The European Defence Agency (EDA) and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus are co-organising an EDA seminar on EU funding for the defence sector which will take place on 18 May 2016 in Nicosia, Cyprus.
The objective is to raise awareness and inform defence-related stakeholders (SMEs, academia and research associations) about existing possibilities to access European Union funding programmes running till 2020, including the European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIF) and COSME (EU Programme for COmpetitiveness of SMEs).
A particular focus will be put on ways and means to benefit from dual-use R&T funding and Enterprise Europe Network free-of-charge services.
The seminar is also intended to inform interested parties on how to participate in collaborative EDA programmes/projects and explore Horizon 2020 funding possibilities.
Location: the seminar takes place on 18 May (9:00h-16:30h) in the Filoxenia Conference Center, Nicosia (http://www.fcc.com.cy).
Registration: by email to seminar@mod.gov.cy or online on the Ministry of Defence website (before 12 May)
RQ-7 Shadow
(click to view full)
By 2007, US Army RQ-7 Shadow battalion-level UAVs had seen their flight hours increase to up 8,000 per month in Iraq, a total that compared well to the famous MQ-1 Predator. Those trends have gained strength, as workarounds for the airspace management issues that hindered early deployments become more routine. Some RQ-7s are even being used to extend high-bandwidth communications on the front lines.
The difference between the Army’s RQ-7 Shadow UAVs and their brethren like the USAF’s MQ-1A Predator, or the Army’s new MQ-1C Sky Warriors, is that the Shadow has been too small and light to be armed. With ultra-small missiles still in development, and missions in Afghanistan occurring beyond artillery support range, arming the Army’s Shadow UAVs has become an even more important objective. It would take some new technology, but that seems to be on the way for the US Marine Corps RQ-7B Shadow UAV fleet.
SecDef Robert Gates’ has consistently offered strong support for more attention to the needs of the counterinsurgency fight. Surveillance is part of that, but it needs to be backed by action. Pending and emerging approaches tie UAVs, manned propeller planes, artillery, and helicopters into a cohesive, fast, and flexible solution for finding, identifying, and capturing or killing opponents.
Larger RQ-5 Hunters have been tested with Viper Strike mini-bombs, and MQ-1C Sky Warriors can carry up to 4 Hellfires – but both UAV types are far outnumbered by the Army’s smaller RQ-7 Shadows. Precision weapons can also be dropped by fighters or bombers, but the planes’ $10,000 – $25,000 cost per flight hour is prohibitive, they require extensive planning processes to use, and declining aircraft numbers affect their potential coverage and response times.
M270 firing M30 GMLRSSmall UAVs can still pack a punch without weapons by providing GPS targeting data to M30 GPS-guided MLRS rockets, long-range ATACMS MLRS missiles, or 155mm Excalibur artillery shells – as long as those weapons are (a) appropriate and (b) within range.
Using an ATACMS missile to take out an enemy machine gun position seems a bit silly, but that’s exactly the sort of help that could really make a difference to troops on the ground – and has been used in urban fights, against building strongholds. With that said, maximum effectiveness comes when battalion-level “Tactical UAVs” like the RQ-7B Shadow can perform the full spectrum of missions: surveillance, laser or GPS target designation, or close support for infantry fights.
The U.S. Army’s Armament Research Development and Engineering Center (ARDEC) at Picatinny Arsenal, NJ has funded some R&D in order to provide “Tactical Class Unmanned Aircraft Systems (TCUAS)” with a low-cost weapon, US NAVAIR is busy developing a 5-pound missile called Spike, and global trends are pushing companies like Raytheon and Thales to invent designs of their own. The US Army ended up dragging its feet on arming its small tactical UAVs, but they are fielding GBU-44 Viper Strike weapons on MQ-5B Hunter UAVs, and have a small but growing fleet of Hellfire-armed, Cessna-sized MQ-1C Gray Eagle UAVs. The US Marines have no such option, and decided that arming their own growing fleet of RQ-7Bs was the way forward.
Step 1 requires a lightweight laser designator that would add the ability to actively mark targets for common helicopter and UAV weapons like Hellfire missiles, laser-guided 70mm rockets, or Paveway bombs. That way, the small and relatively cheap RQ-7s could mark targets for any component of Task Force ODIN, or its equivalent. That effort is already underway, across the board.
Step 2 involves arming even RQ-7 size UAVs, but their payload weight limits make that a very challenging task. Small missiles like the US Navy’s Spike are in development, in cooperation with Finmeccanica’s DRS, but parallel private developments
ATK: Hatchet. This 7-pound weapon is extremely small, and half its weight is warhead. GPS and GPS/laser guidance variants are both said to be possible.
GD: RCFC. General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems makes the US Army’s mortar rounds, and had an interesting idea. What if their 81mm mortars could receive a small add-on GPS guidance kit, similar to the JDAM kits used on larger air force bombs? The Army’s 81mm mortars weigh just 9-10 pounds each, and GD-OTS’ clip-on Roll Controlled Fixed Canard (RCFC) is an integrated fuze and guidance-and-flight control kit that uses GPS/INS navigation, replacing current fuze hardware in existing mortars. A standard M821 81mm Mortar with fuze weighs 9.1 pounds, and the same mortar with an RCFC Guidance system and fuze weighs just 10.8 pounds. US Army ARDEC funded their development testing.
The nose-mounted RCFC guidance has now been successfully demonstrated on multiple mortar calibers, in both air-drop and tube-launch applications. The tube-launched application has been successfully demonstrated at Yuma Proving Grounds, AZ in a tactical 120mm guided mortar configuration known as the Roll Controlled Guided Mortar (RCGM), which uses the existing 120mm warhead and the M934A1 fuze.
Lockheed Martin: Shadow Hawk. In 2012, Lockheed began discussing its “11 pound class”, semi-active laser-guided Shadow Hawk bomb.
Raytheon: Pyros. STM. Raytheon has a privately-developed effort called Pyros, a 22-inch, 13.5-pound bomb that uses dual GPS/INS and semi-active laser guidance. It also has also 3 warhead options: height-of-burst, point-of-impact or fuze-delay detonation.
Thales/ Textron: FF-LMM/Fury. Thales’ beam-riding Lightweight Modular Missile with its tri-mode (burst height, impact, delayed) warhead will equip Britain’s AW159 Wildcat helicopters, and single launchers are small enough to fit on tactical UAVs like Schiebel’s S1000 Camcopter. Removing the propulsion system lightens the missile even further as the Free-Fall LMM, which adds a dual-mode GPS-laser guidance system up front. A partnership with Textron is aimed at the US market, where the weapon is known as the Fury. It was tested from an RQ-7B in 2014.
These and other systems will offer the US Marines the options they need. In the end, however, they key change isn’t the individual weapons – it’s the concept. That concept’s influence will extend past small UAVs, in 2 ways.
MC-130W: nextOne is the growing trend away from sole USAF control of air support, and toward a much more responsive era of “federated airpower” that includes high-end aircraft and UAVs operated by the US Air Force, and lower-tier propeller planes and small UAVs operated by the US Army and Marines. Those lower-tier options use lower-cost platforms that are far more affordable to operate, which means they can be bought and operated in numbers that provide far wider battlefield coverage for small-unit engagements.
The USAF’s long-running and pervasive deprecation of relevant counter-insurgency capabilities, and strong institutional preference for high-end, expensive platforms, has left them vulnerable to lower-cost disruptive technologies that meet current battlefield needs. While the service still has a key role in maintaining American power, strategic control of the air, and high-end capabilities, the new reality involves a mix of high and low-end aerial capabilities, with a lot more aerial control nested closer to battlefield decision-making.
