Defence`s Feeds

Jorge Domecq, EDA’s Chief Executive, was in Warsaw on Wednesday (27 April) for talks with Polish Minister of Defence Antoni Macierewicz, Defence Secretary of State Bartosz Kownacki, as well as other senior officials in the MoD.

Mr Domecq also met with the head of the Sejm’s National Defence Committee, Michal Jach. It was the first encounter of Mr Domecq with the new Polish Defence minister since the change of government in November 2015.

Discussions mainly focused on Poland’s current and potential future contributions to EDA projects and programmes, the general state of play in European defence cooperation as well as several upcoming events such as the publication of the new EU Global Strategy in June, the Warsaw NATO summit in July and the European Commission’s Defence Action Plan expected to be presented by the end of this year.

Mr Domecq welcomed Poland’s strong involvement in EDA, in particular in the MRTT programme (Air-to-Air Refuelling) and encouraged the country to continue fostering its engagement in European defence cooperation projects in the future.

Polish Defence minister Macierewicz indicated he would fully commit to increase the engagement of Poland in EDA towards more cooperative programmes and support to defence industry: this would be part of the interest of Poland to address the security challenges that Europe is facing.

Defence Secretary of State Kownacki said: “Cooperation with EDA is an important direction for Poland, and our involvement in different initiatives is increasing. We see the added value of the Agency’s work on many issues and support it as a forum for discussion and real cooperation”.

The Lürssen family has been operating Lürssen Shipyards for four generations and more than 135 years.

Donald Trump

Trump used a major speech on Thursday to lay out an “America first” foreign policy that would see Nato allies contribute more to their own defence. Castigating the “reckless and rudderless” policies of President Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton that he said “blazed a path of destruction” in the world, Mr Trump said he would return the US to a more self-interested approach.

“America first will be the major and overriding theme of my administration,” the Republican front-runner said in Washington, emphasising the need to view every decision “through the clear lens of American interest”. Mr Trump said he would return the US to the peace through strength philosophy of the Cold War by redoubling America’s investments in its military and only taking on fights it can win, but would simultaneously reduce military support for key allies.

“We’re rebuilding other countries while weakening our own,” he said, insisting that America’s foreign policy had been “a complete and overriding disaster” over the past two decades. “I’m the only one - believe me, I know them all, - I’m the only one that knows how to fix it,” he said.

Nato allies would be forced to step-up their efforts
Mr Trump said that as president he would call a Nato summit to pressure allies who had failed to hit spending targets and move the focus of the bloc away from Russia and onto terrorism and migration. Calling both the mission and structure of Nato “out-dated”, the property mogul noted that just four of 28 countries were spending the required two per cent of GDP on defence. “Our allies are not paying their fair share,” he said. “Our allies must contribute toward the financial, political and human costs of our tremendous security burden, but many of them are simply not doing so.”

Hillary Clinton

"...When the United States was hit on 9/11, our allies treated that attack against one as an attack against all. Now, it’s our turn to stand in solidarity with France and all of our friends. We cherish the same values. We face the same adversaries. We must share the same determination. After a major terrorist attack, every society faces a choice between fear and resolve. The world’s great democracies can’t sacrifice our values or turn our backs on those in need. Therefore, we must choose resolve. And we must lead the world to meet this threat.

Now, let’s be clear about what we’re facing. Beyond Paris in recent days, we’ve seen deadly terrorist attacks in Nigeria, Lebanon, Iraq and Turkey, and a Russian civilian airline destroyed over the Sinai. At the heart of today’s new landscape of terror is ISIS. They persecute religious and ethnic minorities; kidnap and behead civilians; murder children. They systematically enslave, torture and rape women and girls.ISIS operates across three mutually reinforcing dimensions: a physical enclave in Iraq and Syria; an international terrorist network that includes affiliates across the region and beyond; and an ideological movement of radical jihadism. We have to target and defeat all three, and time is of the essence.
ISIS is demonstrating new ambition, reach and capabilities. We have to break the group’s momentum and then its back. Our goal is not to deter or contain ISIS, but to defeat and destroy ISIS.

But we have learned that we can score victories over terrorist leaders and networks, only to face metastasizing threats down the road, so we also have to play and win the long game. We should pursue a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, one that embeds our mission against ISIS within a broader struggle against radical jihadism that is bigger than any one group, whether it’s Al Qaida or ISIS or some other network.An immediate war against an urgent enemy and a generational struggle against an ideology with deep roots will not be easily torn out. It will require sustained commitment in every pillar of American power. This is a worldwide fight, and American must lead it.

Our strategy should have three main elements. One, defeat ISIS in Syria, Iraq and across the Middle East; two, disrupt and dismantle the growing terrorist infrastructure that facilitates the flow of fighters, financing arms and propaganda around the world; three, harden our defenses and those of our allies against external and homegrown threats.
Let me start with the campaign to defeat ISIS across the region. The United States and our international coalition has been conducting this fight for more than a year. It’s time to begin a new phase and intensify and broaden our efforts to smash the would-be caliphate and deny ISIS control of territory in Iraq and Syria. That starts with a more effective coalition air campaign, with more allied planes, more strikes and a broader target set.

A key obstacle standing in the way is a shortage of good intelligence about ISIS and its operations, so we need an immediate intelligence surge in the region, including technical assets, Arabic speakers with deep expertise in the Middle East and even closer partnership with regional intelligence services. Our goal should be to achieve the kind of penetration we accomplished with Al Qaida in the past. This would help us identify and eliminate ISIS’ command and control and its economic lifelines.
A more effective coalition air campaign is necessary, but not sufficient, and we should be honest about the fact that to be successful, airstrikes will have to be combined with ground forces actually taking back more territory from ISIS. Like President Obama, I do not believe that we should again have 100,000 American troops in combat in the Middle East. That is just not the smart move to make here. If we have learned anything from 15 years of war in Iraq and Afghanistan, it’s that local people and nations have to secure their own communities. We can help them, and we should, but we cannot substitute for them. But we can and should support local and regional ground forces in carrying out this mission.
Now, the obstacles to achieving this are significant. On the Iraqi side of the border, Kurdish forces have fought bravely to defend their own lands and to re-take towns from ISIS, but the Iraqi national army has struggled, and it’s going to take more work to get it up to fighting shape. As part of that process, we may have to give our own troops advising and training the Iraqis greater freedom of movement and flexibility, including embedding in local units and helping target airstrikes.

Ultimately, however, a ground campaign in Iraq will only succeed if more Iraqi Sunnis join the fight. But that won’t happen so long as they do not feel they have a stake in their country or confidence in their own security and capacity to confront ISIS. Now, we’ve been in a similar place before in Iraq. In the first Sunni awakening in 2007, we were able to provide sufficient support and assurances to the Sunni tribes to persuade them to join us in rooting out Al Qaida. Unfortunately, under Prime Minister Maliki’s rule, those tribes were betrayed and forgotten.So the task of bringing Sunnis off the sidelines into this new fight will be considerably more difficult. But nonetheless, we need to lay the foundation for a second Sunni awakening. We need to put sustained pressure on the government in Baghdad to get its political house in order, move forward with national reconciliation, and finally stand up a national guard. Baghdad needs to accept, even embrace, arming Sunni and Kurdish forces in the war against ISIS. But if Baghdad won’t do that, the coalition should do so directly.

On the Syrian side, the big obstacle to getting more ground forces to engage ISIS, beyond the Syrian Kurds who are already deep in the fight, is that the viable Sunni opposition groups remain understandably preoccupied with fighting Assad who, let us remember, has killed many more Syrians than the terrorists have. But they are increasingly under threat from ISIS as well. So we need to move simultaneously toward a political solution to the civil war that paves the way for a new government with new leadership, and to encourage more Syrians to take on ISIS as well. To support them, we should immediately deploy the special operations force President Obama has already authorized, and be prepared to deploy more as more Syrians get into the fight. And we should retool and ramp up our efforts to support and equip viable Syrian opposition units.
Our increased support should go hand in hand with increased support from our Arab and European partners, including special forces who can contribute to the fight on the ground. We should also work with the coalition and the neighbors to impose no-fly zones that will stop Assad from slaughtering civilians and the opposition from the air. Opposition forces on the ground, with material support from the coalition, could then help create safe areas where Syrians could remain in the country, rather than fleeing toward Europe.
This combined approach would help enable the opposition to retake the remaining stretch of the Turkish border from ISIS, choking off its supply lines. It would also give us new leverage in the diplomatic process that Secretary Kerry is pursuing.

Of course, we’ve been down plenty of diplomatic dead- ends before in this conflict. But we have models for how seemingly intractable multi-sectarian civil wars do eventually end. We can learn lessons from Lebanon and Bosnia about what it will take. And Russia and Iran have to face the fact that continuing to prop up a vicious dictator will not bring stability.
Right now, I’m afraid, President Putin is actually making things somewhat worse.Now, to be clear, though, there is an important role for Russia to help in resolving the conflict in Syria. And we have indicated a willingness to work with them toward an outcome that preserves Syria as a unitary, nonsectarian state, with protections for the rights of all Syrians and to keep key state institutions intact.

There is no alternative to a political transition that allows Syrians to end Assad’s rule. Now, much of this strategy on both sides of the border hinges on the roles of our Arab and Turkish partners. And we must get them to carry their share of the burden, with military intelligence and financial contributions, as well as using their influence with fighters and tribes in Iraq and Syria. Countries like Jordan have offered more, and we should take them up on it, because ultimately our efforts will only succeed if the Arabs and Turks step up in a much bigger way. This is their fight and they need to act like it.So far, however, Turkey has been more focused on the Kurds than on countering ISIS. And to be fair, Turkey has a long and painful history with Kurdish terrorist groups. But the threat from ISIS cannot wait. As difficult as it may be, we need to get Turkey to stop bombing Kurdish fighters in Syria who are battling ISIS, and become a full partner in our coalition efforts against ISIS.

The United States should also work with our Arab partners to get them more invested in the fight against ISIS. At the moment, they’re focused in other areas because of their concerns in the region, especially the threat from Iran. That’s why the Saudis, for example, shifted attention from Syria to Yemen. So we have to work out a common approach.
In September, I laid out a comprehensive plan to counter Iranian influence across the region and its support for terrorist proxies such as Hezbollah and Hamas. We cannot view Iran and ISIS as separate challenges. Regional politics are too interwoven. Raising the confidence of our Arab partners and raising the costs to Iran for bad behavior will contribute to a more effective fight against ISIS.

And as we work out a broader regional approach, we should, of course, be closely consulting with Israel, our strongest ally in the Middle East. Israel increasingly shares with our Arab partners and has the opportunity to do more in intelligence and joint efforts as well. Now, we should have no illusions about how difficult the mission before us really is. We have to fit a lot of pieces together, bring along a lot of partners, move on multiple fronts at once. But if we press forward on both sides of the border, in the air and on the ground, as well as diplomatically, I do believe we can crush ISIS’s enclave of terror. And to support this campaign, Congress should swiftly pass an updated authorization to use military force. That will send a message to friend and foe alike that the United States is committed to this fight. The time for delay is over. We should get this done.

Now, the second element of our strategy looks beyond the immediate battlefield of Iraq and Syria, to disrupt and dismantle global terrorist infrastructure on the ground and online.
A terror pipeline that facilitates the flow of fighters, financing, arms and propaganda around the world has allowed ISIS to strike at the heart of Paris last week and an Al Qaida affiliate to do the same at Charlie Hebdo earlier this year. ISIS is working hard to extend its reach, establish affiliates and cells far from its home base, and despite the significant setbacks it has encountered, not just with ISIS and its ambitious plans, but even Al Qaida, including the death of Osama bin Laden, they are still posing great threats to so many.
Let’s take one example. We’ve had a lot of conversation about ISIS in the last week, let’s not forget Al Qaida. They still have the most sophisticated bombmakers, ambitious plotters and active affiliates in places like Yemen and North Africa, so we can’t just focus on Iraq and Syria, we need to intensify our counter — our counterterrorism efforts on a wider scope.
Most urgent is stopping the flow of foreign fighters to and from the war zones of the Middle East. Thousands — thousands of young recruits have flocked to Syria from France, Germany, Belgium, the United Kingdom and, yes, even the United States. Their western passports make it easier for them to cross borders and eventually return home radicalized and battle hardened. Stemming this tide will require much better coordination and information-sharing among countries every step of the way. We should not stop pressing until Turkey, where most foreign fighters cross into Syria, finally locks down its border.

The United States and our allies need to know and share the identities of every fighter who has traveled to Syria. We also have to be smart and target interventions that will have the greatest impact. For example, we need a greater focus on shutting down key enablers who arrange transportation, documents and more.When it comes to terrorist financing, we have to go after the nodes that facilitate illicit trade and transactions. The U.N. Security Council should update its terrorism sanctions. They have a resolution that does try to block terrorist financing and other enabling activities, but we have to place more obligations on countries to police their own banks, and the United States, which has quite a record of success in this area, can share more intelligence to help other countries. And once and for all, the Saudis, the Qataris and others need to stop their citizens from directly funding extremist organizations as well as the schools and mosques around the world that have set too many young people on a path to radicalization. When it comes to blocking terrorist recruitment, we have to identify the hotspots, the specific neighborhoods and villages, the prisons and schools where recruitment happens in clusters, like the neighborhood in Brussels where the Paris attacks were planned. Through partnerships with local law enforcement and civil society, especially with Muslim community leaders, we have to work to tip the balance away from extremism in these hotspots.

Radicalization and recruitment also is happening online. There’s no doubt we have to do a better job contesting online space, including websites and chat rooms where jihadists communicate with followers. We must deny them virtual territory just as we deny them actual territory. At the State Department, I built up a unit of communication specialists fluent in Urdu, Arabic, Somali and other languages to battle with extremists online. We need more of that, including from the private sector. Social media companies can also do their part by swiftly shutting down terrorist accounts, so they’re not used to plan, provoke or celebrate violence. Online or off-line, the bottom line is that we are in a contest of ideas against an ideology of hate, and we have to win. Let’s be clear, though, Islam is not our adversary. Muslims are peaceful and tolerant people, and have nothing whatsoever to do with terrorism. The obsession in some quarters with a clash of civilization, or repeating the specific words radical Islamic terrorism isn’t just a distraction, it gives these criminals, these murderers more standing than they deserve. It actually plays into their hands by alienating partners we need by our side.

Our priority should be how to fight the enemy. In the end, it didn’t matter what kind of terrorist we call bin Laden, it mattered that we killed bin Laden. But we still can’t close our eyes to the fact that there is a distorted and dangerous stream of extremism within the Muslim world that continues to spread. Its adherents are relatively few in number, but capable of causing profound damage, most especially to their own communities throughout an arc of instability that stretches from North and West Africa to Asia.
Overlapping conflicts, collapsing state structures, widespread corruption, poverty and repression have created openings for extremists to exploit.

Before the Arab Spring, I warned that the region’s foundations would sink into the sand without immediate reforms. Well, the need has only grown more urgent. We have to join with our partners to do the patient’s steady work of empowering moderates and marginalizing extremists; supporting democratic institutions and the rule of law; creating economic growth that supports stability; working to curb corruption, helping training effective and accountable law enforcement, intelligence and counterterrorism services. As we do this, we must be building up a global counterterrorism infrastructure that is more active and adaptable than the terror networks we’re trying to defeat.When I became secretary of State, I was surprised to find that nearly a decade after 9/11, there was still no dedicated international vehicle to regularly convene key countries to deal with terrorist threats.
So, we created the Global Counterterrorism Forum, which now brings together nearly 30 countries, many from the Muslim world. It should be a clearing house for directing assistance to countries that need it, for mobilizing common action against threats.

And let’s not lose sight of the global cooperation needed to lock down loose nuclear material and chemical and biological weapons, and keep them out of the hands of terrorists.
At the end of the day, we still must be prepared to go after terrorists wherever they plot using all the tools at our disposal, that includes targeted strikes by U.S. military aircraft and drones, with proper safeguards when there are any other viable options to deal with continuing imminent threats.
All of this — stopping foreign fighters, blocking terrorist financing, doing battle in cyberspace — is vital to the war against ISIS, but it also lays the foundation for defusing and defeating the next threat and the one after that.

Now, the third element of our strategy has to be hardening our defenses at home and helping our partners do the same against both external and home-grown threats. After 9/11, the United States made a lot of progress breaking down bureaucratic barriers to allow for more and better information sharing among agencies responsible for keeping us safe.
We still have work to do on this front, but by comparison, Europe is way behind. Today, European nations don’t even always alert each other when they turn away a suspected jihadist at the border, or when a passport is stolen. It seems like after most terrorist attacks, we find out that the perpetrators were known to some security service or another, but too often the dots never get connected.

I appreciate how hard this is, especially given the sheer number of suspects and threats, but this has to change. The United States must work with Europe to dramatically and immediately improve intelligence sharing and counterterrorism coordination. European countries also should have the flexibility to enhance their border controls when circumstances warrant.And here at home, we face a number of our own challenges. The threat to airline security is evolving as terrorists develop new devices like nonmetallic bombs. So our defenses have to stay at least one step ahead. We know that intelligence gathered and shared by local law enforcement officers is absolutely critical to breaking up plots and preventing attacks. So they need all the resources and support we can give them.

