European Union

Caracas. Venezuela-Expertin Claudia Zilla sagt, ob der von Donald Trump angeordnete Angriff auf Venezuela mit dem Völkerrecht vereinbar ist.

AI risk pyramid. Source: European Commission https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/regulatory-framework-ai

Bao-Chau Pham

When the European Union‘s Artificial Intelligence Act finally entered into force on 1 August 2024, it was widely described as a landmark: the world’s first comprehensive framework for regulating AI. Throughout the policy-making process from early 2018 onwards, much of the debates focused on how the Act regulates – its risk categories and list of banned use-cases – and what these legislative choices do. This included commentary on its neglect of human rights, as well as concerns that it might stifle innovation. Sitting underneath these discussions, however, is a simpler question: what problem is the AI Act actually trying to solve?

That question is at the heart of my article, co-authored with Sarah R. Davies and published in Critical Policy Studies. As the EU now debates delays and possible revisions of the Act – or “rollbacks”, as more critical voices have put it – the question feels newly relevant. The recently proposed Digital Omnibus package may not just tweak the AI Act as a legal instrument. We may be witnessing the re-articulation of the very problem the legislation was designed to address.

In this post, I briefly introduce the argument of our article, reflect on why this way of reading the AI Act matters, and suggest why current discussions about revisiting the Act make the question ”What problems is the AI Act really solving?” even more salient.

 

Reading policy as problem representations: the WPR approach

Our article starts from the premise that policies do not merely respond to external issues. Instead, policies actively participate in producing the very problems they are designed to solve. Drawing on Carol Bacchi’s seven-step “What’s the Problem Represented to Be?” (WPR) approach, we therefore read the AI Act as a document that constructs a particular understanding of AI and its governance.

From this perspective, asking whether the AI Act is effective or proportionate is only half the story. The more fundamental question is how the Act frames AI as a policy problem in the first place. This, in turn, allows us also to interrogate what and who gets foregrounded, sidelined, or taken for granted in the process.

Using the WPR approach, we identify two dominant, yet ambivalent, problem representations of AI in the Act. On the one hand, AI is framed as a major economic and societal opportunity, essential for competitiveness and Europe’s (digital) future and something that Europe risks „missing out“ on. On the other hand, AI appears as a source of significant risk, particularly to European fundamental rights and democratic values. 

This dual framing is not a contradiction to be resolved; it is the organising logic of the Act. The cascading scale of risk – dividing systems into minimal, limited, high, and unacceptable risk categories – emerges directly from this way of problematising AI. The AI Act frames the policy problem as one of managing trade-offs: how to promote uptake while preserving trust, or how to govern a fast-moving technology without stifling it.

Seen this way, the AI Act is not just regulating technology. It stabilises a particular vision of AI as something that can, and should, be rendered governable through categorisation, technical requirements, and legal obligations. Other possible ways of characterising AI as a policy issue, as well as other possible responses, are, in the process, foreclosed. 

Importantly, the problem is also represented in a way that positions the European Union as the primary actor capable of solving it. One of our key arguments that follows is that the AI Act also plays a role in enacting a particular version of Europe and Europeanness. It constructs and institutionalises the notion of the EU as an exceptional, morally authoritative policy actor in global AI governance. In this sense, the AI Act is as much about Europe’s self-identification in a global technological landscape as it is about regulating specific AI systems.

 

Why this matters now: shifting goalposts

At first glance, current discussions about revising the AI Act may look like implementation politics: delayed technical standards, pressures from industry and lobbyists, and geopolitical concerns about competition. If we return to the question of problem representation, however, these debates take on a different meaning. They point to a possible shift in what is understood to be the central problem that AI policy should address.

As we argue in our article, during the AI Act’s legislative process the dominant discourse centred on risk to fundamental rights alongside economic opportunity. Increasingly, however, public debate is framed in different terms: how to avoid over-regulation, maintain competitiveness, and keep pace with global AI development. The risk that now receives the most attention is not always harm to citizens or democratic institutions, but harm to innovation ecosystems and market position.

