Diplomacy & Defense Think Tank News

Research on the role of information and communication technologies (ICT) to improve the lives of migrants is a growing field. However, studies in this area have been conducted mainly in wealthy countries, with municipalities that are capable of supporting migrants or refugees. There is less evidence from middle-income host countries and how ICTs can help migrants in their resettlement efforts. To address this gap, this study examines ICT access and the use of e-government services by Venezuelan migrants in Colombia and compares this group with short- and long-term residents of Bogotá. The descriptive analysis of the data reveals that, after controlling for demographic and socioeconomic characteristics, foreign migrants are less likely to own ICT devices compared to short- and long-term residents, but over time do acquire ICT access. In addition, Venezuelan migrants are less likely to use e-government services than their local peers even after controlling for demographic characteristics and internet access, with the exception of address registration. The results indicate that ICT access is not a sufficient condition for migrants to access e-government services and there is a need for policy coordination to reduce bureaucratic “red tape” that may diminish migrants’ likelihood of accessing to e-government services.

The attribution of cyberattacks is a sovereign act by the EU Member States. However, these all have different technical and intelligence capabilities. This leads to a lack of coherence in European cyber diplomacy, for exam­ple when imposing cyber sanctions. Analysis of policy responses to the WannaCry, NotPetya, Cloud Hopper, OPCW, and Bundestag hack cyber incidents reveals the following problems: Attribution takes a long time and relies on intelligence from NATO partners; the technical realities and the legal facts for classifying and pros­ecuting cyberattacks do not always match; the weighting of the criteria for establishing what constitutes a crime is unclear. Cyber sanctions should be proportionate, targeted measures and destructive attacks, such as WannaCry or NotPetya, should result in harsher punishment than everyday cases of cyber espionage, such as Cloud Hopper or the Bundestag hack. The EU must adapt its tools accordingly. The EU should tighten the legal criteria and harmonise the standards of evidence for attribution. The EU Joint Cyber Unit and EU INTCEN, part of the European External Action Service, should be strengthened to improve the exchange of forensic information and to coordinate attribution policy more effectively. EU Member States and their allied partners should better coordinate political signalling to condemn cyberattacks. To this end, it would make sense to allow qualified majority voting for the adoption of cyber sanctions.

In the past decade, the EU has significantly stepped up its profile as a security and development actor in the Sahel. Drawing on historical institutionalism, we conceptualise path-dependencies and lock-in effects as elements of a “foreign policy entrapment” spiral to analyse the EU’s policies towards the Sahel. Specifically, we seek to explain the EU’s increasingly widened and deepened engagement in the region. Hence, this article traces the evolution of the EU’s Sahel policy both in discourse and implementation. We identify a predominant security narrative as well as a regionalisation narrative and show that EU action has followed and reinforced these narratives. Based on this analysis, we argue that the evolution of the EU’s Sahel policy can be understood as a case of “foreign policy entrapment”. Initial decisions on the overall direction of EU foreign policy have created strong path-dependencies and lock-in effects that make it difficult for EU policy-makers to change the policy course.

In the past decade, the EU has significantly stepped up its profile as a security and development actor in the Sahel. Drawing on historical institutionalism, we conceptualise path-dependencies and lock-in effects as elements of a “foreign policy entrapment” spiral to analyse the EU’s policies towards the Sahel. Specifically, we seek to explain the EU’s increasingly widened and deepened engagement in the region. Hence, this article traces the evolution of the EU’s Sahel policy both in discourse and implementation. We identify a predominant security narrative as well as a regionalisation narrative and show that EU action has followed and reinforced these narratives. Based on this analysis, we argue that the evolution of the EU’s Sahel policy can be understood as a case of “foreign policy entrapment”. Initial decisions on the overall direction of EU foreign policy have created strong path-dependencies and lock-in effects that make it difficult for EU policy-makers to change the policy course.