Law enforcement also needs the trust of residents and communities, including in our own country Muslim Americans. Now, this should go without saying, but in the current climate, it bears repeating. Muslim Americans are working every day on the front lines of the fight against radicalization.Another challenge is how to strike the right balance of protecting privacy and security. Encryption of mobile communications presents a particularly tough problem. We should take the concerns of law enforcement and counterterrorism professionals seriously. They have warned that impenetrable encryption may prevent them from accessing terrorist communications and preventing a future attack. On the other hand, we know there are legitimate concerns about government intrusion, network security, and creating new vulnerabilities that bad actors can and would exploit. So we need Silicon Valley not to view government as its adversary. We need to challenge our best minds in the private sector to work with our best minds in the public sector to develop solutions that will both keep us safe and protect our privacy.

Now is the time to solve this problem, not after the next attack. Since Paris, no homeland security challenge is being more hotly debated than how to handle Syrian refugees seeking safety in the United States. Our highest priority, of course, must always be protecting the American people. So yes, we do need to be vigilant in screening and vetting any refugees from Syria, guided by the best judgment of our security professionals, in close coordination with our allies and partners.
And Congress need to make sure the necessary resources are provided for comprehensive background checks, drawing on the best intelligence we can get. And we should be taking a close look at the safeguards in the visa programs as well, but we cannot allow terrorists to intimidate us into abandoning our values and our humanitarian obligations. Turning away orphans, applying a religious test, discriminating against Muslims, slamming the door on every Syrian refugee, that is just not who we are. We are better than that.
And remember, many of these refugees are fleeing the same terrorists who threaten us. It would be a cruel irony indeed if ISIS can force families from their homes and then also prevent them from ever finding new ones. We should be doing more to ease this humanitarian crisis, not less. We should lead the international community in organizing a donor conference and supporting countries like Jordan who are sheltering the majority of refugees fleeing Syria.

And we can get this right. America’s open, free, tolerant society is described by some as a vulnerability in the struggle against terrorism, but I actually believe it’s one of our strengths. It reduces the appeal of radicalism and enhances the richness and resilience of our communities. This is not a time for scoring political points.
When New York was attacked on 9/11, we had a Republican president, a Republican governor and a Republican mayor, and I worked with all of them. We pulled together and put partisanship aside to rebuild our city and protect our country. This is a time for American leadership. No other country can rally the world to defeat ISIS and win the generational struggle against radical jihadism. Only the United States can mobilize common action on a global scale, and that’s exactly what we need. The entire world must be part of this fight, but we must lead it.

There’s been a lot of talk lately about coalitions. Everyone seems to want one, but there’s not nearly as much talk about what it actually takes to make a coalition work in the heat and pressure of an international crisis. I know how hard this is because we’ve done it before. To impose the toughest sanctions in history on Iran, to stop a dictator from slaughtering his people in Libya, to support a fledgling democracy in Afghanistan, we have to use every pillar of American power — military and diplomacy, development and economic and cultural influence, technology and maybe most importantly our values. That is smart power. We have to work with institutions and partners like NATO, the E.U., the Arab League and the U.N., strengthen our alliances and never get tired of old-fashioned shoe leather diplomacy, and if necessary be prepared to act decisively on our own, just as we did it to bring Osama bin Laden to justice.

CLINTON: The United States and our allies must demonstrate that free people and free markets are still the hope of humanity. This past week, as I watched the tragic scenes from France, I kept thinking back to a young man in the world met in January after the last attack in Paris. His name was Lassana, a Muslim immigrant from Mali who worked at a kosher market. He said the market had become a new home and his colleagues and customers a second family. When the terrorist arrived and the gunfire began, Lassana risked his life to protect his Jewish customers. He moved quickly, hiding as many people as he could in the cold storage room, and then slipping out to help the police. “I didn’t know or care, he said, if they were Jews or Christians or Muslims. We’re all in the same boat.” What a rebuke to the extremists’ hatred. The French government announced it would grant Lassana full citizenship. But when it mattered most, he proved he was a citizen already. That’s the power of free people. That’s what the jihadis will never understand and never defeat. And as we meet here today, let us resolve that we will go forward together, and we will do all we can to lead the world against this threat that threatens people everywhere...."
(Hillary Clinton called on Congress to authorize a new military action against ISIS in a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations Thursday, Nov. 19. 2015.)

Sources
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/04/27/five-things-we-learnt-from-do...
http://www.ontheissues.org/celeb/Hillary_Clinton_Foreign_Policy.htm
http://www.vox.com/2016/4/27/11504272/hillary-clinton-hawk

Tag: NATODonald TrumpEUHillary Clinton

FIVE soldiers were killed and 12 others were wounded when Harakat al-Shabaab al-Mujahideen militants attacked a military base near the town of Baidoa in Somalia's Bay region on 26 April, Reuters reported. Six Al-Shabaab militants were killed in retaliatory fire. Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for

Americas

• The forth and final test aircraft of Boeing’s KC-46A tanker program has made its maiden flight. While not kitted out for aerial refueling, the 767-2C aircraft will be used to conduct environmental control system testing for the program. The arrival of the latest tanker comes as Boeing scrambles to complete a “milestone C” review by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). A favorable review will unleash additional funds needed for the program, including a seven tanker production order, which the manufacturer had already begun producing out of its own pocket.

• Northrop Grumman has been awarded an $83.4 million modification contract by the US Army to provide logistics support for the Hunter Unmanned Aircraft System. Work will continue until October 30, 2016. Based on the Hunter UAV by Israel’s IAI, the RQ-5 Hunter has been used by the US Army as a short wave system, and has been operated extensively on missions in Afghanistan. While retirement of the Hunter was scheduled for 2013, the Army has issued a number of logistic and support contracts to Northrop since then, giving the RQ-5 a license to keep hunting for the time being.

• Efforts to prevent Canada’s $11 billion deal to sell light armored vehicles to Saudi Arabia have gone one step further after the filing of a legal challenge in the Federal Court of Canada by former MP and law professor Daniel Turp. According to Turp, the sale violates Canadian law, which prevents the export of military goods to a nation that abuses human rights or is engaged in an active conflict. However, the case may be over before it begins, as Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion quietly issued export permits for the bulk of the shipments earlier this month, and the deal has received its blessing from Canada’s media darling, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. Saudi Arabia, accused of committing war crimes during its ongoing campaign in Yemen with western made weaponry, has purchased 1,400 LAVs from General Dynamics Land Systems with a variety of weapon systems, ranging from 25mm cannons to 90mm guns over the last 20 years.

Middle East North Africa

• Israel’s eagerness to customize its orders of F-35 Joint Strike Fighters has already seen its first app created for the next generation jet. Utilizing the open-architecture software design found in the Lockheed Martin designed fighter, Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI) has developed its own command, control, communications, and computing (C4) system which will be equipped on the aircraft in December. The software is an upgrade of an existing C4 system the Israeli air force flies on its F-15 and F-16 fighters.

Europe

• After some guessing and speculation, the UK’s Protector unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) platform will be the Certifiable Predator B (CPB) UAV. The MoD had announced its plans to go ahead with its 10-strong MQ-9 Reaper Block 1 fleet replacement back in October 2015, but only now has its successor been revealed. The $606 million purchase from manufacturer General Atomic Aeronautical Systems will be facilitated through the usual government to government Foreign Military Sales with the US. Compared to the MQ-9, the CPB has 40% more endurance and four extra external store stations.

Asia Pacific

• After numerous delays in its maiden flight which occurred last week amid much excitement from manufacturer Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (MHI), the X-2 stealth demonstrator will have a year long test campaign involving around 50 flights. With the maiden flight described as “ordinary” by Hirofumi Doi, manager of Japan’s Future Fighter Program at the defence ministry’s Acquisition, Technology & Logistics Agency (ATLA), future testing will help ATLA gather data on advanced fighter technologies such as stealth, thrust vectoring, data links, and other areas. Depending on this data, flight testing of the X-2 could easily be extended, leading the way for a potentially busy period for the demonstrator.

• Delivery of the S-300 air defense system to Iran is ahead of schedule after deliveries began earlier this month. The $900 million contract was initially signed back in 2007, but suspended when UN Security Council sanctions blocked the deal in 2010. A thawing in relations between the US and Iran over the latter’s dropping of its nuclear program has allowed Tehran to pursue additional military hardware, much to the chagrin of the US’s Gulf allies. Potential future arms contracts between Russia and Iran may involve weaponry that is not on the UN ban list, including air defense systems, small arms, and electronic warfare systems.

• France’s DCNS has been announced as the winner of the $38.7 billion Australian Future Submarine contract. The hotly contested tender for the 12 new subs also saw offers from Germany’s Thyssen-Krupp Marine Systems and the Government of Japan to carry out the build. The new design will be based on DCNS’s Shortfin Barracuda A1 submarine design, a conventionally-powered derivative of the nuclear-powered Suffren-class submarine now under construction for the French Navy. US made combat systems integrator and weapons systems will be installed by either Lockheed Martin or Raytheon in contracts expected to be announced shortly.

Today’s Video

• Live fire testing of a Russian Iskander-M Tactical Missile Launcher Cruise Missile:

Bridge to the future?
(click to view full)

In its 2009 White Paper, Australia’s Department of Defence and Labor Party government looked at the progress being made in ship killing surveillance-strike complexes, and at their need to defend large sea lanes, as key drivers shaping future navies. These premises are well accepted, but the White Paper’s conclusion was a surprise. It recommended a doubling of Australia’s submarine fleet to 12 boats by 2030-2040, all of which would be a new successor design that would replace the RAN’s Collins Class submarines.

The surprise, and controversy, stem from Australia’s recent experiences. The Collins Class was designed with the strong cooperation of ThyssenKrupp’s Swedish Kockums subsidiary, and built in Australia by state-owned ASC. The class has had a checkered career, including significant difficulties with its combat systems, issues with acoustic signature and propulsion, major cost growth to A$ 5+ billion, and schedule slippage. Worse still, reports indicated that the RAN can only staff 2 of its 6 submarines. High-level attention led to a report and recommendations to improve the force, but whether they will work remains to be seen. Meanwhile, the nature of Australia’s SEA 1000 future submarine project – and its eventual cost – remain unclear, with estimated costs in the A$ 36-44 billion range. This FOCUS article covers Australia’s options, decisions, and plans, as their future submarine program slowly gets underway.

Australia’s SEA 1000 Future Submarine Program Structure & Timeline

There is widespread skepticism that the Australian can handle this proposed project, especially after the failure of the Collins Class. Worse, a number of expert reports have pointed out that the next generation of submarines needs to be in the water before the Collins Class wears out. Many believe that the Collins’ original 2024 – 2031 range for safe and effective service is too generous (vid April 21/12 entry, below), which left very little time as of 2009.

Australia’s Labor government didn’t approach the problem with that level of urgency. The breadth and severity of problems with the Collins Class led to a number of reports covering failures in current submarine operations, and lessons learned. The good news is that this has given Australia a better foundation for its decisions, and improved the government’s understanding of its real needs and responsibilities. The bad news is that this approach delayed action on the May 2009 White Paper for almost 3 years. It’s likely to be 2017 before there’s a serious contract to build the new boats, and the schedule announced in May 2012 has already slipped slightly:

CIS re: ‘$40B mistake’

2012: The Government will make a decision on design and test facilities, including the Land Based Test Site, and will receive the Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan. Actual: That skills plan wasn’t publicly unveiled until May 2013.

2013: The Government will receive the results of the design, technical, and capability studies, and will make a decision on the combat systems, torpedoes, sensors and other weapons systems. Actual: The studies were received, and the combat system was decided on in May 2013, but not the other elements.

2013/2014: First Pass approval was scheduled for late 2013/early 2014. This would presumably involve a picked design. That hasn’t happened yet, and the new Liberal Party government is rethinking the entire short list.

2017: Second Pass approval is scheduled for around 2017, with construction expected to begin afterward.

These delays and replacement realities have forced to government to state that the Collins Class can operate safely and effectively to 2031 – 2038. Whether that’s true remains to be seen.

Submarine Choices S-80 cutaway, labeled
(click to view full)

Australia’s Labor government delayed making its decision, as it considered 4 broad options for the future diesel-electric fast attack submarines. By May 2013, however, it had decided to go with the riskiest 2 options for a purchase that’s supposed to be the RAN’s future centerpiece. If they get this wrong to the same degree that they botched the Collins Class, they will have crippled Australia’s future naval posture for a generation.

RAN needs

Off-the-Shelf. An existing design available off-the-shelf, modified only to meet Australia’s regulatory requirements. Australia looked at the AM-2000 Scorpene, U214/U216, S-80, and Soryu Class – see Appendix A for details. This option was eliminated in May 2013.

Picking this option would have ensured rapid delivery for the RAN’s strategic centerpiece. It also would cut the risk of technical failure by deploying proven systems, and offered greater cost certainty and savings. The price of this approach is that the submarine chosen might not fit Australia’s exact vision. Which leads to the question of how much that vision is worth, when the extra cost is judged by what else it could buy Australia. If the answer is “their entire future fleet of 72 F-35A stealth fighters,” decision-makers are going to stop and think carefully.

Modified. One way to get most off-the-shelf benefits is to buy existing design and make minor changes to incorporate Australia’s specific requirements, especially the RAN’s chosen combat systems and weapons. Accepting off-the-shelf choices for a new submarine class would force Australia to stock and maintain new types of torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, electronics, etc. Which could be done, but is expensive. Hence the potential attraction of a modified buy. This option was eliminated in May 2013, but it’s resurfacing under the new Liberal government.

Either Japan’s Soryu Class or TKMS’ U218SG would require some modifications along these lines. The Soryus would need to modify their combat system to be compatible with Australia’s chosen AN/BY-1G combat system and with its Mk-48 heavy torpedoes. The U218SG is less defined, but Singapore uses Finmeccanica WASS Black Shark torpedoes in its Archer Class, so unless Singapore plans to switch to torpedoes and use the American AN/BYG-1 combat system, switching the U218SG’s combat system and weapons will take similar design work.

Note that the ultra-cramped nature of a submarine’s internals means that modifying a submarine’s internal electronics is a bit more than a minor design swap-out, and carries expenses and risks of its own. The German/Singaporean U218SG and Sweden’s potential A26 would add the risks inherent to a new design. Hence Australia’s growing focus on Japan’s Soryus. There is talk that the entire set of 10 subs may now be built abroad; a weaker option would use the common approach of having 2-3 boats built in the foreign shipyard with Australian workers on site, and the rest built in Australia following that hands-on skills transfer period.

HMAS Rankin
(click to view full)

Evolved. An evolved design that enhances the capabilities of existing off-the-shelf designs, or of the current Collins Class design. Groups like ASPI suggest that Australia is moving toward an Evolved Collins Class design, but first, they had to remove a key roadblock noted in RAND’s December 2011 report (q.v. Dec 13/11 entry):

“One problem that hindered the Collins program was the lack of the intellectual property (IP) rights to the design of the basic platform and much of the fitted equipment. Not having the rights to Collins IP on future designs may constrain the design effort for the new submarine class that will replace the Collins. Although Kockums and the DoD reached a settlement in 2004 that provided ASC and its subcontractors access to Kockums’ IP, it still protected Kockums’ proprietary information to the point that no intellectual property from the Collins can be used in a new Australian submarine design [implied: absent negotiations & licensing].”

A May 2013 agreement with Sweden’s FMV procurement agency has settled that issue, but an Evolved Design option remains inherently risky, precisely because it’s so easy to pretend that the structural and electronic modifications to an existing class won’t really create much risk. Experiences in a range of Australian and Canadian programs show that this simply isn’t true. Both technical and cost risks can become serious problems, as demonstrated by the fact that the Collins Class was itself begun under those same auspices. Worse, ASC’s performance regarding Collins construction, and metrics far below global norms while building Australia’s new Hobart Class air defense destroyers, may be raising the risk profile so high that it destroys the Evolved option. Nevertheless, an evolved variant of the Collins Class remains on the table as a possibility.

SMX Ocean

One possible way to sidestep the Evolved Option’s issues is to choose DCNS’ SMX Ocean Class, a 4,000t+ design that’s evolved from France’s Barracuda Class nuclear submarines. That takes care of a big chunk of the R&D costs and risk, and offloads most of the rest to the vendor. On the other hand, Australia would still be the initial and only customer for a new design – one that will require replacement of its combat system, its standard weapons, and other key technologies.

New. An entirely new developmental submarine, designed in Australia.

The “New Developmental Submarine” option is, of course, the riskiest option of all. It’s also by far the most expensive, as a large amount of R&D must be financed. Since export sales from Australia are deeply unlikely, any R&D expenses are simply money down the drain.

