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Boeing is set to move full-rate production (FRP) for its electronic warfare (EW) kit that will be employed on the U.S. Air Force's fleet of F-15E Strike Eagle and F-15EX Eagle II aircraft. On Monday, the aerospace firm was awarded a $615 million Pentagon contract for the F-15 Eagle Passive Active Warning Survivability System (EPAWSS) FRP, which will see the multirole aircraft updated with the kits through the end of 2030.

"This contract provides for procurement of Group A and Group B kits, system engineering program management, and interim contractor support lay-in material," the Department of Defense (DoD) announced.

The EPAWSS was developed in a partnership between BAE Systems and the U.S. Air Force to replace the analog F-15 Tactical Electronic Warfare System (TEWS) and promises to increase the survivability of the F-15 from modern air defense platforms. Initial operational and test evaluations were conducted last year.

"BAE Systems is currently on schedule in support of Boeing's F-15 EPAWSS LRIP [low-rate initial production] activities and is looking forward to supporting Boeing in the FRP [full rate production] phase of the program," Kevin Fournier, EPAWSS program director at BAE Systems, said in a statement, per Breaking Defense.

A highly capable electronic warfare (EW) suite, EPAWSS is an all-digital radar warning, geolocation, situational awareness platform that was developed to aid in the detection and to counter surface and airborne threats in what BAE Systems describes as " highly contested, dense signal environments." It further provides radio frequency (RF) electronic countermeasures (ECM), while it is smaller and lighter than previous EW platforms employed in the F-15. The number of chaff and flare dispensers has also been increased with a full dozen holding 360 cartridges.

"EPAWSS is a leap in technology, improving the lethality and combat capabilities of the F-15E and F-15EX in contested, degraded environments against advanced threats," Explained EPAWSS test director Maj Bryant 'Jager' Baum. "EPAWSS has set the baseline for EW within the fighter community."

The installation of EPAWSS could help deliver on Boeing's efforts to transform the F-15EX into an Air Force version of the U.S. Navy's EA-18G Growler – the EW variant of the carrier-based F/A-18 Super Hornet.

Upgrading the Eagle Fleet

The U.S. Air Force inventory currently includes 218 F-15Es, and according to a December 2023 Pentagon Modernized Selected Acquisition Report (MSAR), 99 of the Strike Eagles will receive the upgrades – while all of the planned 98 F-15EX Eagles IIs that the service is acquiring will be equipped with the EPAWSS.

The numbers are a significant reduction noted in an April 2022 Select Acquisition Report (SAR), which stated that the procurement quantity would include "217 F-15E and 144 F-15EX aircraft." However, the Air Force scaled back on the upgrades citing the high costs. The totals could still be adjusted depending on how many F-15EXs the Air Force ends up acquiring, while it is also likely the oldest F-15Es (with the most flight hours) won't receive the enhancement given that their remaining service life.

"Used 34 years as a hybrid number for life-cycle since EPAWSS on F-15E has a 24 year while F-15EX has a 44 year life-cycle expectancy," the DoD's MSAR stated.

The work will be carried out at Boeing's facility in St. Louis, Missouri, and by BAE Systems in Nashua, New Hampshire. It was not stated how the work would be divided, but it is likely that Boeing would handle the installation of the EW suite in all of the F-15EX aircraft.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.
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At the tail end of 2024, two new Chinese stealth fighter demonstrators were revealed. The separate designs put forth by manufacturers Shenyang and Chengdu stunned aviation buffs and military experts alike. Both airframes featured qualities that would make them stealthy, high-performance next-generation platforms. While additional information surrounding these planes has yet to be publicized, their overall design falls in line with what experts have already assumed about China’s future aerial objectives. One of the combat aircraft depicted in leaked videos of the flights is likely a successor to the PLAAF’s current fifth-generation program. The Chengdu J-20 is widely considered to represent one of the most formidable jets of its kind to ever fly the skies. The “Mighty Dragon’s” design, from its fuselage shape and engine intake shape to its paint design and stealth, mirrors the American-made F-22 and F-35 platforms. If a full blown war were to erupt over the South China Sea, the J-20 platform would undoubtedly lead the PRC’s aerial strategy.

A brief overview of the J-20 platform

When the J-20 was first introduced to service, China became the second country ever to release a fifth-generation stealth aircraft. The aircraft was initially endorsed by the PLAAF in the early 2000’s and entered service in 2017. By 2019, considerable numbers of J-20s became operational. Initially, the fifth-generation platform flew with Russian AL-31 engines. The PRC later turned to its domestically produced WS-15 engine, an important transition as the Chinese engine is remarkably more capable than the Russian import as it allows the J-20 to enter a super cruise regime while unlocking the supermaneuverability granted by thrust vectoring.

Specs & capabilities- how does the J-20 compare to its American near-peers?

In terms of capabilities, aviation buffs believe that the J-20 features a sensor suite that parallels the F-35’s Electro-Optical Targeting System. The twinjet all-weather Mighty Dragon has a reported range of 1,200 miles, a servicing ceiling of 55,000 feet and a maximum speed of Mach-2.55. While these characteristics make the Chinese fifth-generation jet a formidable threat to its American near-peers, the extent of the jet’s capabilities remains unknown. A research fellow for airpower and technology at the United Kingdom-based Royal United Services Institute for Defense and Security called the Mighty Dragon “a qualitatively greater threat than any previous non-Western combat aircraft.”

The race to produce sixth-gen platforms is underway

In total, the PRC plans to increase production of the J-20 to match and even exceed the number of American-made Raptors in service today. If the Mighty Dragon reaches this production goal, the potential for incursions over Taiwan will heighten. The PRC remains steadfast in its ambition to seize control of this First Island Chain Nation in the near future. In addition to acquiring more J-20’s, China’s military is prioritizing the production of sixth-generation platforms. The upcoming H-20 Xi’an stealth bomber is Beijing’s counter for the American-designed B-21 Raider. China is also working to develop a next-gen fighter program as made evident by the recent flights of stealth fighter demonstrators.

Maya Carlin is a National Interest security contributor, an analyst with the Center for Security Policy, and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. 

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

China is reportedly developing two stealth bombers: the H-20 strategic bomber and the JH-XX tactical bomber. If China is capable of finishing either project, the military implications for the region could be significant, giving China a tool that to date only the Americans have ever possessed.

The Stealth Bomber

Only one country has ever developed and fielded a stealth bomber – the US and their B-2 Spirit. And when the B-2 was first delivered, in 1993, the aircraft was a legitimate game changer. Suddenly, the US possessed the ability to fly undetected, across enemy lines, and deliver either nuclear or conventional ordnance; the B-2 added another layer of sophistication to the US’s nuclear triad, which constituted the US’s nuclear deterrence strategy.

Times have changed, however. The B-2’s stealth technology is no longer cutting-edge; it’s radar cross section is no longer as impressive. Air defense systems have grown more sensitive, challenging the B-2’s ability to operate undetected. Accordingly, the Air Force is working on an updated stealth bomber, the B-21, which will presumably feature a smaller RCS.