This does not mean that fundamental rights have completely disappeared from the conversation, but it does suggest that they may no longer be the primary lens through which the policy problem is articulated. From a WPR perspective, the question is not whether the AI Act is being weakened or strengthened. It is whether the problem the policy is meant to solve is being re-articulated.

If AI is increasingly represented as a competitiveness challenge rather than a rights challenge, then different policy solutions, which favour scalability and speed, follow suit. Seen in this light, current proposals to simplify the AI Act are interventions in an ongoing struggle over how AI should be understood as a matter of public concern and whose interests should take priority when trade-offs are made.

This is precisely why the question “what problem is the AI Act solving?” remains important. It reminds us that regulation and policy are never only about technicalities. If we take problem representation seriously, then revisiting the AI Act is equally about deciding which understandings of AI become stabilised in European governance going forward.

To conclude, the AI Act was never just a response to extraneous technological developments. From a critical policy perspective, it reads as an attempt to stabilise a particular way of thinking about AI and governance in Europe. As the constellation we saw in the AI Act is now being reconsidered, returning to the question of problem representation can help us unpack and trouble what is at stake. Whether the AI Act ultimately changes or not, it is worth remembering that the debates about AI governance are not only about how we regulate, but about what we think needs regulating, why, and for whom.

 

Bao-Chau Pham is a recent PhD graduate in Science and Technology Studies from the University of Vienna (Austria). In her dissertation, Bao-Chau explored imaginaries of artificial intelligence in European policy and media discourses. 

The post Revisiting what problems the EU AI Act is actually solving appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Zord

Dear Colleagues,

As I reflect on my first full year as Chair, I am so proud of the work we have done and especially for the warm support I continue to enjoy. This supportive spirit was very much on display at our last annual conference in Liverpool, hosted by Liverpool John Moores University.

The programme, so expertly put together by our Events Working Group, track conveners and our UACES office staff highlighted different facets of Europe in interesting times. This conference facilitated conversations about the trajectories of European integration and transformation, governance, especially in the health and digital spheres, the importance of law and history to our understanding of the current moment and the utility of critical perspectives. Beyond the academic debates and discussions, the real world implications of our work and activities, especially how our field can respond to a rapidly changing global environment.

The local organising team went all out for us, and I want to extend heartfelt thanks to all of our Liverpool colleagues for their hard work and hospitality.

Aside from the main conference, the Graduate Forum Research Conference in Athens and the Doctoral Training Academy in Madrid were important reminders of how central PhD researchers and early-career colleagues are to the future of European Studies. I am pleased to note that this was yet another successful year and I am thankful to Sydney and the team for leading on our early career activities.

This has also been a year of change within UACES governance. We have said thank you and goodbye to colleagues whose terms on the Committee and in Officer roles have come to an end and welcomed new trustees who are already bringing fresh ideas and energy. I am grateful to everyone who gives their time and expertise to UACES governance, often quietly and on top of already heavy workloads.

Our journals, JCMS and Contemporary European Politics, continue to thrive, with strong rankings and a growing global readership that reflects the quality and breadth of scholarship produced by this community and of course the excellent work of the editors.

Looking ahead, there is much to be excited about. In 2026, we will build on the success of Liverpool as we prepare future Annual Conferences, including our 56th meeting in Prague hosted by Charles University. Prague promises to be a fantastic setting for conversations about how Europe is constructed, contested and reimagined in national discourses and I hope many of you will already be thinking about submitting those panel and paper proposals.

We continue to work on strengthen the infrastructure that underpins our scholarly community. In that spirit and with members of the committee, I undertook a review of how to continue support through Research Networks in a very constraining financial environment. In the new year, we will be relaunching this funding stream in a way that offers more flexible, sustainable backing for collaborative projects and better showcases the diversity of work across European Studies. Alongside this, we are looking at how to expand our awards programme to recognise the different ways in which colleagues at all career stages contribute to our field. Throughout, our priority remains to support research, teaching and impact that is intellectually ambitious, inclusive and outward facing.