With that said, the Swedish government may have a very interesting offer to make. They have broken off talks with Germany’s TKMS following accusations of bad faith in TKMS’ management of Kockums, which designed the Collins Class. In response, they’re working to revive a Swedish submarine industry at Saab. One possible solution is to continue taking those steps toward a Swedish submarine industry, but buy Australia’s ASC as well, and design their planned A26 successor submarine as a co-development project with Australia (q.v. April 12/14 entry).

Contracts and Key Events 2015 – 2016

April 28/16: France’s DCNS has been announced as the winner of the $38.7 billion Australian Future Submarine contract. The hotly contested tender for the 12 new subs also saw offers from Germany’s Thyssen-Krupp Marine Systems and the Government of Japan to carry out the build. The new design will be based on DCNS’s Shortfin Barracuda A1 submarine design, a conventionally-powered derivative of the nuclear-powered Suffren-class submarine now under construction for the French Navy. US made combat systems integrator and weapons systems will be installed by either Lockheed Martin or Raytheon in contracts expected to be announced shortly.

January 26/16: Japan and France are the front runners in providing Australia with its next submarine fleet. Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems had also been considered, however recent worries over technical concerns may have them out of the running for the $34.55 billion contract. Japan has offered a variant of its 4,000-ton Soryu boats made by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries and Kawasaki Heavy Industries, where as France’s state-controlled naval contractor DCNS has proposed a diesel-electric version of its 5,000-ton Barracuda nuclear-powered submarine. The final decision will be made within the next six months ahead of Australian elections, with a slowing economy to be the main issue among voters. All competitors have agreed to build the new fleet in South Australian shipyards.

Feb 12/15: Bids to be competitive, just not too competitive. Japan is expected to be disappointed that Australia will have a competitive process for choosing submarine vendors. But it won’t be too competitive. Russia and North Korea have been excluded.

2014

New center-right gov’t and its supporters rethinking the program; Interest in Japan’s Soryu Class accelerates; Swedish sub turmoil could be Australia’s big opportunity; France steps in with SSN derivative; ASC may be losing its grip on sub construction. A26 concept

Dec 02/14: Love Me Tender. Treasurer Joe Hockey brushed aside the idea of running an open tender for new submarines as “a speculation process” that Australia no longer had time for. The opposition in return stuck to its support of local construction. This comes a week after Defense Minister David Johnston said that he wouldn’t trust ASC “to build a canoe”, a statement that he and his boss David Abbott only softly backpedaled later. In other words the government is clearly not softening the substance of its position, which is widely interpreted as favoring Japan as the closest thing to an off-the-shelf option.

Sources: The Australian: Joe Hockey rules out open tender for new submarines | Sydney Morning Herald: Defence Minister David Johnston ‘regrets’ his shipbuilder ‘canoe’ comments.

Nov 19/14: France. The CEO of France’s DCNS opens a DCNS Australia subsidiary during an official visit to Australia by French president Francois Hollande. DCNS can tout its FREMM frigates for Australia’s ASW program, but recent decisions pointing to the Hobart Class hull as a base give them few options. On the other hand, they are specifically touting their submarine:

“Xavier Mesnet (Submarines Marketing Director at DCNS) told Navy Recognition: “SMX OCEAN is more than a concept ship, it is a concept ship near to be realized”.”

The design’s touted 14,000 mile range would help Australia meet the recent promise of a sub with “longer range and endurance than any diesel/electric submarine currently available off the shelf” (q.v. Nov 12/14), and its SSN heritage removes some of the risks associated with a new boat. On the other hand, Australia is insisting on an American combat system and weapons, which would require design modifications. Then, too, several key technologies, like the propulsion system and fuel cells, come with all of the standard risks accompanying new technologies. Sources: Naval Recognition, “DCNS opens a subsidiary in Australia to better market its SMX OCEAN SSK for the RAN”.

Nov 18/14: Politics. The South Australian Economic Development Board commissions an analysis from the independent National Institute of Economic and Industry Research, to assess the economic ramifications of purchasing 12 submarines overseas versus building them in South Australia. The report finds no cost difference from building in South Australia, and a lot of negative economic impacts from building outside it. What a shock.

ASPI runs an article that attacks the study’s core assumptions. Past projects’ cost blowouts show that skill differences in Australia’s industry have predictable effects, and an unrealistic economic impact model assumes the highly-skilled people involved have no other job options. The Chair of the South Australian government’s Advanced Manufacturing Council replies, defending their costing model and shifting the argument about the input-output model to a discussion about spillovers from new knowledge – with a reference to Sweden’s JAS-39 Gripen fighter program. Sources: Government of South Australia, “New expert economic report supports an Australian submarine build” [PDF] | ASPI, “On economics and submarines” | ASPI, “Submarines: reader response.”

Nov 17/14: Politics. A Labor Party dominated Senate committee says that there aren’t any off-the-shelf submarine options for Australia, and pressures the government to adopt a competitive global tender.

The reasons behind the Liberal Party’s distrust of this option have been discussed (q.v. Sept 11/14), but their own defense minister may have given away their case this week by agreeing that no off-the-shelf option is possible. He’s narrowly correct, in that even Japan’s Soryu would need combat system and weapon swap-outs. On the other hand, there’s a difference between a contention like that, and a belief that the Australian design would be wildly different. The government hasn’t managed its message in a way that makes this clear. Sources: Melbourne Herald-Sun, “Give up on Japanese sub plan: committee”.

Nov 16/14: Germany & Japan. Australian media report that the TKMS proposal to biuld 1 submarine in Germany, and 11 more at ASC in Adelaide, is gaining traction within the Australian government.

If Australia can’t buy the Soryus, or Japan blocks the transfer of key technologies, the government is reportedly looking at having Japan build an evolcved version of the Soryu Class, then have it refitted in Adelaide. Sources: The Advertiser, “New German hope for multibillion-dollar submarine build at Adelaide’s ASC shipyards”.

Nov 12/14: Politics. The Minister for Defence speaks to the Submarine Institute of Australia Biennial conference. Sen. Johnston highlights the view that 2009 should have seen full approval for the next-generation submarine, and highlights the urgency of Australia’s shrunken replacement schedule:

“I am advised that by 2030, half of the world’s submarines will be in Australia’s broader strategic region…. the Government’s priorities are sustaining Collins, followed by the Future Submarine capability, schedule and cost. And I highlight the issue of schedule as being the most challenging constraint as I can not solve for time I don’t have…. Australia’s next submarine will have longer range and endurance than any diesel/electric submarine currently available off the shelf.”

That last quoted line is seized upon by the media, because it shifts the playing field against any off-the-shelf buy. That, in turn, makes anything other than a competitive procurement hard to justify. Which cuts the throat of efforts to keep the replacement schedule on an urgent track, or to build the boats much more quickly abroad. Sen. Johnston does make arguments about the industrial end, but they aren’t widely reported:

“There has been almost $1 billion worth of Defence procurement and sustainment work being undertaken in South Australia this year, and over the next four years, there will be up to $4.2 billion in Defence spending for building and sustaining defence materiel in South Australia…. It is well over 20 years since a submarine was designed for Australia and already over a decade since the last Collins class submarine was launched.”

The government also mentions that they are committed to the processes laid out in the Kinnaird Review, with 1st and 2nd pass approvals, but explicitly avoids committing to any kind of competition. The question is whether the minister has fatally undermined the sole-source option, even so. Sources: Australia DoD, “Minister for Defence – Opening address to the Submarine Institute of Australia Biennial conference, Fremantle WA” | The Australian, “Subs boost for SA — Defence Minister David Johnston rules out ‘off the shelf’ submarine purchase”.

Nov 8/14: Saab bids. Saab CEO Hakan Bushke will be unveiling Saab’s offer to Australia at the Submarine Institute of Australia’s centenary conference, but Australia’s government confirms that it has already received the unsolicited bid. At this point, all the report will say is that:

“It includes a lower price than its competitors and a smooth flow of Japanese submarine [propulsion] technology from the Soryu Class boat, because Sweden is a partner in the Japanese project. There will also be substantial technology transfer and industrial offsets for Australia, including jobs in Adelaide during the build phase.”

The question is whether there will be an open competition. Australia’s government has been handed a program that’s already badly behind, and an existing Collins Class fleet whose cost-effective and performance-effective lifecycle is being questioned. Japan’s Soryu Class is already designed, built, and in service, unlike its German and Swedish competitors. Meanwhile, state-owned ASC has lost this government’s confidence as a shipbuilder, and delays in awarding a contract make it harder to reduce ASC’s role. Sources: News Corp., “Australian jobs promise as Sweden’s Saab Group bids for Navy’s $20 billion plus submarine project”.

Sub advances

Oct 28/14: Enter France? DCNS unveils its 4,750t SMX Ocean concept design at EuroNaval 2014. This diesel-electric attack submarine design is much closer to reality than past SMX concepts, because it’s based on the basic SSN Barracuda nuclear fast attack submarine’s layout, masts, and combat system. Meanwhile, shifts in the global market toward the Pacific and Indian oceans are tilting requirements in favor of larger conventional submarines, with more range and endurance.

Switching out the nuclear reactor does create a bit more space, even with 2nd generation fuel cell technology added to give the submarine a submerged endurance of 3 weeks. A cable-and-collar “saddle” system can be added for deployment and retrieval of UUVs from a mid-body chamber, and a detachable mobile pod aft of the sail can carry a special forces swimmer delivery vehicle. Behind the UUV bay, a 6-shooter for vertically-launched cruise missiles like MBDA’s MdCN/ Scalp Naval is complemented by internal frontal space for 28 weapons in any combination of heavyweight torpedoes, Exocet anti-ship missiles, A3SM anti-aircraft missiles, or mine packages. Items like the Vipere tethered communications and surveillance buoy round out the package.

The key caveat is that this isn’t a prototype, or even a detail design that’s ready for manufacturing. If DCNS wants to compete at this level of capability in markets like Australia or India, they have an advance investment decision ahead of them. Their competitor TKMS already has a contract for the large U218SG, and Australia has also been discussing Japan’s 4,000t Soryu Class. Sources: DCNS, “DCNS unveils SMX-Ocean, a new blue-water SSK with expanded capabilities”.

Sept 15/14: Japan risks. As it becomes clear that Japan is the odds-on favorite, discussion of that choice’s particular risks is coming up. If Australia picks the Soryus, the risks it will accept include some level of opacity with respect to key technologies, like special steels for hull strength. Time will tell, but Japan is also said to be reluctant to transfer all of the boat’s key technologies to Australia. Noise reduction designs in particular transfer naturally, as part of giving Australia full local maintenance capability, but are highly sensitive.

These issues, and the complex nature of these technologies, have industrial implications. The ability to actually build the submarines at ASC would leave no middle ground regarding technology transfer. Worse, experts like Kazuhisa Ogawa and ex-submariner Toshihide Yamauchi estimate that an ASC build could double the cost to the full planned A$ 40 million. This compares rather unfavorably with TKMS’ reported bid submission, but that design promises serious performance and timeliness risks, along with the potential for unexpected costs. Pick your poisons.

Other risks are geopolitical. Hugh White is not a fan of local construction, but his questions go to the heart of the strategic risks:

“How sure can we be that within that time [of the submarines’ delivery and entire service life] Japan will… be a US ally? That it will not have restored its long-standing ban on defence exports? That it will not have become a compliant neighbour of a predominant China, or on the other hand have become China’s bitter enemy? What would happen to our new submarine capability in any of these contingencies?”

Fair questions. Does Australian participation in a project of this magnitude make some of these outcomes less likely? How much less likely, and what role will other macro trends play? Someone needs to be doing this kind of analysis, and Australia’s DoD hasn’t shown great proficiency in the past. Sources: Australia’s ABC, “Soryu submarine deal: Japanese insiders warn sub program will cost more, hurt Australian jobs” | Canberra Times, “Japanese submarine option odds-on favourite”.

Sept 11/14: Germany & Sweden. The Australia Financial Review says that they’ve “confirmed that German submarine builder ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) has submitted a bid for a joint venture with Adelaide-based ASC that comes in at under $20 billion.” What they don’t say are which model of submarine the proposal used, and how cost risk for going beyond that budget would be handled. For instance, an A$ 20 billion bid with 100% escalation risk to the government is effectively an open-ended contract for any amount; vs. an A$ 20 billion contract with a 50/50 sharing arrangement for cost escalation and a $30 billion government cap, which is an A$ 20-30 billion contract. Or a straight A$ 20 billion purchase and delivery contract, which remains at A$ 20 billion unless the government changes the design or decides to negotiate for other reasons. The details matter.

Australian Labor Party leader Bill Shorten has been invoking World War II a lot in his opposition to a built in Japan deal, which makes a collaborative offer from the other former Axis power a mite awkward. Meanwhile, Sweden is committed to making a strong bid, if there is an open competition. Saab CEO Haakan Bushke says that they’re willing to design a 4,000t submarine for Australia, and take ASC and Royal Australian Navy engineers and technicians to work on its new A26 design. He adds:

“As of July 2, Saab completed a full takeover of Kockums which is now Saab Kockums and the Swedish Kingdom now controls the intellectual property for… [Australia’s currently-serving] Collins class submarines…. If there is an open competition, Saab Kockums will be in it.”

The publicity and lobbying builds pressure toward an open tender, which would create 2 distinct policy problems for the Abbott government. One is a policy angle. The Soryu Class is a proven and built design, while TKMS and Saab’s offerings aren’t. This creates a real risk that the new submarines will be delayed (q.v. Sept 8/14), amid questions concerning the Collins Class’ costs and effective lifespan. The 2nd problem is political. Opening competition delays the contract, allowing ASC, unions and the Labor Party to spend a lot of time and effort lobbying. That raises the odds of having the contract outcome and costs dictated by political forces outside the government. Against those negatives, one must weigh the potential for really great competitive offers, which could avoid a complete breach of the Liberal Party’s pre-election commitment to building the boats at ASC. Sources: Australia Financial Review, “Germans undercut Japan on Australia’s submarines” | Australia Financial Review, “Swedes launch desperate bid for Oz submarine project” | Business Insider Australia, “Germany Joins The Race To Build Australia’s New Submarine Fleet” | Business Insider Australia, “Australia Could Get A Great Deal On Its New Submarine Fleet If Tony Abbott Wants It” | Manufacturers’ Monthly, “German company wants to build Australia’s submarines”.

Sept 8/14: Japan. News Corp. reports that the government is fast-tracking their pursuit of Soryu Class submarines, because of growing concerns about the $2+ billion cost of maintaining the Collins boats beyond 2026; some estimates put that cost at more than $2 billion. The government also seems focused on a proven solution; TKMS’ U218SG isn’t, and neither is Saab’s A26. DCNS’ Scorpene, meanwhile, lacks the size and range Australia wants. Hence Soryu, especially given Australia’s urgency:

“The Government cannot afford a submarine capability gap and every day past 2026/27 when Collins class is due to begin decommissioning, adds days of risk,” a senior defence source said.”

Controversy. A second consequence of the government’s risk and cost aversion is that ASC Pty’s performance on the Air Warfare Destroyer project may have relegated them to a service role for the future submarines. In other words, construction in Japan. ASC and the Labor Party are understandably unhappy, arguing that the industry is strategic and that the Collins Class’ reported 21,300 km range is 88% better than even the Soryus. Australia would also need to either modify the Soryus to use American torpedoes, or switch as a fleet to the class’ natural weapon set of American UGM-84 Harpoon missiles and Japanese Type 89 torpedoes.

Cost. A Japanese build would be a big, big geopolitical deal, but the headline’s A$ 20 billion figure is unreliable because it’s based on a statement by Germany’s TKMS, regarding a different submarine. Another report costs a program for 10 Soryu Class boats at A$ 25 billion. Note that even A$ 25 billion is just 69% of the original A$ 36 billion projection for ASC. For perspective, this inherently optimistic build cost means that switching to Soryus leaves about enough money to cover current official costs for Australia’s 2 Canberra Class LHDs and 3 Hobart Class Air Warfare Destroyers. If build-out cost in Australia were to hit A$ 40 billion, which is very possible, savings from a Japanese build would pay the estimated A$ 15 billion cost of Australia’s F-35A stealth fighter program.

Politics. Does that level of cost savings negate the political blowback from cutting out ASC? It might, but there are risks. Australia is a Parliamentary system, but Abbot’s government relies on a coalition of 4 parties in the House. If the Liberal Party’s partners don’t bolt the coalition over the issue, and the plan goes forward, the question becomes whether Parliamentary maneuvering can force an issue vote in the Senate. There, the government would need 6 of 8 non-Labor and non-Green votes outside of its own coalition.

Basing. To make things even more interesting, there are also reports that Australia is considering a basing shift to HMAS Coonawarra, up near Darwin in the north. That would drastically improve deployment into theater, as the sailing difference between HMAS Coonawarra and the current submarine base in Australia’s southwest at HMAS Stirling is almost 5,000 km / 2,700 nmi. Unfortunately, HMAS Coonawara is currently just a patrol boat base, and creating a full submarine and support base would be expensive. Especially if the natural harbor isn’t super-deep. The other problem is that basing the RAN’s most strategic assets near Darwin makes it much easier to reach them with weapons like cruise missiles. A forward base near Darwin is possible for refueling and minor service, and it would basically cancel the range difference between the Collins and Soryu classes, but a full basing switch is unlikely.