Respect is still due: The B-2 was ahead of its time; over thirty years later, no nation has offered an equivalent technology. But now China is reportedly working to do just that, with not one stealth bomber but two.

China’s Efforts

Little is known about the Chinese efforts to field a stealth bomber. Details are exceedingly scant. But what is understood is that the H-20 project will offer a strategic option while the JH-XX will offer a tactical option. What does that mean? The H-20 will have a larger combat radius, perhaps upwards of 5,000 miles, and will feature advanced radar systems like the AESA. The H-20 would serve in a similar capacity as the B-2, giving the Chinese a credible method for delivering nuclear weapons via air, hence creating a credible nuclear triad.

The JH-XX meanwhile can be expected to have similar features but will be a smaller, regionally focused bomber that may include fifth-generation fighter technologies i.e., thrust vectoring, data fusion, network connectivity, supercruise, and an internal weapons bay. Granted, that’s not much to go on. Yet, the existence of the project has been confirmed through official channels; according to the Defense Intelligence Agency’s 2019 China Military Power report, “The PLAAF [ People’s Liberation Army Air Force] is developing new medium- and long-range stealth bombers to strike regional and global targets…stealth technology continues to play a key role in the development of these new bombers, which probably will reach initial operational capability no sooner than 2025.”

The report added that the JH-XX “will have additional capabilities, with full-spectrum upgrades compared with current operational bomber fleets, and will employ many fifth-generation fighter technologies in their design.” That’s not a lot to go on. The significant takeaway is simply that the Chinese are working on a stealth bomber, an ambition that is consistent with Xi’s overarching ambition of enhancing Chinese military prowess and revisionism.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Russian state media reported that an airstrike was carried out on Wednesday in the Ukrainian-occupied Kursk region involving a Sukhoi Su-34 (NATO reporting name Fullback). The fighter-bomber launched guided glide bombs at ground targets, while it was escorted by a Sukhoi Su-35S (NATO reporting name Flanker-M).

"The crew of a Russian Aerospace Forces Su-34 multi-role supersonic fighter-bomber delivered a strike on a cluster of Ukrainian military manpower and armored and motor vehicles near the border in the Kursk Region," the Russian Ministry of Defense said in a statement to Tass.

"After completing the combat mission, the entire group successfully returned to the base airfield. According to the intelligence report, the targets were successfully hit," the Defense Ministry added.

The airstrikes were allegedly carried out on a "Ukrainian stronghold," and the Kremlin claimed multiple Ukrainian personnel were killed and several vehicles destroyed. Kyiv has not commented on the strike or confirmed that it suffered any losses.

Replenishing the Losses

It was just weeks ago that the United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), a subsidiary of the military-industrial conglomerate Rostec, announced that it had delivered a new batch of Su-34s multirole fighters to the Russian Aerospace Forces.

UAC didn't state how many fighters were delivered in the latest consignment, but it has been reported that Moscow's rate of attrition has been outpacing production throughout the ongoing conflict. Last month, Stavros Atlamazoglou, writing for The National Interest, cited Oryx open-source data that found thirty-seven Su-34s had been to that point.

Russia was believed to have around 163 operational Su-34s at the start of the conflict nearly three years ago. Though the Kremlin didn't confirm the loss of one in October, Russian military bloggers (mil-bloggers) acknowledged that a Su-34 was shot down by an American-made F-16 Fighting Falcon. It marked the first successful air-to-air kill involving the F-16 in Ukraine.

Russia's Fullback

The Sukhoi Su-34 multirole strike aircraft is a twin-engine, twin-seat, all-weather supersonic medium-range fighter-bomber, initially developed for the Soviet Air Forces in the 1980s. A derivative of the Sukhoi Su-27 (NATO reporting name Flanker), the Su-34 was developed to operate in all weather conditions and conduct attack, bombing, and fighter missions.

The development of the aircraft was one of the Kremlin's many programs that were forced on the backburner following the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the economic crisis that followed. The Su-34 program was only revived in earnest in the early 2000s, with eight pre-production aircraft built for trials and evaluations. The aircraft formally entered service in 2014 – although there are reports that the strike aircraft was employed during the Russo-Georgia War of 2008.

As Atlamazoglou further emphasized, the aircraft was designed with "an enhanced cockpit with additional armor to withstand anti-aircraft ground fire," while it also is equipped with "advanced electronic warfare countermeasures to jam or defeat enemy anti-aircraft missiles." The Su-34 is capable of reaching Mach 2 (approximately 1,500 miles per hour) and is able to carry 18,000 pounds of ordnance on its 12 hardpoints. It can conduct air-to-air attacks beyond visual range (BVR), but also be employed in a fighter-bomber role – which appears to be how the Kremlin is now mostly using the aircraft.

Though it can strike targets up to 160 miles away, that doesn't seem to be far enough for the fighter-bomber to avoid hostile air-defense fire, or enemy aircraft as noted in the October encounter with the F-16.

Thus while the Su-34 remains among Russia's most capable multirole aircraft, and it has been widely used in the ongoing war, it clearly isn't invincible. The question now is whether Russia will be able to replace the losses – especially as Ukraine is to receive additional F-16 Fight Falcons and French-made Mirage 2000s.

The Su-35S

As previously reported, the Sukhoi Su-35 has been touted as one of the most advanced 4++ generation aircraft systems, combining many fifth-generation elements. It is also a heavily upgraded derivative of the Su-27 aircraft and was originally intended for export.

As UAC failed to initially find foreign buyers, the Su-35S first entered service with the Russian Aerospace Forces in 2014 and made its first combat deployment in Syria in 2015 – where it was employed to provide cover for other Russian aircraft on bombing missions.

While sharing broadly the blended wing-body design of the Su-27, the Su-27M/Su-35S can be visibly distinguished from the basic version by the addition of canards, which are small lifting surfaces, ahead of the wings. The Su-35's large and powerful Saturn AL-41F1S engines provide it the ability to supercruise for a long time, while it can reach supersonic speeds without using an afterburner.

The engines are also noted for employing three-dimensional thrust vectoring, which makes the Su-35 very maneuverable. Currently, it is the only production fighter to use two-plane thrust vectoring nozzles.

Designed primarily to be an air superiority fighter, the Su-35 has secondary air-to-ground capability and can carry an enormous amount of weapons. It has 12 wing and fuselage hardpoints, which allow for it to carry ordnance with a maximum weight of up to 8,000 kg (17,630 pounds), including a variety of air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation, and anti-ship missiles, as well as a number of TV, laser-, and satellite-guided bombs. The Su-35's armament also includes a GSh-30-1 30mm autocannon with 150 rounds.

The multirole aircraft can further be equipped with an electronic warfare pod, which provides it with powerful jamming capability. It has been reported that its advanced jammers can reduce the performance of enemy radars, and can blind onboard radars found on missiles, notably the AIM-120 AMRAAM.