The other change is reaching beyond UAVs, and into USAF and USMC aircraft, which can carry larger weapons. Related tube-launched small precision weapons, which already include Raytheon’s Griffin missile, are finding their way to USMC KC-130J and Special Operations MC-130W Hercules, which are receiving roll-on/ roll-off weapon kits that can turn them into multi-role gunship support/ aerial tanker aircraft. Similar weapons, like Textron’s G-CLAW and many of the weapons discussed here for UAVs, will make it easier to equip more planes with more on-board weapons. As Airbus and Alenia both begin fielding smaller gunship aircraft of their own, and more countries begin arming other kinds of counterinsurgency aircraft, the market is expected to grow.
Contracts and Key Events Pyros strikeMay 2/16: Textron is currently testing their upgraded RQ-7 Shadow M2 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which they believe will allow the system to undertake increased mission capabilities currently reserved for larger UAVs such as the MQ-1 Predator. At present, Shadow V2s are used by the US Army in conjunction with AH-64 Apaches to fill the armed reconnaissance mission, following the retirement of the OH-58 Kiowa Warrior helicopter. The Shadow M2 will add longer endurance, more capable payloads, and more power than the M2 version, and also gain a satellite uplink that allows it to communicate beyond-line-of-sight.
Sept 23/14: FF-LMM. Textron Systems touts a pair of successful live-fire demonstrations from an RQ-7 Shadow 200 UAV at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ, using its new GPS/laser guided Fury (FF-LMM) collaboration with Thales. Textron’s AAI subsidiary makes the Shadow, and the demonstration to TRL 7 levels (prototype tested in representative environment) took 15 months of planning and work with Thales.
As noted above, Fury is derived from Thales’ beam-riding Lightweight Modular Missile, but it uses a different guidance system and removes the rocket motor. It’s properly a glide bomb, which is true for the vast majority of entrants in this market niche. Sources: Textron Systems, “Textron Systems Fury™ Lightweight Precision Weapon Engages Target During Live-Fire Demonstrations”
July 13/14: FF-LMM. Thales unveils an unpowered version of LMM at Farnborough 2014, as a smaller and lighter option for use on tactical UAVs, as well as larger platforms. It’s 70cm / 2’4? long and 6 kg / 13 pounds in weight, with a combined GPS and laser guidance system. The initial model won’t have an airburst fuze, though. Sources: IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, “Farnborough 2014: Thales unveils new LMM variant” | Aviation Week, “Thales Reveals 6-Kg Glide Bomb For UAVs”.
Aug 7/12: STM-II Pyros. Raytheon announces a successful test for their 13.5 pound “Small Tactical Munition,” now redesigned and named “Pyros.” The end-to-end test from a Shadow-sized Cobra UAV validated the weapon’s dual laser/GPS guidance, its height-of-burst sensor, electronic safe and arm device, and multi-effects warhead.May 2/12: Shadow Hawk test. Lockheed Martin announces successful tests of its privately-developed Shadow Hawk bomb from an RQ-7B. The “11 pound class,” 2.5 inch diameter weapon is laser-guided, and hit within 8 inches of the target at at Dugway Proving Grounds in Utah after being dropped from 5,100 feet.
April 4/12: Army update. The US Army discusses its plans for the RQ-7 Shadow. The army’s product manager, ground maneuver, UAS is Lt. Col. Scott Anderson. He says the Army is observing USMC efforts to add weapons to the Shadow, but is more interested in giving the UAV a new engine to improve reliability. That multi-phase competition got 14 responses, and could indirectly help weaponization efforts, especially if the new engine also provides more power.
Jan 12/12: Armed to Afghanistan? Flight International reports that the USMC plans to send 8 armed RQ-7Bs to Afghanistan as a combat demonstration program, after 94 “high-value targets” escaped during a recent Marine unit’s deployment, even though they were spotted by RQ-7s circling overhead. There isn’t always someone else on hand to fire.
The goal is to arm the Shadows with guided bombs weighing under 25 pounds, which was cleared for treaty compliance (?!?) by the US State Department in July 2011, and reportedly followed by a $10 million December 2011 contract. Installation and certification is expected to take a year, followed by a $7 million follow-on contract for deployment. The magazine reports that the weapon isn’t Raytheon’s STM, MBDA’s SABER, or ATK’s Hatchet, but is “another guided weapon that already has been developed and fielded in secrecy.”
Dec 30/11: Laser designators. Textron subsidiary AAI Corp. in Hunt Valley, MD receives a $54.8 million firm-fixed-price contract modification to supply RQ-7B laser designator retrofit kits.
Work will be performed in Hunt Valley, MD, with an estimated completion date of March 31/14. One bid was solicited, with one bid received by US Army Contracting Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-08-C-0023).
FY 2011
STM-P2 on Cobra UAV
(click to view full)
Sept 16/11: STM-II test. Over at Yuma Proving Ground, AZ, Raytheon’s 12-pound, 22″/ 56cm Small Tactical Munition Phase II finishes captive carry tests on the company’s smaller Cobra test UAV, paving the way for full weapon tests.
STM Phase II is more than 2 inches shorter than the Phase I design, and has foldable fins and wings that allow it to be used from the U.S. military’s common launch tube. It uses both GPS and semi-active laser guidance. Raytheon is taking the production-ready mandate seriously, as well; STM Phase II is also easier to assemble than the Phase I design. Raytheon Nov 30/11 release.
Aug 17/11: Cleared to arm. Flight International, quotes US NAVAIR’s Small Tactical UAS program manager, Col. Jim Rector, who says that the Marines have received clearance from policymakers to arm the RQ-7 Shadow. The USMC made its intent to do so clear late last year (vid. Jan 18/11 entry). Field trials are to be performed on with unnamed munition selected by AAI, within the Marines’ request that it be a production-ready item. This evaluation process is scheduled to last 18 – 24 months.
Aug 15/11: Collision. When an RQ-7 flies into a C-130 Hercules, at least the latter gets to land in one piece. This time.
The incident underscores the role that “deconfliction” needs to play, when armed UAVs are used over the battlefield without “sense and avoid” technologies on board. Experiments are underway to give Shadow-sized UAVs those capabilities, but without that, expect sharp flight restrictions that emphasize long advance notice of flight plans, and narrow altitude bands. Those restrictions will reduce an armed “MQ-7C” Shadow’s potential value, which means the full impact of small tactical armed UAVs won’t be felt until that technical hurdle is cleared.
June 21/11: First test flight at Webster Field, MD of a RQ-7B Shadow UAS under the direction of NAWC Aircraft Division’s UAS Test Directorate. Col. Jim Rector, program manager for Navy and Marine Corps Small Tactical UAS program office (PMA-263), said:
“Having a RQ-7B at the UAS Test Directorate allows for the test and evaluation of system enhancements and ultimately provides the ability to quickly get new technologies into the hands of Marines”.
Rector was appointed in April after last serving in the V-22 program office (PMA-274).
May /11: Competition: T-20. Arcturus in Rohnert Park, CA has built the T-20 tactical UAV drone, whose wings can carry MBDA’s 10-pound Saber mini-missile.
The USMC has a few in testing now, and this wing-mounting capability may give Arcturus an opening to supplement, or even replace, AAI’s RQ-7 Shadow as the USMC’s armed tactical UAV.
Jan 18/11: USMC in. Flight Global reports that the US Marines have decided to arm Shadow UAVs as their own initiative, since the Army is dragging its feet, and the Marines don’t have a larger armed UAV like the Army’s MQ-1C Gray Eagle:
“Although the Army Aviaton [sic] and Missile Command issued a request for information in April seeking data on precision-guided weapons weighing 11.3kg (25lb) or less… and said as recently as October that it would take the lead on development of Shadow weaponisation with the USMC, the programme is no longer on the table for the army… says Col Robert Sova, capability manager for UAVs at the Army Training and Doctrine Command.”