Sources: News Corp., “New Japanese submarines to cost Abbott Government $20 billion” | Australia’s ABC, “Submarine policy: [Independent Sen.] Nick Xenophon urges PM to ‘end the uncertainty’ over SA project” | The Australian, “Submarine plan a threat to national security: Labor” | 7News, “Darwin submarine base ‘won’t happen’, Australian Defence Association chief Neil James says”.

Japan buy: key issues

July 8/14: Japan. Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe sign the “Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of Japan Concerning the Transfer of Defence Equipment and Technology” at a ceremony in Canberra.

It isn’t the full security cooperation policy mooted in previous reports (q.v. May 28/14), but it’s an immediate step. As expected (q.v. April 6/14), they’re leading off with a joint Marine Hydrodynamics Project between Australia’s Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO) and Japan’s Technical Research and Development Institute (TRDI). In English, they’ll analyze propulsion and water resistance around submarine hulls – and, implicitly, torpedoes. Sources: Australian DoD, “Minister for Defence – Defence Minister David Johnston hails defence science and technology accord with Japan”.

May 28/14: Japan. Reuters reports that Japan is warming to the idea of selling submarines to Australia, but what they want in return is something Australia will need to think about:

“Japan is considering selling submarine technology to Australia – perhaps even a fleet of fully engineered, stealthy vessels, according to Japanese officials. Sources on both sides say the discussions so far have encouraged a willingness to speed up talks…. Japanese military officials and lawmakers with an interest in defense policy have signaled a willingness to consider supplying a full version of the highly regarded Soryu to Australia if certain conditions can be met. These would include concluding a framework agreement on security policy with Canberra that would lock future Australian governments into an alliance with Japan, the [Australian] officials said.”

China’s likely reaction would create diplomatic complications, and limit Australia’s future political options. On the other hand, the Japanese have the one proven design that meets Australia’s needs. Just don’t expect rapid decisions. That isn’t usually the way things are done in Japan. Sources: Reuters, “Japan & Australia consider submarine deal that could rattle China”.

April 12/14: Swedish option? The Collins Class was built around a Swedish design, News Corp Australia says that Saab and the Swedish Government have been engaged in secret talks around a joint submarine effort. That proposed approach may have the potential to cut through many of the dilemmas faced by Australia’s government, and Sweden’s as well. Here’s Australia’s problem, as explained in the SMH:

“This week the Australian Strategic Policy Institute hosted a conference billed as the “Submarine Choice” – but the arguments simply shot past each other. Nothing connected. The Navy stressed its strategic need for submarines without reference to the budget; industry obsessed about the business case without worrying about how such massive expenditure would severely unbalance the forces; while politicians agonised over the need to save jobs and save money, despite the fact these objectives stand in direct contradiction to one another. In the meantime, the bandwagon rolls remorselessly onwards.”

The reported Swedish solution would buy ASC, and embark on a fully cooperative joint design for Sweden and Australia’s next submarines. Australia would receive a design that’s explicitly built for Australia’s needs – a necessary compromise for Sweden, whose needs are different. It’s also worth noting that the Japanese Soryu Class propulsion system that has attracted so much interest from Australia’s Navy is part Swedish. From industry’s point of view, making ASC part of Saab removes any conflict of interests with a foreign firm that acts as the project lead, and creates both development jobs/skills and production work. From the politicians’ point of view, a program that includes Sweden and Australia offers the added security of shared risk, and shared acquisitions. As a starting point, Saab soon buys Kockums from TKMS, after hiring away many of its engineers. Read Saab Story: Sweden’s New Submarines for full coverage.

April 8/14: Minister for Defence Sen. David Johnston gives the speech, but says that the government is still evaluating options and has made no decisions. Since his party had campaigned on building 12 submarines in Australia, he also needs to qualify his way out by invoking his statement that “…if anything the Minister has said is based on fantasy, we’ll tell you and we’ll revisit this.” He does put industry on notice that the priority is performance rather than jobs, and adds that the priority isn’t X number of submarines, but a stable submarine capability that matches what Australia can afford and operate.

Taken as simple logical propositions, both points are extremely sensible. The government can expect to face strong lobbying from the shipyard and its associated unions, and that’s already starting, but the sheer size of the price tag involved means that the unions’ traditional allies on the left aren’t going to fight very hard alongside them. Observers are speculating that that the minister’s framework means 6-9 submarines, but no-one knows at this point. Sources: Australia DoD, “Minister for Defence – Speech – Address for the ASPI conference” | Australia DoD, “Minister for Defence – [Q&A] Transcript – ASPI Conference” | ASPI, “The Submarine Choice: ASPI’s International Conference, Canberra” | State-owned ABC, “Submarines off-the-shelf would breach promises to South Australia, says Penny Wong” | The Age, “Why do we need more submarines?” | The Australian, “Cheaper submarines ‘risk the lives of sailors’”.

April 7/14: Rethink? Looks like the stirrings of discontent earlier this year (q.v. Jan 29/14, Dec 17/13) are about to become more real. Minister for Defence Sen. David Johnston is scheduled to make a speech at ASPI on April 9/14, and there’s considerable speculation that he will change the submarine program in 3 important ways. One, he may choose to cut the program from 12 boats to 9, on both cost and operational capacity grounds. Two, he will force ASC to make a case to win the work, saying that the Navy’s strategic centerpiece “is not a job-creation program”. Third, there’s the clear implication that if the ASC case isn’t good enough, some or all of the submarines may be built abroad. As a final wrinkle, talks continue with Japan regarding their large Soryu Class boats, shortly after Japan relaxes their restrictions on exporting weapon technologies:

“When asked yesterday what aspects of the Japanese boats might be included in an Australian design, a senior government source replied: “Everything.”…pressed on whether that included buying the boats off-the-shelf from the Japanese the answer was an emphatic “yes”.”

The usual approach is to build the first few boats aboard, with some local workers sent to participate, and then begin production locally. That would create an industrial timing problem for ASC, but if the government replaces 3 submarines with a 4th Hobart Class air defense destroyer, it could enhance Australia’s naval and missile defense options while covering the industrial gap. Sources: News Australia, “Australia in talks to buy Japanese submarines to upgrade fleet” | Sydney Morning Herald, “Coalition casts doubt on plan to replace Collins Class submarines”.

April 6/14: Japan. Jane’s reports that Australia and Japan have agreed to start talks on creating a framework for defense technology co-operation, with an initial project involving joint research into marine hydrodynamics.

“An official at the Japanese Ministry of Defence (MoD) told IHS Jane’s said this would include the analysis of propulsion and water resistance around submarine hulls.”

The message to Jane’s also suggested that the propulsion technology that so interests in Australians was deemed too sensitive. Instead, Japan’s Technical Research and Development Institute and Australia’s DSTO would begin collaboration here. Japanese decision making processes are slow, especially in an area so likely to create tensions with China. Will they be too slow for the decisions Australia needs to begin making? Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Japan, Australia agree to joint research on submarines, hydrodynamics”.

March 6/14: Evolved Collins. It isn’t new to say that Australian politicians seem to be leaning toward an evolved Collins Class submarine, given the riskiness of designing a new boat. The political dynamics at work are more interesting:

“An evolved Collins-class has emerged as the favoured option for Australia’s next generation of submarines amid signs the much maligned existing boats will remain in service beyond 2030…. Few sources close to defence believe it will opt for a new design given the risk of having an orphan boat class. Treasurer Joe Hockey is said to be uneasy with the mooted pricetag of $36 billion. Defence Minister David Johnston has also cast doubt on whether Australia will double its fleet to 12, saying the number first mooted in the former prime minister’s 2009 white paper has never been justified.”

The report also says that decision makers are more comfortable leaving the Collins Class in service until 2030 – ironically, because they’ve been defective so often and spent so much time out of water. Sources: Australian Financial Review, “Evolved Collins favourite but timing unclear”.

Jan 20/14: Political pushback. The A$ 30-40 billion size of the future submarine project guarantees political scrutiny, but that won’t really begin until it’s a near-term project rather than just funded studies. The Sydney Morning Herald decides to start as the new center-right Liberal Party government prepares its 1st budget, and it’s coming from a right-wing source:

“Whatever one may think of [new Board member] Mirabella [q.v. Dec 17/13], she is an economic dry and does not shirk the dirty work of confronting spendthrift bureaucrats, military brass and trade unions, all of whom have treated the Australian Submarine Corporation and the Defence Materiel Organisation as a giant honey pot.

Both organisations are impervious to competence…. The idea that Australia should produce a dozen submarines in South Australia, at a projected cost of about $3 billion a vessel, is madness…. The new submarines will have a unit cost that dwarfs the Collins-class subs if built here, or roughly three times the cost of acquiring the submarines from foreign shipyards. The navy disputes this disparity but history does not.”

As many observers have noted before: please tell us how you really feel, Paul Sheehan. More seriously, this is an early sign that Abbott’s traditional allies may not be solidly behind the program as currently conceived. Meanwhile, the Labor Party is no longer in power, and hence no longer really bound to defend a program that will demand many more dollars for national defense. Sources: Sydney Morning Herald, “Future Submarine project a farce that has missed a mention”.

2013

Combat system picked. Potential work with Japan? click to read

Dec 17/13: ASC Board. Former Liberal Party MP Sophie Mirabella, a 12-year incumbent who was the only party incumbent to lose her seat in the recent election, is appointed to ASC’s Board of Directors by Prime Minister Tony Abbott, alongside new members Peter Iancov and Paul Rizzo.

Ms. Mirabella does have qualifications as the Coalition’s Shadow Minister for Innovation, Industry and Science while they were in opposition, and is known as a strong opponent of public sector waste. It’s arguable that ASC could use both, given the scale and importance of the projects they’re handling, and will soon begin to execute. Prime Minister Abbott could certainly use a critically-minded loyalist on the inside, to avert problems or at least give him advance warning of any nasty surprises. Now he has one. Sources: Minister for Finance, “Appointment of Three New Board Members to ASC Pty Ltd” | Sydney Morning Herald, “Coalition appoints Sophie Mirabella to board of government-owned shipbuilding firm”.

May 16/13: IP deal. Australia’s government signs a deal with Sweden’s FMV procurement agency, Intellectual Property rights for submarine design and technology. As RAND’s 2011 report had noted (q.v. Dec 13/11), this was a major stumbling block for any sort of Evolved Collins design.

The agreement covers use of Collins Class submarine technology for the Future Submarine Program. It also creates a framework and principles for the negotiation of Intellectual Property rights, if Australia wants to be able to use and disclose other Swedish submarine technology for an Evolved Collins solution. Disclosure is included because there are sub-contractors et. al. who require some level of disclosure in order to work on the project. Defense Ministers Joint Communique | Australia DoD.

Swedish Intellectual Property Agreement

May 2/13: White Paper. The Labor government’s 2013 defense white paper rejects the safer and quicker options of buying or modifying an existing class from abroad. Instead, they’ll focus on options #3 & 4: an evolved design of the Collins Class, or a completely new Australian design. As part of that decision, they’re going to continue with the American AN/BYG-1 combat system as their standard. It equips every class of American nuclear submarines thanks to a combination of initial installs and systems modernizations, and a BYG-1(V)8 variant was inserted into the current Collins Class as Project SEA 1439 Phase 4A.

This is a decision that exacerbates both the performance risks so amply illustrated by the Collins Class to date, and the risks of delayed in-service date for new boats. Which is why it shouldn’t surprise anyone that the government has extended their estimates of how long the Collins Class can serve. Unless they want a gap where Australia loses its submarines entirely, or operates with a much-reduced force, delays and decisions to date mean that the government can’t say anything else. Whether their study’s carefully-couched conclusion is true in an operational sense is a different question.

On the topic of performance risks, even with the new Submarine Propulsion Energy Support and Integration Facility, the submarine skills plan, and government plans to improve productivity in Australian shipbuilding, the new submarine decision expands almost every possible risk facing the Australian Navy’s future strategic centerpiece. It may be that a new propulsion system can fix some of the Collins Class’ problems, but the boats’ problems over the years have stemmed from a wide variety of defects and failures, across multiple systems. There are conflicting reports regarding the extent and success of the fixes tried to date, and one can be forgiven some skepticism that the same organizations responsible for the present situation can create or insert new designs that solve all of their previous mistakes. Since the systems will be new, or at the very least not proven in operations with the boat they’re inserted into, it’s also more than possible that “unforeseen” delays will make it hard to get new boats into service before the existing fleet becomes unfit for purpose.

In exchange, of course, the government gets to promise more spending with a state-owned firm (ASC) and its sub-contractors, on behalf of a Labor Party whose political standing is shaky, a few months before an election. Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan | Australia DoD release | ASC | ASPI | ASPI Shipbuilding timeline.

2013 White Paper, Combat System picked

Feb 13/13: Japan. The New Pacific Institute reports that Japanese media are now openly discussing a Soryu Class deal with Australia, and chronicles the process so far. Bottom line: If a deal is consummated, it’s going to be a delicate process of mutual trade-offs, not a straightforward transaction:

“The article did not offer much additional detail about how the process from here is likely to unfold, although it did frame the technology transfer as part of a supposedly mutual desire to balance against Chinese naval activities. It nevertheless suggests that defense officials are still considering the plan and that the chances are good that something will come out of the process notwithstanding any domestic or international backlash. The main issue for the Japanese side likely revolves what level of information and access to provide to the Royal Australian Navy.”

The relaxation of Japan’s export laws was meant to support joint development projects like the SM-3 Block IIA, rather than a 1-way transfer of technology to a foreign shipbuilder. Japan sees submarines as a strategic technology for its own preservation, and must weigh the risk of dissemination against the potential benefits. NPI doesn’t believe that complicating China’s life is enough of an inducement all by itself. Meanwhile, Australia knows that it wants a large diesel-electric sub, and believes that Japan has a reliable propulsion system design. Cooperation that stops short of full-scale licensed submarine construction might be an option for both parties.

2012

Initial studies budget; Is the project about pork-barrel politics, at the expense of defending Australia? Japan’s Soryu Class enters the mix; Kokoda’s shoddy study. JS Soryu
(click to view full)

Nov 15/12: Requirements. David Feeney, Parliamentary Secretary of Defence, speaks to the Submarine Institute of Australia Biennial Conference. He describes regional trends that could see A$ 44 billion spent by 2021 and up to 150 diesel-electric submarines operational, offers a naval “sea control” doctrine formulation straight from Sir Julian Corbett, and adds more clarity to his government’s expectations for the future submarine:

“Denial retains a place, but sea control operations ensure that Australian response options are not constrained and our freedom of action is not threatened. It is inconceivable that Australia can achieve sea control – a requirement for successful maritime power projection – without submarines.

Government is resolved that the Future Submarine will have greater range, longer endurance on patrol, and expanded capabilities (i.e. communications) as compared to the current Collins Class submarine. The Future Submarine must be able to carry different mission payloads such as uninhabited underwater vehicles (UUVs)… conduct strike operations against military targets, including an adversary’s operating bases, staging areas and critical military infrastructure.

Relative to other nations that operate diesel-electric submarines, the Future Submarine must operate across exceptionally vast distances… Asia-Pacific possesses numerous critical maritime nodes – notably the Malacca Strait, Sunda Strait, and Lombok Strait- all of which are critical to the global economy. These nodes are 2,000 or even 3,000 nm from [naval base] HMAS Stirling.”

The problem is that those requirements amount to a unique requirements set that will add massive costs to the project, along with risk that the next batch will fail like the Collins Class. Industry infrastructure is acknowledged to be shaky. Could the same money be used to buy an existing design, along with the sub tenders needed to give it all of that range and more? Or a set of submarines plus other critical sea control forces (like maritime aircraft)? Very likely. But the “made in Australia” rhetoric is all about jobs and perceived government largesse first, and defense second. Australia DoD Transcript.

Nov 14/12: Jobs justification. Jason Claire, Minister for Defence Materiel, speaks to the Submarine Institute of Australia’s 6th Biennial Conference. He begins by justifying the need for large submarines, on the grounds that they need to operate at long ranges. There are other approaches which could address this issue, but it makes for a useful uniqueness justification when he gets to the speech’s point – justifying his decision to build all of the submarines in Australia.

That approach significantly raises the risks of program failure, and of failure to replace existing boats in time. If the submarines really were a strategic priority, an approach that had the first 2-3 subs built abroad with Australian engineers on site, and the rest built locally as expertise grows, would be the obvious plan. Note, too, Claire’s use of the word “design,” indicating that despite government assurances, use of an existing submarine design isn’t getting serious consideration from this government:

“…will create thousands of jobs and work for hundreds of Australian companies. More than this it will create a new Australian industry… It will take decades to build 12 submarines, and by the time the last is built the first will need to be replaced. It’s not a short project. It will go on and on. It will create an industry that could last for a century or more. That industry should be here. That industry also has flow on benefits. It will build skills useful for other industries and technology… also build the capabilities and skills of our universities and our technical colleges… it is important we have an indigenous capability that can design, develop, build and maintain submarines.