None of this would be possible without you.

And to you a massive thank you.

As we approach the holiday season and the turn of the calendar year, I hope you are able to find some time for rest, joy and the people who matter to you.

I look forward to our many collaborations in the coming year.

With warm wishes,

Toni
Chair, UACES

The post End Of Year Letter From UACES Chair appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Kritische Rohstoffe sind zu einem Schlüsselthema der Trump-Administration gewor­den. Mit einer Mischung aus Deregulierung, staatlicher Steuerung und Finanzierung will sie die amerikanische Rohstoffindustrie ausbauen. Denn die hohe Ab­hängigkeit der USA von chinesischen Rohstoffen zwingt Washington bei Verhandlungen mit Peking zu schmerzhaften Zugeständnissen. Trump nutzt die Roh­stofffrage nun selbst als geopolitischen Hebel, um seine handels- und sicherheits­politischen Interessen global geltend zu machen. Während multilaterale Foren wie die Minerals Secu­rity Partnership brachliegen, setzt Trump auch im Rohstoffsektor auf bilaterale Deals. Bei der Sicherung kritischer Rohstoffe konkurriert Europa mittlerweile nicht mehr nur mit China, sondern auch mit den USA. Daher sollte die Europäische Union (EU) ihre Rohstoff­souveränität entschlossener stärken, ohne sich bei Fragen der Nachhaltigkeit und regelbasierter Kooperation von Trump in die Defensive drängen zu lassen.

Schon wieder wurde der Abschluss des EU-Handelsabkommen mit den Mercosur-Staaten geschoben - auch, weil Europäier in Lateinamerika bloß einen Absatzmarkt sehen, sagt Lateinamerika-Experte Günther Maihold. Freuen dürfte das China.

The third Disability Rights Week in the European Parliament takes place from 1 to 5 December 2025. On the initiative of the EMPL Committee, all Committees, Policy Departments, Vice-Presidents, Questors and Directorates General are invited to organise hearings and other types of activities focusing on the rights of persons with disabilities in their respective policy and administrative areas.

The rights of persons with disabilities have been high on the agenda in the past mandate and the EU and its institutions have been very active in that respect. Many flagship initiatives stemming from the Commission's Disability Strategy 2021 to 2030 have been put in place but we are still awaiting an update on its second half. The UN CRPD Committee put forward a report on the EU in Spring this year, containing recommendations how the EU and its institutions can better comply with the UN CRPD and thus gave us homework. The forthcoming Disability Rights Week is an excellent opportunity to discuss these issues with, and to learn from persons with disabilities and their representative organisations.

Disclaimer: Committee events and workshops, publically webstreamed, are listed below. For further information, please check the DRW 2025 programme.

