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Des experts ont soulevé des questions concernant des informations qui ne figurent pas dans le rapport préliminaire, écrit Theo Leggett.

This policy paper is authored by Ioannis Armakolas, Head & Senior Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP, Dimitar Bechev, Senior Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP, and Ana Krstinovska, Research Fellow, South-East Europe Programme, ELIAMEP is published in the context of the of the project EMBRACing changE – Overcoming Blockages and Advancing Democracy in the European Neighbourhood. EMBRACE is a multi-country research initiative that aims to enhance democracy promotion efforts in the EU’s neighbourhood by identifying key obstacles to democratisation and formulating evidence-based strategies to overcome them. The project draws on locally led research and stakeholder engagement across twelve case studies in five regions: the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, the Southern Caucasus, the Middle East, and North Africa.

Focusing on Work Package 7 of the project, the report “The EU’s Democracy Promotion and Geopolitical Competition” examines how the European Union’s democracy promotion efforts are shaped and challenged by both external authoritarian actors, primarily Russia and China, and internal political dynamics within partner countries. The report offers an in-depth comparative analysis of five case study countries: Algeria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine.

The authors analyse how authoritarian rivals deploy various forms of coercion, subversion, and co-optation, often exploiting internal political vulnerabilities. They also highlight how domestic elites navigate this external competition, at times instrumentalising their ties with Russia and China to entrench their power and limit EU influence. In this geopolitical context, the paper finds that EU democracy promotion tools are most impactful when tied to credible enlargement prospects and implemented with consistency and strategic sensitivity to local conditions.

The paper concludes that democracy promotion is no longer merely a matter of institutional design or normative appeal, it has become a geopolitical contest where foreign influence and domestic agency intersect. As such, future EU strategies must account for this complexity and tailor instruments to local realities while remaining steadfast in their democratic commitments. The report closes with concrete policy recommendations aimed at refining the EU’s approach, particularly in geopolitically contested environments.

You can read the policy paper  in pdf here.

The European Union’s capacity to foster democracy in its neighbourhood is increasingly constrained by a dual challenge: the pushback from authoritarian powers like Russia and China and the domestic political dynamics in partner countries. This policy report draws on granular empirical evidence and comparative analysis from five states—Algeria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine—to seize the nuances in the approach (objectives, tools, tactics) of Russia and China and to identify patterns in how EU leverage is shaped by external authoritarian strategies and internal political conditions. The report draws conclusions about the conditions under which EU democracy promotion has the potential to be impactful when facing geopolitical challengers, offering ideas for its future design improvements.

This policy report finds that:

• The EU’s democracy promotion tools are most effective when paired with credible enlargement prospects and coherent conditionality.
• Authoritarian rivals, particularly Russia, deploy a mix of coercion, subversion, and co-optation, capitalizing on internal vulnerabilities.
• Domestic elites play a decisive role in shaping the direction of foreign alignment, often exploiting ties with Russia and China to cement their hold on power and dilute EU influence.
• Societal attitudes significantly condition the success of EU or authoritarian leverage.

The policy report argues that, beyond geopolitical competition and authoritarian diffusion, as the most common explanatory devices for the spread of authoritarianism to be found in the scholarly literature, democracy is often undermined as an “unintended consequence” of the domestic actors’ multiple engagements with external actors.

The report also concludes that democracy promotion is not merely a matter of institutional engineering but a geopolitical contest where domestic politics and external power plays intersect. The outcome is contingent on EU consistency, strategic adaptation, and the good understanding of the limitations and opportunities of the domestic political context in partner countries.

Finally, the report offers recommendations for tailoring EU democracy promotion policies in response to the challenges faced by increasingly emboldened geopolitical and authoritarian rivals. The recommendations pertain to the type of instruments the EU is fielding in geopolitically contested states, the relationship to domestic political elites and civil society in these countries, and the communication and economic instruments intended to appeal to the wider societies.

Introduction to the EMBRACE project

The EMBRACE research project (2022-25) collects evidence-based knowledge on the obstacles to democratisation and ways to overcome them in five regions of the European neighbourhood: Southern Caucasus, Eastern Europe, Western Balkans, Middle East and North Africa. Its aim is to strengthen the capacity of policy-makers and pro-democracy forces to develop effective strategies to promote democratic progress in the European neighbourhood. In addition to research reports and policy briefs, new policy tools for EUDP practitioners and pro-democracy activists are developed based on the project’s findings.

The EMBRACE consortium consists of 14 partner organisations based in 13 countries, and places particular emphasis on locally-led research with deep contextual familiarity and stakeholder access within the regions under study. It brings together partners with unique and complementary strengths as well as shared areas of interest, in order to foster joint learning and development.

Empirical data was gathered in twelve case study countries through a variety of research approaches, investigating episodes of political closure and opening to identify, analyse and explain behavioural, institutional and structural blockages, and the conditions under which they can be overcome. A new quantitative dataset was generated on the larger trends of EU Democracy Promotion and its effects on democratisation over the last two decades in all 23 neighbours.

The research is structured around four thematic clusters: the re-configurations for democratic policy shifts after popular uprisings; democratisation and economic modernisation in authoritarian and hybrid regimes; the nexus between democratisation and peace; and the geopolitics of EUDP and the competition that the EU encounters in its democracy promotion efforts. This report focuses on Work Package 7, which aims to understand the EU’s democracy promotion potential when confronted with geopolitical challenges by powerful and authoritarian geopolitical rivals. It analyses how all these forces interact, compete, clash or cooperate, and how such interplay raises obstacles or offers opportunities for democracy promotion by the EU.

Introduction to this Policy Report

Since the end of the Cold War, the European Union (EU) has positioned itself as a champion of democratic norms and values, using a combination of economic assistance and political conditionality to push for institutional and political reforms in target countries. These efforts are particularly pronounced in regions such as the Western Balkans, Eastern Europe, and North Africa—areas characterized by fragile institutions, hybrid regimes, and complex geopolitical alignments. As immediate neighbours of the EU, those regions have been the primary target of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the EU enlargement process, which now covers Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia in addition to the Western Balkans.

However, EU democracy promotion now unfolds in a hostile strategic environment. Authoritarian powers like Russia and China have expanded their regional footprints and actively challenge the EU’s normative agenda.  With its aggression against Ukraine culminating in a full-scale invasion, Russia has resorted to crude military power to assert its primacy.  Faced with this reality, political elites in countries next door to the EU increasingly adopt hedging strategies, playing with all external powers to maximize regime survival or economic gain. This interplay between external pushback and internal resistance complicates the EU’s ability to shape political trajectories in its neighbourhood.

This policy paper is the outcome of rigorous research on the geopolitical competition to EU democracy promotion conducted in the context of the EMBRACE project. It draws on a cross-regional comparison of five countries—Algeria, Georgia, North Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine. It highlights the limitations of EU influence, identifies the modes of authoritarian contestation, and explores how domestic political contexts determine the effectiveness of democracy promotion. The aim is not only to diagnose challenges but to propose strategies that could help recalibrate the EU’s external democracy promotion.

EU Leverage: Dense Ties, Uneven Impact

EU democracy promotion rests on a set of well-established instruments: political conditionality, economic incentives, technical assistance, and societal engagement. These instruments are operationalized through the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) for Algeria and through the Enlargement Policy for Serbia, North Macedonia, Ukraine and Georgia. All five countries in question have dense trade and investment ties with the Union, in most cases their leading economic partner, and are also linked to member states thanks to large diaspora populations. In that sense, both linkage and leverage – two variables highlighted by the literature on international promotion of democracy (Levitsky and Way 2005) – favour the EU’s role as a driver of political and institutional reform.

However, the EU’s track record is, at best, mixed.  Success is rare and setbacks common. North Macedonia and Ukraine are two cases giving grounds for qualified optimism. In both countries, the EU has demonstrated its potential to support democratic breakthroughs. In North Macedonia, the European Commission and the European Parliament played an important role in resolving the 2015-2016 political crisis, combining mediation, support to civil society, and conditionality tied to the broader EU accession agenda. Moreover, the Prespa Agreement concluded between Skopje and Athens, which resolved the long-standing naming dispute, was conditioned by the attraction of EU membership (Armakolas 2023, Bechev 2022).  However, the Europeanisation process ground down to halt in 2020 owing to new hurdles North Macedonia confronted because of France delaying, and later of Bulgaria blocking, its progress.