That is not something we can or should do on our own… But we also can’t, and shouldn’t, outsource the whole task… Acquiring nuclear powered submarines… [means] outsourcing the construction, maintenance and sustainment of the submarines… built overseas, they would have to be fuelled, docked, defueled and disposed of overseas. That means tens of billions of dollars for acquisition and sustainment over decades that could be invested in Australia, spent overseas.

We have got a valley of death between the last AWD and the start of construction of the first future submarine. It’s a valley where jobs are lost and the skills we need will disappear… We need to fix this. This is the job of the Future Submarines Industry Skills Plan that I will receive next month.”

Sept 6/12: Infrastructure. Australia’s government announces that the Future Submarine Systems Centre will be based in Adelaide, South Australia. There had been some concern that the work might migrate elsewhere, but this is where Australia’s naval shipbuilding infrastructure is located.

The Systems Centre is set to formally open in 2013 as the home of the Future Submarine program, much as the AWD Centre in Adelaide has been the home of the A$ 8 billion Air Warfare Destroyer program. There are already staff working on the project, but they are based at state-owned shipbuilder ASC. Once they move, the center will be used to conduct evaluation of options, design work, program management, engineering, logistics and production planning. Over the next few years, it will grow to include hundreds of Defence personnel from Navy, the Defence Materiel Organisation (DMO), the Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO), and defense contractors.

There has also been a steady drumbeat of criticism over Australia’s slow decision-making, and the government’s readiness to choose an industrial structure that will roughly double the program’s cost to A$ 36 billion or more, and introduce significant risk. Even as the RAN has extreme difficulties sustaining and manning its existing fleet of 6 Collins Class subs. The government is sticking to the 2009 plan of 12 new submarines to be assembled in South Australia, with the same 4 options under study, etc. The minister adds that this commitment will be reinforced as part of the 2013 Defence White Paper.

Aug 28/12: Where’s Coles Review 2? Liberal Party opposition defense critic Sen. Johnston releases a statement:

“Part 2 of the Coles Review of the Sustainment of Australia’s Collins Class Submarines was expected to be handed to the Minister in April, but in spite of the Minister declaring Collins Class sustainment was at the top of the Government’s Project of Concern List, it is still nowhere to be seen… I can see why the Defence Minister isn’t exactly pushing down Mr Coles’ door as Part 1 of his report was a damning indictment… Senator Johnston said this year alone taxpayers will spend close to $1 billion on maintenance and sustainment of the Collins Class with only one, sometimes two out of six submarines operationally ready at any one time.”

The review doesn’t arrive until mid-December 2012.

July 25 – Aug 3/12: Breakdowns & delays. After reporting a successful torpedo firing and sinking exercise during RIMPAC 2012, Australia’s DoD reveals that a leak is forcing HMAS Farncomb to return to port immediately. The Liberal Party’s shadow defence minister, David Johnston, reminds Sydney Morning Herald readers that these kinds of breakdowns are all too common, while highlighting the timing problem that could leave Australia without a viable fleet. The time for a decision, he says, is now:

“The ASPI report described the gap between when all the Collins Class have been retired and the time it would take to build a replacement as “nothing short of catastrophic”… three years “of no submarines at all”… After some prodding the Minister also declared [in May 2012, 3 years after the White Paper] a final decision on the replacement would not be made until late 2013 or 2014 – in other words, not until after the next election… all against the backdrop of our submarines being so operationally fragile that competing in exercises with allies becomes a case of going in with fingers crossed… We also have our submariners reluctantly leaving the Navy because they simply don’t get time at sea doing what they signed up to do.”

July 9/12: Japan’s Soryu? RAN Future Submarine Program head Rear-Admiral Rowan Moffitt, and DMO Chief Defence Scientist Dr. Alexander Zelinsky are traveling to Japan to look at the country’s new 4,200t Soryu (“Blue Dragon”) Class/ 16SS submarines.

Japan relaxed its ban on weapon exports somewhat in December 2011, which opens up the possibility of an Australian-built submarine derivative. On the flip side, the previous ban means that Japanese firms lack the same kind of technology transfer and off-site quality control experience that has been earned over the years by Germany’s HDW (Greece, India, South Korea, Turkey), and France’s DCNS (Brazil, India).

The Soryus have a Stirling Air Independent Propulsion system, and began service just 3 years ago. They’re also much larger than competitors like France’s 2,060t MESMA AIP equipped AM-2000 Scorpene. That makes the Soryus attractive to Australia, and some think they might have the range and capacity Australia needs. It’s worth noting that smaller submarines like Germany’s 1,830t U212As have traveled thousands of miles while submerged, and technically have a longer range than the Soryus. Still, bigger is better to some. The Japanese subs do offer a lot more space for weapons, and a similar submarine design might offer interesting opportunities for Australian-Japanese operational cooperation. Adelaide Now | Sydney Morning Herald.

May 3/12: Initial budget & plans. Australia’s Labor Party government announces a budget of another A$ 214 million for the next stage of the Future Submarine Project, and appoints Mr. David Gould as the DoD’s General Manager of Submarines, working within the DMO and reporting directly to its CEO. The initial budget will pay for detailed studies and analysis to inform the design choice, the cost/ capability tradeoffs, and the workforce skills requirements to build them in Australia. Those funds are on top of the government’s December 2011 RFI, and the contract with Babcock for a land-based propulsion testing site.

Overall, the Government announces that they’re considering 4 broad options for diesel-electric fast attack submarines, as outlined above. with respect to the studies and work conducted:

Scientific and technological studies will be conducted primarily by the Australian DoD’s Defence Science and Technology Organisation (DSTO).

The off-the-shelf studies will be undertaken with same trio of firms who were sent the December 2011 RFI: DCNS (Scorpene), TKMS HDW (U212A/214), and Navantia (S-80). TKMS Kockums will perform the evolved design studies for the Collins Class, as they were its original designers.

An interesting 2nd look will happen within the AUSMIN framework agreed in November 2010. US technical cooperation will involve capability modeling for both off-the-shelf and evolved Collins options. Systems Performance and Analysis, and GD Electric Boat, will do that work under a US Foreign Military Sales case.

The workforce skills plan will be developed by a team be led by the DoD’s Defence Materiel Organisation CEO, Mr. Warren King, and supported by an Expert Industry Panel headed by Mr. David Mortimer, AO. The Expert Industry Panel will include representatives of the Navy; DMO; the Department of Industry, Innovation, Science, Research and Tertiary Education; Skills Australia; unions; the CEOs of ASC, Austal, BAE Systems and Forgacs Engineering; and the Australian CEOs for local subsidiaries of Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, Thales, Saab Systems and BAE Systems. Australia DoD.

Budget & Studies

April 23/12: An interview with Minister for Defence Stephen Smith touches on the Collins Class’ ongoing problems, and the decisions to be taken regarding Australia’s future submarines. An excerpt:

“So there are capability issues [with the operating ranges required for Australian submarines] but no decisions have been made other than the Government ruling out a nuclear [propulsion] option… Australia does not have a nuclear industry, and if we acquired nuclear submarines that would effectively see the outsourcing to another country of our maintenance and sustainment… We remain committed to 12 submarines assembled in Australia.

“…Whether there is a gap in capability will in the end depend upon the decision that we make about the new submarine, firstly; secondly, the length of life or the life of type of the Collins Class Submarine. That is currently not known… one of the studies we have currently under way is a study trying to better define the life of type of the Collins Class Submarine… it would have been in my view wrong – indeed, irresponsible – to have leapt into a Future Submarine Project without trying to address the long-standing endemic, systemic difficulties that we’ve had with the Collins Class Submarine.”

April 21/12: Captain’s Critique. Commander James Harrap, a 20-year navy veteran, resigns from the RAN after commanding both HMAS Waller and HMAS Collins. While the boats and their crews had “serviced the navy well and achieved much,” the media obtain a copy of his overall assessment. It is stark and scathing: scrap the class.

“I don’t believe the Collins-class are sustainable in the long term and many of the expensive upgrade plans which have been proposed would be throwing good money after bad… Over the last two years, I believe these problems have become worse… Throughout my command of both Collins and Waller, full capability was never available and frequently over 50 per cent of the identified defects were awaiting stores… Collins has consistently been let down by some fundamental design flaws, leading to poor reliability and inconsistent performance. The constant stream of defects and operation control limitations makes getting to sea difficult, staying at sea harder and fighting the enemy a luxury only available once the first two have been overcome.”

The submarines’ diesel engines come in for special criticism, but they are far from his only target. His final conclusion has special relevance to Australia’s next-generation program: “I do not believe we have the capability to independently design and build our own submarines.” The Australian.

Jan 19/12: Kokoda criticized. The Kokoda Foundation releases its study “Sub Judice: Australia’s Future Submarine,” written by former ASC employee Brice Pacey. It concludes that no off-the-shelf conventional submarine can meet Australia’s requirements, and that a nuclear submarine program is unaffordable and unmanageable. Instead, it recommends “an evolution of the Collins design,” and claim that “the cost of building the submarine will be markedly less than some published estimates… there is no cost penalty for an Australian build.” These statements are from the foundation’s release; the full document itself is a for-fee publication.

While there is widespread agreement that nuclear-powered SSN fast attack boats are not a realistic option for Australia, the foundation’s other 3 conclusions draw fire. First, submarine-builder ASC’s sponsorship of the paper has led several observers to question the study’s seriousness and objectivity. The critics add that requirements themselves are arbitrary, unless the gaps involving current state-of-the-art submarines create serious mission problems, and the cost to field a 100% solution is acceptable. Given the demonstrated capabilities of submarines like the U214, they see the capability gap as too small, and the price gap as too large.

On which topic, reports indicate Kokoda estimates of just A$ 18 billion for the 12 boats, which is, indeed, significantly less than other published estimates. The history of the Collins Class, with respect to both build costs and performance, is not overly encouraging, and the credibility of this estimate has been deeply doubted. ASPI analyst Andrew Davies summed up this view with a Carl Sagan quote: “Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.” Kokoda Foundation release [PDF] | Canberra Times | Lowy Institute for International Policy.

2011

German “Type 216”?; Learning from other submarine programs – including Australia’s. U214 cutaway
(click to view full)

Dec 28/11: Type 216? HDW has released details of a 4,000t “Type 216” concept design, which appears to be targeted at Australia’s SEA 1000 future submarine program.

Australian sources have expressed concerns that the U214, and other boats investigated in the RFI, may not have the size and range to meet Australia’s specification. This may or may not be accurate, but a larger design could conceivably appeal to customers like Australia, India, and possibly Canada one day.

With doubts growing that an Australian-designed successor to the Collins class boat cannot be ready by the 2025 deadline, HDW might find some traction with a large submarine that offered 10,400 nm/ 19.240 km notional range, Air-Independent Propulsion for long underwater patrols; and the ability to launch cruise missiles, a special forces swimmer delivery vehicle, or UUVs. The flip side is that first-of-class boats can be problematic, even if the class is designed by a very experienced and skilled firm. The Greek experience with the 1st of class Papanikolis (U214) is instructive here. Canberra Times | Navy Recognition (incl. drawings).

click to read

Dec 13/11: Studies & Contenders. The Phase 1 Coles Review into the Collins Class’ difficulties is released, and goes as far as calling Australia’s approach to managing submarines “unfit for purpose.” The same day, Australia’s DoD releases RAND’s requested report of lessons learned from US, UK, and Australian submarine programs, and discusses the class options they’re investigating:

“Options for the Future Submarine range from a proven fully Military off the Shelf design through to a completely new submarine. All options are being considered, other than nuclear propulsion which the Government has ruled out… The Government has approved the release of Requests for Information to three overseas submarine designers… [to] provide a better understanding of the capabilities of off-the-shelf options.”

The list deals a blow to recent reports, as it’s made up of France’s DCNS (Scorpene), Germany’s TKMS HDW (Type 214), and Australia’s biggest shipbuilding partner, Spain’s Navantia (S-80). TKMS’ Swedish Kockums subsidiary, who worked with Australia to design the Collins Class, didn’t see its developmental A26 Class make the list.

The government isn’t stopping there. Australia’s DoD has signed a contract with Babcock Australia to study a land-based propulsion systems test facility, and the Defence Materiel Organisation has been ordered to develop a Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan, in consultation with Australia’s defense industry. Meanwhile, the Government refers to the discussions and agreement with the USA at AUSMIN 2010, regarding Australian-United States cooperation on submarine systems, which “will extend into future submarine acquisition program.” That could add one more advantage to Navantia, whose S-80 uses a number of American technologies. Australia DoD | RAND Report | Coles Review, Phase 1 [PDF].

Coles Review & RAND Report

Oct 15/11: The Labor Party government’s leader in the Senate, Chris Evans, indicates that components and possibly modules of Australia’s future submarines are expected to be built beyond South Australia, and even overseas. This is not a surprising plan, given the history of the Collins Class, but it creates political sparks. ASC, of course, is lobbying to keep everything it can in-house. The Australian | Adelaide Now.

Oct 15/11: Australian media report on the Collins Class’ annual costs, and future sub competition:

“Figures obtained by the Herald Sun, show the six Collins subs cost about $630 million a year – or $105 million each – to maintain, making them the most expensive submarines ever to put to sea… A US Navy Ohio Class nuclear attack submarine – more than three times the size of a Collins boat – costs about $50 million a year to operate.

The cost figures are revealed as Defence officials say at least two possible contenders for the navy’s new submarine fleet – the Spanish S-80 and French-Spanish Scorpene class boat – have been ruled out of the future submarine project.”

If true, one wonders what’s left. Sweden is just beginning to design a new A26 Class, and Germany’s HDW has its U214. Russian designs aren’t a realistic option. The other possibility is that Australia might seek, once again, to design its own submarine. Herald Sun | Courier Mail, incl. infographic | Australia’s Daily Telegraph.

July 25/11: The Australian reports that Australia’s DoD:

“…will seek US help with Australia’s plan to build 12 big conventional submarines to replace the navy’s six troubled Collins-class boats… After initial problems with the Collins fleet a decade ago, the US provided a state-of-the-art combat system and the latest technology to improve the subs’ propulsion systems and make them less noisy.”

July 19/11: Coles Review begins. Labor Party Defence Minister Stephen Smith admits that there are “long-term difficulties” with the Collins Class submarine fleet, and announces a full independent review led by British private sector expert John Coles. The Minister cites too many stretches where only 1-2 submarines have been available, and there are reportedly doubts that the subs’ diesel engines are robust enough to last until 2025 as planned:

“These problems are significant and highly technically complex. At times we have seen as few as one Collins Class submarine available for operations. This situation is unacceptable but will not be addressed simply by continuation of the status quo… As a consequence, the Government will conduct a review into the optimal commercial framework for the conduct of Collins Class Submarine sustainment… My ambition is that the Coles Review will do for the Collins Class Submarine what the Rizzo Report has done for our amphibious fleet capability: a clear sighted path to improve the sustainment and availability of the Collins Class Submarines… Without having confidence in our capacity to sustain our current fleet of submarines, it is very difficult to fully commence, other than through initial planning, the acquisition program for our Future Submarine. This is consistent with the absolute necessity to work very hard in the early days to get projects right and thereby avoid, reduce, and minimise project difficulties down the track.”

The Coles Review has been asked to provide an interim report by December 2011, and a final version by March 2012. The key questions are how long this will delay Australia’s future submarine program, and whether the review will include political-structural weaknesses in the program, or confine itself to procedures. Minister for Defence ASPI transcript | ASC release | Adelaide Now | Australian Broadcasting Corp. and ABC AM radio | Canberra Times | Queensland’s Courier-Mail | Sydney Morning Herald | The Australian.

May 15/11: Australia’s Kokoda Foundation releases “Under the Sea Air Gap: Australia’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Challenge. The study “attempts to identify issues surrounding Australia’s Anti Submarine Warfare capabilities that will require greater scrutiny in the period leading up to the 2014 Defence White Paper.”

Author Brice Pacey is concerned that the design for Australia’s next-generation submarines might not be complete until 2019, and the first boat might not be ready until 2030. With the Collins Class scheduled to begin retiring in the mid-2020s, that would present a problem. Australia would need to either extend the lives of a class that has not performed well or reliably, or accept a vestigial submarine fleet even as it neighbors build up their capabilities. See also Adelaide Now.