The Marines reportedly want a solution fielded within 12-18 months. Beyond options like RCFC, NAVAIR’s Spike, etc., Raytheon has been pressing ahead with its 13 pound Small Tactical Munition (STM), with its dual-mode, laser/GPS guidance system.
Dec 3/10: R&D projects. Aviation Week reports that the US Navy is working on weapons that could give even the ScanEagle UAV hunter-killer capability – and implicitly, the Marines’ Shadow 200s as well.
The 2 pound next-generation weapon management system (WMS GEN2) is designed for use on small UAVs like the Shadow. It has been tested in the lab, and the development team is now looking at using the WMS GEN2 with the 5 pound NAWCAD Spike mini-missile, the Scan Eagle Guided Munition (SEGM), and a GPS-Guided Munition (G2M).
Oct 26/10: STM tests. Flight International reports that Raytheon has conducted tests of its 13 pound, unpowered Small Tactical Munition (STM) at the Yuma Proving Ground, AZ. The 2 successful tests used Raytheon’s Cobra UAV, which was picked because it’s close to the RQ-7 Shadow’s size. Raytheon estimates needing 12 to 18 months to get STM production lines running at quantity, and is readying the project in response to interest from the USMC and, they expect, from Special Forces.
FY 2008 – 2010
81mm RCFC test
(click to view full)
April 19/10: Army RFI. Looks like the US Army is getting more serious about fielding armed Shadow UAVs. US FedBizOpps solicitation #W31P4Q-10-R-0142 says that “Responses to this RFI will be used for information and planning purposes only and do not constitute a solicitation…,” but its issue does show a higher level of seriousness, and could well be a prelude to a real solicitation if an acceptable candidate emerges:
“The US Army Aviation and Missile Command (AMCOM) Program Executive Office (PEO) Missiles and Space (M&S), Program Management (PM) Joint Attack Munition Systems (JAMS), on behalf of the war fighter, seeks information from industry on weapons systems ready for production and suitable for integration on the RQ-7B with POP 300D laser designator payload Shadow Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs). Potential weapons systems must be ready to field within 12 months from the date of a potential contract award. The primary interest is in weapon systems approximately 25 lbs or less total system weight (to include munition, launcher, wiring, fire control interface, etc). The weapons system should be able to engage stationary and moving targets such as light vehicles and dismounted combatants in day and night conditions with low collateral damage when launched from a Shadow UAS flying at speeds of 60-70 knots and between 5,000 and 12,000 feet Above Ground Level (AGL). Terminal accuracy must be on the order of that demonstrated by currently fielded Semi Active Laser / Imaging Infrared / Millimeter Wave (SAL/IIR/MMW) weapons…”
That level of terminal accuracy may be an issue for RCFC mortars, depending on how the Army interprets it. SAL/IIR/MMW weapons are generally considered to be more accurate that GPS guidance, but if “on the order” means “approximately,” then a GPS guidance kit would qualify. It is intended that this RFI will be open for 21 calendar days from date of publication (to May 10/10).
April 1/10: RCFC test. General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems announces successful 81mm Air-Dropped Mortar guide-to-target flight demonstrations at Ft. Sill, OK. The RCFC weapon was released from a TUAV (Shadow) using the GD-OTS’ newly developed “Smart Rack” carriage and release system.
Feb 12/09: Laser designators. Textron subsidiary Army Armaments Incorporated (AAI) in Hunt Valley, MD receives a $9.3 million cost plus fixed fee contract modification, exercising options for additional engineering hours related to these Shadow UAV modifications. These services are related to low-rate initial production of Laser Designators, Tactical Common Data Link (TCDL) interoperability, and integration with the Army’s Universal Ground Control Station and Universal Ground Data Terminal.
Work will be performed in Hunt Valley, MD, with an estimated completion date of April 30/09. One bid was solicited and one bid received by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-08-C-0033).
Jan 21/09: Laser designators. Textron subsidiary AAI Corp. in Hunt Valley, MD receives a $12.2 million firm-fixed-price finalization of Letter Contract Modification P00012. It will purchase 25 Laser Designator Retrofit Kits for its RQ-7 Shadow Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS).
Work will be performed at Hunt Valley, MD, with an estimated completion date of Aug 31/09. One bid was solicited and one bid received by the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command in Redstone Arsenal, AL (W58RGZ-08-C-0023).
Dec 16/08: RCFC test. General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems announces that it has successfully demonstrated the ability to maneuver and guide 81mm air-dropped mortars to a stationary ground target after release from an aircraft. These test results in Kingman, AZ build on previous pre-programmed maneuver flight tests successfully conducted by General Dynamics in 2007, and use the company’s patented Roll Controlled Fixed Canard (RCFC) flight control and guidance system.
Additional ReadingsListed in alphabetical order of manufacturer.
MBDA – SABER. Their Small Air Bomb Extended Range (SABER), whose unpowered version is about 10 pounds. The powered version of this GPS/laser guided weapon is 30 pounds.
“Array of Aging American Aircraft Attracting Attention” discusses the issues that accompany an air force whose fighters have an average age of over 23.5 years – vs. an average of 8.5 years in 1967. One of the most obvious consequences is the potential for fleet groundings due to unforseen structural issues caused by time and fatigue. That very fear is responsible for the #1 priority placed on bringing new KC-X aerial tankers into the fleet to complement the USA’s 1960s-era KC-135 Stratotankers.
It can also affect the fighter fleet more directly.
Following the crash of a Missouri Air National Guard F-15C aircraft Nov 2/07 (see crash simulation), the US Air Force suspended non-mission critical F-15 flight operations on Nov 3/07. While the cause of that accident is still under investigation, preliminary findings indicate that a structural failure during flight may have been responsible. In response, Japan suspended its own F-15 flights, which left them in a bit of a bind – even as Israel’s F-15s joined them on the tarmac. As the effects continue to spread and the USAF and others continue to comment on this situation, DID continues to expand its coverage of this bellwether event. A conditional restoration of the American F-15A-D fleet to flight status was soon overturned by the re-grounding of that fleet as a result of the report’s conclusions – a status that remains only been partially lifted. Meanwhile, the accident report has been released (compete with video dramatization) and the status of the remaining aircraft will have significant implications for the USAF’s future F-15 fleet size. Not to mention its other procurement programs.
Then, too, this is America. Now there’s a lawsuit.
The F-15A reached initial operational capability for the US Air Force in September 1975, and approximately 670 F-15s remain in the USAF’s inventory. Current F-15 flying locations include bases in the continental United States, Alaska, England, Hawaii, Japan and the Middle East, and the aircraft are active on the Iraqi and Afghan fronts. The Missouri Air National Guard F-15C that crashed was built in 1980.
Lt. Gen. Gary L. North, US CENTCOM Combined Forces Air Component commander, is maintaining the newer F-15E Strike Eagles on ground alert, to be used if required. Otherwise, he says he will accomplish all assigned missions using a variety of fighter, attack and bomber aircraft, and unmanned aerial vehicles. Lt. Gen. North added that:
“I worry about the health of our aging fleet and how sometimes it is not well understood by those our Airmen protect… The investigation will get to the cause of the accident.”
USAF Chief of Staff Michael Moseley was even more specific in an Oct 30/07 interview with GovExec.com:
“The F-15s and F-16s were designed and built in the late ’60s and ’70s. Some of them were produced up until the early ’80s. But they’ve led a pretty hard life of 17 years of combat. So you have to replace them with something, because we were continuing to restrict the airplanes. In the F-15 case, we’ve got the airplane restricted to 1.5 Mach. It was designed to be a 2.5 Mach airplane. We’ve got it limited on maneuvering restrictions because we’ve had tail cracks, fuselage cracks, cracks in the wings. The problem with that is – and Mike Wynne uses this analogy – it’s almost like going to the Indy 500 race practicing all the way up until Memorial Day at 60 miles an hour, and then on game day, accelerating the car out to 200 miles an hour. It’s not the time to be doing that on game day.