Similarly, in Ukraine, post-Maidan governments embarked on reforms under the impetus of societal demand, EU encouragement and the prospect of becoming a member of the 28-strong bloc. Russia’s full-scale invasion has shifted the priorities of the Ukrainian state from governance and market reform to ensuring state survival in the face of a mightier adversary.  Yet it has also propelled Kyiv further on the path to membership, with formal negotiations launched in 2024. Despite the political, economic and institutional obstacles going forward, at present Ukraine has a chance to enter the EU in the following decade. Particularly if NATO membership is off the table, accession to the Union would provide the highly desired anchor to the West that Ukrainians have pursued for at least two decades.

Yet these successes do not tell the full story of the complex landscape of EU democracy influence and other cases illustrate the limits of EU’s policies. In Georgia, despite robust public support for membership in the EU, which hovers around 80% of the populace, the government of the Georgian Dream (GD) party has slowed down (and arguably reversed) the effort to secure accession together with Ukraine and Moldova. GD gradually distanced itself from the EU, especially when democratization has threatened its political dominance. The passage of a highly problematic foreign agents’ law in 2024, inspired by legislation Russia adopted in the 2010s, coupled with the alleged irregularities at the October 2024 general elections have deepened the rift with the EU. In Algeria, the EU has largely prioritized stability and energy cooperation over democracy promotion. The 2019 Hirak protests received lukewarm support from Brussels, revealing a strategic preference for regime continuity over democratic change.

Even in the EU accession countries, conditionality is inconsistently applied. Serbia continues to slide into hybrid authoritarianism with little EU pushback. President Aleksandar Vučić has managed to simultaneously negotiate EU accession and cultivate ties with Russia and China, taking advantage of the EU’s reluctance to prioritize democracy over regional stability as well as its dire need to access critical resources. Europe’s reaction to an unprecedented wave of popular protests, which unfolded after November 2024 and demanded greater transparency and accountability, has been half-hearted at best. The outreach by Enlargement Commissioner Marta Kos to pro-rule-of-law protesters has not moved the needle for the overall policy of the EU, which prefers engagement over confrontation with President Vučić.

EU credibility oftentimes falls prey to internal divisions. Member states diverge in terms of geographical focus, with some looking at Ukraine and the rest of Eastern Europe, others prioritising the Western Balkans while still others interested in the Maghreb, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa. Though the Russian aggression has helped soften such divisions by creating a sense of a common threat, they have not been fully overcome. Historically, member states have variable levels of commitment to enlargement too. While some see it as compatible with their strategic interests, others are concerned it might undermine the EU’s internal cohesion.

There are also institutional factors at play. Unanimity rules in enlargement decisions allow individual countries —such as Hungary or Bulgaria—to block or delay progress over bilateral issues or political calculations, as seen in North Macedonia and Ukraine. Though there have been multiple proposals coming from think tanks and academic researchers to reform decision-making on enlargement by introducing qualified majority voting (QMV), there is no sufficient mass in the EU Council to support such a move. As a result of all that, the EU has often struggled to deliver on promises to aspirant countries.

The experience of the countries under investigation shows that inconsistencies in EU policies, ambiguity over strategy, principles and priorities, as well as occasional failures in implementation limit the effectiveness of the EU’s democracy promotion tools. Local leaderships recognise the opportunity presented by these challenges and often devise a strategy of “pick and choose” of aspects of EU integration that suit their agenda and benefit their political, economic and strategic interests, while at the same time increasingly resist those aspects of EU ties that may challenge their authority or upset domestic equilibria. Aspects of these conclusions can be observed to a greater or lesser extent in all countries investigated. But the cases of Algeria and Serbia stand out as the ones where the ruling elites have found unique ways to make ties with the EU beneficial to their regime and its survival prospects.

Overall, the democracy promotion toolkit of the EU has the potential to foster democracy and strengthen resilience against external authoritarian pressure in aspiring countries. But the likelihood for success increases significantly when the pro-democracy policies are paired with a credible EU membership prospect and conditionality. Analysis shows that close economic, political, and institutional ties to the EU alone do not guarantee democratization, especially when the accession outlook is uncertain. Inconsistent application of democracy promotion tools or conflicting EU priorities risk undermining both their effectiveness and the EU’s overall credibility. Finally, authoritarian states—especially Russia—have shown a keen interest in shaping the democratization trajectories and undercut the EU’s positive influence on the examined countries.

Authoritarian Rivals: Strategies of Pushback

The EU is coming to terms with the fact that it is no longer the only game in town when it comes to influencing domestic politics. Authoritarian and semi-authoritarian states such as Russia, China, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates are growingly present on the European periphery. Of these, Russia and China are the two most remarkable cases. As early as 2008, the prominent scholar of democratisation, Larry Diamond, noted that “[the a]uthoritarian regimes in Russia and China are acting as black knights, supporting autocrats and undermining democratic transitions by providing diplomatic cover, economic aid, and sometimes even security assistance to embattled regimes.”

Russia and China are not ideologically committed to spreading authoritarianism per se, but they actively contest the EU’s influence when it threatens their strategic interests. In the Russian case, the latter include influence over institutions and elites in adjacent countries that are considered by Moscow as its “privileged sphere of influence” or its “near abroad.”   Beijing’s policies are more low-key, undermining alignment with the EU when it goes against China’s (predominantly business) interests, while increasing its political and economic footprint, but still without adopting the aggressiveness that Russia often uses. Russian and Chinese objectives, strategies and methods vary. Russia aims to blunt the EU’s – and more broadly the collective West’s – leverage, undermine its normative standing and accordingly increase their own room for manoeuvre. China, on the other hand, aims to secure allies to pursue its global agenda and opportunities to advance its economic priorities. In that context, while its objectives do not clash with enlargement countries’ bid to join the EU, Beijing’s approach is not always compatible with EU norms and standards, and it sometimes exploits structural governance weaknesses.

Russia’s and China’s strategies fall into three categories:

• • Coercion

Coercion involves the use of tools designed to compel a significant shift in the target’s behaviour. This includes direct military action or the threat of force, intervention in internal conflicts, terrorism, cyberattacks, and various forms of economic pressure such as sanctions or embargoes. These instruments are intended to impose costs that alter the target’s strategic calculus.

Russia’s approach in Ukraine demonstrates how far it is willing to go to prevent EU integration. After the 2013 Euromaidan protests and the pro-European turn, Russia responded with the annexation of Crimea, support for separatists in Donbas, and eventually a full-scale invasion in 2022. In Georgia, the 2008 war was a similar move to destabilize a reformist government and maintain influence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

• Subversion

Subversion (or soft coercion), by contrast, seeks to weaken an adversary—be it the EU, the broader West, or Western-aligned governments—from within. The ultimate aim is behavioral change, achieved through the erosion of institutions, norms, or public trust. This domain is extensively covered in the literature on “hybrid” threats, which span both overt and covert activities below the threshold of open conflict.

Russia presents many examples of subversion. It excels at using hybrid tools to undermine democratic institutions and pro-Western narratives. In North Macedonia, Russian-linked actors used disinformation and Orthodox Church networks to oppose the Prespa Agreement in 2018-2019. In Serbia, Russian-backed media outlets reinforce nationalist sentiment and scepticism toward the West. Their message is amplified by the mainstream media, including TV channels, news portals and tabloids that are linked to President Vučić. In a similar way, China has worked to undermine trust in Western-style democracy – e.g. propagating its success in tackling the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21 and presenting the performance of EU members and the United States in negative light.

• Co-optation

Co-optation operates through the cultivation of relationships with domestic elites—political parties, business lobbies, media outlets, or civil society groups—to shape a target country’s foreign policy or internal choices. This approach provides external actors with channels of influence embedded within local power structures. A well-documented example is Russia’s strategic presence in the energy sector across Eastern Europe and even within the EU’s core.

Similarly, China primarily uses economic tools—investment, loans, and trade partnerships—to create dependencies and cultivate elite networks. Its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and bilateral deals often bypass transparency mechanisms, contributing to state capture and corruption. This strategy is evident in Serbia, where Chinese investments have expanded rapidly, including in strategic sectors like energy and infrastructure. Algeria presents a case of strategic triangulation, where both Russia and China are welcomed as partners in arms sales, infrastructure, and diplomacy. While their influence remains mostly co-optative, it offers the regime a buffer against EU democratization demands. In Georgia, the ruling party has allowed increasing Chinese economic presence and has taken a softer line on Russia since 2022, to offset the increasing EU influence over the country’s democracy and reform agenda. Strengthened ties with authoritarian countries became the counterbalance to EU’s pro-democracy influence which had the potential to undermine the power base and authority of the ruling political elites in Tbilisi.

