Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

L'espace muséal de la gare de Liège-Guillemins expose jusqu'au 9 janvier 2022 "Napoléon - au-delà du mythe", un ensemble de 350 pièces originales, comme des tenues et la baignoire de l'empereur ou une robe de Joséphine, provenant de collections privées et d'institutions belges et étrangères.

A decade after the adoption of the ‘Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities’, the EU presented the new ‘Concept on EU Peace Mediation’ in December 2020. Despite the 2009 concept’s importance for strengthening EU mediation capacities, there had been a persistent plea for updating the mediation concept in order to better outline the EU’s priorities and objectives in peace mediation and adapting them to a new geopolitical context. The new concept clearly delivers on these points.
The birth of the EU’s new concept on mediation and its enhanced ambition sensibly align with the EU’s unveiled ambition for a greater ‘geopolitical’ role. As the new concept underlines, the EU’s peace mediation efforts add to its geopolitical power and should not be seen as opposed to a vision of the EU becoming a more assertive global actor. Although the new framework is a positive step towards a politically and operationally more coherent EU mediation practice, open questions remain regarding the political and institutional conditions of an effective practical implementation of the new concept.
Going forward, the EU should further invest in institutionalising cooperation with member states in mediation, improve communication practices regarding its mediation activities and mainstream the mediation concept into its strategic and programming documents.

A decade after the adoption of the ‘Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities’, the EU presented the new ‘Concept on EU Peace Mediation’ in December 2020. Despite the 2009 concept’s importance for strengthening EU mediation capacities, there had been a persistent plea for updating the mediation concept in order to better outline the EU’s priorities and objectives in peace mediation and adapting them to a new geopolitical context. The new concept clearly delivers on these points.
The birth of the EU’s new concept on mediation and its enhanced ambition sensibly align with the EU’s unveiled ambition for a greater ‘geopolitical’ role. As the new concept underlines, the EU’s peace mediation efforts add to its geopolitical power and should not be seen as opposed to a vision of the EU becoming a more assertive global actor. Although the new framework is a positive step towards a politically and operationally more coherent EU mediation practice, open questions remain regarding the political and institutional conditions of an effective practical implementation of the new concept.
Going forward, the EU should further invest in institutionalising cooperation with member states in mediation, improve communication practices regarding its mediation activities and mainstream the mediation concept into its strategic and programming documents.

A decade after the adoption of the ‘Concept on Strengthening EU Mediation and Dialogue Capacities’, the EU presented the new ‘Concept on EU Peace Mediation’ in December 2020. Despite the 2009 concept’s importance for strengthening EU mediation capacities, there had been a persistent plea for updating the mediation concept in order to better outline the EU’s priorities and objectives in peace mediation and adapting them to a new geopolitical context. The new concept clearly delivers on these points.
The birth of the EU’s new concept on mediation and its enhanced ambition sensibly align with the EU’s unveiled ambition for a greater ‘geopolitical’ role. As the new concept underlines, the EU’s peace mediation efforts add to its geopolitical power and should not be seen as opposed to a vision of the EU becoming a more assertive global actor. Although the new framework is a positive step towards a politically and operationally more coherent EU mediation practice, open questions remain regarding the political and institutional conditions of an effective practical implementation of the new concept.
Going forward, the EU should further invest in institutionalising cooperation with member states in mediation, improve communication practices regarding its mediation activities and mainstream the mediation concept into its strategic and programming documents.

Mira Milosevich-Juaristi. ARI 45/2021 - 9/4/2021

¿Qué causas y consecuencias tiene y puede tener la creciente presencia de tropas rusas en la frontera con Ucrania?

“At the IMF we recognize that the climate actions we take in our institution and globally are paramount for our future. We have embraced climate in everything we do.” — Kristalina Georgieva, December 2020

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has only recently started to acknowledge that climate change may be a “macro-critical” factor, that is, crucial to the achievement of macroeconomic and financial stability, which is at the core of the Fund’s mandate. In 2015, the IMF identified climate change as an “emerging  structural  issue”.  In  November  2015,  then  Managing  Director  Christine  Lagarde  recog-nized that “[t]he Fund has a role to play in helping its members address those challenges of climate change for which fiscal and macroeconomic policies are an important component of the appropriate policy response” (Lagarde 2015: 1). Upon assuming office in October 2019, the IMF’s new Managing Director,  Kristalina  Georgieva,  acknowledged  the  centrality  of  climate  change  for  the  Fund’s  work:  “The criticality of addressing climate change for financial stability, for making sure that we can have sustainable growth, is so very clear and proven today, that no institution, no individual can step from the responsibility to act. For the IMF, we always look at risks. And this is now a category of risk that absolutely  has  to  be  front  and  center  in  our  work”  (IMF  2019).  Since  then,  she  has  reiterated  the  importance of climate change for the IMF’s mandate countless times.