So in our training models and in our scenarios, we’re limiting these airplanes because they’re restricted and getting old. So there’s two parts to the recapitalization of the fighter inventory. The first part is the existing stuff is old and it’s getting broke, and it’s getting harder to get it out of depot on time. And our availability rates and our in-commission rates are going down. The ability to generate the sorties on those old airplanes is in the wrong direction.”
And Flight International:
“A USAF F-15 crashed in the Gulf of Mexico in 2002 when it broke up after the leading edge of its left vertical stabiliser detached in a high-speed dive to Mach 1.97. The pilot was killed.
The USAF says it began replacing the leading edge and upper aft portion of the vertical stabilisers during depot overhaul and has so far completed 463 of its 664 aircraft. The F-15 involved in the Missouri accident had its vertical stabilisers repaired in August 2003, the service says.”
Further investigation focused on the plane’s longerons, which connect the aircraft’s metal ‘skin’ to the frame, and run along the length and side of the aircraft. Both the Accident Investigation Board and Boeing simulations have indicated them as a possible source of catastrophic failure; indeed, DID had wondered why structural failure was suspected immediately, and it with that revelation it began to make sense. As DID explained at the time, if one or more of those longerons had failed, the stresses on the airframe could have folded or broken the plane in half – a very unusual form of accident. Eventually, the publication of the formal report confirmed that hypothesis:
“The one longeron, already not up to design specifications, cracked apart under the stress of a 7G turn, the colonel said. This led to the other longerons failing as well, which then caused the cockpit to separate from the rest of the fuselage. The pilot was able to eject, but suffered a broken arm when the canopy snapped off.”
F-4EJ “Kai(zen)”Nor is this problem confined to the USA – or even to the here and now.
The Chinese government’s Xinhua agency reports that Japan has also grounded its F-15 fleet. Japan’s F-15Js were built locally under license, on a more recent production schedule, but their oldest planes do date back to 1980. This is a precautionary measure until more is known.
Since Japan’s F-16-derived F-2 fighters are also grounded in the wake of a recent crash at Nagoya, this leaves 1960s era F-4EJ ‘Kai’ Phantom IIs as Japan’s interceptor and fighter patrol fleet for the time being.
Israel confirmed to Flight International that it had also grounded its 70 F-15A-D air superiority aircraft, which are undergoing multi-role conversions, and its F-15I Strike Eagles. The Strike Eagles were later removed from the USA’s concern list, but its F-15 A-D fleet is an important component of Israeli air defenses alongside its larger F-16 fleet.
Gen. John D.W. Corley, the commander of US Air Combat Command, was not encouraged by the results of the report, and of the in-depth fleet inspections that led to 40% of the Eagle fleet remaining on the ground over 3 months after the investigation:
“The difficulty is that issues have been found with F-15s built between 1978 and 1985, across A through D models at several bases, so no one source of the problem can be isolated… This isn’t just about one pilot in one aircraft with one bad part… I have a fleet that is 100 percent fatigued, and 40 percent of that has bad parts. The long-term future of the F-15 is in question… We don’t have a full and healthy fleet, so we’ve gotten behind on training missions, instructor certifications, classes and exercises…
We’re going over each and every aircraft to make a determination. We will take some F-15s out of the inventory. It just doesn’t make sense to spend the time and money if it won’t be worth it for some aircraft.”
Updates F-15E, P-51, F-22AMay 2/16: USAF’s fleet of more than 500 F-15s are to get a wheel and brake upgrade after successful flight testing. Once completed, F-15C/D/E fighters will be capable of undertaking 1,400 landings before having to swap out their brakes. The USAF stands to save over $194 million in F-15 maintenance costs once all of the aircraft are fitted with the upgrade, and this will be the first brake testing to be carried out on the jet since the 1980s.
May 26/09: Aviation Week reports that the USAF is looking into the possibility of a Service Life Extension Program for its F-15A-D fleet, designed to increase their service lives from 8,000 flight hours to 12,000.
The move is driven, in part, by the impending collapse of Air National Guard wings that can be used in domestic air sovereignty patrols, as older fighters retire and are not replaced. The USAF is accelerating the retirement of 250 F-16 and F-15 fighters in FY 2010, and current plans calls for 2 ANG air sovereignty mission units to get F-22s, 4 to get receive upgraded F-15A-Ds, and the remaining 12 are yet to be determined.
March 22/08: Maj. Stephen Stilwell, a pilot for Southwest Airlines whose Missouri Air National Guard F-15C’s mid-air crackup began the fleet groundings, has filed suit in U.S. District Court against claiming Boeing Corp. His injuries left him with a 10-inch metal plate in the injured arm and shoulder, and he reports that he has suffered from chronic pain since the accident.
Stilwell’s suit, filed by attorney Morry S. Cole, says that Boeing knew or should have know that the F-15 as manufactured allowed and permitted for catastrophic flight break-up, and adds that Boeing failed to notify the Air Force and Missouri Air National Guard of “the likelihood of excess stress concentrations, fatigue cracking, structural failure and in-flight aircraft break up as a result of the structural deficiencies.” St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
February 2008: The largest effects of the F-15 fleet’s grounding may yet play out on the procurement front. If many of the USAF’s F-15s, which were supposed to serve until 2025 or so, must be retired, how should they be replaced? Read “Aging F-15s: Ripples Hitting the F-22, F-35 Programs.”
Jan 21/08: This week’s edition of the “Today’s Air Force” show highlights how the Air Force carried on its mission while more than 700 of its F-15 Eagles were grounded. See “The Eagle flies once again!” on the Pentagon Channel, American Forces Radio and Television Service stations around the world, and video podcast [30 minutes].
Jan 14/08: Officials begin flight operations again as 39 of the 18th Wing F-15C/Ds at Kadena Air Base, Japan are cleared to fly again after remaining on the ground for more than 2 months as a result of a fleet-wide stand-down. See USAF story.
Jan 10/08: According to the Air Combat Command Accident Investigation Board report released on this day. Their conclusion? The plane was simply too old:
“…a technical analysis of the recovered F-15C wreckage determined that the longeron didn’t meet blueprint specifications. This defect led to a series of fatigue cracks in the right upper longeron. These cracks expanded under life cycle stress, causing the longeron to fail, which initiated a catastrophic failure of the remaining support structures and led to the aircraft breaking apart in flight… the pilot’s actions during the mishap sequence were focused, precise and appropriate. The pilot’s actions did not contribute to the mishap, said Colonel Wignall. In addition, a thorough review of local maintenance procedures revealed no problems or adverse trends which could have contributed to the accident.”
Col. William Wignall, the head of the accident investigation added that:
“We’ve had great involvement from Boeing during the investigation. In fact, they’re the ones who determined the longeron was the problem. This was then confirmed by the Air Force Research Laboratory.”
See the USAF’s “F-15 Eagle accident report released,” and the accompanying video dramatization, as well as “Air Force leaders discuss F-15 accident, future.”
Jan 9/08: Air Combat Command officials clear 60% of the F-15A-D fleet for flying status, and recommends a limited return to flight for those planes that have cleared all inspections. The decision follows detailed information briefed on Jan 4/08 to Air Combat Command from the Air Force’s F-15 systems program manager, senior engineers from Boeing and the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center; as well as a briefing received on Jan 9/08 from the Accident Investigation Board president.
The USAF report describes inspections as “more than 90% complete,” with remaining inspections focusing primarily on the forward longerons. Thus far, 9 other F-15s have been found with longeron fatigue-cracks, and almost 40% of inspected aircraft have at least 1 longeron that is thinner than blueprint specifications. ACC believes each affected F-15 will have to be analyzed to determine if there is sufficient strength in the non-specification longeron, and this analysis will take place at the Warner-Robbins Air Logistics Center over the next 4 weeks. A number of F-15s are scheduled to be retired in 2009, and calculating the cost of fixes and airframe life of fixed aircraft could have a substantial bearing on the size of the USAF’s future F-15 fleet.
