Afrique

Jeudi soir, Donald Trump a annoncé un cessez-le-feu de 10 jours entre Israël et le Liban, deux jours à peine après l’ouverture de négociations directes à Washington. Une annonce qui intervient alors qu’Israël continue d’occuper le sud du pays.

Mais c’est un autre fait qui retient l’attention : Benjamin Netanyahou a exigé l’exclusion de la France de ces négociations, allié historique du Liban, alors qu’elles sont elles-mêmes conduites par les États-Unis, principal allié d’Israël.

Cette exigence israélienne pose une question de fond : que reste-t-il de la relation franco-israélienne ? Elle apparaît aujourd’hui profondément déséquilibrée et unilatérale ; Israël exige, la France cède, ou se contente de condamnations verbales qui n’ont jamais infléchi la moindre décision de Tel-Aviv.

Est-ce le signe d’une fin définitive de l’amitié franco-israélienne, ou simplement l’aboutissement d’un affaiblissement diplomatique français ?

Mon analyse dans cette vidéo.

L’article Liban : nouvel affront israélien à la France est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

A constitutional revision solves the wrong problem – and creates new complications.

India has turned the corner in its battle against Naxalism – and effectively governing its own margins is an essential step toward global power status.

The Indian Ocean has no shortage of distressed strategic assets: financially stressed yards, ports, and logistics infrastructure in small states that cannot sustain them independently.

With Viktor Orban’s election loss, Pedro Sanchez is now Beijing’s most useful European leader.

L’IA devient l’un des principaux terrains de rivalité stratégique entre grandes puissances. Les États Unis et la Chine cherchent à s’assurer une maîtrise complète de la chaîne de valeur, des semi conducteurs au développement des modèles de fondation, en passant par le contrôle des infrastructures de calcul. D’autres puissances cherchent également à se distinguer dans ce nouvel espace de compétition géopolitique à la croisée des enjeux de souveraineté, de sécurité et de compétitivité.

Philippe Barbet, professeur émérite d’économie à l’Université Sorbonne Paris Nord et chercheur associé à l’IRIS, répond à nos questions :

• Les États-Unis et la Chine ont-ils définitivement distancé leurs concurrents en matière d’IA et de sa chaîne de valeur ?

• Quel est le rôle de l’UE sur ce marché de l’IA ? Quelle carte a-t-elle à jouer ?

• Certains parlent d’un futur éclatement de la bulle IA. Ce scénario vous semble-t-il plausible ? Cette fébrilité ne représente-t-elle pas une faiblesse pour les États-Unis par exemple dont l’économie est dopée à l’IA ?

Cette vidéo a été réalisée à l’occasion de la 3e édition des Rencontres géoéconomiques et géopolitiques organisées par l’IRIS et NEOMA Business School, en partenariat avec Diplomatie Magazine et Courrier international, le 2 avril 2026.

L’article Géopolitique de l’IA , quels nouveaux rapports de force mondiaux ? est apparu en premier sur IRIS.

In an era defined by geopolitical fragmentation, the Australia-Japan partnership shows how middle powers can cooperate to mitigate risk and enhance resilience. 

Il y a plus de 10 ans, nous pensons que nous avons un tel préjudice ou notre son. Mais la lumière émise par le téléphone portable est loin d’être une véritable raison qui nous amène à mal dormir.

Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Le cessez-le-feu tiendra-t-il et les efforts diplomatiques se poursuivront-ils, ou l'Iran et les États-Unis se dirigent-ils vers une escalade contrôlée, voire vers une guerre plus vaste ?

AMENDMENTS 1 - 290 - Draft report 2025 Commission report on Kosovo
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Riho Terras

Source : © European Union, 2026 - EP

Despite the swearing-in of a new "civilian" government, progress on the project is likely to remain sluggish.

While drone attacks from Iran have temporarily halted oil and gas production in Iraqi Kurdistan, the Sarsang oilfield, which produces [...]

It's the annual gathering of spymasters from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, when the heads of ASEAN's military intelligence [...]

It's rarely a good thing for a company to find itself on the agenda at a meeting of the top [...]