Location : Brussels
President Metsola’s video for the Disability Rights Week 2025
Disability Rights Job Interview from Chair
Programme
EP research publications in the area of disability rights
Research for EMPL Committee - Independent living of persons with disabilities in the European Union
Events taking place during the 3rd Disability Rights Week
1 December, 15:00-16:00 - AGRI Exchange of Views: "Promoting the inclusion of persons with disabilities in the agricultural sector : The example of La Canopée in Belgium"
     Webstreaming
     AGRI highlight (with programme)
1 December, 16:00-17:30 - HOUS/EMPL Joint Public Hearing: “Inclusive Housing for All: Accessibility, Disability Rights, Vulnerable Groups and social inclusion in EU Housing Policy”
     Hearing event
     Webstreaming
1 December, 16:00-18:30 - SANT Exchange of Views on several topics: "Disabilities following cancer", "Harmonizing newborn screenings for early detection and disability support", Study Presentation on Rare Diseases
     Event highlight
2 December, 9:00-16:30 - Quaestors Ms Lexmann and Mr Angel & DG ITEC: "Digital Accessibility Day event"
     Programme
2 December, 10:30-11:10, TRAN Exchange of Views: "From ‘Mobility-Restricted’ to "Mobility Redefined"
     TRAN highlight
2 December, 11:00-12:30 - MEP Jagna Marczulajtis-Walczak's Conference: "Why is independent living so important for persons with disabilities?"
     MEP Profile for Jagna Marczulajtis-Walczak
2 December, 14:30-15:15 - CULT Exchange of Views: “Using sport as a tool for empowerment”
     Webstreaming
     CULT highlight
2 December, 14.30-16.00 - Policy Department/DG IUST (for PETI): Annual Workshop on 'The UN CRPD Concluding Observations on the EU report, from the perspective of petitions received"
     Webstreaming
     PETI highlight
2 December, 16:00-17:00 - FEMM Exchange of Views with EUROFOUND: "Integration of Women with Disabilities in the Labour Market"
     Webstreaming
2 December, 16:15-17:00 - DEVE Exchange of Views: 'Global Partnerships for inclusive employment and ending segregation of persons with disabilities'
     Webstreaming
3 December, 9:00 - 10:00, DROI exchange of views: 'Towards a Disability Action Plan in EU External Action: a state of play'
     Webstreaming
3 December, 9:30-10:00 - IMCO Exchange of Views: Accessibility – state-of-play and way forward in light of UN CRPD recommendations
     Webstreaming
3 December, 14:30-15:15 - ITRE Exchange of views with the European Commission's DG JUST: European accessibility Act, assistive technologies and interoperability
     Webstreaming
3 December, 14:30-16:00 - EMPL Public Hearing: “Quality support for persons with disabilities and carers of persons with disabilities at the workplace and in the community”
     Webstreaming
3 December, 16:15-17:45 - Policy Department/EMPL/DG CASP - EMPL Workshop: Independent living of persons with disabilities in the European Union - Implementation of Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
     Webstreaming
3 December, 18:30 (Open to public on registration) - DG COMM/Civil Outreach Unit - Movie “Deaf /Sorda”, nominated for the 2026 LUX audience award
     Registration
4 December, 10:30-11:30 - JURI Public Hearing: “Legal capacity and supported decision-making mechanisms of adults”: Discussion around the 2023 proposal for a regulation on the protection of adults"
     Hearing event
4 December, 10:30 - 16:00, Quaestor M. Lexmann & DG COMM/ Dir for visitors - Workshop : “Disability and Accessibility to Art – A workshop on how to engage with persons with disabilities through art” with Belgian partner organsiation Zonnelied
     Registration
4 December, 11:45-12:45 - LIBE Exchange of Views: “The rights, freedoms and remaining gaps in the protection of persons with disabilities in the EU”
     LIBE highlight
4-5 December (Charlemagne) - European Commission with European Disability Forum: European Disability Day (Registration required)
     More information
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

By Francesco Duina (Bates College, USA)

For decades, the EU has projected its internal legal frameworks onto the world. It has done so indirectly through the Brussels Effect, whereby countries and trading blocs in other parts of the world pre-emptively adopt EU internal standards in order to facilitate trade with the EU. And it has done so directly, by way of imposing its own standards through trade agreements. Given this, most observers of the EU have viewed it as an ‘exporter’ of norms – and this has represented perhaps its most important form of international power.

The possibility of the EU importing standards from other countries or blocs has been given little consideration. Instead, attention has consistently gone to the continued production of EU internal regulations which, once in place, have had significant external effects. The EU’s unabated propensity to regulate has sustained this interest: its various efforts to slow down or even reverse its regulatory output have come and gone, with little impact on the overall picture. Between 2019 and 2024 alone, for instance, the EU passed 13,000 legal acts. The EU has in turn relished the benefits associated with being the ‘first mover’ in new areas such as, say, digital markets and environmental policy: it knows that those who regulate first set the terms and that those who follow must at least consider them, especially if the first mover enjoys a huge internal market. These dynamics have turned the EU into a regulatory juggernaut committed to its internal standards and historically eager to have other countries and blocs adopt them.