Meanwhile, the 2-month grounding, which has been the longest of any USAF jet fighter, is a gift that keeps on giving. Fully 75% of US Air Force and Air National Guard F-15A-D pilots have lost their currency status for solo flight, and another week would have made it 100%. Instructor pilots have retained their currency and will begin flying F-15B/Ds with the other pilots, so the pilots can land the plane and regain their status. This will be followed by further pilot training, which is required to regain operational proficiency status. USAF report | Flight International.
F-15C CAP(Combat Air Patrol)Dec 27/07: The Associated Press details some of the ripple effects created by the F-15 A-D grounding. With the F-15s in Massachusetts out of commission, the Vermont Air National Guard (ANG) is covering the whole Northeast. The Oregon ANG’s fighters are grounded, so the California Air National Guard is standing watch for the entire West Coast plus slices of Arizona and Nevada. To meet that need, the Fresno, CA based 144th Fighter Wing has had to borrow F-16s from bases in Indiana and Arizona and trim back training.
The Minnesota ANG is manning sites in Hawaii, while the Illinois ANG covers Louisiana. In Alaska, the new F-22 Raptors are stepping in – and so are Canadian CF-18s, which have intercepted several Russian bombers near Alaska in recent weeks.
Dec 10/07: The F-15 A-Ds remain grounded. A USAF update informs us that throughout the Air Force, maintainers have found cracks in the upper longerons of 8 F-15s so far: 4 from Air National Guard 173rd Fighter Wing, Kingsley Field, OR; 2 from USAF 18th Wing, Kadena Air Base, Japan; 1 from 325th Fighter Wing, Tyndall AFB, FL; and 1 from ANG 131st Fighter Wing, St. Louis, MO.
Inspections are underway using previous methods, until the Warner Robins ALC develops new ones for the fleet. After the area’s paint is stripped and bare metal is exposed, Airmen apply chemicals that reveal cracks under a black light. “Other inspections in hard-to-see areas are done with a boar scope [sic… maybe they mean “borescope”?] – a tool that uses a tiny camera and fits in tight areas.” Inspection time per aircraft is 12.5 to over 20 hours, and the 2-seat B and D models are more time consuming because the rear seat must be removed to access the upper longerons. USAF story.
UPDATE from USAF: “Yes, other readers pointed that out as well (although yours was the funniest). The story was corrected…”
Dec 3/07: It’s now official. Gen. John D.W. Corley, the commander of Air Combat Command orders the stand-down of all ACC F-15 A-Ds until further notice, and recommends the same for all other branches of the USAF. The stand-down does not affect the F-15E Strike Eagle and its variants abroad.
Technical experts with the Warner Robins Air Logistics Center at Robins Air Force Base, GA are developing a specific inspection technique for the suspect area, based on the recent findings. However, unlike previous inspections, the inspected aircraft will not be returned to flight until the F-15 A-D model findings and data have been analyzed, required inspections have been accomplished, and the necessary repair or mitigation actions have been completed. To date, longeron cracks have been discovered in an additional 4 aircraft. USAF release.
F-15E: Mission executed.Nov 28/07: The accident investigation board (AIB) report leads to the recommended re-grounding of the USAF F-15 A-D fleet, and almost certainly those of other countries as well. The new AIB findings have drawn attention to the F-15’s upper longerons near the canopy of the aircraft, which appear to have cracked and failed. Longerons connect the aircraft’s metal ‘skin’ to the frame, and run along the length and side of the aircraft. In addition to the AIB’s conclusions, manufacturer simulations have indicated that a catastrophic failure could result from such cracks, which were also discovered along the same longeron area during 2 recent inspections of F-15C aircraft.
The commander of Air Combat Command has recommended the stand-down of all F-15 A-D model aircraft across the US military, and ordered a renewed fleet-wide inspection of all ACC F-15 A-D model aircraft using a very specific inspection technique for the suspect area. The multi-role 2-seat F-15E Strike Eagles, which were manufactured later and had several design changes made, remain exempt from these cautions and exceptions. USAF article.
Nov 21/07: All USAF’s F-15s are being returned to flight status, despite acknowledgment that the service is accepting a degree of risk in doing so. Gen. John D.W. Corley, commander, Air Combat Command:
“The cause of the mishap remains under investigation… At the same time, structural engineers have conducted in-depth technical reviews of data from multiple sources… First, we focused on the F-15Es. They are… structurally different than the A-D models. Problems identified during years of A-D model usage were designed “out” of the E-model… Next, we concentrated on the remainder of the grounded fleet. The AIB(Accident Investigation Board) is now focused on the area just aft of the cockpit and slightly forward of the inlets. Warner Robins ALC mandated a thorough inspection and repair of all structural components in this area. I have directed each F-15 aircraft be inspected and cleared before returning to operational status. Today, ACC issued (a flight crew information file) and Warner Robins ALC issued an Operational Supplemental Tech Order to further direct and guide your pre-flight and post-flight actions.”
There are 666 F-15s in the Air Force inventory. As of this day, 219 of the 224 E-models and 294 of the 442 A-D models in the USAF’s inventory have been inspected and re-cleared for flight.
Nov 19/07: Shortly after becoming the first deployed F-15E unit in the Air Force to return to full operational capability following the Air Force’s fleet-wide grounding of the aircraft, the 455th Expeditionary Maintenance Squadron at Bagram AFB, Afghanistan, began the move from 5-7 day phase inspections every 200 flight hours, to a phase inspection every 400 flight hours. This change isn’t slated for implementation until 2008, but it’s being implemented early at Bagram AFB to keep more F-15Es in the air and meet mission demands.
The USAF says that its engineers at the Warner-Robins Air Force Base Air Logistics Center, GA looked carefully at all the data after years of F-15E analysis and testing, before approving the change. USAF release.
Nov 15/07: A USAF release says that an order issued by Air Combat Command’s Commander Gen. John Corley on Nov 11/07 mandates a 13-hour Time-Compliance Technical Order (TCTO) on location for each of the USAF’s F-15E Strike Eagles, to inspect hydraulic system lines, the fuselage structure, and structure-related panels. Aircraft that pass this inspection may return to flight status, and similar procedures are likely to be underway for Israel’s F-15Is. ACC Combat Aircraft Division chief Col. Frederick Jones said that this was possible because:
“We were able to determine, based on initial reports from an engineering analysis, that the F-15E is not susceptible to the same potential cause of the Missouri mishap.”
The TCTO inspection is designed to confirm the engineering analysis, and aircraft deployed the CENTCOM has apparently completed inspections and returned to flying status. This still leaves 2/3 of the USAF’s F-15 fleet grounded, however, as the F-15A-D models remain under suspicion. The F-15Es are about 15 years old on average, but the F-15A-D models were introduced earlier. Maj. Gen. David Gillett, ACC director of Logistics said that:
“What we’ve got here is an example in the C model of what happens when you have an airplane that’s about 25 years old… What you find is that it becomes more and more expensive to modify [the F-15 airframe] over time… Our costs have gone up 87 percent in the last five years and continue to rise rapidly. Even when you invest in an old airframe – you still have an old airframe.”
Additional Readings & SourcesTurning government-run Radio Television Afghanistan (RTA) into a public service broadcaster, a symbol of a democratic state, has been on the agenda of both donors and the Afghan government since 2002. However, only small, cosmetic changes have so far been made. As a result, many argue that this goal is no longer realistic. The overstaffed, cumbersome government institution would require strong political and financial buy-in to change its way of doing business and presenting the news. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica looks into the government’s plans for RTA.
