Die halbjährlich stattfindenden ASEAN-Gipfeltreffen sind fester Bestandteil der regionalen Gipfeldiplomatie. International finden sie aber nur wenig bis gar keine Beachtung. Das liegt zum einen daran, dass sie, als »talk shops« verschrien, selten konkrete Ergebnisse liefern; zum anderen daran, dass strukturelle und institutionelle Schwächen der ASEAN, die häufig bei Gipfeln zutage treten, grundsätzliche Zweifel an ihrer Wirksamkeit bestärken. Dass dem ASEAN-Gipfel im Oktober 2025 in Kuala Lumpur größere internationale Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt wurde, hat mehrere Gründe: US-Präsident Trump nahm zum ersten Mal an einem Gipfeltreffen der Regionalorganisation teil und trat als Schirmherr des im Rahmen des Gipfels unterzeichneten thailändisch-kambodschanischen Friedensabkommens auf. Am Rande des Gipfels führten die USA und China zudem Verhandlungen über die Begrenzung ihrer Handelsstreitigkeiten. Die Aufnahme Timor-Lestes als elftes Mitglied der ASEAN unterstreicht die Attraktivität des Verbunds. Viele konkrete Herausforderungen wie das Management regionaler Konflikte oder die Reform des Konsensprinzips sind allerdings noch immer nicht bewältigt. Trotzdem bleibt die ASEAN aufgrund ihrer »convening power«, ihres inklusiven Multilateralismus und der wachsenden strategischen Bedeutung Südostasiens für Deutschland und Europa wichtig.
Financial investigations are a cornerstone in the fight against human trafficking. Tracking money flows helps uncover the financial networks and key actors sustaining these crimes.
On 6 and 7 November, the Office of the OSCE Special Representative and Co-ordinator for Combatting Trafficking in Human Beings, together with the OSCE Mission to Montenegro, and the Ministry of the Interior of Montenegro, organized a two-day workshop to strengthen co-operation among law enforcement, prosecutors, the judiciary, and the private sector. The goal: to make financial flow tracing and financial investigations central pillars of Montenegro’s anti-trafficking efforts.
The event gathered around 50 participants from across Montenegro, financial investigation experts from Canada, Cyprus, Latvia, and the Netherlands, as well as representatives from the National Bureau of Investigation of Hungary, the Finance Against Slavery and Trafficking (FAST) initiative, and private sector partners from, Romania, Spain, and Sweden. Notably, companies such as Santander Bank, Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC), blockchain intelligence company TRM Labs, the Global Coalition to Fight Financial Crime, and Western Union also attended and contributed with their expertise.
Opening the event, Giovanni Gabassi, OSCE Mission to Montenegro’s Officer-in-Charge, said the initiative reflected a shared commitment “to tackle human trafficking by targeting the profits that sustain it.” He added that stronger financial investigations not only expose trafficking networks, but also enable the identification of victims and support successful prosecution of cases.
Dragana Kažanegra-Stanišić, State Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, emphasized the importance of partnerships in addressing human exploitation. “Financial institutions play a key role in identifying suspicious transactions and activities that may indicate this crime. Together with law enforcement, they provide invaluable data to help break down networks.” Moreover, she also stressed that “the use of cryptocurrencies and new financial technologies further complicates supervision and regulation, which requires an agile, co-ordinated and adaptive approach.”
Velimir Furtula, Acting Assistant Director of the Police Directorate’s Department for the Fight against Crime, noted that human trafficking represented one of the most complex and serious violations of human rights and one of the most profitable forms of organized crime. “At its core, there is always the same motive - illegal earnings through the exploitation of people. That is why monitoring of financial flows becomes a key tool in its detection and suppression,” said Furtula.
Jean-Benoit Manhes, OSCE Deputy Co-ordinator for Combating Trafficking in Human Beings pointed out that human trafficking and migrant smuggling have been identified in both the National Risk Assessment and the recent MONEYVAL Mutual Evaluation as a major source of illicit funds. “Montenegro’s geographical position, as a transit and destination country within the Western Balkans, makes it especially vulnerable to such crimes. The adoption of a whole-of-society approach, including the financial sector, can be instrumental in helping detect, track and recover financial benefits from trafficking, including via complex schemes involving cryptocurrencies. No-trafficker is invisible, no-trafficker shall escape,” he concluded.
Plus de 84 % des exportations du Mexique se dirigent vers les États-Unis, mais avec la guerre commerciale menée par Donald Trump, le pays pourrait être tenté de trouver de nouveaux débouchés au sein de l’Union européenne.
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How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.
How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.
How do Chinese state-owned enterprises (SOEs) involved in Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects navigate international pushback, balance political directives with commercial objectives, and comply with intensified Party oversight? This article addresses a key gap in party-state capitalism literature by exploring the under-examined role of reputational governance in shaping the operations of Chinese SOEs abroad. Drawing on interviews and fieldwork in China, Ethiopia, Zambia and Tanzania, we analyze the reputational governance practices of a SOE that spearheaded two flagship railway projects: the Tanzania–Zambia Railway and the Addis Ababa-Djibouti Railway. We argue that reputational governance is a core feature of party-state capitalism, with overseas SOEs serving as examples of this unique model, where elements of party loyalty and capitalism coexist.
The accelerating pace of digitalisation - driven by artificial intelligence (AI), e-commerce, cloud computing, and cryptocurrencies - has significantly increased the global demand for data centres. While these facilities underpin the digital economy, their rapid expansion has created substantial challenges in energy consumption and sustainability. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that data centres accounted for approximately 1–2% of global electricity use in 2022, excluding the additional energy required for associated infrastructure. With the continuing proliferation of AI-driven applications, this trend is expected to intensify dramatically, raising critical concerns regarding carbon emissions, energy security, and the broader environmental impact of digital transformation. As nearly 90% of global data centres are located within G20 countries, the group holds a pivotal position in addressing these challenges. However, considerable disparities exist in the distribution of data centres between and within the members of the group. The United States alone accounts for approximately 46% of global data centres while China follows with ten times fewer facilities. Such concentration amplifies energy consumption pressures and risks deepening global digital and economic inequalities. This policy brief examines the relationship between digitalisation and energy use through the lens of data centre distribution within the G20. It highlights the uneven concentration of data infrastructure and energy demand, revealing significant imbalances in data power and resource allocation. The brief concludes with policy recommendations for fostering climate- and resource-efficient digitalisation, enabling G20 members to align data-driven growth with global sustainability and net-zero objectives.