Domestic Elites and Public Attitudes

The five cases under examination demonstrate that Russia and China are effective in countering the EU policies and influence only because they find allies within the countries. Domestic political elites early on draw the conclusion that closer ties with the EU come with policy impact that may prove challenging for the survival of their regime or the longevity of their governments. They quickly adapt to the situation, incorporate the EU impact on their cost-benefit calculations, and develop counterbalances to influence that is potentially harmful to their interests, including by increasing ties with EU’s rivals. Thus, both Russia and China often find the political circumstances in different countries ripe for increasing their footprint and unfolding their agendas.

Both Russia and China maintain strong military, economic, and diplomatic ties with Algeria while avoiding overt interference. Their influence is primarily co-optative—built on elite networks and strategic infrastructure investments—rather than subversive. Russia leads in arms sales and military cooperation, whereas China focuses on infrastructure and surveillance technology. Both actors also engage in vigorous public diplomacy, targeting Algerian media to counter Western narratives. Importantly, the role of Algeria’s regime is crucial in making the co-optative policies possible. The Algerian ruling elite triangulates between the EU and these external players to maximize its autonomy and expand its room for manoeuvre in foreign policy. This balancing act reinforces internal cohesion and bolsters authoritarian resilience.

A similar dynamic is evident in Georgia. The ruling Georgian Dream party prioritizes regime survival over alignment with EU democratic standards. It combines formal EU ties with growing cooperation with China and a muted alignment with Russia, especially following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. While Russia exploits political polarization and institutional fragility—classic subversive tactics—the more decisive factor remains the agency of domestic actors. In Georgia as in Algeria, co-optation is the principal strategy used by Russia and China to blunt EU-led democratization, though Moscow retains also coercion as a viable tool, given its military capabilities and economic leverage.

Ukraine represents a contrasting scenario. There, Russia has long since abandoned co-optation and subversion in favour of direct coercion. Since 2014, military aggression has become the primary instrument to thwart Ukraine’s EU aspirations, overshadowing earlier tools such as economic pressure and disinformation. China, by contrast, has adhered to a strategy of co-optation, maintaining economic engagement (e.g., Belt and Road projects) while presenting itself as a neutral actor. Beijing avoids direct confrontation, diplomatically supports Russia, and carefully manages its relations with both Ukraine and the EU.

In the Western Balkans, Russia counters EU influence through a dual approach: exploiting societal divisions (subversion) and cultivating networks with local actors—politicians, civic groups, businesses, and national Orthodox Churches. Serbia offers a textbook case. Since the mid-2000s, political elites and influential societal actors have aligned with Russia. Moscow’s influence has benefited from enablers such as state capture, media control by President Aleksandar Vučić and his allies, aggressive nationalism, and the marginalization of opposition forces. As in Algeria and Georgia, Serbia’s leadership uses its ties with both Russia and China to pursue a “multi-vector” foreign policy. This strategy supports regime durability and dilutes the impact of EU democratic conditionality. In North Macedonia, Russia has deployed media manipulation, proxy actors, and disinformation—often via Serbian networks and Orthodox Church links—to disrupt Euro-Atlantic integration. Influence operations peaked in the late 2010s following the Prespa Agreement with Greece. Tactics included propaganda and intelligence-driven subversion.

In both Serbia and North Macedonia, China has pursued a quieter path. It avoids direct confrontation with the EU agenda, instead promoting economic cooperation through infrastructure projects and trade. Its involvement—often via opaque loans and non-transparent procurement—undermines good governance by reinforcing corrupt practices. During the COVID-19 pandemic, China successfully leveraged propaganda and disinformation to boost its image, often with the active participation of local actors such as President Vučić. Still, China’s approach remains firmly co-optative; subversion is rare, and coercion is not a preferred tool.

Overall, our analysis has found that significant EU influence on domestic political dynamics, including in the democratisation process, tends to be resisted by ruling elites through seeking geopolitical counterbalances. Such resistance is more effective, and EU’s influence less powerful, the more a country in question is geopolitically contested between the EU and its authoritarian rivals. Influence is also a function of the type of pressure coming from the EU. When the EU does not have the ambition to significantly influence and alter the domestic political landscape or when receiving countries already have well-established and consolidated autonomous international role and they avoid being tied to one only geopolitical option, then any influence coming from Europe will tend to be more limited. Conversely, countries and ruling elites with limited autonomous international role and less foreign policy clout are less likely to seek extensive geopolitical realignment and more likely to accept the geopolitical anchoring to the West and its democracy implications.

The autonomous role of domestic elites and their resistance to EU democracy influence tend to be facilitated and made easier by matching public attitudes in their respective countries. In every country case that we have studied, higher popular support for non-EU influence or for foreign relations that counterbalance the EU makes it much easier for political elites to challenge the conditions set by the EU and the democracy requirements that accompany EU ties. The resilience of (semi-)authoritarian elites is stronger in countries where the EU and its influence are not popular.

In contrast, the role of the economic dimension proved more complicated to gauge than what we had originally expected. Our analysis has shown that there is no straightforward correlation between economic ties and propensity to align politically or accept pro-democracy influence. Rather, what we have found is that political elites chart a policy path between economic benefits and political autonomy. Decisions are not determined by economic dependencies alone but are also highly influenced by domestic popular attitudes, historical legacies, ruling elites’ political strategies and broader geopolitical dynamics. The role of the economic dimension is dynamic and context specific, always shaped by political strategies, elite priorities and the broader societal context.

Conclusions

Across these three regions—North Africa, Eastern Europe, and the Western Balkans—several core conclusions emerge:

• Domestic factors are the primary obstacles to democratic development. Authoritarian norms, institutions, practices, and societal preferences, in combination with structural governance weaknesses, often present a complex, self-sustaining and with deep roots reality that severely challenges the EU’s ambitions for transformative influence. The EU’s transformative power, that comes through leverage (democratic conditionality) or diffusion (economic and societal linkages), can be drastically limited by the strong presence of these internal conditions.
• External authoritarian actors benefit from these domestic conditions both relatively and absolutely. In relative terms, the EU is at a disadvantage, providing rivals with a comparative edge. In absolute terms, domestic deficits—polarization, institutional fragility, underdevelopment, and state capture—create openings for external authoritarian influence. The motivations of EU’s authoritarian rivals—whether geopolitical rivalry or authoritarian promotion—are secondary to the methods used to achieve influence, as well as the outcome.
• Co-optation is the preferred method for both Russia and China. It is cost-effective and relies on partnerships with local elites. Subversion and especially coercion are riskier and more costly, potentially provoking backlash from within target states or from the EU. Coercive actions, such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, can have unintended consequences, including closer alignment between the target and Western actors.
• Policy Implications

The case studies suggest that democracy promotion is not a technocratic process but a political contest. The EU’s credibility and effectiveness depend on three pillars: coherence, consistency, and contextual awareness.

• Coherence: The EU must align its strategic interests with its normative agenda, and this should be reflected by all EU actors – institutions and member states. Prioritizing short-term stability (e.g., on energy or migration) at the expense of democratic values weakens long-term influence. EU and member states should also work more to have their positions and agendas aligned. Internal divisions within the EU, especially when it comes to policies and ties that have impact on democracy, tend to dilute the EU’s message, undermine its leverage and make it overall less credible and relevant.
• Consistency: Conditionality must be applied uniformly. Turning a blind eye to democratic backsliding, as for example in Serbia, undermines incentives for reform in other countries.
• Contextual Awareness: Democracy promotion must be tailored to local conditions. Where public support for EU integration is high (e.g., Georgia, Ukraine), civil society should be a strategic ally. Where sovereigntist sentiment is strong (e.g., Algeria), EU engagement must be more subtle but no less principled.