April 14/11: Australia’s ASPI think-tank releases “The once and future submarine – raising and sustaining Australia’s underwater capability.” Based on past acquisitions, beginning the future submarine program immediately would only deliver the 1st boat in 2025; further delays would create timing issues with the Collins Class’ retirement. On which subject:

“…the boats have spent so little time in the water due to maintenance and crewing problems that the hulls have not been pressure cycled anywhere near to the extent anticipated. However, a life-of-type extension for the Collins is not an especially appealing prospect for a number of reasons. To start with, the drive train in the Collins has been problematic since day one, and attempts to keep the fleet going into the late 2020s would almost certainly require work to replace the highly problematic diesel engines (which are already ‘orphans’ in the world of maritime diesels). That alone is an undertaking requiring major engineering work, not to mention a lot of money. It is a simple fact of geometry that the engines can only be removed by cutting the pressure hull. Given that less complex mid-cycle dockings are taking 100 weeks to complete (against an anticipated 52 weeks), this exercise would result in considerable downtime. It could be that every five years of additional life would come at the cost of one or two extra years out of the water and/or conducting sea trials for each boat being upgraded. This would further exacerbate the already disappointingly low availability of the fleet.”

2009 – 2010

Australia’s White Paper sets an ambitious target. Collins Class
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Jan 27/10: Australian DoD:

“There have been inaccurate reports today that the Rudd Government was reconsidering its decision to build our future submarines in Adelaide[, Australia]. These reports are false. The Rudd Government is fully committed to building our new future submarines in Adelaide.”

Jan 25/10: The Collins Class submarine HMAS Farncomb encounters a generator failure, which reduces Australia’s operational Collins Class submarine fleet to 1 boat in 6. The cost of repairs is not yet predictable, and the mechanical issue could extend beyond HMAS Farncomb.

Continuing issues with the class also lead to questions concerning the feasibility of, and proposed strategy for, Australia’s next-generation submarine program. Read “Australia’s Submarine Program in the Dock” for full coverage.

Nov 5/09: Acting Minister for Defence Greg Combet highlights the major challenges facing Australia’s next generation submarine project in a speech to the Sydney Institute. Excerpts of “From Collins to Force 2030: The Challenge of the Future Submarine“:

“…the White Paper recognises that the aim of establishing sea and air control in our primary operating environment does not entail a purely defensive or reactive approach. Rather, we must be able to conduct proactive combat operations at a distance from our shores. This demands a mix of intelligence, defensive and strike assets to ensure both deterrence and, if that were to fail, an ability to impose unacceptably high costs… Put simply, we need to be able to take warfare to an adversary’s front door. Submarines are able to stop an adversary from deploying its’ fleet by maintaining sea denial. By imposing disproportionate costs on an adversary, submarines represent an asymmetric threat well suited to Australia’s defence.

…In planning for the future submarine, we need to consider a range of engineering and production solutions, ranging from the acquisition of a Military Off The Shelf (MOTS) design, options consistent with the Kinnaird/Mortimer reforms, to a developmental solution designed indigenously… Electric Boat have a rule known as the ‘law of 1:3:8’, that is, a task that takes an hour in module construction takes 3 hours when the hull has been assembled and 8 hours when the submarine is in the water. In other words, make sure the design is mature before you start cutting steel.

…Studies have shown that 90 per cent of the discretionary decisions that affect the outcome of a project are made in the first 7 to 12 per cent of the project’s life. There are three things that we must get right… adequately define the operating concepts and requirements for the future submarine… develop a sophisticated acquisition strategy [which may include rolling production or batch buys]… understand the interaction between capability and the acquisition strategy. It is often the interaction between these two processes that leads to trouble.

One of the matters that we will need to tackle early in the project is the need to invest in and develop a sustainable industrial base that is capable of designing, constructing and maintaining 12 large submarines [which will include cooperation with US Navy facilities].”

Nov 3/09: RAND study commissioned. The Sydney Morning Herald quotes Acting Defence Minister Greg Combet, who says that the USA’s RAND Corporation will be conducting a study related to the submarine project, due in February 2010:

“(Defence) is undertaking a number of studies to identify and explore all the options to ensure we have the appropriate design capability to support our submarines throughout their life.”

See also SpaceWar article.

Oct 29/09: The Australian Strategic Policy Institute releases “Strategic Insights 48 – How to buy a submarine: Defining and building Australia’s future fleet.” ASPI projects an $A 36 billion (currently about $32.6 billion) cost to field 12 built-in-Australia diesel-electric submarines – a sum comparable to buying 12 of the USA’s most advanced SSN-774 Virginia class nuclear fast attack submarines. OIt adds:

“As described, the resultant boats are likely to be the largest, most complex and, at $3 billion each, the most expensive conventional submarines ever built. The industrial capacity and capability to produce these vessels does not exist in Australia at the moment. By the time construction commences, it will be over fifteen years since the last Collins-class submarine was launched. Hard-earned lessons from that process will need to be re-learned in many cases and the required engineering and construction skills will have to be built up to the required level… This paper, authored by Sean Costello and Andrew Davies, surveys the complexities that have to be negotiated and suggests a way ahead that makes best use of the resources available to government.”

See also Full report [PDF].

May 2/09: Australia’s 2009 Defence White Paper is released. One of its goals is a fleet of 12 non-nuclear diesel-electric submarines with Air-Independent Propulsion, capable of launching land attack cruise missiles, to be assembled in South Australia. Design to be determined. ASC is not guaranteed the contract, however, something Fitzgibbon had pledged during the election.

The subs could be upgraded versions of the existing Collins class, or a foreign partnership around a sub like Spain’s S-80, which will already be designed to launch Tomahawk missiles.

The Collins class will also receive sonar and other upgrades during their lifetime.

White Paper

Appendix A: Foreign Contenders CM-2000 Scorpene
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Once Australia decided to field new submarines, the next question was “which submarines”? Off-the-shelf designs, or a modified variant that kept the structure but used Australian combat systems and weapons, were 2 of the 4 options under consideration until May 2013.

The 4 contenders that evaluated as potential off-the-shelf or modified design buys were:

• DCNS’ Scorpene, which has been bought by Brazil, Chile, India, and Malaysia. It includes an option to add the MESMA AIP(Air-Independent Propulsion) section, for longer underwater running time.

• Navantia’s S-80. So far, only Spain has bought it, but it’s designed for size, range, and compatibility with American systems & weapons. Navantia is also the RAN’s biggest shipbuilding partner, with very deep experience and partnerships thanks to the Air Warfare Destroyer and LHD projects.

• TKMS HDW’s U212A/U214, which has been sold to Germany, Greece, Italy, South Korea, and Turkey. South Korea’s world-leading shipbuilding firms can even build the design under license, which may create interesting collaboration opportunities in Australia. The class comes with AIP built-in, and has undertaken some long trips in German service. A larger 4,000t U218 design has also been discussed by TKMS, and sold to Singapore.

• Japan’s new 4,200t Soryu Class, which is far larger than any of the European submarines. It’s also an AIP submarine, using a Stirling system from TKMS in Sweden. Japan changed some of its laws in December 2011, allowing it to export some items to vetted allies.

Additional Readings

• Australia DoD – Defence Capability Plan 2009 Public Version: SEA 1000.

• DID – Australia’s Submarine Program In the Dock. Covers issues with the Collins Class.

• The Submarine Institute of Australia. Wide-ranging work in this general area, and on this program specifically. See their May 5/11 “FAQ for the Future Submarine,” among others.

• Project Gutenberg – Some Principles of Maritime Strategy by Sir Julian Stafford Corbett. His theories of naval power are similar to Australia’s goals and vision for their submarine force.

Official Reports

• Australia DoD (May 2013) – Government releases 2013 Defence White Paper.

• Australia DoD (May 2013) – Future Submarine Industry Skills Plan.

• Australia DoD (July 2012 – Dec 2012) – Coles Review: The Study Into the Business of Sustaining Australia’s Strategic Collins Class Submarine Capability.

• DID – Australia’s 2009 Defense White Paper.

Other News & Reports

• The National Interest (Sept 18/14) – U.S. Submarines: Run Silent, Run Deep…On Diesel Engines? Suggests buying a squadron of Soryus for the USN. Tremendous obstacles, but the author is a US Naval War College professor, and co-author of a defining work analyzing the Chinese naval buildup: “Red Star Over the Pacific”.

• Naval Technology (Feb 19/14) – Sink or swim: Sweden’s new A-26 next-gen submarine in doubt.

• Wall St. Journal (March 23/14) – Dispute Threatens ThyssenKrupp’s Submarine Business.

• SvD Naringsliv (March 18/14) – Sverige tar tillbaka ubåtarna. Mentions Australia and Poland as potential collaborators on a Swedish submarine design.

• Defense News (March 2/14) – Saab Maneuvers To Buy Swedish Submarine Maker. Following a late February decision by Sweden’s FMV to give Saab a $3.87 million contract. The point? To study Saab’s ability to produce Sweden’s next-generation submarine, instead of Kockums.

• Sverige Radio (Feb 27/14) – Osäker framtid för Kockum. “Uncertain future for Kockum”.

• The Local – Germany (Nov 29/13) – Poland gives thumbs down to German subs. “…but sources have told The Local that on the back of a landmark naval deal between the two countries, Poland is likely to lease two subs anyway.” Over the longer term, could Poland become a partner?

• Polish MON (Nov 15/13) – Okrety podwodne – rozmawiajmy o faktach. Excerpt Trans.: “The Polish Navy, according to the approved Technical Modernisation Programme 2013-2022, is expected to receive three new submarines. Two will go to its facilities by 2022 – a third by 2030.”

• Sydney Morning Herald (Aug 3/12) – Time for talking on new submarine is over. Explains the program’s timing issues, and also ongoing problems with the Collins Class.

• Kokoda Foundation (January 2012) – Sub Judice: Australia’s Future Submarine [PDF, Release]. A number of observers weren’t impressed, questioning its seriousness, objectivity, and conclusions – see Jan 19/12 entry.

• RAND 2011 – Learning from Experience: Lessons from the Submarine Programs of the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia. Covers SSBN/SSGN Ohio, SSN-21 Seawolf, and SSN-774 Virginia programs in the USA, Britain’s Astute SSNs, and Australia’s Collins Class SSKs (Volume IV).

• Australian DoD (Dec 13/11) – Collins Class Sustainment Review Phase 1 Report [PDF]. Also known as the “Coles Review”. Delivered to government Nov 4/11.

• Kokoda Foundation (May 25/11) – Under the Sea Air Gap: Australia’s Anti-Submarine Warfare Challenge. “This study attempts to identify issues surrounding Australia’s Anti Submarine Warfare capabilities that will require greater scrutiny in the period leading up to the 2014 Defence White Paper.”

• ASPI (April 14/11) – “The once and future submarine – raising and sustaining Australia’s underwater capability.

• Australian Defence magazine (April 1/10) – Size Matters, by Rex Patrick. A wide-ranging and educational look at trends in submarine warfare.

• The Australian (Feb 9/11) – Nuclear or not, we’ll need prefab subs. Amidst calls for SSN nuclear-powered fast attack subs, the article looks at the shortcomings of existing diesel-electric SSKs – and of Australian submarine experiences to date.

• ASPI in Brisbane Courier (Feb 1/10) – Royal Australian Navy lumbered with sub-par hardware.

• ASPI (Oct 29/09) – Strategic Insights 48 – How to buy a submarine: Defining and building Australia’s future fleet.

• DID (May 25/09) – ADF: An “Aren’t Deployable” Force?.

• ELP Defens(c)e Blog – Defence White Paper Fantasy. About the most critical coverage of the 2009 White Paper that we found.

• Australia DoD (July 1/99) – Mcintosh-Prescott report. Covering the shortcomings and issues with Australia’s Collins Class submarine program.

• Naval Technology – Collins class submarines.

Potential Contenders

• DID – Saab Story: Sweden’s New Submarines. Began as the A26; how will it end up?

• Spanish Navy – Submarine S-80.

• DID/DII – S-80: A Sub, for Spain, to Sail Out on the Main. Technical issues remove it as an export option until they’re fixed.

• Naval Technology – SSK Scorpene. India and Malaysia will operate this in the neighborhood.

• Naval Technology – SS Soryu Class Submarines, Japan.

• Naval Technology – U212/ U214 Type Submarines.

• TKMS – Type 216. About 4,000t, much larger than all but Japan’s Soryu. A customized version will become Singapore’s U218SG.

• Defense Update (Dec 5/13) – Singapore’s Type-218SG – Forerunner of a new Submarine Class? Says the U216 is designed to be scaled up or down.

Regional Developments

• DID/DII – India’s Multi-billion Dollar Scorpene Sub Contract. Includes a snapshot of Chinese developments.

• DID – Scorpene’s Sting: Liberation Publishes Expose re: Malaysia’s Bribery & Murder Scandal.

• DID – KSS-II: South Korea Orders 6 More U-214 AIP Submarines. They can build/assemble them, and may be about to begin exporting them.

& DID – Submarines for Indonesia. South Korean built, reportedly modified Chang Bogo Class U209s.

• DID – Thailand’s New Second-Hand Submarines. Reportedly 6 of the 500t U206As – but Thailand ended up backing out.

• SLD (Jan 9/14) – From Dynamic Defense to a “Comprehensive Defense Architecture”: Japan Re-Shapes Its National Security Strategy. The changes affect Australia’s plans, and expand the windows for cooperation.

• Senang Diri (Dec 4/13) – Republic of Singapore Navy Type 218SG submarine buy caps 18-year journey in underwater warfare.

• Singapore MINDEF (Dec 2/13) – MINDEF Signs Contract to Acquire Two Submarines. The U218SGs.

• TKMS (Dec 2/13) – ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems receives major submarine order from Singapore. For its U218SG. Switches them away from traditional provider Kockums, after TKMS blocked attempts by their subsidiary to sell new submarines to Singapore.

• The Diplomat (July 16/13) – The Submarine Race in the Malaccan Strait.

Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII) has announced the successful completion of endurance testing for the dual-mode manned or unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) Proteus, developed by the company's Undersea Solutions Group (USG) subsidiary and Battelle.

Raytheon has received a $104m contract from the US Navy's Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP) to provide operations and maintenance services for the relocatable over-the-horizon radar (ROTHR) programme.

The US Department of Defence (DoD) has awarded an indefinite-delivery / indefinite-quantity, multiple award contract, worth $8bn, to 12 companies for the electromagnetic manoeuvre warfare command and control (EMC2) programme.

GE has been selected by Freire Shipyard to provide a suite of marine solutions for the Peruvian Navy's first-ever diesel electric propelled vessel.

German Faun SLT-50 Elefant Tank Transporter

The US Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) has notified Congress of the potential foreign military sale of RIM-116C and RIM-116C-2 Rolling Airframe Missiles (RAM) to Qatar.

The US Navy's Nimitz-class nuclear-powered aircraft carrier USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75) and embarked Carrier Air Wing (CVW) 7 have achieved a major operational milestone during Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR).

The UK Royal Navy has concluded a bi-annual war game exercise Joint Warrior in Scotland.

Tide Class is a new fleet of four tankers being built to enhance the Royal Navy’s maritime capabilities. The first vessel in the class is due to be commissioned into the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA) service in 2016.

Gowind® 2500 corvette is one of two variants in the Gowind family of multi-mission corvettes developed by DCNS Group.

President Ghani’s speech to the Afghan parliament, in an extraordinary joint session on 25 April 2016, was unprecedented. Made in response to demands that he clarify the government’s security policies, the televised speech was sober and dignified, and detailed the government’s hardening stance against Pakistan, the Haqqani network, Daesh and “parts of the Taleban.” Although, according to the president, the door to peace was still ajar, the speech’s main aim was to project an image of resolve and military dominance. It represented a further hardening of the rhetoric and was met by an equally harsh statement by the Taleban. AAN’s Martine van Bijlert takes a closer look (with input from Salima Ahmadi).

The context

It was the first time a post-2001 president called an extraordinary joint session of both houses of the Afghan parliament. (1) Yet, Ghani’s speech was also part of an ongoing conversation between the president and the legislative bodies, which have enjoyed uneasy relations even during the Karzai years. A week earlier, on 18 April 2016, President Ghani called both houses to a large closed-door session at the presidential palace to discuss and consult on the government’s security policies. The meeting, that took place in the presence of the acting Minister of Defence, the new Minister of Interior and the acting head of the National Directorate for Security (NDS), was described by MPs as cordial and constructive.

During the 18 April 2016 meeting, President Ghani asked the MPs to support the government now that the quadrilateral talks – involving Afghanistan, Pakistan, the United States and China – had not brought Taleban to the negotiating table and the Taleban had launched their Omari Operation instead. Ghani warned that the nation would have six tough months of war and killing ahead of it and asked them to be united and support the security forces. The MPs, in turn, presented a list of ten demands or issues. (Some MPs said this was in response to the president’s request for a technical security plan, while other described the demands as a list of conditions if they were to support the government, as requested). In the subsequent days, the list grew and by the time the president made his speech, it contained 24 points, many not to do with security.

The president referred to the parliament’s conditions (“I received your list of 24 items”), saying he would address the most important ones in his speech and discuss the remaining in regular meetings with the parliament, that would take place monthly in the Palace from now on.