The Animal Welfare Case

A recent development in animal welfare policy represents, however, a noteworthy departure from this pattern. I explained how and why this happened in my recent JCMS article. The EU – widely viewed as already having a wide-reaching regulatory framework in this policy area – was about to announce four long-awaited proposals in late 2023 on transport, slaughter, labelling, and the housing of animals. The Commission had determined that its existing frameworks, developed over the previous 25 years or so, required modernization. Equally important, major polls, the European Citizens’ Initiative ‘End the Age Cage’ that was supported by 170 non-governmental organisations and nearly 1.5 million citizens across the EU, and various protests, electoral campaigns and other civil society initiatives had put pressure on the EU. More broadly, the measures were consistent with its wider effort to ‘green’ agricultural trade.

Crucially, and not surprisingly, the four proposals would have come with ‘conditionality’ expectations: the requirement that trade partners exporting products into the EU comply in their treatment of animals with the standards set in those laws. An announcement by the Commission on the proposals was expected by the end of December 2023. But starting in the summer of that year the momentum slowed. Then, in her State of the Union speech in September, Commission President Ursula von der Leyen signalled that something might go astray: there was no mention of animal welfare in her list of priorities. At the end of 2023, the Commission finally presented a proposal only on transport. The surprise turnaround caused significant consternation. The media publicised it, and NGOs and other interested parties voiced their objections (with, for instance, Eurogroup for Animals putting up posters in Brussels’ subway system) that continued well into late 2024.

What can explain this unexpected turn of events? Several factors surely played a role. These included powerful farmers’ protests against more agricultural regulation and unfair international competition, a diminished interest in the Commission’s Green Deal at a time when conservative populist parties seemed poised to do well in national and EU elections, and food security concerns fuelled by the war in Ukraine.

But the pending ratification of the EU-Mercosur trade deal (twenty years in the making) also played a (late-stage) role. In particular, Commission officials worried – whether justifiably or not – that the proposals’ conditionality clauses for exporters to the EU would have risked upsetting the South American countries given their lower standards.  These concerns led those officials to conclude that only one of the four proposals could go ahead. The EU-Mercosur trade deal thus became the ‘nail in the coffin’ for animal welfare progress in the EU.

What is crucial to emphasize here is that this meant not only a derailment of internal EU policy but, in effect, a willingness to accept that the lower standards of trading partners should be a cause of that derailment. Put differently, rather than a rule ‘giver’ the EU became in essence a rule ‘taker.’ Close attention should therefore go to how, exactly, Commission officials reached their position.

My analysis highlights the confluence of three dynamics. The first were institutional: competition amongst three directorates-general, with Directorate General Trade prevailing in its push to conclude the deal over the preferences of Director General Health (which supported the proposals) and Director General AGRI (which demanded that, should the proposals be pursued, conditionality had to be imposed). The second set of dynamics were temporal: animal welfare came to be seen as the ‘last straw’ in terms of EU demands on Mercosur especially because the EU had just months before greatly frustrated the Mercosur countries with extensive demands on deforestation. The third were symbolic: the Commission had made increasingly vocal public commitments to conclude several major trade deals in the very near future.

The Broader Lessons

The derailment of EU animal welfare policy thus offers us an opportunity to observe a sort of reversal of the EU’s ability to project its regulatory power. As such, it also prompts us to reflect on two broader points related to the nexus between EU trade policy and its regulatory power.

First, when it comes to trade, the EU may no longer be fundamentally concerned with the projection of regulatory power. We know that the Commission has already asserted, in part given its new Open Strategic Autonomy direction, the importance of geopolitical priorities as it pursues trade opportunities across the world. Regulatory power may become a victim of this new approach.

Second, there may be subject areas where the EU will struggle to impose its regulatory standards onto its trading partners, even if it wants to do so. There is in fact something particular about animal welfare that also applies to policy areas like the environment and labour standards. The target is not the physical standards of finished products that exporters wish to send to the EU. Instead, it is the processes associated with the production of those products. These are much harder to observe and measure, and ultimately make intrusive demands on the trading partners. The EU will therefore likely find it rather difficult to project its standards in those areas.