Policy Recommendations

The changed geopolitical reality and pressing need for the EU to re-assert its influence in its immediate neighbourhood mandate a bolder approach in re-imagining the EU’s democracy support. Support for continuous democratization of the EU’s neighbourhood is an investment in the EU’s own security, reducing the space for manoeuvre of EU’s geopolitical rivals and building stronger allies that will be able to resist external actors’ pressure that indirectly affects EU’s interests (e.g., reducing migratory pressures, securing energy supplies, closing enforcement gaps in sanctions/restrictive measures, reducing disloyal competition for EU and local actors et al.). This is even more important as these countries progress towards EU membership, but also as means to address current loopholes and build resilience. The improved understanding of the specific links between democratization and geopolitics should translate into targeted policy improvements in several areas:

• Step up the geopolitical game: As both Russia and China speak the language of multipolarity, the EU needs to step up the game in demonstrating that its neighbourhood is its own “sphere of influence”. On the medium to long term, this can be achieved through a credible and consequential enlargement policy. On the short term, however, the European institutions and local EU actors (e.g, EU Delegations in the neighbourhood) need to be more vocal on geopolitical topics and call foul all direct attempts by both external and domestic actors to undermine democracy and European values, membership-related reforms and alignment with the acquis.
• Streamline gradual accession in CFSP: The gradual accession, that is the inclusion of negotiating countries in specific EU-level policies and instruments before membership, should extend to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Candidate countries with full CFSP alignment should be allowed to seat as observers in Council meetings where decisions are discussed. This will serve as encouragement to maintain full alignment, as well as incentive, through peer pressure, to candidate countries who are not fully aligned.
• Re-imagine democracy support in light of geopolitical needs: The new design and significant reduction in the volume of US Government funding has adversely affected democratization programs and projects in the EU’s neighbourhood. To mitigate the consequences, which are especially dire for civil society actors, the EU should re-design its democracy support programs in parallel with the adoption of the new MFF. While this would necessitate an increase in funding, streamlining to maximise the impact and better target the priorities is even more important, considering both the Court of Auditors’ recommendations and geopolitical challenges.
• Encourage local ownership: If they want to make progress in the accession process, candidate countries should take ownership of democracy promotion and contribute alongside the EU in supporting pro-democracy actors. While the EU should remain in charge of the rules, procedures and oversight, national governments should be asked to provide some amount of financial contribution (co-financing) to national democracy promotion programmes.
• Enhance resilience against foreign information manipulation: The EU should encourage candidate countries for EU membership to prioritise the adoption of its Foreign Interference and Manipulation of Information (FIMI) toolkit and align with the Digital Services Act, implementing stricter policies related to media and social media platforms’ control over information manipulation (content transparency, inorganic activity, state-controlled entities etc.). This should be teamed with support for media literacy programs, investigative journalism focusing on the dealings of third actors and their proxies, and media projects devising counter-narratives to the propaganda of external actors.
• Build economic resilience: The EU’s Economic Security Strategy should expand to include, both at the level of design and implementation, the countries in the EU neighbourhood. Their adoption of and alignment with specific instruments, like foreign direct investment screening mechanism or foreign subsidies regulation, have the potential to limit the economic penetration of external actors through their companies that often benefit from subsidies and/or undue practices, distorting the level-playing field to the disadvantage of local and EU companies.
• Improve strategic communication: While it cannot be expected that different EU actors, especially member states, speak with one voice on all topics of interests related to the EU’s neighbourhood, there should be clear strategic communication plans in place for each country. They should be regularly updated to identify and distinguish between (i) messages that form a clear consensus and need to be amplified, (ii) messages that may create unnecessary divisions, block democratization or empower external actors, hence need to be reviewed and addressed.

References

Armakolas, Ioannis 2023. “The Promise of European Integration: Breathing New Life into the Settlement of Bilateral Disputes”, Institute for Human Sciences – Europe’s Futures, www.iwm.at/europes-futures/publication/the-promise-of-european-integration-breathing-new-life-into-the

Bechev, Dimitar 2022. “The EU and Dispute Settlement: The Case of the Macedonian Name Issue”, East European Politics and Societies, 37 (2), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/08883254221101905

Diamond, Larry 2008. “The Democratic Rollback: The Resurgence of the Predatory State”, Foreign Affairs, 87 (2), https://www.jstor.org/stable/20032579

Levitsky, Steven and Lucan A. Way 2005. “International Linkage and Democratization,” Journal of Democracy, 16(3): 20–34, www.journalofdemocracy.org/articles/international-linkage-and-democratization/

 

The authors would like to thank EMBRACE project partners Arab Reform Initiative (ARI) and Ilia State University for analysis of country cases that informed this policy paper and Isabelle Ioannides for feedback to earlier versions of this text. The authors alone are responsible for any errors.

 

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• Turkey occupies a distinctive position—geographically proximate to the epicentres of regional crises and institutionally is embedded in Western security structures such as NATO.
• However, Turkey is more than a geopolitical bridge; it has emerged as a multidimensional actor with ambitions to act both as a regional stabilizer and as a global mediator.

• Turkey’s position within this evolving global order is both advantageous and inherently paradoxical. As a long-standing NATO member, Turkey remains structurally embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet its geostrategic identity—historically, culturally, and geographically intertwined with the volatile landscapes of Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa—drives it to adopt a multi-vector foreign policy.

• From an economic standpoint, Turkey’s position remains marked by deep-seated contradictions. While its customs union with the European Union and strategic access to multiple regional markets confer structural advantages, these are significantly offset by institutional fragility, regulatory ambiguity, and elevated geopolitical risk premiums.

• Turkey’s defence industry has evolved into more than a military instrument; it is now a key lever for diplomatic influence and geopolitical ambition. Positioned at the heart of NATO, yet often at odds with its Western allies, Ankara has expanded its strategic footprint across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus by leveraging domestically-developed military platforms.

• Turkey must articulate a clear strategic rationale to underpin its defence investments. This involves moving beyond reactive threat perceptions and developing a holistic framework that aligns defence policy with broader developmental and diplomatic objectives. The protection of democratic institutions is an integral part of this framework, while two interrelated concepts are essential: economic security and open strategic autonomy.

Read here in pdf the Policy paper by Ahmet Erdi Öztürk, Non-Resident Senior Scholar, Turkey Programme and Can Selçuki, Economist and public opinion expert.

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM HAS BEEN UNDERGOING a profound transformation, marked by increasing complexity and unpredictability, for a long while (Ulgen 2022). This evolution has revalidated the core assumptions of the neorealist paradigm (Hyde-Price 2015), which emphasizes power dynamics, security imperatives, and systemic uncertainty (Kessler and Daase 2008). Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 not only disrupted the European security architecture, it also destabilized global economic equilibria by triggering energy crises, disrupting trade routes, and exacerbating food insecurity (Panchuk 2024). Similarly, the protracted civil war in Libya—fuelled by multifaceted proxy dynamics—has reshaped geopolitical calculations across North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean, with significant implications for energy geopolitics and maritime jurisdiction issues (Zoubir 2020). In the Horn of Africa, the intensifying competition between Somalia and Ethiopia is extending beyond bilateral frictions to reflect broader strategic rivalries involving Gulf actors, China, and the United States (Møller 2009). These regional crises have direct consequences for international capital flows, infrastructure development, and trade corridors. These developments and others have in fact led to significant changes in the foreign policies of countries with historically heightened concerns about ontological security—with Turkey first and foremost among them, both geographically and politically (Alpan and Ozturk 2025).

However, the strategic concerns of a country like Turkey are not amplified solely by the factors outlined above; there are more. For instance, the Hamas-led attack on Israel on 7 October 2023, and Israel’s sweeping military response in Gaza, have deepened volatility across the Middle East, drawing Iran further into an escalating regional confrontation. The ensuing conflict between Israel and Iran not only represents a military flashpoint; it also poses risks to global energy markets, investor confidence, and regional financial stability. These dynamics have been further complicated by the start of Donald Trump’s second term in the Oval Office and the electoral ascendance of far-right political forces across Europe (Georgiadou, Rori and Roumanias 2018). Such developments threaten to undermine the normative foundations of the transatlantic alliance and raise fundamental questions about the future of collective security, institutional cooperation, and liberal economic governance.

Reflecting these escalating security challenges, the most recent NATO summit concluded with an agreement to incrementally increase member states’ defence expenditures to 5 percent of GDP—a significant rise from previous commitments. This decision underscores the gravity of the security environment and signals that even established alliances anticipate more turbulent and resource-intensive times ahead, heightening the pressure on member states, including Turkey, to bolster their military and strategic capabilities. Undoubtedly, this situation will affect fragile economies even more negatively. From a neorealist standpoint, this turbulent environment underscores the anarchic structure of the international system (Nedal and Nexon 2019), wherein states—faced with uncertain alliances and eroding norms—seek to maximize their relative power and security through self-help mechanisms. Military build-ups, strategic autonomy in defence production, and regional balancing behaviour have become key instruments of statecraft. Crucially, economic capacity has become inextricably linked with strategic power: fiscal sustainability, industrial resilience, energy security, and technological sophistication now shape the contours of national strength.