A new attempt at reform?
“I want our national TV [RTA] to be like the BBC. It must be a true national TV, which should reflect the voice of Afghans,” tweeted Ashraf Ghani, during his presidential campaign in August 2014. That day, just before this eager tweet, he had met with a group of journalists and told them that RTA “should become a media station that gives the opportunity for dialogue to all, and it should be under an independent, impartial institution. RTA should not be a microphone for the President and his deputies.”
This aim was also reflected in the National Development Strategy 2010-13, ie for the Ministry of Information and Culture to develop “a truly editorially independent public service broadcasting of a high standard by 2010.”
Since Ghani’s enthusiastic words were spoken and he took office, there seems to have been some movement between the president’s office and RTA about the transformation. Everything, however, is still very hush-hush.
AAN was recently given two confidential documents, which both deal with the future of RTA. The first document is a 2015 confidential feasibility study on the reform of the institution, which was carried out on the president’s request and authored by David Page, a well-known media expert and a former BBC world service staffer. The second document is a lengthy proposal on RTA’s transformation to a public service broadcaster (PSB) developed by the institution’s own Director-General, Zarin Anzor (a well-known writer, Pashtun scholar and journalist), and submitted to the president several months ago. The second document was a direct result of recommendations made in the confidential feasibility study.
RTA: some facts, figures and problems
Currently, RTA has approximately 2,000 staff on its tashkil (the formal staffing spread-sheet). Of this number, 1,050 are in Kabul and the remaining 950 in the provinces. All RTA staff are government employees, and most of them are over the age 35, which makes RTA less competitive on the market, where most privately-owned TVs are run by young professionals who speak to an equally youthful population. (62 per cent of Afghanistan’s population is between the age of 20 and 40, and 75 per cent of the population is under 35 years of age.) According to the people interviewed for the 2012 BBC Media Action Policy Briefing on Afghan media in transition, “RTA has only one shortcoming: it has less young people… If they hire young people as anchors or newscasters, it would attract a younger audience.” However, there is also a beauty in preserving institutional memory with the ‘old-timers’, as captured by this 2002 BBC feature story on a RTA staff member in charge of the pre-computer age tape archive of Afghan radio.
RTA’s operational budget for 1395 (2016/17) is 404 million Afghani, approximately 5.9 million US dollars; the development budget for the same year is around 2.4 million US Dollars. (Afghanistan operates with this kind of split budgeting). This is a rise compared to the previous year, when operational costs of 343 million Afghani (5 million USD) and developmental expenditures of 1.6 million US dollars were allocated to it. At the same time, RTA generates revenue from advertising and other sources that amount to approximately 220 million Afghani (3.2 million USD). This shows that RTA is far from being self-sufficient. However, RTA, although an independent directorate, does not manage its advertising revenue directly; this is handled by the Ministry of Finance. (1)
The proportion allocated for personnel expenses is over 60 per cent of the operational budget (five years average 2008-13), both in its TV and radio sections. As in many other Afghan institutions, this accounts for its largest expenditure – meaning fewer resources for modernisation. Program production costs, for example, account for only 1.3 per cent, while the budget for producing original content is almost zero, as shown by the Japanese development agency, JICA, in December 2013.
However, according to Abdul Rahman Panjshiri, RTA’s director of planning and international relations, the crux of RTA’s problem is not the availability of financial resources, but the management structures of the state-owned broadcaster.
“The money we receive from the government is sufficient, but our management is weak,” Panjshiri told AAN.
Different approaches to transformation
President Ghani appears to have a strong personal vision for RTA. In November 2014 following his inauguration, he repeated his ambition for the broadcaster to become independent and took the conversation one step further in a meeting with a senior BBC manager. “He talked about putting in place a robust enough system to prevent RTA from becoming a ‘political capture’ after it has become independent,” the BBC’s Shirazuddin Siddiqi wrote in a paper presented at the Global Media Freedom Conference (GMFC), held in Copenhagen in April 2015. (2)
A confidential feasibility study authored by David Page also notes that the views of senior official advisors to both the president and the CEO are very similar and favourable for turning RTA into a public service broadcaster.
The confidential feasibility study suggested two models for structural transformation, such as that of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC) or the Independent Joint Anti-Corruption Monitoring and Evaluation Committee (MEC). Both organisations are based on Afghan law (the MEC on a presidential decree, the AIHRC even has constitutional rank), and receive direct funding from it, but in a way that safeguards their independence and their ability to act in the public interest. A similar change for RTA, according to the study, should allow for its transformation into a public corporation with greater autonomy in finances and human resources.
RTA planning director, Mr. Panjshiri, told AAN in 2015 (AAN could not confirm the exact date) that President Ghani met with RTA’s management and asked them to prepare a detailed report and plan for transformation. The RTA’s management probed the president’s resolve regarding the introduction of a licence fee paid by TV viewers. The president, however, advised RTA’s management to first improve its programme quality and increase its reach to its audience, and then “to start thinking about the licence fee.” Following this meeting, RTA organised a committee, which included representatives from UNESCO, the BBC and the Afghan media organisation Nai, which works locally on the empowerment of independent media outlets and organisations.
However, an internal disagreement (between Anzor and Panjshiri) soon surfaced regarding how the PSB should be organised. This disagreement reflects conflicting ideas about the central issue as to whether RTA should become a broadcaster governed by an independent commission or remain a national broadcaster under the control of the government. (3) This inevitably resulted in halting the committee’s work.
Anzor’s proposal, which includes a strategic plan of transformation, a draft PSB law, a proposal for RTA’s reform and three programme documents for 2015/16, is a light take on the reform and does not make significant changes to RTA’s governing structures. For example, according to the draft law the candidate for the post of Director General will still be proposed and appointed by the president, not through public bidding (locally called kankur) and approved by an independent commission (to be formed), as is the case in many other countries. According to international PSB standards, the most important way of securing the independence of the governing board is through appointments of its management governing bodies through a multi-party body, not by an individual minister.
The proposal covers the period from 1 January 2016 to 31 December 2019 and will cost 13.5 million US dollars for the first three years. (The budget for 2019 is not included in the document AAN received.) On a technical level, the proposal includes changes such as a conversion from analogue to digital transmission, the establishment of four TV channels (global and national, entertainment and news) with 33 studios, ie one in all provinces, a correspondent network in Pakistan, India, Russia, Iran, the EU and the US and the incorporation of the Wolesi Jirga channel, currently managed by parliament itself. It also proposes the recruitment of 300 new employees during its structural reform, but omits to mention what would happen to current staff. Additionally, 40 new radio and 15 new TV programmes (including talk shows and entertainment programmes) are to be produced during this period.
The transformation proposal for RTA also suggests an annual licence fee of 100 Afghani (1.5 US dollars), which would be collected from customers along with electricity bills by the state-owned Afghanistan Electricity Company, better known as Breshna. (4) According to the proposal, this would result in annual revenue of 400 million Afghani (5.8 million US dollars). Additional resources would be collected through advertising, on average 200 million Afghani (3 million US dollars) per year.
This all sounds attractive, but it remains technical to a large extent, avoiding changes in the management and the very character of the institution. “A PSB is a system of principles, you can not accept some and reject others,” Panjshiri told AAN, adding, “Anzor’s proposal did not capture the essence of the PSB. It is like a mouth without the teeth.”
Earlier reform attempts
Talks about RTA’s reorganisation and its new role in society started in 2002, on the eve of the interim administration’s general effort to reform everything and to revive old, ‘prestigious’ institutions in the country. The Minister for Information and Culture during Hamed Karzai’s interim administration issued policy directions on Reconstruction and Development of Media in Afghanistan on 6 June 2002. An International Media Conference, which brought together representatives of the Afghan government, local civil society and the international community followed in September 2002. The conference declaration together with the Afghan government policy direction from June 2002, constituted the basic framework for the development of media policy in Afghanistan. The declaration specifically recommended:
… that work begin immediately on transforming Radio-Television Afghanistan into a public service broadcasting system. In recognition of the significant role the media will play in the debate over national reconstruction, a timetable for the conversion should be agreed to by the end of 2002 and a detailed plan initiated with the aim of significant progress towards this goal being achieved by June 2004. This should include early creation of an independent board of governors that reflects Afghanistan’ s diversity.