The demands/issues raised by the parliament include a shift in policy from negotiations to war; fundamental changes to the structure and policies of the High Peace Council; the introduction of the new minister of defence and head of NDS (currently filled by an acting minister and director) and the filling of other vacant governmental positions; a clear definition of the nation’s enemies and friends; presentation of the government’s five-year strategic plan to the Wolesi Jirga; the strengthening of the national security forces; a stronger stance against what they term Pakistan’s ‘double game’; electoral reforms; the parliamentary elections to be held on time; and the presentation of a concrete plan at the Warsaw summit.

Wolesi Jirga speaker Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, at the beginning of the joint session, also mentioned the implementation of the bilateral security agreement (BSA) with the US, an addressing of the problems of Afghan refugees and migrants in Saudi Arabia and European countries, the strengthening of good governance and the fulfillment of the promises made before and after the establishment of the NUG (see here for more detail).

The session was unusual, but it is not the first time the Afghan government has publicly sought to announce its stance in response to a major security incident. In October 2011, President Hamed Karzai addressed the nation in a televised speech to announce a ‘policy change’ after the assassination of High Peace Council head Burhanuddin Rabbani, who had been killed by a supposed Taleban peace envoy (current acting defence minister Massum Stanakzai, was badly injured in the attack). At that time, Karzai stated that the Afghan government would no longer seek to talk to the Taleban, but would address Pakistan directly instead, arguing that the Taleban did not appear to be in a position to take a decision with regard to peace. Ghani’s speech, now, was the exact opposite and may signal the end of a years-long strategy of demanding Pakistan ‘deliver’ the Taleban leadership.

But given that President Ghani’s speech was not just a reaction to recent events, but also a direct response to issues raised by the parliament, it should be read, not just as an address to the nation, but also as a direct attempt to forge greater unity between the executive and the legislative.

The speech

The president’s speech itself was sober and dignified. Alternating between Dari and Pashto, he made no jokes and displayed no sudden outbursts of emotion. Some of the more emotive sentences – in praise of the security forces, vilifying the Taleban or portraying a strong, bellicose stance – were met with polite rounds of applause. (The full official text in Dari/Pashto can be found here;  a link to a video of the full speech can he found here; and an English translation by BBC Monitoring can be found in the annex below.)

In terms of substance, the speech contained no big surprises. Most of the main themes had already been foreshadowed in comments to the media by the government leadership and their spokespersons. Emerging themes included praise of the Afghan security forces; a clearer ‘definition’ of the enemy; de-prioritisation of the peace process in favour of military operations; a loss of patience with Pakistan’s role; and continued assurances that the National Unity Government would keep its promises. It was, however, the nuance and detail that mattered.

In praise of the security forces

A large section of the early part of the president’s speech was spent in praise of the ANDSF (formerly known as the Afghan National Security Forces, the country’s security forces, under the new government, are now referred to as Afghan National Security and Defence Forces). President Ghani told his audience that the last 13 months had seen more than 40,000 combat missions and 16,000 resolute operations and that at that very moment more than 15,000 “brave troops” in seven provinces were fighting the Haqqani network, Taleban and Daesh. There was a bit of hyperbole when he praised the 50,000 families who had sent their sons and daughters to serve as soldiers over the last year, or the women who were cooking for the combat troops because they remember how they had been whipped [presumably by Taleban Vice and Virtue police] in the past. He listed a large number of units, departments and equipment (with special mention of the helicopters) that had been added to the security forces, based on their needs and experiences of last year.

The general image the president sought to project was that of a nation with security forces that had come to terms with their weaknesses and regained the initiative on the battlefield:

The combat capabilities of your [sic] young security and defence forces have been enhanced in a way that cannot be compared to the past … our Air Force has become so active it can reach the enemy in the country’s roughest terrains and mountainous areas … our army is becoming younger and stronger … reforms are ongoing.

He closed the speech with the wish that, “If God wills it, this year will turn into the last and final year of defeat for the terrorists and the bloodthirsty.”

A matter of definition

A second point the president dealt with in his speech was the prickly question of distinguishing friend from foe. The demand that the nation’s enemies be properly defined is a long-standing one, also often heard under President Karzai. The demand stems from criticism over the government’s confused stance vis-a-vis the Taleban, treating them as a party that needs to be wooed and appeased, even while they continue to launch vicious attacks. In the history of the country’s attempts to start a peace process, there has been a steady concern that concessions to the Taleban would be made before they were earned. Both Karzai and Ghani have been accused of being far too soft on the Taleban, with critics being fearful that in the haste to get something that looks like a peace deal, the Taleban would be allowed to join the government on their own terms and that chances for a more substantive peace negotiation would be squandered.

In his speech, Ghani started off his definitions by stating that all political groups who worked in favour of the national interests were “friends,” including the opposition: “Friends of Afghanistan are all Afghanistan’s citizens – including supporters of the state, those who are impartial and the political opposition with their different political perspectives and positions, who are nevertheless loyal to the national interests and protect and defend them.”

The enemies of Afghanistan were those, “who take advantage of the pure religious emotions of our youth, while they themselves are part of the drug mafia and are gathering wealth and luxury. The enemies of Afghanistan are the hireling groups like Daesh, al-Qaeda and the murderous groups of Haqqani and some Taleban who enjoy shedding the blood of their countrymen.” (emphasis added)

Ghani’s hedging with regard to the Taleban – defining only “some Taleban” as enemies – was explained in the next sentence: “The difference is that there is no way to talk with the foreigners’ hirelings, but we have still left the door of dialogue ajar for reconciliation with those groups of Taleban who are ready to work together for their country to put an end to the bloodshed and restore peace and stability – although this window of opportunity will not remain open for good.”

The reiteration that the door to peace is still open (to those who want to lay down their weapons, accept the constitution and distance themselves from terrorism, as state elsewhere) is much needed. But it is also so obvious – those surrendering will be allowed back – that it is unclear why Ghani felt his definition needed a caveat.

President Ghani also sought to frame the conflict as an “undeclared war,” claiming that he had reached consensus with the international partners that “this war is not a civil war, but a war waged by terrorists and their regional supporters against our country.” The Minister of Defence, while visiting Kunduz on 21 April 2016, referred to the conflict as an “imposed war,” stressing that the Afghan security forces would remain resilient against the conspiracies of the enemies of Afghanistan.

A stern talking to Pakistan

Although there had been commentary about the failed quadrilateral talks, the president’s comments were relatively circumspect – presumably in an attempt not to alienate the allies he still needs (the US and China). He said that the quadrilateral efforts, with all their difficulties, had “created appropriate conditions to better understand the rightfulness of the demands, of our people and our government, to seek a political solution.” He singled out Saudi Arabia and Iran as international partners and made a veiled, but unmistakable swipe at Pakistan: “Those who have failed to implement their commitments within this international framework or have been unwilling to implement them, are isolated more than ever today.”

A day earlier, presidential spokesman Dawa Khan Minapal had been a lot less guarded when discussing Afghanistan’s intentions to review its policy on Pakistan: “Pakistan is in a state of isolation. We want to use diplomatic initiatives to isolate Pakistan at the regional and international levels and to tell the world community where the terrorists are and which country and intelligence (agency) supports them.”

As widely reported, the president made it clear that he no longer expects Pakistan to bring the Taleban to the talks and instead called on Pakistan to either deal militarily with those Taleban who reside on Pakistani soil and refuse to accept the “political road” – based on its written commitment in the framework of the quadrilateral talks – or “surrender them to our sharia-based courts so they can be tried and punished for their actions.” President Ghani stressed that he, and the rest of the world, expected Pakistan to abandon the concept of ‘good terrorists’ and ‘bad terrorists’ and act as a responsible government. Failing to do so, Afghanistan would see no other option than to complain to the United Nations Security Council and other international bodies.

The US has recently also been increasing pressure on Pakistan. A US State Department spokesperson stressed on 22 April 2016 that Pakistan has been told at the highest level that the Taleban and Haqqani network had to be reined in:

We have consistently expressed our concerns at the highest level of the Government of Pakistan about their continued tolerance for Afghan Taliban groups such as the Haqqani Network operating from Pakistani soil. And we did again – after this week’s attack we have pressed the Government of Pakistan to follow up on its expressed commitment not to discriminate between terror groups regardless of their agenda or their affiliation by undertaking concrete action against the Haqqanis.

At about the same time as Ghani’s speech, reports surfaced in the Pakistani press that a delegation from the Taleban office in Doha had arrived in Islamabad and would possibly start face-to-face talks with the Afghan government on 27 April 2016. However, Taleban spokespersons either said they were unaware of the trip or denied the reports.

Pakistan, in the meantime, has yet to show any strong reaction to President Ghani’s speech. A Pakistani foreign affairs official, in a rather bland statement, said that Pakistan denounces terror in all forms, does not differentiate between terrorist groups and considers peace and stability in Afghanistan to be in the best interest of Pakistan.

Sartaj Aziz, the President’s advisor on foreign affairs, said in an interview that Pakistan would deal militarily with the “anti-talks Taleban,” but only after it had consulted with all sides.

A tougher stance on war and peace

In terms of a tougher stance on war and peace, Ghani’s speech was largely a reiteration of an earlier statement  issued on 21 April 2016, indicating that peace through negotiations with the Taleban was no longer a priority for the National Unity Government, as the insurgent group had shown no mercy on the Afghan people. While the stance in his latest speech was not new, the language of resolve when it came to punishing those who continued to choose war, was:

The enemies of Afghanistan should know that if they are caught on the battlefield while committing terrorist acts against the people of Afghanistan, they will be brought to justice and the rule of law will be fully implemented on them. … I will resolutely deal with those who shed the blood of our soldiers and our innocent people and I will not hesitate to punish them. The time for those who enjoyed unjustified amnesty is over. The government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is committed to resolutely implement decisions of the courts and judicial entities, including the rulings of death penalties.

The reference to capital punishment earned him the longest round of applause during the whole speech.

Echoing the same language, President Ghani told provincial NDS heads on the same day  (full palace statement in Dari here):

In the past eighteen months we exerted enough efforts to ensure peace, but they rejected it and last week in Kabul they martyred your colleagues and civilians. Therefore, they are rebels and criminals. Tighten the area around them, raise fear in their heart, block their passage routes, cut their financial resources, destroy their hidden places through air and ground operations and demolish them.

Of course, this tougher stance of the government will only signal actual change if the forces are indeed capable of holding their own and regaining the initiative.

The tougher stance could, incidentally, also usher in a period of increased tolerance for rights abuses on the battlefield and in detention centres – as already indicated, in UNAMA’s 2015 Protection of Civilians report, by the rising portion of civilian casualties caused by the ANDSF and the decision to use detention without trial.

Calls for unity

The speech, finally, was also laced with calls for unity. The president opened with a reference to last week’s meeting in the Palace, saying that “respected MPs had joined their voices with the government,” declaring their support for the government’s war and peace policies. He later spoke out against those who “tarnish this unity while they are within the system and the government, and who utilise the [government’s] resources to keep pouring water into the enemy’s watermill, and consciously or unconsciously, take part in the enemy’s psychological warfare; there will be no compromise regarding them anymore.” He asked the MPs and senators “to define this moral discipline and to enshrine it in law, so that in light of these principles, we can respond to the enemy’s psychological warfare more successfully.” The remark was vaguely phrased, but it sounded like the president was asking the parliament to lay down limitations to free speech and free reporting, along the lines of occasional requests to the media and commentators to refrain from reporting and debates that might threaten the nation’s morale or unity.

On the other hand, the president insisted that although the enemies had wanted to force the government to declare a state of emergency, “they did not know and do not know that Afghans are not a people to be intimidated and coerced. The Afghan soul does not accept coercion. We will never limit the freedoms that our Constitution has granted us.” The two seemingly contradictory statements seem an apt illustration of the competing drivers that the government faces. (Also, the government has already given itself an extra power – to detain without trial – by decree, rather than getting it after declaring a state of emergency, as laid out in the constitution.)

The president further briefly responded to the parliament’s demands for reforms, appointments and other National Unity Government promises still to be fulfilled, but his statements were largely vague reiterations of continued commitments. The two most practical points were a promise to introduce candidates for the ministry of defence and the NDS “in the coming days” (2) and an assurance that the elections “will be held as scheduled” – a position the government continues to repeat despite mounting evidence that the reform process is largely stalled and the elections, practically speaking, will need to be delayed again.

The president, at the same time, used the opportunity to request both houses of parliament to pass two new electoral decrees. An earlier set was voted down in December 2015 (more details here) and the electoral process is stalled until the status of the amended laws has been clarified (AAN dispatch forthcoming). The parliament is expected to discuss the decrees early next week and it is clear that the president hopes that a feeling of unity and urgency will encourage MPs to vote in the law’s favour.

The president’s speech was thus part framing exercise, part presentation of newly defined policy lines. It contained enough strong language to satisfy those who have long hoped for a clearer and more belligerent stance from the government on the Taleban. At the same time, however, it hard to ignore the fact that much of the rhetoric has not yet been backed up by actual significant change, for instance when it comes to the coherence of the security forces at the local level, or the government’s capacity to deal with corruption.

Responses

Responses to the president’s speech, then, were unsurprisingly mixed. Pajhwok ran a headline emphasising positive responses from Kabul residents (although they only quoted only one citizen who was positive, while another resident called the speech “symbolic”). In a second article, the same news agency cited opposition politicians who criticised the speech as containing “nothing new.”

Wahidullah Ghazikhel, the spokesman of the New National Front, led by former finance minister Anwar ul-Haq Ahadi, was quoted as saying “The New National Front and the Afghan people had hoped the president would come up with a clear stance on the peace and war in Afghanistan, but there was nothing.” He called the president’s remarks “ambiguous” and “controversial.” The spokesperson of the Protection and Stability Council, which has Abdul Rabb Sayyaf as one of its leaders, also said the president’s remarks were not very different from his previous remarks, which had also not been able to resolve the current problems. He warned the government not to compromise on the constitution, national sovereignty, the territorial integrity of Afghanistan or the achievements of the past. Only Amrullah Saleh, former NDS head and leader of the Green Trend political group had something positive to say, welcoming the president’s commitment to executing Taleban.

The Taleban responded in kind to Ghani’s speech, with explicitly harsh and mocking rhetoric of their own, first in a sequence of tweets by their spokesman Zabihullah Mujahed and later in a longer piece, that largely mirrored Ghani’s statements. They portrayed the Afghan government as servants to the Americans, comparing them with Shah Shuja and the various communist leaders and saying their fate would be the same. They added that a servant’s choice lay only in death or surrender and announced that this year would be the year of freedom for the whole country and of punishment of the ‘servants.’ The wording, chillingly, appeared to reflect an increased readiness to accept civilian casualties in Taleban bomb attacks in urban areas (compare also the rhetoric in the Taleban’s statement following the massive truck-bomb attack on 19 April 2016 which left more than 400 people killed or wounded). The hardening of positions in the immediate aftermath of the Pol-e Mahmud Khan attack thus seems to be escalating, at the very least in terms of rhetoric.

The implications

Ghani’s speech served several aims. The respectful and earnest address to both Houses was meant both as a rallying call and a basis for improved relations with the legislative. He undoubtedly hoped to ensure the parliament’s cooperation, for instance when voting on the electoral decrees and the government’s candidates for minister of defence and director of NDS.

The president’s messages – of resolve, success and commitment – were aimed at countering the image of a besieged and dysfunctional government that is being deceived and pushed around by Pakistan. The show of a fairly unified response by President Ghani and CEO Abdullah in the aftermath of the 19 April 2016 truck bombing prompted some commentators to wonder whether this could usher in a greater internal unity in the government in the face of mounting security challenges. That however remains to be seen. It is not difficult to be united in the face of such a vicious attack. The first real test will be now that the unity government, with its complicated system of appointments, tries to finalise the candidacies for the ministry of defence and NDS positions. Rumours that Abdullah boycotted the joint session of the houses of parliament, because he felt snubbed that he would not be given the same podium as the president, do not bode well. (3)

 

(1) According to article 104 of the constitution “Sessions of the two Houses shall be held jointly under the following circumstances: 1. When the legislative term or annual sessions are inaugurated by the President; 2. When deemed necessary by the President.”

(2) The Wolesi Jirga MPs had actually called for the introduction of these candidates before the president’s address; some MPs had even made it a condition for attending the session. In the end it seems only Latif Pedram boycotted the session, claiming that such a meeting where MPs are not allowed to respond or ask questions was a waste of time.

(3) A deputy Spokesperson to the CEO confirmed to AAN that Abdullah had cancelled at the very last moment because all the formalities were for the president and not for him. Also he was told to sit with his deputies and not with the president and the heads of both houses.

 

Annex: President Ghani’s speech to the Afghan houses of parliament, as broadcast live on state-owned National Afghanistan TV on 25 April 2016 (translated by BBC Monitoring)

In the name of Almighty Allah, the most compassionate, the most merciful.

[President Ghani begins in Pashto] Your Excellences, [Speakers] Mr Ebrahimi, Mr Moslemyar, [Vice-President] Mr Danesh, Mr Chief Justice, respected Pir [Gilani], Mr Khalili [possibly former vice president], esteemed members of the cabinet, the nations’ representatives, members of the senate, journalists, countrymen! Assalamu Alaikum Wa Rahmatolla-he Wa Barakau [greetings].