The French government has amended the procedure governing the approval [...]

As relations remain cool between Paris and Ankara, France has [...]

The economic brunt of a prolonged war would be borne by the Indian and Pakistani people, who have no part in it but no escape from its consequences.

For nearly thirty years, beginning with the Razali Initiative in 1997, I’ve been in and out of discussions related to UN Security Council reform. Aside from the work undertaken by the Small Five Group (S-5) and later by the ACT Group on working methods (with which I was fortunate to be involved), much of the discussion at the UN has focused on permanent representation and whether the privilege of exercising the veto should be extended to new permanent members. So much so that it is now almost taken for granted that Security Council reform will only be meaningful if it brings about permanent representation for both the Group of Latin America and the Caribbean and the African Group, with the question of the veto remaining in the balance.

While permanent membership is a matter of utmost significance, just changing the composition of the membership (permanent, elected to two-year terms, or elected to longer terms) would not be enough to deliver a fully functional Security Council. This led me to indulge in some thinking on what else would be needed.

The first thought came to me months ago as I was sharing with my law students some of the techniques a multilateral diplomat chairing a complex legal negotiation would use to arrive at a strong outcome. I pointed out that if a delegation was being obstructive, I would suspend the meeting for a period of time and ask that delegation to come up with a solution that would secure widespread support. No multilateral diplomat worth their salt, or with any sense of professional pride, would refuse me, simply because it would be too embarrassing for them to admit before all their peers that they were lacking the skills to do so. If it was the first time a delegation had ever experienced something like this, they would shuffle out of the conference room looking dumbstruck. They would, however, return at some point, beaming with pride at having found a solution. They would be exhausted, too, and the very next day they would be less enthusiastic about raising an objection.

This reflection coincided with an argument I recalled hearing in private repeatedly from Larry Johnson and Mona Khalil of the UN Office of Legal Affairs when I was a permanent representative (PR). They would tell me time and again that the permanent members of the Council were always quick to seize on their veto privileges expressed in Article 27(3) of the UN Charter but not to honor this article’s twin—the “responsibility” conferred on them in Article 24(1). In other words, they were happy to exercise the privilege of blocking actions without bearing the responsibility of ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

Fifteen years ago, I remember casually making remarks in this direction in discussions within the ACT Group. Now, I believe this issue needs to be studied more closely.

The problem with the Council is its chronic state of constipation, with obvious and disastrous effects felt around the world. Changing the composition in any direction won’t affect that underlying state. Instead, we can learn from the techniques used to unlock complex negotiations. Would it not be more sensible to make the exercise of the veto contingent on having a permanent member first provide the Council (in informal consultations) with a credible alternative that could secure nine affirmative votes and no vetoes? This would mean that the PR of a permanent member could only block a draft resolution if they were also willing to do the work of imagining another possible solution—and one that would win widespread support. No work, no veto. The work of the Council might then tip from blocking action to ensuring the maintenance of international peace and security.

The same principle applies to other multilateral bodies. It is high time we dispense with references to a “consensus rule” in multilateral negotiations and call it what it is: a “veto rule.” I have been saying this for many months now. It is hypocritical for member states to weigh in against the use of the veto in the Security Council when they are only too happy to themselves block agreement in the climate negotiations or the negotiations on a pathogen access and benefit sharing system for the Pandemic Treaty. If we are serious about wanting to do something about the veto in the Council, we must address it in all multilateral bodies and stick to the intent behind Article 18 and its provisions on majoritarian voting in the General Assembly.

If Article 27(3) were to be amended, what might it look like? It might require the concurrence of permanent members “provided those members can first assure the Security Council of there being an accepted alternative.”

There would also have to be an additional subparagraph (4): “The Secretary-General will provide the first draft of every resolution (carrying a decision) to the Security Council but will not subsequently negotiate over it; that will be the prerogative of the Council.” More on this point in my next post.

“From pillar to post” is an English expression denoting frenetic activity—an accurate representation of a functioning multilateral system.

The post From Pillar to Post: No Work, No Veto appeared first on International Peace Institute.