In 2004, the first comprehensive strategy for the reform of RTA was handed to the government. But reform dragged on, and the target – progress by mid-2004 – was clearly missed. Between 2004 and 2007 yet another set of reform plans was drafted, as “a funding package between 15 and 40 million Euros was potentially on offer from the EU and other donors,” as a recent confidential feasibility study on RTA reform shows. The study further reveals that although “the Parliament voted to make RTA independent by a two-thirds majority, the project was not ultimately approved by the President [Karzai] and the EU withdrew its offer.” (For the 2007 WJ discussion on the media law see here.)
Panjshiri summarised these efforts in one sentence in his interview with AAN: “[S]ince 2002 there has been a lot of talk on transforming RTA into a PSB, but these were just words, nothing materialized in practice.” According to Panjshiri’s observations, then minister of culture and information, Dr Seyyed Makhdum Rahin’s fear of losing control (5) was the main obstacle to serious changes. He said Rahin, who served as the minister twice (2002–05 and 2010–15), never really pushed for transformation.
However, Panjshiri also had some serious disagreements with Rahin’s successor Abdul Karim Khurram, minister from 2005 to 2009. He even resigned in September 2007, directly citing the minister’s efforts to curb the station’s independence as his reason. “During my 29 years of service with RTA I have not seen such an attempt to suppress freedom,” he said in comments published by Radio Netherlands. Since January 2007, following the resignation of RTA’s director Najib Roshan over policy differences with the minister, RTA staff complaints regarding Khurram were numerous. He became well known for his use of threats and violent language against any RTA employee who objected to unqualified or political appointments made at RTA, and was reported by international actors involved in the process. Khurram had RTA employees who voiced objections physically removed from the premises by his fifty armed bodyguards who regularly accompanied him to meetings.
The International Federation of Journalists (IFJ) in its report on media freedom in Afghanistan 2008–11 also named Khurram, who belonged to president Karzai’s inner circle, as a key opponent to the transformation.
It was not until March 2014, as noted in the confidential study on the reform of RTA, that Karzai was finally persuaded to re-designate RTA as an ‘independent directorate’:
…the organisation since incorporated this title into its branding. In effect, this means that the Ministry of Information no longer directly manages the broadcaster, which is a big step forward; previous Ministers of Information had an office on the campus and were involved in most major decisions.
RTA’s new logo (Source: RTA)
Mass Media Law(s): forward into the past?
Four different media laws, from March 2002, April 2004, June 2006 and August 2008 (the latter gazetted July 2009), have been passed in the meantime. But even the last one, that of 2009, still does not make RTA a public service broadcaster. (6)
This was prevented by a long discussion that preceded the 2009 law (currently in force), and during which quite a few articles that dealt with RTA were amended or deleted at the last minute. This was mainly due to President Karzai and Khurram’s opposition to a more independent national broadcaster. The delay of several months in publishing the law led to the belief, “in some circles”, that there had been a deliberate effort to ensure that provisions on the obligations of state-owned media organisations, which would have limited the government’s influence on them, were not made operative before the presidential elections on 20 August 2009, notes the IFJ report.
The 2009 draft of the Media Law stated that the “director of RTA shall be appointed by the President and approved by Lower House of parliament.” The High Council of the Supreme Court, because of the pressure coming from the President’s office, considered this to be “inconsistent with the Afghan Constitution.”
According to the IFJ report, the final compromise on this issue was to split the difference. In the final text of the law (article 13), finally ratified in July 2009 by President Karzai, RTA was described as “a mass media that belongs to the Afghan nation and shall perform, as an independent directorate, within the framework of the Executive Branch.” RTA’s budget, the law stipulated, would “be provided by the Government and through advertisements and provision of services” (see IFJ report Reporting in Times of War: Media Freedom in Afghanistan 2008 – 2011 http://www.ifj.org/uploads/media/2011_Afghanistan.pdf). A second clause of this article, which stated that RTA’s director would be appointed by the president, subject to approval by the lower house of parliament, the Wolesi Jirga, was deleted. With this, RTA remains in the Executive’s control and nothing close to becoming a public service broadcaster.
Its status is laid out in six articles in the electronic mass media chapter, including one that sets up RTA’s commission (heavily controlled by the Ministry of Information and Culture and the de jure and de facto powerless) and constitutes the entire legal regulation on the national broadcaster. (7) However, there is strong ownership of the 2009 Media Law among MPs of the Wolesi Jirga, who approved it by a two-thirds majority vote and worked on the draft. (The IFJ report finds that members of parliament, who themselves had business investments in the media, had allegedly been responsible for writing RTA’s article as a public service trust into the proposed law.) (8)
Nevertheless, according to media experts, the 2009 Media Law was a great success as it set out worthy objectives relating to freedom of thought and speech, the promotion of free, independent and pluralistic mass media and the protection of the rights of journalists. The law is also seen as a new attempt to set in motion the transformation of RTA into a public broadcaster. According to BBC Media Action Policy Briefing, the 2009 law “allows RTA to play a more independent national role, with a governance structure in which government, parliament and civil society organisations are all represented.” However, this is not yet the law needed to set up a public service broadcaster, due to the limitations imposed on RTA and the de facto control of the Ministry of Information and Culture over it that is provided for by the law.
Shirazuddin Siddiqi of BBC Media Action told AAN “the current media legislation is the best Afghanistan ever had.” However, according to Siddiqi, back in 2008 a legal charter on RTA was also given to the parliament with the draft law, but MPs refused to discuss it and said their job was to deal with the laws, not the charters. (9)
What of the RTA commission?
The 2009 Mass Media Law established three commissions under the auspice of the High Media Council, the Mass Media Commission, the Commission of National Radio Television and the Commission for the Bakhtar Information Agency, the state-run Afghan news agency. (10) In the original draft of the law, the High Media Council was an over-arching body with representation by the government, parliament, the judiciary, civil society, the Ulema council and journalists. It was to provide long-term media policy directions, while the Mass Media Commission (which has yet to be appointed) had a supervisory role over the private and public media sector. Among others, its duties was to include a review of complaints, refer mass media violations of a criminal nature to justice institutions and provide technical consultations to mass media officials. However, in the final approved draft, the Ministry of Information and Culture reinstated its control over the Mass Media Commission and the RTA commission, as explained in the confidential study:
Despite the liberal character of the law, the Ministry of Information succeeded by a variety of means in retaining day to day control of RTA: the new governance structures were modified in ways that undermine their original purpose and the entire structure has not been fully implemented to this day […] In the final version, however, the Ministry of Information takes responsibility for paying salaries of the members of the Mass Media Commission, and that Commission’s role is expanded to include supervision of RTA and the scrutiny of its budget. At the same time, the RTA Commission is deprived of the role of appointing the Director General and approving appointments of other directors proposed by DG. Contrary to the original intention, the Ministry of Information managed to re-assert its dominant role in the management of RTA, undermining its national independence and blurring the clear lines of responsibilities set out in the original draft.
The three-year mandate of the last RTA commission expired in May 2015. The new commissioners have not yet been appointed. Furthermore, the last commission was widely seen as the creation of Minister Rahin, who also declined to establish the Mass Media Commission. According to Panjshiri, the last RTA commission used to meet every week, but mainly “to sip tea and coffee.” The RTA Director General is also a member of the commission, leaving no space for it to independently look at RTA’s programming or financing.