“At the IMF we recognize that the climate actions we take in our institution and globally are paramount for our future. We have embraced climate in everything we do.” — Kristalina Georgieva, December 2020

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has only recently started to acknowledge that climate change may be a “macro-critical” factor, that is, crucial to the achievement of macroeconomic and financial stability, which is at the core of the Fund’s mandate. In 2015, the IMF identified climate change as an “emerging  structural  issue”.  In  November  2015,  then  Managing  Director  Christine  Lagarde  recog-nized that “[t]he Fund has a role to play in helping its members address those challenges of climate change for which fiscal and macroeconomic policies are an important component of the appropriate policy response” (Lagarde 2015: 1). Upon assuming office in October 2019, the IMF’s new Managing Director,  Kristalina  Georgieva,  acknowledged  the  centrality  of  climate  change  for  the  Fund’s  work:  “The criticality of addressing climate change for financial stability, for making sure that we can have sustainable growth, is so very clear and proven today, that no institution, no individual can step from the responsibility to act. For the IMF, we always look at risks. And this is now a category of risk that absolutely  has  to  be  front  and  center  in  our  work”  (IMF  2019).  Since  then,  she  has  reiterated  the  importance of climate change for the IMF’s mandate countless times.

“At the IMF we recognize that the climate actions we take in our institution and globally are paramount for our future. We have embraced climate in everything we do.” — Kristalina Georgieva, December 2020

The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has only recently started to acknowledge that climate change may be a “macro-critical” factor, that is, crucial to the achievement of macroeconomic and financial stability, which is at the core of the Fund’s mandate. In 2015, the IMF identified climate change as an “emerging  structural  issue”.  In  November  2015,  then  Managing  Director  Christine  Lagarde  recog-nized that “[t]he Fund has a role to play in helping its members address those challenges of climate change for which fiscal and macroeconomic policies are an important component of the appropriate policy response” (Lagarde 2015: 1). Upon assuming office in October 2019, the IMF’s new Managing Director,  Kristalina  Georgieva,  acknowledged  the  centrality  of  climate  change  for  the  Fund’s  work:  “The criticality of addressing climate change for financial stability, for making sure that we can have sustainable growth, is so very clear and proven today, that no institution, no individual can step from the responsibility to act. For the IMF, we always look at risks. And this is now a category of risk that absolutely  has  to  be  front  and  center  in  our  work”  (IMF  2019).  Since  then,  she  has  reiterated  the  importance of climate change for the IMF’s mandate countless times.

Alejandro de la Fuente y Stanley R. Bailey. DT 5/2021 - 09/04/2021

En la Cuba de hoy existen dos perspectivas claramente diferenciadas sobre el racismo y la desigualdad racial. Este análisis permite destacar las formas en que distintos datos pueden mostrar un panorama completamente diferente sobre la desigualdad racial en un contexto dado.

Esther Solano y Alexandre Fuccille. ARI 44/2021 - 08/04/2021

Este análisis aborda los últimos acontecimientos políticos de Brasil: el juicio por la parcialidad de Sergio Moro, la situación descontrolada de la pandemia, la reforma ministerial de Bolsonaro y su crisis con las fuerzas armadas.

Since the parliamentary elections in October 2020, Georgia’s government and oppo­sition have found themselves in a political deadlock. This is evidenced above all by the fact that the majority of elected opposition parties have boycotted entering par­liament. The country is not only facing domestic political challenges. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh has also changed the regional constellation. While Russia and Turkey have positioned themselves as influential actors in the region, the EU has been barely visible. For Georgia, which is the only country in the South Caucasus to have clear EU and NATO ambitions, this change is a potential threat to its pro-Western course. Tbilisi continues to have high expectations of the EU, which claims to be a geopolitical actor. Both the new regional context and the Georgian domestic political crisis should be an inducement for the EU to engage more with its eastern neighbourhood, and especially to give new impetus to its relations with Euro-Atlantic orientated Georgia.