 [The president switches to Dari] In the past two weeks, our country has gone through some important political and military developments as been the victim of a horrifying terrorist incident. Despite all the efforts made by the people and our government to put an end to the fighting, the rebels of this era, with their foreign supporters, have beaten the drum of battle and insurgency and declared the genocide of our innocent people. But they are not aware that our brave security and defence forces are committed to finding them across the whole country and defending the lives and property of their people by suppressing them. The members of the two esteemed houses of the national council echoed the voice of the government at a meeting at ARG [presidential palace] last week and pledged full political support for the government and national security forces with regards to peace and fighting. Exactly just one day after this consensus, the wicked Taleban committed the most horrifying inhuman crime and left our innocent countrymen killed. I would like to use this opportunity to pray for all the martyred of this land and particularly the victims of the recent terrorist attack and wish a complete recovery for the injured.

 Dear countrymen! The incident in Kabul on Tuesday [massive car bomb] is not the first act by the criminals of this group. Their despicable killing of innocent people, their depriving people of freedom, are just part of their long history of slaughter and mercilessness. They enjoy shedding innocent people’s blood and tearing people’s bodies apart. But, regardless of their blood lust, there is a large number of genuine sons of the nation who rushed to the hospitals and donated millions of litres of their blood to their injured countrymen from across the whole country, demonstrating their unity and solidarity and expressing their loathing for this terrorist group. As you know, the world, including the Islamic countries, and especially the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Islamic Republic of Iran, the United Nations, the majority of Asian and European countries, the USA, China, Japan, Australia and Canada have also called this criminal act by terrorists unforgivable.

[President Ghani reverts to Pashto] Sisters and brothers! These criminals are not the seekers of knowledge [literal meaning of “Taleban” is seekers of knowledge]. They are rather rebels and militants who stood against the legitimate government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan [applause]. The real Taleban study in madrasahs. Those who murder people, who are the enemies of education and who destroy mosques have no right to call themselves “Taleban”. Based on the Holy Koran’s explicit instruction, we have the right to defend our people against rebels and militants and to punish them [applause]. This group is led by some of those enemies of our country in Peshawar and Quetta who shed the blood of their countrymen and enjoy destroying the people of Afghanistan. They feel no goodwill towards the people of Afghanistan. They have no respect for the demands and hopes of the people of Afghanistan. In the political arena, they have proved their ignorance and unworthiness. I call upon the religious scholars of Afghanistan to show to these fools and misdirected people what the right direction is.

Esteemed audience! The enemies of our people wanted to force the Afghan government to declare a state of emergency by spreading fear and brutality. But they did not know, and still do not know, that Afghans are not going to join in the unrest soon [applause] The Afghan soul does not accept unrest and we will never impose restrictions on the freedom that the constitution has given to us [applause].

[Dari] Esteemed members of parliament! I have received a list that contains 24 chapters, if I remember correctly. I will refer to part of this list which is of vital importance and I will leave the remaining part for some monthly meetings at the presidential palace in the future.

I have come to parliament today, to the highest tribune of Afghanistan, to share with you and the people that we used all our resources last year to put an end to violence through peaceful manners. We also tried our best to defend our people against the undeclared war and to continue strengthening our defensive and security forces relentlessly. We have also called for a consensus among our international partners that this is not an internal war, but rather a war launched by terrorists and their regional supporters against our country and our people to achieve their unlawful objectives. They will achieve this objective only through barbarity and terrorism.

We have stepped up efforts to put an end to the fighting through non-military means at the national, regional and international level. Meanwhile, we have also used our military channels against terrorist groups. In the last 13 months, the country’s brave security and defence forces have carried out more than 40,000 combat operations and over 16,000 resolute operations in various parts of the country. Currently, as I speak, the brave sons of this land are busy suppressing the terrorists of the Haqqani network, the Taleban and other terrorist groups in seven provinces, as part of 15 ongoing military operations.

The fighting ability of the national security and defence forces has been enhanced significantly compared with the past. Within less than a year, at least 50,000 of our patriotic families have sent their sons and daughters to join the ranks of our security forces. We thank our patriotic families and each and every mother and father who gave birth to such brave children. Our security forces were given a warm welcome all across the country. Some housewives in various parts of the country have even voluntarily provided food to our security forces while they were engaged in military operations. The modest women of this land still remember the oppression of these fools [from when the Taleban were in power] and will never tolerate this group [applause].

Based on the security requirements and in the light of the lessons learnt from previous years, we have established a military unit in Konduz and an army brigade in Badakhshan Provinces [applause]. We have also created a deputy command for special forces in order to enhance coordination among special security units. We are proud of the sacrifices made by this unit.

Among some of the units recently set up within our security forces are: the technical, weaponry and artillery section; the 777 special air force brigade; the coordinating centre for the Kabul Garrison command – led by the chief of army staff and we thank him; the regional hospital of the 215 army corps; directorates for technical affairs and operations and maintenance within the army corps and army brigades; the centre for evaluation of intelligence threats and the radio intelligence centre.

[Speaking in Pashto] Esteemed audience! Last year when we had a limited number of helicopters and planes, we began the renovation of the country’s air force and now our air force is active to the extent that they are able to launch air operations against our enemies in some of the mountainous regions such as Khostak and Kohestani [applause].

The military coordination centre that we established last year has become the most effective centre with regards to coordination and decisions. Our intelligence abilities in various areas have progressed substantially.

More than 80 generals of our country were retired after reaching pension age to make way for our youth and to inject more young blood into our army and make it more powerful. The reform process in this area is ongoing.

Today, our security and defence forces have the support of some Islamic countries, the People’s Republic of China, Russia, Australia, Japan, Canada, India, NATO member states and other international partners. We are pleased to say that a consensus has been established among international donors to support our defence and security forces in the context of a five-year security plan [applause]. This plan will be finalized in the near future at the Warsaw Summit. Before that, we will discuss the plan with you at the palace. This consolidation is the result of the hard work of the National Security Council members and especially esteemed Mr Atmar and esteemed Mr Stanekzai. I thank them very much.

Esteemed MPs and senators! In the next few days, the national defence minister and the heads of the intelligence agency will be presented to you for a vote of confidence. I hope for your cooperation in this regard. This will fill the gap [applause] We will no longer continue with acting ministers. We echo your voice [applause].

Esteemed MPs and senators, we must stand against the Haqqani Network and other Taliban groups as they are serving foreign interests and have formed an alliance with international and regional terrorists and the drugs mafia and are seeking to return our people and country to the dark era of history. History testifies to the fact that whenever we have remained united, the strongest combat armies of the world have knelt down in front of us. In order to defend our religion, country and constitutional values, we must unanimously and practically demonstrate unity. There will be no compromises and we will take action against those who work in this system and government and who harm our national unity by exploiting its resources and knowingly or unknowingly joining the enemy’s psychological warfare. I request that you, the MPs and leaders of this country, introduce this moral discipline and incorporate it into a law, so that we can more successfully respond to the enemy’s psychological warfare. You requested an explanation for friend and foe from me at our meeting in the presidential palace a few days ago. Our friends are the citizens of this country, regardless of whether they support or do not support the system, the political opposition that has a different position and perspective, but is committed to the supreme national interests and protects and guards them as much as they can. However, our enemies are those who exploit the sacred religious emotions of our young people and are part of the drugs mafia and are making their fortune through this. The enemies of Afghanistan are the slaves of foreigners, such as Da’ish, Al-Qa’idah, the Haqqani Network, the Taliban and other savage groups which take pleasure in shedding the blood of their compatriots and continuing war and terrorism. Talks with the slaves of foreigners cannot be held. However, we have opened our doors for reconciliation talks with those Taliban who are willing to cooperate with their country in ending the bloodshed and restoring peace and stability. However, this is not an everlasting opportunity.

Esteemed nation and audience, our efforts to build an effective international mechanism to end war and bring about international consensus, in particular to meet the genuine demands of our people, have proven effective. Despite the problems, the mechanism of quadrilateral talks has prepared the ground for better recognition of the fact that the demands of our people and governance are genuine and that a political solution must be sought [to the current crises]. As a result of these efforts and an active diplomacy, we have extensive relations with our key international partners in the region and the world, including key Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, based on mutual trust. And those who have failed to honour their commitments within this international framework, who did not want to honour them, have been more isolated than ever before.

Pakistan promised to use military force against those Taliban elements who do not renounce violence and reconciliation [with the Afghan government]. Let me clarify this today – we are not expecting Pakistan to bring the Taliban to the negotiating table. We, however, call on Pakistanis to keep the promises they made in the quadrilateral agreement and carry out military operations against those who, according to our intelligence organizations, the intelligence organizations of our international partners and senior Pakistani officials, have centres inside Pakistan and whose leaders are residing inside Pakistan. We also call on Pakistan to hand over these criminals to our courts to be punished unless it is willing to launch an operation against them itself. Our relations with Pakistan are based on mutual obligations and rights. We and the world expect our neighbour, Pakistan, to drop the policy of “good terrorists” and “bad terrorists” and to launch operations against them all, meaning that there is no good terrorist or bad terrorist because a terrorist is a terrorist. Pakistan’s government should act as a responsible government. There is no good terrorism or bad terrorism. And whoever believes in this will in the end themselves be harmed by the terrorists. Our people are expecting us to take the issue of sanctuaries, equipment and resources being provided to terrorist groups on Pakistan’s soil for use against Afghanistan to the UN and several other international institutions as well as international civil society, because this is against the UN charter and international conventions. No country should support terrorists against another country. We believe their expectation is genuine. Despite our efforts and desires to shape regional cooperation, we have no choice but to refer to the UN Security Council and take serious diplomatic steps unless [Pakistan] changes its policy. Furthermore, we will take steps to pursue criminals whose hands are stained with the blood of our people outside Afghanistan with the help of international institutions.

Esteemed MPs, senators, dear audience, sisters and brothers,

The government never halts its peace efforts, in view of the holy verse “peace lies in reconciliation”. However, we will pursue peace only through Afghan channels and the Afghan government will reach peace only with those who do not want war and violence, who accept Afghanistan’s constitution and who completely cut their ties with terrorists. However, I want to make it clear to everyone that if we want peace, it does not mean that criminals will walk freely and a blind eye will be turned to the acts of murderers. Our defence and security forces, who enjoy the backing of their nation, in particular of the religious scholars, have decided and devised a programme to destroy the centres of the Haqqani Network and its friends – militants, Da’ish, Al-Qa’idah and other savage groups and send these rebels to hell. The enemies of Afghanistan must realize that if they are caught during a combat operation or while conducting an act of terrorism against the people of Afghanistan, they will definitely be handed over to the law and will be punished according to the law. I assure our esteemed MPs, senators, elders and the pious people of Afghanistan that as the president and guard and protector of the rights and security of the people of Afghanistan, I will deal severely with those who shed the blood of our innocent people and soldiers and will show no mercy when punishing them. No-one will be pardoned anymore. The Afghan government is committed to executing the rulings of the courts and legal and judicial authorities strictly, including where it concerns capital punishment.

The execution of these orders with strong determination delivers a clear message: our justice system is strong enough to punish criminals and terrorists. But it is clear that our resolve to apply the law must conform to the constitutional injunctions, our commitment to human rights and just policies. You will see how those who have rejected our call for reconciliation will beg us to join the peace process after being defeated on the battlefield. Henceforth, we will achieve lasting and dignified peace through tough military action throughout the country.

Esteemed MPs, senators, sisters and brothers, all of our people stress the need for reform and a fundamental change. We are committed to honouring our promises in this regard. Reform of the electoral bodies has started and elections will be held on time. I request both houses of parliament to pass the [electoral] law submitted to them as soon as possible. One of the weak points in our government, which the enemy is exploiting, is corruption. The perpetrators have weakened the military capabilities of our defence and security forces and are serving the country’s enemies. We will mete out serious punishment through our courts to these perpetrators who commit treason. I request you all to support reforms and the elimination of corruption in every institution, in particular in the security sector, to completely depoliticize our security institutions. And those who exploit their positions should not be supported at all. We can secure victory over the enemy on the battlefield only by introducing reforms and creating cleaner institutions. I request you to support the government in achieving this goal.

In order to fight corruption, the legal and judicial system and the independence of the judiciary must be further strengthened. More attention must be paid to the protection of our esteemed judges and prosecutors against the perpetrators of organized crime. I should thank the lower house of parliament for giving a vote of confidence to Attorney-General Mr Hamidi and for preparing the ground for completion of the High Judicial Council. As part of the reforms in the judicial system, Mr Halim and his friends have transferred, replaced or appointed new judges over the past six months and have launched capacity building programmes for judges. The National Security Council will approve a new regulation for the formation of Afghanistan’s judicial and legal police. This will help judges and prosecutors to fulfil their duties confidently. I thank those judges and prosecutors who have issued death sentences to rebels and assure them that we will protect them. Moreover, the government is making efforts to improve the economic situation and create employment opportunities. The Brussels conference on Afghanistan will be held and will be attended by more than 70 countries and 20 international organizations who will announce their commitment to economic development and the promotion of good governance for the next five years.

Development projects which were launched last year will continue this year and the TAPI [gas pipeline project], the CASA-1000 [project for] electricity supply from Turkmenistan, the Aqina-Turkmenistan railway track and Herat-Khawaf [railway track] are among these projects.

Esteemed MPs and senators, I call on you once again to continue supporting your courageous and brave security and defence forces. Your political support will help our security and defence forces to fight the enemies of Afghanistan more confidently and, God willing, this year will see the last and final defeat of terrorists and murderers.

Long live Afghanistan,

Long live Afghanistan,

Long live Afghanistan.

The latest issue of European Defence Matters, the official magazine of the European Defence Agency (EDA), is now available.

In its 10th edition, the magazine analyses the tremendous change the defence sector is currently facing in the way innovation and R&T related to future military capabilities are driven and implemented. European Defence Matters asked EDA subject matter experts, industry representatives and academics how changing innovation patterns might impact on European strategic autonomy, and what the prospects for Europe preserving its autonomy in critical R&T are. It furthermore looks at how the European defence industry deals with the challenge of strategic innovation, identifies some of the most critical new emerging technologies and gives an update on the setting up of the Preparatory Action on defence research.

The magazine also includes an interview with Dutch Defence Minister Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, presents Michel Barnier’s views on the upcoming European Commission Defence Action Plan and highlights the latest achievements in an EDA project aimed at enhancing Member States’ Personnel Recovery capabilities.

More information:

• European Defence Matters 10

On 20 April, SEDE exchanged views with Florence Gaub, EUISS, and Anar Valiyev, ADA University, Baku on how to combat ISIL in the Eastern and Southern Neighbourhood Countries. The attacks in Paris and Brussels have demonstrated the recklessness and tenacity of the terror organisation "Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL)". Their jihadist ideology has become the blueprint for aspiring terrorist groups and organisations in the Eastern and Southern neighbourhood of the EU.
Further information
Draft agenda and meeting documents
Source : © European Union, 2016 - EP

Work underway in the European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Commission to explore dual-use synergies on R&T with the support of existing EU funding instruments has led to a tangible result with the recent announcement that a €2.2 million dual-use research project led by a Polish SME will be co-funded by the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF).

The Polish project called “Intruder Detection and Avoid System” (IDAAS) aims at developing a sensor-based system helping to avoid collisions between general aviation and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV, or drones). It is the second dual-use research project co-funded under ESIF after a first successful pilot project in Portugal related to technologies for unmanned maritime systems (project TURTLE).

Of the total required investment (€2.2 million), ESIF will fund €1.75 million (78,7%). Project holder is EUROTECH, an SME based in Mielec, a town in south-eastern Poland.

IDAAS will integrate different types of independent measurement sensors (optoelectronic cameras working in visual range and infrared, acoustic microphones with a big sensitivity, laser scanner, radar) and a complex measurement and calculation module which will communicate directly with on-board or control systems. The fundamental advantage of IDAAS system will be its complete autonomy and independence from other devices and systems. Therefore it will be possible to use it as an independent or a supplementary anti-collision system.

The IDAAS project was first selected within EDA’s “1st ESIF process”, issued in December 2012 to obtain EDA technical assistance in finalizing the application dossier under the EU multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2007-2013. Due to a lack of residual ESIF budget at the end of the previous MFF, EDA has kept supporting it for submission within the new multiannual financial framework (MFF) 2014-2020.

EDA Chief Executive Jorge Domecq welcomed the ESIF co-funding and stressed the importance of seeing an SME taking the lead in such an innovative project. “It’s a great success which confirms that there are funding opportunities for defence-related stakeholders available in the EU’s multiannual financial framework running till 2020, especially for SMEs with dual-use projects”, Mr Domecq stated. “The challenge is to ensure that all current and future EU funding schemes or tools are complimentary to Member States’ existing R&T programmes and not seen as a replacement for them”, he added.