Russia is reported to have around 120 Su-35s in service, while at least six are believed to have been lost in the fighting in Ukraine. It would seem that the Su-35S may have a new role – namely protecting the Su-34 when it carries out its ground attacks.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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Even one of the greatest weapons of mass destruction has what could be described as a "shelf life." On Tuesday, the United States Department of Energy announced that its National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) had completed a program to keep the B61-12 nuclear bomb in service for decades to come.

The B61-12 Life Extension Program (LEP) was initiated in 2008, with a specific focus on upgrading the family of B61 gravity bombs, "which are deployed from U.S. Air Force and North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) bases." The latest modification of the original bomb, the B61-12 is a twelve-foot-long, approximately 825-pound, air-launched nuclear gravity bomb that utilizes an inertial navigation system (INS) to make a precision strike on a target.

According to NNSA, the B61 has already been in service for more than five decades, yet remains both "the oldest and most versatile weapon in the enduring U.S. nuclear weapon stockpile." The B61-12 LEP is meant to further extend the service life of the bomb stockpile by at least another 20 years. That will include refurbishing, reusing, and if necessary even replacing some of the nuclear and non-nuclear components.

As a result, instead of entirely fresh ordnance, the B6-12s are a combination of new and refurbished components from earlier variants including the B61-3, B61-4, B61-7, and B61-10. On December 18, 2024, NNSA completed the Last Production Unit (LPU) of the B61-12 LEP – the culmination of an effort that began almost 20 years earlier.

"Completing the B61-12 on schedule is the latest example of what we've been saying for several years now: NNSA is delivering capabilities at the pace and scale needed by our Department of Defense partners and our deterrence requirements," said Under Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and NNSA Administrator Jill Hruby. 

The total cost of the program was reported to be approximately $9 billion.

Upgrades to Continue

The B61-12 LPU came three years after the First Production Unit (FPU) was achieved in November 2021, and 17 years after its design and development was first initiated.

"NNSA's program managers and experts from Los Alamos National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, the Pantex Plant, the Savanah River Site, the Y-12 National Security Complex, and the Kansas City National Security Campus worked in close collaboration with NNSA on the design, development, qualification, and component production," the Department of Energy explained.

"Completion of the last B61-12 testifies to the successful collaboration we've had with our U.S. Air Force and Department of Defense partners. The momentum built through B61-12 production and delivery will continue into delivery on the other six active weapons modernization programs and on additional programs that will become active in the coming years," explained Dr. Marvin Adams, deputy administrator for Defense Programs at the DoE. "Achieving LPU in FY 2025 demonstrates our ability to execute, not only to our partners and stakeholders in DoD and Congress but also to our adversaries and allies. This demonstration is itself a contribution to deterrence and assurance."

Even as the B61-12 LEP has reached its end, NNSA will look to the B61-13, which will further build on this last upgrade effort. It is scheduled to reach its FPU in the department's fiscal year 2026 (FY26).

An Air-Launched Nuclear Weapon

The B61-12was first integrated with the U.S. Air Force's F-15E Strike Eagle, where it is carried externally, and the weapon is also being certified to be carried on the Air Force's B-2 Spirit strategic bomber, as well as the F-16C/D fighter.

Last March, the F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) confirmed that the Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II achieved its nuclear certification to carry the gravity bomb in October 2023, becoming the first fifth-generation nuclear-capable aircraft. With that certification, the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) variant stealth fighter further became a "dual-capable" aircraft able to carry both conventional and nuclear weapons internally.

However, it was noted at the time that the F-35A can only carry the upgraded B61-12 variant – but that is essentially a moot point now that the program has reached its LPU. In addition, the certification did not extend to the stealth jet's sister variants, the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B and carrier-launched F-35C. It remains unclear if and when those variants could receive the certification – and as the F-35A can carry the current variant, it is expected it will be certified for the B61-13 as it enters service.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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Uncle Sam is getting his rear-end kicked by the Russians and Chinese (heck, even the North Koreans are starting to outdo the Americans) in the all-important realm of hypersonic weapons. Indeed, it’s possible that China is even already creating working defenses against hypersonic weapons (meaning that Beijing is doubling up on success whereas the Americans are still languishing in the design phase).

But a new US defense project is desperately trying to change that. This author remains highly skeptical about the endeavor. Given how key hypersonic weapons are, and will continue to be, the effort by the Defense Department and the defense firm known as Kratos, must be assessed. 

Kratos Saves the Day?

Under the rubric of “MACH TB 2.0” Kratos is attempting to “enhance the United States’ capabilities in hypersonic technology through rapid, affordable testing,” according to Kalif Shaikh at Interesting Engineering, a trade publication.

Both the Kratos leadership and the top brass at the Pentagon believe that one of the key reasons that the Russians and Chinese have surpassed the Americans in developing a reliable, real-world hypersonic weapons capacity has to do with the extreme costs of hypersonic weapons development and testing. 

In fact, when it comes to testing hypersonic systems, the United States is far behind the curve. Wind tunnels are key elements behind testing hypersonic systems. Guess where the world’s most powerful wind tunnel is for testing hypersonic systems? If you guessed the United States, you’d be wrong—it’s actually in China. 

Kratos is leading a group of powerful defense contractors, including the likes of Leidos and Rocket Lab, all of which are keen on expediting the R&D cycles of American hypersonic weapons. Kratos believes that they can reduce the risks and costs associated with hypersonic weapons development by accelerating the delivery of these systems in the field. One way to do that is by deploying advanced flying testbeds to allow for researchers to assess the efficacy of their hypersonic systems in real-world conditions.

Is the Problem Fundamental or Can It Be Resolved Quickly?

Pentagon insiders (and those at Kratos) do not believe that the United States lacks the fundamentals to achieve parity with both Russia and China in hypersonic weapons. They think the problem is taking all the disparate pieces the Pentagon has been assembling for hypersonic weapons research and development and simply accelerating those projects. There might be something to this theory. 

After all, hypersonic weapons have been researched since the last part of the Cold War. It’s not really new technology. The Americans, however, ignored the need to develop these systems which left a gap for both Russia and China to fill.

So, it might very well be that this is an application problem rather than a fundamental inability to compete. Of course, the United States is being shown up by its rivals, notably China, in multiple other domains. Yet, the Americans are right to give the Kratos team a chance to see if they can simply accelerate the American development of hypersonic weapons. If Kratos is right then the US could achieve real parity with China and Russia in hypersonic weapons in the five years or so.

There are some problems with this outlook. 

Fundamentally, the defense industrial base is broken and the procurement systems for these weapons systems are increasingly corrupt and inefficient. The quest for greater weapons has been reduced to little more than massive profit motive by defense firms—even at the expense of national readiness.