Source: Secretary General Annual Report, 2024, NATO, 2025 figure is an estimate

Turkey occupies a distinctive position—geographically proximate to the epicentres of regional crises, but also institutionally embedded in Western security structures such as NATO. Yet Turkey is more than a geopolitical bridge; it has emerged as a multidimensional actor with ambitions to function as both a regional stabilizer and a global mediator.

Against this backdrop, Turkey occupies a distinctive position—geographically proximate to the epicentres of regional crises, but also institutionally embedded in Western security structures such as NATO. Yet Turkey is more than a geopolitical bridge; it has emerged as a multidimensional actor with ambitions to function as both a regional stabilizer and a global mediator (Sofos 2022). However, there are structural constraints on the implementation of this aspiration. Domestically, enduring challenges related to democratic backsliding (Cinar 2018), institutional fragility, and economic vulnerability limit Turkey’s strategic agility. Externally, Ankara’s dynamic and multifaceted foreign policy and defence initiatives—such as the development of indigenous UAV/UCAV technologies, the KAAN fifth-generation fighter program, and participation in multilateral platforms like ReArm Europe—reflect a desire to strengthen its deterrence capabilities. Nevertheless, these initiatives often face diplomatic pushback, de facto arms embargoes, and technological bottlenecks, illustrating the gap between strategic ambition and systemic capacity.

In addition, crucially, these transformations are unfolding at a time when Turkey is grappling with mounting economic challenges, including entrenched inflation, persistent current account deficits, and waning investor confidence. These structural vulnerabilities significantly limit the scope for coherent long-term strategic planning and complicate Ankara’s ability to underwrite its regional aspirations. The erosion of macroeconomic stability—evidenced by sustained inflationary pressures, capital flight, and pronounced currency volatility—undercuts both the credibility and consistency of Turkey’s foreign policy endeavours. In this context, the country’s strategic orientation is shaped not by geopolitical imperatives alone, but increasingly by its capacity for economic resilience and adjustment.

Grounded in this comprehensive background, this paper underscores the necessity and timeliness of critically assessing Turkey’s evolving role within an increasingly fractured and multipolar international order. At a time when conventional security frameworks are being recalibrated, regional conflicts are intensifying, and the normative foundations of the liberal international system are eroding, Turkey stands at the nexus of numerous geopolitical fault lines. Its geographic position, growing defence ambitions, and assertive foreign policy posture—coupled with domestic political volatility—make it a pivotal yet paradoxical actor. This analysis is rendered particularly urgent by the convergence of multiple pressures: the militarization of regional disputes, Ankara’s strained relations with key NATO allies, its simultaneous pursuit of strategic autonomy and Western alignment, and the deepening entanglement of internal political developments with external security policies. Understanding how these dynamics intersect is essential not only for comprehending Turkey’s future trajectory, but also for anticipating broader shifts within the Euro-Atlantic and Eurasian security architectures. In this context, the paper offers a timely and policy-relevant lens through which to evaluate the constraints, contradictions, and strategic calculations shaping Turkey’s geopolitical behaviour.

New Dynamics in the Global Distribution of Power and Turkey’s Position

As the 21st century enters its second quarter, the global order is marked by growing volatility and systemic fragmentation. The brief post–Cold War unipolar moment, which was dominated by the United States, has given way to a fluid, multipolar system defined by geopolitical, economic, and technological competition. Central to this shift is the intensifying strategic rivalry between the US and China alongside the resurgence of Russia’s revisionist posture, the rise of far-right populism in Europe, and protracted proxy conflicts across the Middle East. Within this landscape, multipolarity reflects not only a redistribution of power but also a reconfiguration of norms, alliances, and global governance tools.

However, the global reconfiguration of economic power—reflected in evolving investment patterns, shifting regional trade architectures, and the strategic decoupling of supply chains—has also fundamentally reshaped the contours of international influence. States no , but increasingly in their capacity to mobilize capital, steer industrial policy, and withstand systemic financial volatility. For Turkey, this transformed landscape presents a dual-edged dynamic: while geographic proximity to burgeoning markets opens avenues for deeper economic integration, persistent macroeconomic imbalances continue to constrain its ability to fully leverage these emerging opportunities.

NATO’s Madrid (2022) and Vilnius (2023) summits redefined threat perceptions by framing China as a “systemic rival” and reaffirming Russia as the principal military threat. The alliance’s agenda now stretches beyond conventional defence to encompass cybersecurity, energy security, disinformation resilience, and food supply stability, reshaping what constitutes strategic power. In this new order, national influence is increasingly tethered to economic robustness, technological sovereignty, and institutional coherence, redefining how states assert agency and respond to crisis.

Turkey’s position within this evolving global order is both advantageous and inherently paradoxical. As a long-standing NATO member, Turkey remains structurally embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet its geostrategic identity—historically, culturally, and geographically intertwined with the volatile landscapes of Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa—drives it to adopt a multi-vector foreign policy.

Turkey’s position within this evolving global order is both advantageous and inherently paradoxical. As a long-standing NATO member, Turkey remains structurally embedded in the Western security architecture. Yet its geostrategic identity—historically, culturally, and geographically intertwined with the volatile landscapes of Eurasia, the Middle East, and North Africa—drives it to adopt a multi-vector foreign policy. This ambition for increased strategic autonomy is exemplified by Turkey’s controversial procurement of the Russian S-400 missile defence system, its growing Eurasian alignments, and its proactive diplomacy in Africa. These initiatives reflect an increasingly pragmatic and transactional orientation which is often at odds with Turkey’s formal Western commitments. However, this assertive diversification also reveals deep institutional limitations. The centralization of decision-making, erosion of bureaucratic expertise, and fragmentation of inter-agency coordination significantly undermine Ankara’s capacity to maintain strategic coherence. As a result, Turkey struggles to convert its geopolitical advantages into sustainable regional influence, oscillating between great-power aspiration and governance constraints.

From an economic standpoint, Turkey’s position remains marked by deep-seated contradictions. While its customs union with the European Union and strategic access to multiple regional markets confer structural advantages, these are significantly offset by institutional fragility, regulatory ambiguity, and elevated geopolitical risk premiums.

From an economic standpoint, Turkey’s position remains marked by deep-seated contradictions. While its customs union with the European Union and strategic access to multiple regional markets confer structural advantages, these are significantly offset by institutional fragility, regulatory ambiguity, and elevated geopolitical risk premiums. Over the past decade, the country has witnessed pronounced deindustrialization in critical tradable sectors, coupled with a sustained decline in total factor productivity—developments that collectively undermine its long-term competitiveness. In an era where strategic influence is increasingly predicated on economic resilience and innovation capacity, Turkey’s deficiencies in export sophistication and technological dynamism impede its evolution from a reactive player to a proactive architect of regional order.

Turkey’s economic capacity has emerged as a critical determinant of the viability of its increasingly multifaceted foreign policy. Escalating inflation, persistent currency instability, a marked decline in foreign direct investment, and continued dependence on external technological inputs have collectively undermined the long-term sustainability of its defence-industrial aspirations. These structural constraints are further exacerbated by Turkey’s substantial reliance on energy imports, rendering the country particularly vulnerable to external shocks—especially amid fluctuating hydrocarbon prices and evolving global energy alignments. Although projects such as the TurkStream pipeline and recent gas discoveries in the Eastern Mediterranean illustrate Ankara’s intent to diversify energy sources, fiscal limitations and technological dependency have delayed their strategic benefits. Consequently, Turkey’s geopolitical assertiveness is frequently constrained by its dependence on imported high-value industrial components, raw materials, and energy.

These constraints not only limit the scope of autonomous policy execution; they also expose Ankara’s efforts towards defence indigenisation to indirect embargoes and political pressures—particularly from within the NATO and EU ecosystems—, thereby diminishing its institutional credibility. In this context, Turkey seeks to position itself as not just a reactive actor, but as a proactive participant in crisis diplomacy and regional stabilization. From its facilitative role in the Black Sea Grain Initiative during the Russia-Ukraine conflict to its backing of the UN-recognized government in Libya and involvement in diplomatic negotiations on Gaza, Turkey has sought to assert itself as a constructive geopolitical broker.