Since the parliamentary elections in October 2020, Georgia’s government and oppo­sition have found themselves in a political deadlock. This is evidenced above all by the fact that the majority of elected opposition parties have boycotted entering par­liament. The country is not only facing domestic political challenges. The war over Nagorno-Karabakh has also changed the regional constellation. While Russia and Turkey have positioned themselves as influential actors in the region, the EU has been barely visible. For Georgia, which is the only country in the South Caucasus to have clear EU and NATO ambitions, this change is a potential threat to its pro-Western course. Tbilisi continues to have high expectations of the EU, which claims to be a geopolitical actor. Both the new regional context and the Georgian domestic political crisis should be an inducement for the EU to engage more with its eastern neighbourhood, and especially to give new impetus to its relations with Euro-Atlantic orientated Georgia.

This paper examines the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) and discusses options to improve sub‐ and non‐state involvement in post‐2020 climate governance. A framework that stimulates sub‐ and non‐state action is a necessary complement to national governmental action, as the latter falls short of achieving low‐carbon and climate‐resilient development as envisaged in the Paris Agreement. Applying design principles for an ideal‐type orchestration framework, we review literature and gather expert judgements to assess whether the GCAA has been collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic. Results show that there has been greater coordination among orchestrators, for instance in the organization of events. However, mobilization efforts remain event‐driven and too little effort is invested in understanding the progress of sub‐ and non‐state action. Data collection has improved, although more sophisticated indicators are needed to evaluate climate and sustainable development impacts. Finally, the GCAA has recorded more action, but relatively little by actors in developing countries. As the world seeks to recover from the COVID‐19 crisis and enters a new decade of climate action, the GCAA could make a vital contribution in challenging times by helping governments keep and enhance climate commitments; strengthening capacity for sub‐ and non‐state action; enabling accountability; and realizing sustainable development.

This paper examines the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) and discusses options to improve sub‐ and non‐state involvement in post‐2020 climate governance. A framework that stimulates sub‐ and non‐state action is a necessary complement to national governmental action, as the latter falls short of achieving low‐carbon and climate‐resilient development as envisaged in the Paris Agreement. Applying design principles for an ideal‐type orchestration framework, we review literature and gather expert judgements to assess whether the GCAA has been collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic. Results show that there has been greater coordination among orchestrators, for instance in the organization of events. However, mobilization efforts remain event‐driven and too little effort is invested in understanding the progress of sub‐ and non‐state action. Data collection has improved, although more sophisticated indicators are needed to evaluate climate and sustainable development impacts. Finally, the GCAA has recorded more action, but relatively little by actors in developing countries. As the world seeks to recover from the COVID‐19 crisis and enters a new decade of climate action, the GCAA could make a vital contribution in challenging times by helping governments keep and enhance climate commitments; strengthening capacity for sub‐ and non‐state action; enabling accountability; and realizing sustainable development.

This paper examines the Global Climate Action Agenda (GCAA) and discusses options to improve sub‐ and non‐state involvement in post‐2020 climate governance. A framework that stimulates sub‐ and non‐state action is a necessary complement to national governmental action, as the latter falls short of achieving low‐carbon and climate‐resilient development as envisaged in the Paris Agreement. Applying design principles for an ideal‐type orchestration framework, we review literature and gather expert judgements to assess whether the GCAA has been collaborative, comprehensive, evaluative and catalytic. Results show that there has been greater coordination among orchestrators, for instance in the organization of events. However, mobilization efforts remain event‐driven and too little effort is invested in understanding the progress of sub‐ and non‐state action. Data collection has improved, although more sophisticated indicators are needed to evaluate climate and sustainable development impacts. Finally, the GCAA has recorded more action, but relatively little by actors in developing countries. As the world seeks to recover from the COVID‐19 crisis and enters a new decade of climate action, the GCAA could make a vital contribution in challenging times by helping governments keep and enhance climate commitments; strengthening capacity for sub‐ and non‐state action; enabling accountability; and realizing sustainable development.

This paper examines the extent to which addressing climate-related risks and supporting sustainable finance fit into the current set of central bank mandates and objectives. To this end, we conduct a detailed analysis of central bank mandates and objectives, using the IMF’s Central Bank Legislation Database, and compare these to current arrangements and sustainability-related policies central banks have adopted in practice. To scrutinise the alignment of mandates with climate-related policies, we differentiate between the impact of environmental factors on the conventional core objectives of central banking and a potential supportive role of central banks with regard to green finance and sustainability. Of the 135 central banks in our sample, only 12% have explicit sustainability mandates, while another 40% are mandated to support the government’s policy priorities, which in most cases include sustainability goals. However, given that climate risks can directly affect central banks’ traditional core responsibilities, most notably monetary and financial stability, even central banks without explicit or implicit sustainability objectives ought to incorporate climate-related physical and transition risks into their core policy implementation frameworks in order to efficiently and successfully safeguard macro-financial stability.