Should the Kratos team be wrong, and the problems affecting America’s hypersonic weapons development are far more fundamental and systemic, then the United States will find itself in a world of hurt, as Chinese and Russian hypersonic weapons rise that can threaten the homeland in ways that conventional missiles simply cannot. 

A global arms race is occurring, and the Americans are in the unenviable position of being on the defensive. Hopefully Kratos can help overcome these problems soon. 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Recent geopolitical developments in the Middle East prove true Vladimir Lenin’s infamous quote that, “There are decades where nothing happens; and there are weeks where decades happen.” That’s because about a month ago the entire geopolitical framework that has existed in the Mideast for decades was completely upended in a relatively short amount of time. 

For the first time since the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, which loosed the Islamic Republic of Iran from its strategic box, the Iranians have been placed on the defensive and their overall strategic position in the region is utterly crumbling. 

As a result of these incredible actions in just a little more than a month, Iran is desperately flailing about in a spasmodic attempt to restore its unstable regional security situation. Recent days have seen pronouncements about rapid Iranian nuclear weapons development meanwhile since last month news about Iran’s mysterious drone mothership has slowly leaked out to the West. 

Earlier this week, Iran’s state-controlled Channel 3 made an ominous prediction that, “In the coming hours, the world will witness unusual scenes and developments.” 

No one knows for sure what that means. It is likely just another desperate act from a regime that, let’s face it, is about to feel the squeeze from the incoming Trump administration if President-Elect Donald Trump’s running commentary on Tuesday, January 7, about Iran and the hostages being held by Hamas in the Gaza Strip are any indicator. 

A Drone Mothership is Born

Regardless, Iran is clearly doing everything in its power to restore its unstable and rapidly deteriorating security situation. An area that should cause some alarm among Western security officials is Iran’s drone carrier, the Shahid Bagheri. This vessel is a modified container ship. Specifically, it is an augmented 24-year-old container ship named the Perarin. The ship was transformed at the Iran Shipbuilding & Offshore Industries Complex Company near Bandar Abbas in Iran.

Significant structure modifications were needed to make the old container ship into a weapon of war. An angled flight deck and a specialized ski-jump takeoff ramp were installed on the boat. Of course, the ship retains its original superstructure. Angled decks for launching and recovering drones was, therefore, necessary. Those modifications included white markings to guide flight operations, indicating that the Iranians are serious about precision in their onboard drone operations. 

Designed to carry a variety of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), including medium-range altitude, long-range endurance drones, vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) drones, and one-way attack drones, the vessel’s capacity suggests she will carry a significant and lethal array of drones. One can assume what kind of drones will be present onboard this ship, but the Iranians have been characteristically mum about the details. Although, the fact that there is a ski-jump ramp indicates the likelihood that the Iranians plan on launching jet-powered drones and/or heavier, longer-range systems from this boat. It’s a significant force multiplier.

The Shahid Bagheri apparently left its port the week of November 12. Its whereabouts are not publicly known (it is very likely that US intelligence has a clear understanding of where this boat is, though). The ship is a perfect example of Iran’s method for keeping up with larger military powers that are competing with the Islamic Republic. By taking existing civilian technology, like the container ship, and converting it into a relatively cheap drone carrier, the Iranians just enhanced their naval power projection significantly on the cheap. 

A Master of Asymmetrical Warfare on the High Seas

By having the Shahid Bagheri (other drone carriers are under construction, too), the Iranian Navy can engage in destabilizing military operations against international shipping passing through the Persian Gulf, the Arabian Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Bab El-Mandeb, and the Red Sea. 

Shahid Bagheri’s role in asymmetrical warfare will be crucial for keeping Iran in the great geopolitical game, especially in light of its recent bad luck at the hands of Turkey and Israel in places like Syria. 

There are, of course, downsides to this jerry-rigged vessel. While it is insanely cheap and gives the Iranian Armed Forces significant capabilities boost, the vessel was not originally designed as a military ship. Therefore, there are inherent limitations to the ship. This is especially true in light of Iran’s serious lack of protective escorts for the drone carrier. 

Beyond that, though, this ship is relatively easy to spot and track for most modern intelligence agencies. So, its threat is likely still limited. Indeed, it was tracked as it left its homeport by the civilian Western satellite firm, Maxar Technologies. 

Where Shahid Bagheri can do the most amount of damage is in the waters surrounding the Middle East. If, however, Tehran gets it in its head that this boat can be used to project military power across distances, such as the Atlantic Ocean, they would find whatever advantages the ship gave their navy utterly negated.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

Fait historique remarquable, les génocides n'ont entraîné que peu de vengeances. Pour que les survivants n'enclenchent pas le cycle infernal des représailles et que les coupables soient châtiés, les institutions judiciaires s'emploient à monopoliser la punition tant au plan national qu'international. (...) / Génocide, Idées - 2025/01

Toutes les guerres se finissent un jour. Celle qui a dévasté la Syrie depuis 2011 a connu un dénouement provisoire avec la chute d'un régime en place depuis 1970. Si la Turquie fait figure de grande gagnante de ce bouleversement, la passivité des soutiens internationaux du pouvoir déchu (Russie et (...) / Syrie, Dictature, Proche-Orient, Printemps arabes 2011- - 2025/01

Few remember the Vought A-7 Corsair II. The Navy attack jet simply lacked the cultural presence to make any sort of staying impact – despite serving for one quarter century. The reason, I suspect, is because the A-7 was quite ugly.

Making an Impact

While the average member of the public may not track military aircraft, most seem to have a general awareness of the basics. Many aircraft gain some mainstream traction either through their use in entertainment, or through some sort of policy/budgeting debate. The F-14 and F/A-18, for example, were featured in the Top Gun franchise and resultingly gained presence amongst the general public. To a lesser extent the A-6 gained exposure through Flight of the Intruder; the F-16 through Iron Eagle. Other aircraft, like the B-1, the A-10, and the F-35, were in the news frequently—thanks to development or budgeting debates—enough to have become somewhat recognizable. Still, other aircraft simply serve before being decommissioned and, ultimately, fading entirely from the public’s conscious. The A-7 is one such aircraft.

As a quick aside, the A-7 was featured in a film, The Final Countdown, starring Kirk Douglas and Martin Sheen, albeit in a limited role.

Anyways, the A-7 was a capable aircraft, despite its lack of cultural staying power. Carrier-compatible, the A-7 entered service in 1967, at the beginning of the Vietnam War, as an intended replacement for the Douglas A-4 Skyhawk. The A-4 stayed in service, however, meaning that the A-7 never did serve as a direct replacement for the A-4. Nevertheless, the A-7 was integrated into the Navy as a valuable attack aircraft.

The distinguishing performance feature of the A-7, perhaps, was its subsonic flight speed. In an era where jets were being made to push the speed envelope, to break the sound barrier, the A-7 was designed to fly about as fast as a commercial airliner. The reason: subsonic jets could be made smaller and cheaper and were simpler to maintain.