Francesco Duina is Charles A. Dana Professor of Sociology at Bates College (USA). His research focuses on the relationship between the economy, culture, and politics.  He co-edited Standardizing the World: EU Trade Policy and the Road to Convergence, published by Oxford University Press.

Website: https://www.bates.edu/faculty/profile/francesco-g-duina/

 

The post Always a Norm Exporter? The Case of Animal Welfare Policy and Trade appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

What could be more festive than reading about alien worlds and malevolent AI leaders? Check out this year’s recommended reads from cybersecurity experts.

The policy dialogue on “Transnational Repression (TNR): Mapping Trends and Improving Responses” is jointly organised by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (UN Human Rights), the European Parliament Sub-committee on Human Rights (DROI) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), in collaboration with the Tackling TNR Europe Civil Society Working Group.
TNR constitutes an increasing danger both by posing systemic threats to human rights, civic space, democratic institutions and the rule of law and by frequently undermining national security, sovereignty and legal order of host states.

Policy makers and experts from EU institutions, the UN, Member States, civil society and academia will come together to exchange views about their findings and experiences, and explore ways to improve responses to TNR, including through policy initiatives, synergies and collaborations. This is a concrete follow-up action by DROI on the recently adopted by the Parliament report on Addressing TNR of Human Rights Defenders (HRDs).
Location : European Parliament (ASP 1G2)
Programme
Live streaming
Key takeaways of the Expert Workshop on Transnational Repression
Photos
Poster
Source : © European Union, 2025 - EP

Die Europäische Kommission erwägt seit 2024, die Zuständigkeiten und Aktivitäten von Europol auszubauen. Das Personal der Agentur soll dabei verdoppelt und ihr Mandat um drei Themen erweitert werden – Sabotage, Desinformation und hybride Bedrohungen. Angepeilt werden eine noch zu definierende Umgestaltung von Euro­pol in eine »schlagkräftige« Polizeibehörde und eine stärkere Kontrolle über die Agentur. Diese Vorhaben, die auf politischen wie bürokratischen Überlegungen be­ruhen, kamen ohne vorherige Konsultation der EU-Mitgliedstaaten und technische Abschätzung zustande. 2026 will die Kommission den Mitgliedstaaten einen Vorschlag für die Mandatsänderung vorlegen. Der Schwerpunkt einer Weiterentwicklung von Europol sollte jedoch nicht unbedingt auf einem neuen Mandat liegen, sondern sich vorrangig nach dem operativen Bedarf richten, den die nationalen Strafverfolgungsbehörden bei der Bekämpfung von Drogenhandel, Cyberkriminalität und Terro­rismus haben. In diesen Kernbereichen sind Personalaufstockung und Innovation er­forderlich, jedoch nicht zwingend durch eine Mandatsreform. Generell bedarf es bei der EU einer langfristigen Strategie für die künftige Architektur der inneren Sicher­heit, an der sich eine Ausgestaltung von Europol orientieren sollte.

United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions are under political and financial pressure. In his letter dated 10 October 2025, UN Secretary-General António Guterres called on nine missions to prepare contingency plans for spending cuts of up to 25 per cent. The peacekeeping mission in Cyprus (UNFICYP), established in 1964, shows why Europe has a fundamental interest in the UN remaining engaged.

The conflict between the Republic of Cyprus in the Greek-speaking south and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, the Turkish-speaking region recognised only by Ankara, has been largely frozen since the de facto division of the island. This certainly has also been due to UNFICYP’s presence. Since the 1974 ceasefire, the mission has controlled the “Green Line”, a 180-kilometre strip separating the two parts that is intended to prevent direct confrontation.

Nevertheless, the mission continues to record numerous military and civilian violations in and along the buffer zone By doing so, it still prevents “those sparks from bursting into flames”, as Colin Stewart, head of UNFICYP until August 2025, put it. To this day, there still is no direct military contact mechanism between the parties. In fact, the threat perception has increased again on both sides recently.