Turkey’s foreign policy ambitions cannot rest on geostrategic vision or rhetoric alone; they demand institutional depth, narrative coherence, and above all economic resilience. Also, it is crucial to remember the following: In Turkey under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, domestic and foreign policy issues are often deeply intertwined. In this context, developments in domestic politics tend to influence foreign policy, while shifts in foreign policy dynamics also have significant repercussions on the domestic political landscape. Despite moments of diplomatic success, persistent structural weaknesses—limited diplomatic capacity, political volatility, and economic fragility—consistently strategic continuity. As the global order becomes more fragmented, Turkey stands at a crossroads: its geographic centrality and diplomatic agility provide real potential, but without parallel reforms in governance, economy, and institutions, its influence risks being fleeting rather than foundational.

Turkey’s Defence Industry: An Emerging Power or a Compelled Defence?

Amid this complex and multi-layered landscape, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has sought to construct a system that he controls almost entirely at the domestic level, while simultaneously attempting to build a “national and local” defence industry. However, this dual endeavour has gradually evolved into a structure that is strong in certain respects yet significantly lacking in others.

Since the early 2000s, Turkey’s defence industry has undergone a striking evolution, emerging as both a cornerstone of national security and a symbol of technological ambition. […] platforms such as the Bayraktar TB2 have reshaped modern warfare and showcased Turkish engineering in conflicts from Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. These advancements have amplified not only Turkey’s hard power reach but also its soft power appeal. 

Since the early 2000s, Turkey’s defence industry has undergone a striking evolution, emerging as both a cornerstone of national security and a symbol of technological ambition. Institutions like ASELSAN, ROKETSAN, BAYKAR, and TUSAŞ have driven a wave of home-grown innovation, positioning Turkey as a rising military power with increasingly autonomous capabilities. Nowhere is this more evident than in its UAV program: platforms such as the Bayraktar TB2 have reshaped modern warfare and showcased Turkish engineering in conflicts from Libya to Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine. These advancements have amplified not only Turkey’s hard power reach but also its soft power appeal. Yet beneath the surface of success lies a structural contradiction: the persistent reliance on imported engines, electronics, and key materials reminds us that technological sovereignty remains aspirational as long as supply chains remain externally anchored.

Despite Turkey’s celebrated progress in national defence technologies, structural dependencies on critical foreign components continue to undermine its strategic autonomy. A stark illustration of this fragility was Turkey’s removal from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program by the United States in 2019, following its acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile system. This exclusion not only disrupted the Turkish Air Force’s modernization path; it also exposed deep-seated weaknesses in domestic production capacity. One of the projects most affected has been the development of the KAAN National Combat Aircraft, which remains highly dependent on foreign technology—especially in jet engine systems. Although national institutions like TÜBİTAK and TUSAŞ are spearheading efforts to produce local engines, technical maturity remains elusive, placing Turkey at a competitive disadvantage within the global aerospace industry.

The Eurofighter Typhoon case starkly illustrates the multilayered barriers confronting Turkey’s quest for defence autonomy. Although Turkey joined the program in the early 2000s with ambitions of technology transfer and joint production, its integration has been shaped by political hesitation and technical bottlenecks. Over 80 percent of the aircraft’s core systems—including engines, avionics, and flight controls—remain sourced from European suppliers, notably in the UK, Germany, and Spain. More recently, renewed discussions on Turkish procurement have reportedly involved political conditionalities, such as restrictions on deployment against Kurdish groups or in the context of Aegean tensions with Greece, further complicating negotiations. These dynamics reveal a structural paradox: Turkey aspires to strategic independence, yet remains entangled in deep interdependencies. Compounding this challenge is Turkey’s fragile economic landscape—marked by high inflation, currency volatility, and limited fiscal space—which weakens its negotiating leverage and casts doubt on the long-term sustainability of such high-cost defence projects. Without a stable economic foundation, ambitions for defence autonomy risk remaining aspirational rather than achievable.

From a macroeconomic standpoint, the viability of Turkey’s expanding defence ambitions is increasingly constrained by fiscal fragility. As of 2023, Turkey’s external debt exceeds $450 billion, inflation hovers around 60 percent, and the Turkish lira continues its volatile depreciation, driving up the cost of imported defence components. These dynamics significantly impede the localization of high-tech systems, especially in electronic warfare, precision munitions, and propulsion.

From a macroeconomic standpoint, the viability of Turkey’s expanding defence ambitions is increasingly constrained by fiscal fragility. As of 2023, Turkey’s external debt exceeds $450 billion, inflation hovers around 60 percent, and the Turkish lira continues its volatile depreciation, driving up the cost of imported defence components. These dynamics significantly impede the localization of high-tech systems, especially in electronic warfare, precision munitions, and propulsion. Currently, foreign dependency in some critical subsystems surpasses 70 percent, particularly in engine technologies and electro-optical sensors—a figure that not only calls Turkey’s defence sustainability into question, but also its geostrategic credibility in NATO and beyond. Ultimately, Turkey’s dual ambition—to assert itself as a regional defence power while maintaining economic and technological sovereignty—remains encumbered by deep-seated systemic and structural constraints. Unless these are addressed through long-term institutional investment, broader technological partnerships, and fiscal stabilization, Turkey’s strategic autonomy risks remaining rhetorical rather than real.

Turkey’s defence industry has evolved into more than a military instrument; it is now a key lever for diplomatic influence and geopolitical ambition. Positioned at the heart of NATO, yet often at odds with its Western allies, Ankara has expanded its strategic footprint across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus by leveraging domestically-developed military platforms. 

Turkey’s defence industry has evolved into more than a military instrument; it is now a key lever for diplomatic influence and geopolitical ambition. Positioned at the heart of NATO, yet often at odds with its Western allies, Ankara has expanded its strategic footprint across the Middle East, North Africa, and the Caucasus by leveraging domestically-developed military platforms. These capabilities have enabled intervention, mediation, and deterrence—but also intensified friction with traditional partners over issues like the S-400 purchase, sanctions, and arms embargoes. In response, Turkey has cultivated alternative defence partnerships with states such as Qatar, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan—an intentional pivot toward a multipolar order in which Ankara seeks to shape, not follow, global security dynamics. The launch of the TCG Anadolu, a drone-capable amphibious assault vessel, and the combat-tested success of UAVs like the Bayraktar TB2, exemplify Turkey’s bid for power projection and defence innovation.

Yet beneath these advances lie unresolved structural vulnerabilities. Turkey remains heavily dependent on imported engines, semiconductors, and electronic warfare components—dependencies that constrain its strategic autonomy. Economic fragilities, including foreign currency volatility and constrained R&D funding, further limit its ability to scale and sustain this momentum. As a result, Turkey’s defence assertiveness risks outpacing its economic and industrial foundations.

Authoritarianism and Geopolitical Capacity: Theoretical and Empirical Dimensions

The interconnection between domestic political structures and foreign policy outcomes has become a defining principle in contemporary international relations, underscoring how internal governance dynamics shape a state’s external behaviour. In Turkey’s case, democratic backsliding—characterized by the erosion of judicial independence, suppression of media freedom, and the marginalization of political opposition—has significantly weakened institutional resilience and diminished international credibility. This authoritarian drift is evident in politically charged trials against figures such as Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, sustained government pressure on influential business associations like TÜSİAD, and the silencing of dissent within academia and the press.

These developments have not only narrowed the space for political pluralism—an essential component of democratic legitimacy; they have also eroded Turkey’s normative appeal and soft power, particularly within multilateral institutions such as the Council of Europe. The institutional degradation extends beyond civil liberties, affecting key bureaucratic and strategic organs. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, once a cornerstone of Turkish diplomatic competence, has seen its autonomy curtailed and its operational coherence strained under an increasingly centralized presidential system. Similarly, the credibility of the Central Bank has been undermined by political interference, complicating efforts to rein in inflation.

Although the appointment of Mehmet Şimşek signalled a tentative return to orthodox economic policymaking, the program faces structural challenges—most notably, the disconnect between the long-term nature of stabilization and the short-term urgency of political expectations. Inflation remains stubbornly high, and while some investor confidence has returned, it remains fragile amid ongoing institutional volatility. These economic constraints directly impact Turkey’s capacity to project consistent and credible influence abroad, further entrenching the feedback loop between domestic fragility and external limitations.

Although the appointment of Mehmet Şimşek signalled a tentative return to orthodox economic policymaking, the program faces structural challenges—most notably, the disconnect between the long-term nature of stabilization and the short-term urgency of political expectations. Inflation remains stubbornly high, and while some investor confidence has returned, it remains fragile amid ongoing institutional volatility. These economic constraints directly impact Turkey’s capacity to project consistent and credible influence abroad, further entrenching the feedback loop between domestic fragility and external limitations.