Derivative of a Gunfighter

The A-7 was derived from Vought’s F-8 Crusader, a single-engine, supersonic, air superiority jet that was known as “The Last of the Gunfighters.” The F-8 was first flown in the 1950s, and served with the US Navy until 1976. The A-7 would adopt the general layout of the F-8, only shorter, with a stubbier nosecone—making for an ungainly appearance. Yet, despite the A-7’s appearance, the jet would perform admirably. Notably, the A-7 could perform rapid aileron rolls, even when weighed down with its impressive six-ton payload, which happened to make for double the payload capacity of the A-4. In addition to a massive payload capacity, the A-7 had impressive range—again double that of the A-4—making the A-7 an effective candidate for bombing missions.

The pilots noted that the A-7 was easy to fly, with excellent forward visibility. Although the jet was not perfect, lacking stability on crosswind landings, suffering from poor stopping performance, and lacking adequate thrust (which would later be addressed with an upgraded TF30-8 engine). The pilots also gave the A-7 a nickname, perhaps the most enduring feature of the now-obscure aircraft: “SLUF,” which stands for “Short Little Ugly F****.”

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

After the collapse of the Assad regime, the current sanctions laws are in desperate need of reform. The Syrian people have long suffered from the effects of blanket economic restrictions that crippled the economy and gave rise to widespread black-market activity and cronyism. The broken licensure system hindered humanitarian operations and paralyzed essential infrastructure in the energy, health, and education sectors. At the same time, targeted sanctions, colloquially known as “smart” sanctions, were actively evaded using a complex network of shells that Assad publicly boasted about for years.

World leaders—particularly in the United States and Europe—should devise a sanctions reform strategy to address these issues. The U.S. Treasury’s issuing of General License 24 (GL 24) is a first step towards reforming sanctions, signaling to regional partners and Syrians a shift in policy while supporting the reconstruction of Syria post-Assad. For the incoming Trump administration, it is key to any new Middle East security architecture, especially as the outgoing administration expands its military footprint through Operation Inherent Resolve, which has long followed a misguided “by, with, and through” defense policy in Syria and Iraq.

Sectoral, Targeted, And Terrorism Sanctions On Syria

The Assad regime was one of the first members of President Jimmy Carter’s list of states sponsoring terrorism published in 1979. However, it was not until the Syria Accountability Act of 2003 that Washington ramped up sectoral sanctions. With Assad’s intransigence and continued regional destabilization, the Bush administration issued executive orders that extended export controls to cover the transportation, banking, and telecommunications sectors. This included listing the Commercial Bank of Syria as a primary money laundering entity, bringing correspondent banks and Exim operations to a halt. Executive Orders 13441 and 13460 reinforced these initial sanctions, leading to a first wave of capital flight and foreign direct investment.

As the Syrian uprising spread in 2011, the scope of trade restrictions expanded to include the central bank and energy sector, forcing foreign firms to declare force majeure and halt production-sharing agreements. Those contracts were a major source of ill-gotten gains as Assad’s investment funds, like Al-Mashreq, were actively used to divert oil revenue and enrich his family. The regime’s persistent collocation of its criminal regional enterprise to official government institutions resulted in a complex web of export controls under the broad aegis of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) and the National Emergencies Act. In 2017, the U.S. Congress introduced the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act, which aimed at protecting civilians from Assad’s criminal enterprise.

A deluge of terrorism-related sanctions has also applied to multiple military factions in Syria since 2012. Some of the designations are multilateral, issued by the United Nations Security Council, such as Resolution 2253. Others are unilateral U.S. designations under the authority of Executive Order 13224, such as the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation for entities and Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT) for individuals—including Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and its leader, Ahmad al-Sharaa. Notably, GL 24 draws a thin line authorizing HTS-related transactions for public services while banning military transactions.

In general, terrorism sanctions require an audit and a potential remedy through a step-for-step model. As the designations are aimed at national security, they should not be extended to the Syrian economy at large, nor should they constitute a barrier to the express issuance of sanctions waivers.

Biden’s Legacy In Syria

Historically, the Biden administration did not ramp up pressure against the regime and signaled that sanctions are reversible. According to sources who spoke on background, Biden’s National Security Council (NSC) actively blocked reform to Syria sanctions by pressuring Congress to freeze all Syria-related bills, especially in 2024. The subsequent delays in the U.S. Congress to update and advance Syria legislation caused friction in the bipartisan agreement against the Assad regime.

The administration did not enforce multiple bills that had passed through previous National Defense Authorization Acts. Officials also ignored existing IEEPA law requiring sanctions evaders to face civil or criminal penalties. As a result, Assad hid his assets as the Ultimate Beneficiary Owner, using nominee shareholders to pierce the U.N. procurement system and buy time for the ten-year sunset clause on penalties to lapse. It took two years for the U.S. treasury to close the controversial 50 percent loophole that Bashar al-Assad’s wife, Asma, abused.

On Captagon, Secretary Blinken deflected requests to designate the regime as a major illicit producer and transit state despite the large body of evidence. The designation would have stripped Assad of revenue, stopped him from procuring precursor chemicals, and given jurisdiction to the U.S. judiciary and Drug Enforcement Agency. The U.S. Department of State also missed an opportunity to reveal Assad’s net worth by limiting its reporting to open-source information. The State Department’s Office of Sanction Coordination hesitated on the Arab gas project and sent mixed messages until it was stalled. Ultimately, regional geopolitics focused on flawed security considerations dominated U.S. Syria policy every time.

On Caesar, the White House has been treading water in reform and renewal. The Caesar code goes well beyond sanctions, requiring accountability and elimination of chemical weapons. It contains economic recovery provisions that facilitate USAID assistance. Hence, it represents a roadmap for transitional justice supported by Syrians. After the collapse of the regime, Caesar’s secondary sanctions are effectively moot as the extraterritorial reach to deter Assad’s re-normalization is no longer applicable. In addition, the names of regime war criminals need an update and expansion as part of a broad legal redefinition of the government of Syria.

The Urgent Need For Licensure Reform

Despite the embedded exemption for non-governmental organizations (NGOs), the scope of the authorization is limited. While GL 24 authorizes energy-related transactions essential to early recovery, it is limited to donations and requires special licenses for commercial exports. Hence, the current Export Administration Regulations (EARs) enforced by the U.S. Commerce Department’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) still constitute a significant barrier to stabilization and reconstruction.

A series of waivers are necessary for NGOs to achieve aid localization and overcome procurement hurdles. According to humanitarian stakeholders, the World Health Organisation, and the United Nations, the situation in Syria is dire. Hence, the general license was warranted and supported by precedent. It will help reverse derisking and overcome ambiguous compliance issues, especially as humanitarian organizations are often stretched in human resources and face clearance hurdles that delay their operations. That said, it is not a perfect or permanent solution.