New impetus for peace efforts

For this reason alone, the European Union and its member states cannot be interested in any further reduction or even a potential withdrawal of the mission. The political process is just beginning to tentatively gain momentum. María Angela Holguín Cuéllar was reappointed as the Secretary-General’s Personal Envoy in May 2025 and is tasked with exploring possibilities for a new round of formal negotiations and breaking the deadlock. 

This is a difficult undertaking. While the UN Security Council continues to pursue a federal solution, Northern Cyprus and Turkey have been promoting a two-state solution for years. However, the election of Turkish Cypriot President Tufan Erhürman in October has raised hopes that the door could open for new negotiations under UN auspices. The first trilateral meeting between him, the President of the Republic of Cyprus, and Holguín has just taken place. But a rapprochement is likely to take time. Confidence-building measures and the safeguarding of peace by the UN therefore remain essential.

The essential role of the UN

As the Republic of Cyprus is a member of the EU, the Union itself can hardly act as an impartial mediator. It therefore primarily supports the UN-led political process. The EU’s options in the security domain are also constrained. A separate EU mission – as is currently being considered for Lebanon following the withdrawal of UNIFIL – would be unrealistic, if only because of the tense relationship between Greece and Turkey, both of which, alongside the United Kingdom, are the guarantor powers for Cyprus. 

Therefore, the stabilising function of the UN mission remains essential for the foreseeable future. It also creates the framework for practical rapprochement, for example through the projects of the Technical Committees. Under joint Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leadership and facilitated by the UN, these initiatives promote understanding between the two communities, and the EU provides a large portion of the funding. 

UNFICYP is in a better financial position than many larger UN missions, as Greece and the Republic of Cyprus cover about half of the budget. However, staffing and operational cuts will be necessary. At the same time, the raison d'être of a mission that has been running for decades is repeatedly being called into question. At the end of January 2026, the mandate is up for renewal again. Despite all the criticisms from the Turkish government and former leaders in Northern Cyprus, the UN Security Council's position has remained unchanged so far. 

In order to break the deadlock in negotiations, there is a need for more economic engagement from the European side to improve the situation in the north. In the short term, however, EU member states should make it clear that UNFICYP – and UN peacekeeping as a whole – is indispensable.

Insights from UN DESA Data on Patterns, Trends, and Misconceptions

By Sebastian Heidebrecht (Centre for European Integration Research, Department of Political Science, University of Vienna)

On 30 October 2025, the European Central Bank (ECB) announced the next preparatory phase and its readiness to introduce a digital euro in 2029. Unlike private forms of electronic money created by private banks, the digital euro will be a retail central bank digital currency (CBDC). As such, it will be directly available to citizens for everyday use. Unlike electronic money held in bank accounts, which is money created by the private banking system, the digital euro will be a direct liability of the central bank, like cash. Shortly before, on 23 October 2025, the European Council also signalledcontinuing support, highlighting the importance of the digital euro project for “a competitive and resilient European payment system” and “Europe’s strategic sovereignty and economic security”.

Down The Rabbit Hole? A Puzzling Policy Initiative

It seems the common currency is getting fit for the digital age, or are key European Union (EU) policymakers marching towards a digital Euroland? (Perceptive readers will note that I am referring to an earlier debate around the introduction of the analogue euro in the JCMS issues of June and September 1999.) A fictive wonderland, in which polarised politics, citizen concerns, and stakeholder interests do not play much role? It is essential to note that the issuance of the digital euro will depend on the success of an accompanying legislative package, which will, among other things, introduce the digital euro as a form of legal tender. Yet, CBDCs have long been met with considerable scepticism; inter alia, they are deemed “a solution in search of a problem”. Furthermore, the digital euro will require costly public infrastructure, marking a departure from the previous reliance on private actors and the general principle that state intervention should only occur in clear cases of market failure.