Dispatches from the ‘court’: The RTA news programme
After 2001, RTA’s leading bodies faced political interference into their news programming. In a speech held at an international seminar in Kuala Lumpur in May 2006, former director Muhammad Ishaq gave an example of how then-President Karzai was interfering, after RTA broadcast one of his speeches, one and a half hour long, but somehow omitted “about one minute of it.” “The next day, the deputy director of Radio-Television was summoned to the president’s office to explain the omission. […] The mistake was rectified by the re-broadcast of the speech with a note that the re-broadcast was due to ‘the repeated request from viewers’,” Ishaq recalled.
In 2002, Karzai had indirectly accused the former ‘Northern Alliance’ (officially United Front, with Jamiat-e Islami as its strongest component) of turning RTA into its own mouthpiece. RTA’s first two post-Taleban directors, Abdul Hafiz Mansur, now an MP, and Ishaq, are prominent Jamiat members. Mansur was sacked for the alleged politicisation of RTA by then Minister Rahin.
Some ten years later, despite all criticisms, support and training, the quality of RTA programming is still very low and under the government’s influence. Every evening at 8pm, RTA broadcasts its main news bulletin, which mainly showcases the government’s activities of the day. The news sequence is prioritised by the seniority of the person involved, not by its relevance or newsworthiness. According to AAN’s observation, every evening the same schedule applies for the news bulletin: first the news from the president’s office followed by news from the vice-presidents’ offices, the chief executive’s office, the ministers, parliament, and lastly the provincial governors.
The recent confidential feasibility study confirms this impression and notes:
Each of these offices prepares its own news, either with its own staff or with RTA staff, and expects to be put on air by RTA unedited. The News Editor has no idea half an hour before the main 8 pm bulletin what he will receive and how long it will be […]. Frequently, packages prepared by the RTA news teams have to be dropped to make space for government material of less news value.
The study indicates that RTA’s “protocol approach” to the news “has a direct bearing on its credibility with the public” – and very likely to the number of viewers. The study concludes that “[u]nfortunately, RTA is seen very much as a government mouthpiece.”
Viewership on the increase?
After obtaining authorisation for 50 terrestrial TV channels for the whole of Afghanistan, RTA facilities located in 37 places have been transmitting the programme directly to the provinces as of November 2012. Prior to this, videotapes with the programme content were flown from Kabul to provincial centres, often delaying the broadcast.
The current coverage area is about 40 per cent of the entire country. This partial coverage is mainly due to the low transmitting power of RTA stations, often only reaching the outskirts of provincial capitals. RTA also broadcasts via satellite, Insat, but is not connected to the large Galaxy or HotBird satellites.
According to research carried out by Altai Consulting, RTA’s audience declined from 7 per cent in 2010 to 2.9 per cent in 2014. The latest 2015 BBC Afghanistan Country Report, however, shows RTA’s reach as high as 40 per cent, just after Tolo TV with 51 per cent and Ariana TV with 42 per cent.
Panjshiri questioned the BBC’s latest ratings. For a number of years, he said, RTA distributed survey questionnaires to over 6,000 people in 34 provinces and none of those surveyed under the age of 35 ever mentioned RTA as their preferred TV channel. Siddiqi of BBC Media Action, however, thinks that RTA viewership might be on the increase for several reasons. “There is a general lack of trust in the private TV stations, radio listenership has gone down in the past several year, there is a general decrease in interest in soap-operas broadcasted by the private channels, and the quality of the talk shows on the RTA has increased,” he explained.
What comes next?
So far, RTA has not heard back from the president’s office on the submitted proposal. (AAN heard from the presidential palace that several proposals are on the table and the president is still deciding which option to go for.) Neither is the EU, one of the strongest advocates for turning it in to a Public Service Broadcaster, aware of the government’s plans. The EU mission in Afghanistan told AAN in an email correspondence:
We were informed, last year, by BBC Media Action, that the Government had plans to restructure RTA. We are however not aware of any recent development in that direction. Pending a government decision, we have not yet adopted a position on this matter.
For Panjshiri, who has worked with RTA since 1978, turning the government channel into a PSB remains a matter of honour, but he fears that the opportunity might be lost. Whether the opportunity is lost or there is still a chance to reform RTA, the answer is in the president’s hands.
(1) Before the Soviet period, Radio and Television Afghanistan (RTA) was a state broadcaster with a monopoly over the market. Though RTA had a long history dating back to 1925, it was generally perceived as the voice of the government.
RTA is heavily dependent on donor support. The Governments of Japan and India have each invested substantially in rebuilding the infrastructure of the state broadcaster during the 2000s. RTA also received support from a number of other donors over several decades, including UNESCO, Deutsche Welle (the German government broadcaster for abroad), UNDP, the Asian Broadcasting Union and, in the 1960s and 1970s, from the Soviet Union, Germany, the Government of Japan and other countries. (See also BBC Media Action Policy Briefing on Afghan media in transition)
(2) See “Media and its role (in) the development of society in developing and fragile states”; a draft paper by Shirazuddin Siddiqi, a senior Manager at the BBC.
(3) A 2010 study by Altai Consulting found that a national broadcaster is the preferred model by the Afghan government, while a public broadcaster is a model more strongly supported by the international community.
(4) De Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS, Afghanistan Electricity Company) is a state owned but corporate national power utility and the sole producer, transmitter and distributor of electricity throughout the country (see here).
(5) Dr Rahin, a Seyyed from Kabul with a Masters and a Doctorate in Literature from Tehran University, served on the Constitutional Commission under President Muhammad Daud (1973-78) in various culture-related posts in Pakistan and the US and was active in the Rome group that, in the late 1990s, pushed for a return of the former King. Minister of Culture in the transitional authority from 2002 to 2005, he failed to receive parliament’s vote of confidence in the new 2006 cabinet. Later he was Afghan Ambassador to India.
(6) There was an attempt to pass a new media law in 2012, which was effectively an attempt to reinstate state control over the media. However it was struck off the Wolesi Jirga’s agenda after strong criticism from both Nai, a media organisation supporting open media in Afghanistan and Human Rights Watch (here and here). This draft law did not foresee any change with regards to RTA. In 2015, there was another mass media draft law in circulation, but this too was taken off the agenda “due to some flaws.” According to Afghan media experts, the 2015 draft law also attempted to restore state control over the media.
(7) In line with principles of the Declaration of Sanaa from 1996, (adopted as the Resolution 34 on the 29th UNESCO general conference, held in 1997), “state-owned broadcasting…should be, as a matter of priority, reformed and granted status of journalistic and editorial independence as open public service institutions.”
A separate law regulates public service broadcasting in most countries, see for example the UNESCO’s PSB model law guidelines and the list of international standards for PSB.
(8) The joint commission of the Meshrano and the Wolesi Jirga worked on the Media Law draft. The head of the commission was Muhammad Mohaqqeq, now deputy CEO, which explains provisions that political parties and government organisations may establish media outlets. Mohaqqeq is head of a political party and the owner of several newspapers, radio and TV stations, including Daily Outlook, Daily Afghanistan and Rah-e Farda TV and radio.
(9) The charter was an attempt to regulate RTA in a way similar to the BBC, which is regulated by the so-called BBC Charter, renewable every ten years.
(10) Internal politics in the Ministry of Information and Culture are the reason the Mass Media Commission has not been appointed yet. In short, the politicking boils down to who controls the Media Violation Investigation Commission (MVIC) established in 2005. This was suppose to be dissolved with the passing of the 2009 Mass Media Law and replaced by the three new commissions, however it continues to function (see AAN’s dispatch on the commissions here and the 2015 Freedom House Report). The commission is still controlled by the government as it is part of the High Media Council (the body which proposes National Radio TV’s budget to the government and submits annual activities report to the National Council).