Wider sanctions reform serves multiple purposes. First, it alleviates the compliance concerns of regional states and companies for an emergency crisis response. Second, it allows USAID to increase its assistance to the Syria Recovery Trust Fund and provide paired expertise for capacity building. This would help implement vital International Humanitarian Law modalities like Cash and Voucher Assistance for Internally Displaced Persons. Third, it would align the U.S. policy stance with regional and international partners who signaled their readiness for speedy humanitarian assistance at scale.

Ultimately, the warped worldviews held by the White House NSC, colored by frustrations from the Obama era, complicated the Syria crisis and prolonged Assad’s control. The incoming Trump administration is left with the tall task of sanctions reform. This will entail restructuring the U.S. deployment in Syria and Iraq, as well as redefining the legal definition of the government of Syria under ambiguous circumstances. However, before embarking on such a wide regional realignment, an urgent disaster response is needed from the United States and the West, given their roles as the largest humanitarian donors to Syria.

Alexander Langlois is a foreign policy analyst focused on the Middle East and North Africa. He holds an M.A. in International Affairs from American University’s School of International Service. Follow him on X: @langloisajl.

Abed Al-Thalji is a policy analyst focused on Sanctions & Foreign Affairs. He holds an MSc. in International Trade from Gothenburg University’s School of Business, Economics, and Law.

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Alors que l'envoyé spécial de M. Emmanuel Macron, l'ancien ministre Jean-Marie Bockel, remet fin novembre son rapport sur la reconfiguration du dispositif militaire français en Afrique, Paris apprend par surprise la décision du Sénégal et du Tchad de mettre un terme aux accords de défense qui les (...) / Afrique, France, Tchad, Sénégal, Relations internationales, Armée - 2025/01

Depuis six mois, l'obstination de M. Emmanuel Macron à ignorer le désaveu électoral dont il a été l'objet provoque une situation de blocage politique et d'instabilité ministérielle. Pour se maintenir au pouvoir, il cherche à créer une coalition de « troisième force » allant de la droite au centre gauche. (...) / France, Politique, Démocratie, État - 2025/01

La loi du 16 juillet 1949 encadrant la littérature pour la jeunesse, plusieurs fois modifiée, concerne aussi les ouvrages destinés aux adultes qui pourraient être vus ou lus par des mineurs. Si les sanctions restent rares, l'autocensure prend le relais. Les éditeurs préfèrent modifier en amont ce qui (...) / Société, Enfance, Livre, Industrie culturelle - 2025/01

Arab nationalism is, for all practical purposes, dead. The so-called “Arab World” has lost its unifying concern, Israel, and its outside support. It has disintegrated into geopolitical blocs, with three major non-Arab powers, Turkey, Iran, and Israel, competing for domination of the Levant region. Indeed, the heyday of twentieth-century Arab nationalism, when Egypt sought to unite the Arab people and Arab nationalist movements dominated the politics of the region, has been long over.

Egypt gave up its role as the leader of the Arab World after the signing of the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978, just before Iran emerged as the prime revolutionary force in the region. In 1991, the radical Arab regimes lost their key global backer, the Soviet Union, and the region came under American hegemony.

In the aftermath of the disastrous U.S.-led Iraq War, today’s Middle East looks very different, including in terms of its place in the international system. The United States has begun to disengage from the region in the aftermath of the Iraq War, and Russia has ceased to be a Middle Eastern power after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. Regional powers are now in charge,

In a way, much of what has been referred to as the Levant, a sub-region that borders the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to the west and Iraq to the east, has been balkanized with Iran, with its hegemonic objectives, Israel, led by a nationalist government, and Turkey, whose leader daydreams about reviving the Ottoman Empire, maintaining spheres of influence.

In that context, the Arab Gulf states, led by Saudi Arabia, are playing a secondary role in this new balance of power. In 1973, they assisted their Arab brethren in their attack on Israel. Now, they are cooperating with Israel to contain Iran.

Israel’s sphere of influence includes, in addition to the West Bank and Gaza, also the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, much of southern Lebanon, and Syria’s Golan Heights and Mount Hermon.

After the loss of its proxies in the Gaza Strip (Hamas) and Syria (Assad), Iran still maintains its influence in Lebanon through the weakened Shia Hezbollah group and in Iraq through its Shia allies and regards Israel as its chief strategic rival in the region.

Turkey, like Israel, has been a beneficiary of the collapse of the Assad regime in Syria, hoping that the Islamist regime in Damascus would embrace it as a military and economic patron, which it probably would.

Turkish Armed Forces and its ally, the Syrian National Army, have occupied areas of northern Syria since the Syrian Civil War, a mini-state under the dual control of the local council and Turkish military administration.  

At the same time, Turkey has been concerned over what it sees as the threat of Kurdish nationalism in Syria, where during the Syrian Civil War, the Kurds established the Autonomous Administration of North and East of the country backed by the United States.

The Kurdish population of Syria is the country’s largest ethnic minority, the majority of whom were originally Turkish Kurds who crossed the border during the twentieth century and are concentrated around the Syria-Turkey border. Many of them seek political autonomy for what they regard as Western Kurdistan, similar to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq.

From that perspective, both Turkey and Israel face a challenge from two stateless peoples, the Kurds in the case of Turkey and the Palestinians in the case of Israel, who seek political independence.

Yet both Ankara and Jerusalem insist that full political independence for those people would pose an existential threat to them. At best, both peoples have been offered a limited form of political autonomy.

And then there is the large Druze minority in Syria as well as Assad’s sect, the Alawites, that had ruled Syria during his regime. One can expect continuing ethnic and sectarian tensions in the country in the coming years that may involve the Israelis (on the side of the Druze), the Iranians (on the side of the Alawites), and the Turks (on the side of the Sunni majority).

At the same time, President-elect Donald Trump, who may come under pressure from Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu to join Israel in attacking Iran’s nuclear military facilities, would probably decide to refuse the invitation to inject U.S. military forces into the region and its many conflicts.

And if the Iranians end up acquiring a nuclear military capability, it is more likely than not that the Turks would have to consider the nuclear option as well, raising the specter of a mutually assured destruction (MAD) posture involving three regional powers.

Leon Hadar is a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the National Security Program at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI).

Image: Shutterstock.com.

Washington’s partners must create a new allied consensus.

Drone warfare has utterly transformed the face of warfare in this century. No longer is it about how many tanks an army has or how many aircraft carriers a navy can maintain, it’s all about rapid maneuverability, stealth, affordability, and mass. Both the Russians and Ukrainians have proven this with their drone-swarming techniques that the two armies regularly use against one another in the ongoing Ukraine war. 

Now, this philosophy is migrating to the sea. 

We live in a time when the power projection capabilities of the United States Navy, notably in the all-important Indo-Pacific, are under constant strain. This is in part due to the development of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) systems by American rivals. The U.S. Navy is further strained, though, by the domestic woes of a sclerotic U.S. defense industrial base and an increasingly cash-strapped U.S. government that is both unable to fund the systems the Navy wants and is unable to fundamentally adapt to the new multipolar strategic environment.