Likewise, economic governance institutions struggle with mounting fiscal pressures, ad hoc decision-making, and inconsistent coordination across government branches—all of which limit Ankara’s ability to formulate and execute coherent foreign policy strategies. These dynamics reflect a growing consensus in international relations: without strong domestic institutions, no state can sustain a credible, consistent, or effective foreign policy. When democratic legitimacy, strategic foresight, and institutional robustness are absent, a country’s global standing erodes (Ozturk 2021). In Turkey’s case, foreign policy limitations are no longer primarily the result of external shocks—they are increasingly self-inflicted. A governance model driven by short-term centralization over long-term planning has weakened the state’s ability to act as a reliable and norm-abiding international actor. The dismantling of checks and balances, the erosion of the rule of law, and the personalization of executive power have collectively undercut Turkey’s capacity for international leadership. As leading theorists have long argued, global influence tends to mirror domestic stability. Without transparency, meritocracy, and accountability at home, sustained diplomatic credibility abroad remains elusive.

This strategic paradox is especially stark in Turkey’s simultaneous pursuit of regional leadership and slide into authoritarianism. While Ankara has achieved significant milestones in defence—most notably with UAVs like the Bayraktar TB2—these successes are undermined by unresolved technological dependencies, exposure to sanctions, and a weak innovation ecosystem. Turkey’s exclusion from the F-35 program is a case in point: a foreign policy consequence rooted in internal political choices. At the same time, deepening polarization and rising authoritarianism continue to hollow out the institutional base required for values-driven, rules-based foreign policy. This contradiction echoes a central dilemma in neorealist thought: the pursuit of power abroad constrained by dysfunction at home.

Turkey’s future as a consequential geopolitical actor depends not only on its external posture, but also—and, perhaps, to a greater extent—on its internal reform trajectory. The link between democratization and foreign policy capacity is now, to a greater extent, structural, not voluntary. A growing body of empirical research affirms that institutional resilience and democratic governance are the bedrock upon which international credibility and sustained strategic engagement are built. In Turkey’s case, revitalizing judicial independence, restoring media freedom, and safeguarding civil liberties would not only stabilize domestic politics; they would also rebuild diplomatic legitimacy. Without such reforms, Turkey’s claims to regional leadership will continue to ring hollow. The strategic imperative is unmistakable: domestic reform must precede external ambition.

The trajectory of Turkey’s defence sector illustrates this tension vividly. The 2019 decision to acquire the Russian-made S-400 missile system in the face of strong NATO objections triggered sweeping sanctions from the United States, including Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 program. These sanctions cost Turkey an estimated $9 billion in lost revenue and delayed the modernization of its air force by years. More broadly, they severed access to key aerospace technologies and components, exposing critical vulnerabilities in Turkey’s defence supply chains. These disruptions have seriously impacted the operational readiness and long-term viability of Turkey’s military modernization agenda.

The fallout has been particularly acute in legacy systems like the F-16 fleet, where embargoes on avionics and engine parts have driven up costs and reduced operational capability. Experts estimate a 15–20 percent drop in readiness for key aerial platforms. In response, Ankara has ramped up investments in domestic production—especially in drones, missile systems, and naval assets. Yet despite notable advances by firms such as BAYKAR, ASELSAN, and TUSAŞ, efforts toward self-reliance remain hamstrung by technological bottlenecks, insufficient R&D capacity, and ongoing exclusion from Western defence networks.

These strategic constraints have been magnified by strained relations with major European powers–particularly Greece, France, and Germany. The Eastern Mediterranean and Aegean have become militarized flashpoints, with defence spending in the region rising by over 25 percent over five years. France’s naval deployments and Germany’s military aid to Greece have fuelled Ankara’s perception of encirclement, prompting muscular responses ranging from intensified naval patrols to aggressive diplomacy. To counterbalance Western isolation, Turkey has cultivated closer ties with countries like Qatar, Pakistan, and Azerbaijan, and expanded its role in multilateral initiatives like the Organisation of Turkic States. Yet these steps offer limited strategic depth and cannot replace the geopolitical capital once derived from robust engagement with NATO and the EU.

The long-term resolution of this structural impasse lies in a political reset domestically. Should Turkey undertake serious reform—restoring judicial independence, ceasing to repress dissent, and reinvigorating media pluralism—it could begin to rebuild trust with Western allies and reposition itself as a credible regional power. The goal of forming a “security community” based on trust, dialogue, and conflict resolution would become increasingly achievable. The political science literature consistently demonstrates that democratization fosters foreign direct investment, strengthens diplomatic partnerships, and deepens economic integration. Empirical studies show that improved governance can increase FDI inflows by up to 15 percent annually in transitioning economies—resources that could sustain defence modernization and broader economic transformation.

Beyond economic gains, democratization would reduce Western scepticism about Turkey’s reliability as a strategic partner. It would unlock avenues for defence cooperation, technological exchange, and deeper institutional integration with Euro-Atlantic structures. Lifting sanctions, rejoining procurement programs, and restoring Turkey’s role in collective defence initiatives would follow. This, in turn, would reduce Turkey’s exposure to embargo-induced shocks and enhance its influence in conflict zones such as Ukraine, Libya, the Caucasus, and Gaza.

Turkey’s current geopolitical constraints—external sanctions, regional tensions, and internal authoritarian drift—are not inescapable. They are symptoms of a deeper structural misalignment between its internal governance and external ambitions. A return to democratic pluralism, institutional integrity, and transparent governance is more than an idealistic proposition—it is a strategic necessity. Only through reform, not confrontation, can Turkey convert its latent potential into lasting, rules-based power in a multipolar world. Alongside political reform, Turkey must also address its structural demographic and economic challenges. Strategic influence in the 21st century hinges not just on military strength; it also depends on human capital, education quality, and technological innovation. Yet Turkey faces mounting pressure in these areas, with high youth unemployment, low female labour participation, and a deepening brain drain. Reversing these trends requires a long-term industrial strategy, targeted education reform, and regional employment programs. Without integrating economic and demographic planning into a cohesive strategic vision, Turkey’s goals of technological autonomy and regional leadership will remain constrained not by external rivals, but by internal inertia.

Conclusion and Policy recommendations

Turkey’s recent investments in its defence industry reflect both a rational response to global volatility and a strategic effort to enhance national resilience. In an era marked by geopolitical fragmentation, escalating conflicts, and waning multilateralism, Ankara’s drive toward military self-sufficiency—particularly in areas like UAV technology, missile systems, and naval capabilities—offers not only national security benefits, but also the possibility of Turkey acting as a stabilizing force beyond its borders. As European security architectures are increasingly strained and regions like the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Eastern Mediterranean face heightened instability, Turkey is uniquely positioned to contribute to reducing regional tensions by maintaining equilibria and providing humanitarian support. However, to fully realize this potential and translate military capacity into sustainable strategic influence, several foundational issues must be addressed.

Turkey must enhance its democratic capacity at home. A resilient democracy—grounded in the rule of law, judicial independence, media pluralism, and civil liberties—is more than a normative ideal; it is a prerequisite for long-term strategic credibility.

First, Turkey must enhance its democratic capacity at home. A resilient democracy—grounded in the rule of law, judicial independence, media pluralism, and civil liberties—is more than a normative ideal; it is a prerequisite for long-term strategic credibility. Democratic legitimacy strengthens foreign policy coherence, facilitates international partnerships, and enhances the soft power necessary for conflict mediation and regional diplomacy. Without internal reforms of this sort, Turkey’s external actions will continue to be viewed with scepticism, particularly by Western allies whose cooperation remains vital for technological collaboration and institutional integration.

Turkey must articulate a clear strategic rationale to underpin its defence investments. This involves moving beyond reactive threat perceptions and developing a holistic framework that aligns defence policy with broader developmental and diplomatic objectives.  