Perhaps most importantly, the digital euro project, and particularly the retail version, also poses several potential challenges, including public opinion. Banks and traditional payment providers may resist it to defend their business models. Populist parties may also oppose it and defend analogue cash against what they may perceive as an elite-driven project originating from Brussels and Frankfurt. In times of tight public budgets and rising Euroscepticism, the drive by the ECB and the Commission to introduce the digital euro seems particularly surprising. Why are the EU institutions advancing this project?

Through the Looking Glass: Why EU Actors Promote the Project

In a recent JCMS article, I examine the move forward of the digital euro project. I demonstrate the importance of how digitalisation, intertwined with geopoliticisation, impacts the euro area. Of course, innovation in the world of finance has long been closely tied to technological advancements. ‘Fintech,’ or the use of digital technology to provide financial solutions, may thus be only the most recent innovation in a long list of financial innovations. Yet, big platform companies have entered the sector, offering payment services such as Apple Pay, Google Pay, and Amazon Pay. These may, due to lock-in and network effects, consolidate markets and create potential oligopolies or even a monopoly in certain sectors. Furthermore, states are using digital financial technology to weaponize interdependence, as demonstrated by Russia’s exclusion from the SWIFT international payment system in March 2022.

Against this backdrop, important developments in the late 2010s and early 2020s encouraged EU policymakers to advance the project.

First, in 2019, Meta (formerly Facebook) announced its intention to introduce its own cryptocurrency, sparking significant debate among public officials about potential threats from private and/or foreign financial innovations, and demonstrating the need to keep pace with financial innovation.

Secondly, policymakers reconsidered the problematic fragmentation of the EU payment sector along national lines, which results in a reliance on a few international card companies, such as Visa and Mastercard. This issue has long been recognised, with repeated but unsuccessful attempts to integrate the euro retail payment market. The latest attempt of a private-run and publicly promoted initiative failed in 2022, revealing the challenges of a market-based European solution.

Third, EU policymakers increasingly aim to ensure monetary sovereignty and the public role of money, thereby safeguarding EU strategic autonomy. One argument presents the European payment sector’s dependence on foreign infrastructure and a few foreign private companies as problematic, particularly in a period of growing international tension. Ever since the prospect of a second Trump presidency in January 2025 emerged, EU officials in the Commission and the ECB have increasingly framed the digital euro in geopolitical terms.

Waking Up: Political Challenges and EU Politics

Yet, concerns remain. Far-right politicians mobilise against the project, inter alia claiming to defend an imaginary “fortress cash”, demanding a “no to CDBC”, and advocating the usage of crypto alternatives instead. The private banking sector is also sceptical about the project. In terms of EU bureaucratic politics, one of the most controversial issues for policymakers and the institutions involved is whether, in line with the Commission’s proposal on the digital euro, holding limits and the prohibition of remuneration should be addressed in secondary legislation. The ECB opposes these measures, arguing that such restrictions in secondary legislation are contrary to its monetary policy competences and may be necessary in exceptional scenarios, such as a negative interest rate environment. Yet, legislators defend them based on their structural impact on the financial system, which, as an economic rather than monetary policy, would be an issue of political concern.

Against this backdrop, it will be interesting to see if the digital euro project can overcome political challenges in the legislative process. Perhaps most importantly, many of the project’s controversial design features will affect whether and how the digital euro will be accepted and used by citizens. Ultimately, this will be the main benchmark for assessing whether we will find ourselves in a digital wonderland, in which the digital euro exists only in central bank drawing boards, or worse, is implemented but not used by anyone, or if we wake up in a world where the familiar euro has found an actual digital reflection.

Sebastian is a Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre for European Integration Research, housed in the University of Vienna’s Department of Political Science. His research looks at how actors, processes, and institutions shape the digital transformation of European economies and societies, with a particular focus on European Union policies. Website: https://eif.univie.ac.at/heidebrecht/index.php LinkedIn: www.linkedin.com/in/sebsebastian-heidebrecht-22194066

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La Présidente Metsola a remis le Prix Sakharov 2025 aux représentantes des deux journalistes emprisonnés au Bélarus et en Géorgie, lors d’une cérémonie qui s’est tenue mardi à Strasbourg.
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