The Design 

Yet, thanks to some innovative design concepts of the United States military’s research arms, the Navy is slowly starting to embrace the idea of unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs). Going back to 2017, the Navy began developing what has become known as the Orca. This is a multi-mission platform designed for a multiplicity of important mission sets, ranging from surveillance to undersea cargo delivery, anti-submarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, mine clearing, and strike missions. 

The Orca is considered an “Extra Large Unmanned Undersea Vehicle” (XLUUV).

Boeing is building this system for the Navy. It is based on design architecture from Boeing’s earlier Echo Voyager, meaning that the Orca was built with modularity in mind. (This modularity is key for Orca’s multi-mission capabilities. It means that Orca has a plug-and-play design). Its modular payload means that Orca is capable of adding up to 34 feet in length and can host an eight-ton payload. Again, this is a key tenet of a multi-mission platform like the Orca. 

In fact, Orca is essentially meant to be a drone mothership. Its cargo hold has a capacity of 2,456 cubic feet, meaning it can bring with it multiple other, smaller unmanned vehicles or drones. Orca is the apotheosis of network-centric warfare. She represents a true transition from the warfare of yesteryear to something entirely new today. A new kind of warfare that is more devoid of the human element than at any time before. 

Sure, this reduction of the human elements ensures U.S. sailors are better protected from dangerous missions. At the same time, though, many people should be concerned that removing that human element from combat could have unintended ethical complications. What’s more, it might ensure that warfare is more likely to occur amongst the great powers using these systems.

Orca itself is powered by an advanced hybrid diesel/lithium-ion battery system that enables the vehicle to operate submerged for extended periods, recharging via diesel vehicles when surfaced. 

Since this is still an experimental vehicle, it is unlikely that the Orca will be the Navy’s final XLUUV design. Its top speed right now is reported to be at nine miles per hour (so she isn’t a speed demon), but its typical operational speed is likely to be slower at just shy of four miles per hour. Orca has an impressive projected operational range of around 7,480 miles.

Boeing delivered its first Orca to the Navy in December 2023, meaning that the program had shifted from development testing to operational capability. The vehicle’s autonomous nature means that it can be deployed easily from a friendly pier and navigate on its own to its destination completely free of human involvement. This makes the Orca a relatively simple (and, therefore, cheap) platform because its logistical footprint is as small as its overall operational footprint. 

Some Challenges to Overcome

One of the promises of developing autonomous systems was that they would be cheaper than their manned counterparts. For the Navy, with its complex platforms, such as the aircraft carrier, this seems like a smart move.

Yet, Orca went about 64 percent over budget, according to the Government Accountability Office, thereby continuing a dangerous trend, especially for the Navy, of all new Pentagon platforms going over their intended budgets. What’s more, like the manned counterparts to Orca, the Orca program ran over its allotted timeline by about three years. 

Unlike many of those manned Navy platforms that have gone over budget and time, however, the Orca’s sea trials have proceeded apace with no complications whatsoever. Indeed, the testing phases for this XLUUV have been successful in proving the vehicle’s endurance, functionality, and the reliability of its autonomous systems. 

Make no mistake, unmanned systems will be an important way for the Navy to cut down on its costs. The hard lessons learned from the Orca program will be applied to future unmanned undersea vehicles. 

Eventually, the Navy will have an impressive fleet of these drones that will serve as critical force multipliers and help to protect the costlier manned warships and submarines of the fleet that are increasingly under the threat of enemy A2/AD systems.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: Shutterstock.

America’s sixth-generation stealth bomber is closer to full-scale production.

According to reports, three B-21 Raider prototypes are actively participating in flight testing, propelling the program forward.

B-21 Raider in Flight Tests

At least three B-21 Raider prototypes are participating in flight testing as part of the program’s initial steps to an operational fleet.

Revealed in 2022, the B-21 Raider is moving at a fast pace. Northrup Grumman, the manufacturer, is conducting the initial flight testing for the program. Data gathered during this phase will be used in the subsequent production of the B-21 Raider fleet.

All in all, the new stealth strategic bomber has been in production for over a decade, and the Air Force wants an operational capability before the decade is out. In addition to flight testing, the prototypes are testing new technology on board the B-21 Raider.

The B-21 Raider

The B-21 Raider is designed to cement the U.S. Air Force’s global strike capability. The U.S. military already has superior strategic bombing capabilities with its fleet comprised of the B-1 Lancer, B-2 Spirit, and B-52 Stratofortress (and potentially the F-117 Night Hawk for some niche missions). The addition of the B-21 Raider in place of the B-2 Spirit will ensure that the Air Force’s global strike capabilities remain cutting-edge.

However, the additional capability won’t come cheap. Although Northrup Grumman and the Air Force are still haggling over the price of the new stealth bomber, it is likely that each B-21 Raider will cost between $600 and 750 million. That is an extremely high price tag and the equivalent of about six F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets. And yet, it is up to $1.4 billion cheaper compared to the B-2 Spirit it will be replacing, which costs an astronomical $2 billion per aircraft.

The Pentagon has been careful about releasing information on the stealth strategic bomber’s actual capabilities. Back in 2022, when Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin unveiled the aircraft during a ceremony, he provided some intel on the aircraft’s bomber capabilities, low-observability, and durability.

“Let’s talk about the B-21’s range. No other long-range bomber can match its efficiency. It won’t need to be based in-theater. It won’t need logistical support to hold any target at risk,” Austin had said.

As a strategic bomber, the B-21 Raider will need to fly thousands of miles to reach targets deep inside a near-peer adversary’s territory. It needs to be efficient with its energy consumption while retaining its stealth characteristics.

“Let’s talk about the B-21’s stealth. Fifty years of advances in low-observable technology have gone into this aircraft. And even the most sophisticated air-defense systems will struggle to detect a B-21 in the sky,” the outgoing Secretary of Defense had added.

The U.S. military is a leader in stealth technology and already has three stealth aircraft in active service, more than any other country: the F-22 Raptor, F-35 Lightning II, and B-2 Spirit.

Finally, Austin gave some information on the B-21 Raider’s durability. An aircraft that can’t fly because of maintenance issues is not very useful. “Let’s talk about the B-21’s durability,” he said. “You know, we really don’t have a capability unless we can maintain it. And the B-21 is carefully designed to be the most maintainable bomber ever built,” the Pentagon’s top official added.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image: Shutterstock.

Video game publisher Tencent was one of several Chinese companies that the United States Department of Defense (DoD) claimed had links to China. On Tuesday, the Pentagon announced it had added dozens of Chinese-based firms – including Tencent, battery maker CATL, AI firm SenseTime, ChangXin Memory Technologies, Quectel Wireless, and drone maker Autel Robotics – to the list of " Chinese Military Companies" (CMC).

The DoD's list is updated annually and now includes 134 companies.

While not officially banned in the United States, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)  2024 bans the DoD from working with any of the designated companies beginning in June 2026. According to a report from Nikkei Asia, the inclusion on the list is also "a blow to the reputation of affected companies and represents a stark warning to U.S. entities and firms about the risks of conducting business with them."