Second, Turkey must articulate a clear strategic rationale to underpin its defence investments. This involves moving beyond reactive threat perceptions and developing a holistic framework that aligns defence policy with broader developmental and diplomatic objectives. In this context, two interrelated concepts are paramount: economic security and open strategic autonomy. Economic security ensures that defence development is underpinned by a stable macroeconomic foundation, robust innovation ecosystems, and inclusive growth. Open strategic autonomy, meanwhile, allows Turkey to pursue sovereign policy choices while maintaining constructive engagement with both Western institutions and non-Western partners. Crucially, these two pillars must operate in tandem. Our recommendation is that rather than severing its historical ties with the Western bloc, Turkey should strengthen its institutions, economy, and democracy in order to gain greater strategic flexibility. This would enable Turkey to enhance its capabilities—particularly in the field of defence—while also increasing its influence across a range of other domains. A defence posture rooted in economic security enhances industrial sustainability and innovation, while open strategic autonomy ensures that sovereignty does not come at the cost of isolation. This dual approach not only supports Turkey’s strategic flexibility; it also encourages democratic consolidation and institutional development, creating a virtuous cycle in which internal governance reform and external credibility reinforce one another.

Turkey’s ambitions to act as a “balancing power” or “regional stabilizer” are both timely and attainable, but only if pursued through a coordinated, multi-dimensional strategy. Defence modernization, democratic reform, economic resilience, and strategic autonomy should be viewed not as separate tracks, but as mutually reinforcing components of a coherent national vision. A Turkey that invests in its people, renews its institutions, and positions its defence capabilities within a transparent and accountable strategic framework will be far better placed to engage with Western partners on an equal footing and to shape regional dynamics in a constructive, stabilizing manner. The future of Turkey’s geopolitical influence therefore lies not solely in its arsenal, but in the strength, legitimacy, and foresight of the state that wields it.

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Both World Bank shareholders and the Bank’s management have emphasised the need for large-scale private investment to achieve development and climate goals. For the World Bank Group, this means collaborating more closely between its different institutions, an issue that World Bank President Ajay Banga has prioritised. This paper examines the extent to which these ambitions are being translated into practice, using energy-related reforms, with a focus on renewable energy sources, as an example. Through three country case studies (Romania, Bangladesh and Cameroon), it examines how the Bank’s diagnostic work is reflected in its country strategies and policy-based lending programmes. Coherence is assessed using nine questions. The case studies show that despite many cross-references between the documents and some parallels in the analysis of key constraints, three challenges emerge. First, the diagnostic documents lack coherence. Second, the issues raised in these documents are often not translated into the Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs). Third, in many cases there is a very weak link between the proposals in the diagnostic documents and the CPF on the one hand, and the policy-based lending programme with its prior actions (PAs) and disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) on the other. The PAs and DLIs are often unambitious. The paper recommends four reforms to address these shortcomings: (1) Diagnostic documents should indicate which policy reforms are considered most binding and suggest steps to address them. In addition, all CPFs should include an annex with the diagnostic documents’ main operational (policy) proposals and how they are reflected in the CPF. (2) CPFs should explicitly explain how management intends to use country platforms. If their use is not considered feasible, the CPF should explain why. (3) Given that fiscal policy is a powerful tool for decarbonising the energy sector, and given the underperformance in translating reform needs into policy-based programmes and appropriate PAs/DLIs, the Bank should review its approach in this area; the new, planned energy policy would be a first opportunity. (4) As bringing together private and public sector perspectives is key to mobilising private sector investment, the Bank’s management should include public sector perspectives and representatives in the Private Sector Lab, set up by the Bank’s president in 2023. The Bank’s management is currently reforming both its country engagement model and its energy policy strategy. Moreover, it has introduced some organisational changes aimed at fostering a closer cooperation between its various institutions. The recommendations in this paper should be considered in this context. Implementing the recommendations would greatly increase private capital mobilisation, which was a key issue on the agenda for the Financing for Development conference in Seville in July 2025.

Both World Bank shareholders and the Bank’s management have emphasised the need for large-scale private investment to achieve development and climate goals. For the World Bank Group, this means collaborating more closely between its different institutions, an issue that World Bank President Ajay Banga has prioritised. This paper examines the extent to which these ambitions are being translated into practice, using energy-related reforms, with a focus on renewable energy sources, as an example. Through three country case studies (Romania, Bangladesh and Cameroon), it examines how the Bank’s diagnostic work is reflected in its country strategies and policy-based lending programmes. Coherence is assessed using nine questions. The case studies show that despite many cross-references between the documents and some parallels in the analysis of key constraints, three challenges emerge. First, the diagnostic documents lack coherence. Second, the issues raised in these documents are often not translated into the Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs). Third, in many cases there is a very weak link between the proposals in the diagnostic documents and the CPF on the one hand, and the policy-based lending programme with its prior actions (PAs) and disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) on the other. The PAs and DLIs are often unambitious. The paper recommends four reforms to address these shortcomings: (1) Diagnostic documents should indicate which policy reforms are considered most binding and suggest steps to address them. In addition, all CPFs should include an annex with the diagnostic documents’ main operational (policy) proposals and how they are reflected in the CPF. (2) CPFs should explicitly explain how management intends to use country platforms. If their use is not considered feasible, the CPF should explain why. (3) Given that fiscal policy is a powerful tool for decarbonising the energy sector, and given the underperformance in translating reform needs into policy-based programmes and appropriate PAs/DLIs, the Bank should review its approach in this area; the new, planned energy policy would be a first opportunity. (4) As bringing together private and public sector perspectives is key to mobilising private sector investment, the Bank’s management should include public sector perspectives and representatives in the Private Sector Lab, set up by the Bank’s president in 2023. The Bank’s management is currently reforming both its country engagement model and its energy policy strategy. Moreover, it has introduced some organisational changes aimed at fostering a closer cooperation between its various institutions. The recommendations in this paper should be considered in this context. Implementing the recommendations would greatly increase private capital mobilisation, which was a key issue on the agenda for the Financing for Development conference in Seville in July 2025.

Both World Bank shareholders and the Bank’s management have emphasised the need for large-scale private investment to achieve development and climate goals. For the World Bank Group, this means collaborating more closely between its different institutions, an issue that World Bank President Ajay Banga has prioritised. This paper examines the extent to which these ambitions are being translated into practice, using energy-related reforms, with a focus on renewable energy sources, as an example. Through three country case studies (Romania, Bangladesh and Cameroon), it examines how the Bank’s diagnostic work is reflected in its country strategies and policy-based lending programmes. Coherence is assessed using nine questions. The case studies show that despite many cross-references between the documents and some parallels in the analysis of key constraints, three challenges emerge. First, the diagnostic documents lack coherence. Second, the issues raised in these documents are often not translated into the Country Partnership Frameworks (CPFs). Third, in many cases there is a very weak link between the proposals in the diagnostic documents and the CPF on the one hand, and the policy-based lending programme with its prior actions (PAs) and disbursement-linked indicators (DLIs) on the other. The PAs and DLIs are often unambitious. The paper recommends four reforms to address these shortcomings: (1) Diagnostic documents should indicate which policy reforms are considered most binding and suggest steps to address them. In addition, all CPFs should include an annex with the diagnostic documents’ main operational (policy) proposals and how they are reflected in the CPF. (2) CPFs should explicitly explain how management intends to use country platforms. If their use is not considered feasible, the CPF should explain why. (3) Given that fiscal policy is a powerful tool for decarbonising the energy sector, and given the underperformance in translating reform needs into policy-based programmes and appropriate PAs/DLIs, the Bank should review its approach in this area; the new, planned energy policy would be a first opportunity. (4) As bringing together private and public sector perspectives is key to mobilising private sector investment, the Bank’s management should include public sector perspectives and representatives in the Private Sector Lab, set up by the Bank’s president in 2023. The Bank’s management is currently reforming both its country engagement model and its energy policy strategy. Moreover, it has introduced some organisational changes aimed at fostering a closer cooperation between its various institutions. The recommendations in this paper should be considered in this context. Implementing the recommendations would greatly increase private capital mobilisation, which was a key issue on the agenda for the Financing for Development conference in Seville in July 2025.

La vie de Muhammadu Buhari a connu des changements spectaculaires au fil des décennies, et il a souvent été au cœur des événements.

An evaluation of the U.N. country teams states that the resident coordinator system has “proven challenging” with “limited results.” Where to now for the U.N. at 80?

An evaluation of the U.N. country teams states that the resident coordinator system has “proven challenging” with “limited results.” Where to now for the U.N. at 80?

An evaluation of the U.N. country teams states that the resident coordinator system has “proven challenging” with “limited results.” Where to now for the U.N. at 80?

Bien qu'il ait promis de rétablir la démocratie dans son pays, le chef de la junte malienne, le général Assimi Goita, s'est vu accorder un mandat présidentiel de cinq ans par le parlement de transition, sans qu'il soit nécessaire d'organiser des élections.