 

Before the fateful February 24, 2022, Russia was making between $15 and $12 billion a year from selling weapon systems abroad. Its customers ranged from emerging powers like China and India to European countries like Cyprus to African warlords.

Although the number of foreign sales has dropped since the illegal invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin still makes between $8 and $5 billion a year. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense and national security journalist specializing in special operations. A Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ), he holds a BA from the Johns Hopkins University, an MA from the Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). He is pursuing a J.D. at Boston College Law School. His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

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