Tencent – A Gaming Giant

The Shenzhen-based Tencent was founded in August 2003, and it currently owns shares in more than 600 companies in the electronic entertainment sector. It fully controls Riot Games, maker of League of Legends, and Grinding Gear Games, creator of Path of Exile; while it has partial ownership of Epic Games and Ubisoft.

Tencent's Hong Kong-traded shares fell 7.3% on Tuesday following the DoD's announcement.

"As the company is neither a Chinese military company nor a military-civil fusion contributor to the Chinese defense industrial base, it believes that its inclusion in the CMC List is a mistake," Tencent said in an announcement to the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, per CBS News.

Tech Firms Links to Beijing

It isn't uncommon for any and all Chinese firms to end up on such blacklists, in no small part due to Beijing's military-civil fusion (MCF), which encourages private firms to partner with the People's Liberation Army (PLA). The goal is to achieve a world-class military by 2049 or earlier.

As the Foundation for Defense of Democracies explained, "This law and associated regulations require Chinese private firms to permit Beijing direct access to their data and mandates their cooperation in protecting Chinese national security interests. This process ensures that the PLA and other elements of China's security and intelligence services can dramatically expand the scope of their reliance on China's civilian economy to bolster their strength and challenge the United States more effectively."

This is why a video game publisher, one that has ties to international studios is suddenly on the DoD's CMC list.

"The core concern with companies like Tencent is that it can conduct surveillance and intelligence opens by gathering large amounts of data on large amounts of players," Dr. Matthew Schmidt, professor of national security and political science at the University of New Haven, told The National Interest.

"It's a game of probabilities. 99% of players are uninteresting targets, but in a population of many millions you'll find some good fish to hook," Schmidt said.

Game Chat Monitored

Video games that are hosted online can record vast quantities of data – including messages between players. That may not seem significant, but Schmidt explained the problem is far deeper than meets the eye.

"They can monitor personal messages between players, use that data to analyze political views and establish any relationships those players may have to classified information or to people with classified information, and create target lists for espionage," Schmidt continued.

The game publisher even has the ability o track movements as people log on to play the game or send messages from different destinations.

"These are the kinds of things that would allow the Chinese military's intelligence branch to gather the back-end information that supports targeting people they exploit based on the information gathered from chats and what that info gives them about other platforms and movement patterns to build the social network diagrams that help Chinese agencies focus on the most likely people they could exploit for access to information," Schmidt continued. "It's the same thing the U.S. does in reverse."

Many companies gather this kind of information and could do this kind of analysis if they wanted. The DoD is especially concerned when it involves China due to MCF.

"Remember the axiom of the Internet Age: if you don't know what the product is they're selling, you're the product. That is, the data you generate when you use Facebook or X/Twitter is where the value is because it allows companies that do sell things to target you," Schmidt told The National Interest. "It's the same science; it's just that one organization targets you for espionage, the other for marketing. The end goal is different, but the process is basically the same."

Gaming Could be a Voter Issue

Even today, video gamers are dismissed as teenage boys in their bedrooms or basements—but it is a multi-billion dollar global industry. The question will be how to balance the economic interests in supporting the digital economy with political interests and not anger millions of constituents by obstructing the digital services they want, and the legitimate security concerns of the government.

"To the generations now of voting age, gaming isn't a fringe issue, it's becoming a core political concern," suggested Schmidt.

Just as we have seen with TikTok, many Americans are less concerned with security and more focused on being able to use the app they've come to love. Gamers could be even more passionate if they were to lose access to League of Legends or the next big hit that Tencent brings to market.

"We haven't figured out the balance yet, and I'd suspect the elder statesmen in power now won't be the last word. My kids fight for more screen time and the ability to play games I ban, every day," Schmidt added. "Someday they'll be power and, as they remind me, they'll let their kids play whatever they want."

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.

As geopolitical tensions across the globe continue to escalate, the race to produce sixth-generation technology is on. The U.S., Russia and China are working to develop their respective next-gen bombers and fighters alike. Washington’s Next-Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) and B-21 Raider, Moscow’s PAK DA and Beijing’s Xi’an H-20 represent just some of these futuristic proposals. Due to its ongoing Ukraine invasion, Russia may be less equipped financially and resource-wise to introduce its stealth bomber as planned. The PAK-DA, designed to rival the American-made B-2 Spirit and the upcoming Raider, would guarantee Moscow aerial clout in the skies if produced before its competitors. While limited information surrounding Russia’s new project is available, the upcoming stealth bomber will allegedly be equipped with conventional, nuclear and hypersonic weapons.

Introducing Russia’s sixth-gen stealth bomber

Described as Moscow’s sixth-generation bomber, PAK DA will incorporate a range of advanced attributes when introduced. From stealth and internal weapon bays to supersonic flight capabilities, PAK DA is set to rival its cutting-edge near peers. In fact, many of the qualities being woven into the sixth-generation design mimic the U.S.-made B-2 Spirit. Like the older American platform, PAK DA has a “flying wing” shape. Unlike typical aircraft design, the Spirit (and PAK DA) do not possess the typical parts of an aircraft, a fuselage, wings, and an empennage or tail assembly with flight control surfaces. Instead, the platform relies on an advanced flight control computer to retain stability in the air. Additionally, the Russian bomber will also fly at subsonic speeds and feature a low radar cross-section.

While Russia’s previous attempts at producing “stealth” have not been overly fruitful in the past, the PAK-DA certainly has the stealth look with its sleek flying wing design. Despite the bomber’s potential, it is unlikely that Moscow will be able to produce PAK-Das any time soon. Russia has been embroiled in its Ukraine invasion for nearly three years, quickly running through its financial and material supplies in the process. Since the Kremlin’s priorities are currently centered on achieving their war objectives in Ukraine, the development of future technologies appears to have taken a back seat.

How does PAK-DA compare to its counterparts?

China and the U.S. are also striving to introduce their own stealth bombers in the upcoming years. Developed by Northrop Grumman, the Raider will serve multiple roles for the Air Force once in commission, including as an intelligence collector and as a stealthy battle manager. Limited information surrounding the specs and capabilities of the B-21 have been made public, however, the platform will undoubtedly feature the latest and greatest technologies as it will represent the aerial component of America’s nuclear triad. China’s H-20 bomber is expected to function similarly and is certainly being designed to achieve full air superiority. Notably, Western analysts believe the H-20 could have a range of 8,500 kilometers, which is concerning since a bomber with this range could reach beyond the First Island Chain off the coast of China and into the Philippines, Japan, or even the U.S. territory of Guam.

Since tensions between Beijing, Washington and Moscow are only mounting, a sobering look at each nation’s stealth bomber progress is essential.

Maya Carlin is a National Interest security contributor, an analyst with the Center for Security Policy, and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel.

Image: Wikimedia Commons.