In the past decade, the EU has significantly stepped up its profile as a security and development actor in the Sahel. Drawing on historical institutionalism, we conceptualise path-dependencies and lock-in effects as elements of a “foreign policy entrapment” spiral to analyse the EU’s policies towards the Sahel. Specifically, we seek to explain the EU’s increasingly widened and deepened engagement in the region. Hence, this article traces the evolution of the EU’s Sahel policy both in discourse and implementation. We identify a predominant security narrative as well as a regionalisation narrative and show that EU action has followed and reinforced these narratives. Based on this analysis, we argue that the evolution of the EU’s Sahel policy can be understood as a case of “foreign policy entrapment”. Initial decisions on the overall direction of EU foreign policy have created strong path-dependencies and lock-in effects that make it difficult for EU policy-makers to change the policy course.

The global implications of a switch to hydrogen (H2) are far-reaching, as hydrogen will, at least in part, gradually replace the oil and gas trade, and new international trade flows will emerge. In addition, hydrogen will transform the industry, and its use will have disruptive effects that reshape the economic geography. Policymakers are being called upon to make far-reaching, fundamental decisions that will decisively shape the contours of the hydrogen world. Germany and the European Union (EU) should consider the geo-economic and political consequences when setting the course.

Die Covid-19-Pandemie hat den Mangel an Gesundheits­personal als globales Problem offen zutage treten lassen. Dies gilt auch für die Rekrutierung, Aus- und Weiterbildung sowie die Verteilung von Gesundheitsfachkräften. International fehlt es an belastbaren Governance-Strukturen. Die Stärkung von Gesundheitsfachkräften kann dazu beitragen, die Ziele der Nachhaltigkeitsagenda der Vereinten Nationen zu erreichen, vor allem in den Bereichen Gesundheit, Sicherheit, Wirtschaft und Geschlech­ter­gerechtigkeit. Der Länderkontext Ghanas offenbart zentrale Herausforderungen. Zu nennen sind der Mangel an und die ungleiche Verteilung von Gesundheitspersonal, fehlende Ausstattung in Gesundheitseinrichtungen, begrenzter fiskalischer Spielraum, eine unzureichende Informationslage zum Gesundheitspersonal, Migration und die kaum vorhandene Aufnahmefähigkeit des Arbeitsmarktes für ausgebildetes Personal. Externe Akteurinnen und Akteure wie Deutschland haben nur begrenzten Handlungsspielraum in der bilateralen Zusammenarbeit. Doch selbst diesen nutzen sie nicht genug dafür, die Chancen für eine nachhaltige Stärkung des Gesundheitspersonals mit positiven Effekten auf andere Politikfelder zu ergreifen. Entwicklungs- und außenpolitisch könnte sich die Bundesregierung mit einem intensivierten internationalen Engagement im Gesundheitssektor langfristige Partnerschaften mit Ländern des Globalen Südens sichern. Eine nachhaltige globale Gesundheitspersonalpolitik sollte sich auf fol­gende bi- und multilaterale Handlungsoptionen konzentrieren: Gesundheitsdaten, Training von Gesundheitspersonal, Ausstattung mit Gesundheitsgütern, bedarfsorientierte Migrationsprogramme und nachhaltige Finanzierung der globalen Gesundheitsgovernance.

The Russian military buildup along Ukrainian borders conducted over the last few months – similar to an escalation by Russia in April – has led to new direct talks between US President Joe Biden and his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin. The biggest fear in the West is whether Russia intends to invade Ukraine. The Russian leadership has claimed that its more than 100,000 troops deployed along Ukrainian borders are on Russian territory, are conducting routine training, and should not worry anyone. In stark contrast, Russia perceives the potential deployment of NATO troops close to its borders as a major security threat. This reveals that Russia understands very well the signals it is sending by amassing an unprecedented-in-size military strike group to Ukraine’s frontiers. There is solid evidence that Russia is engaging in a bold brinkmanship game over Ukraine, using the logic of threat to create strategic ambiguity about a potential military invasion. Its goal is to force Western concessions on Ukraine in particular, and to obtain strategic carte blanche in the post-Soviet area more generally.    

The logic of threats

Following the December 7 teleconference conducted between Biden and Putin, the Russian leadership sent a number of signals that created more clarity about the Kremlin’s intentions. Their form was accurately reflected in a few analyses published by the Russia-based Carnegie Moscow Center. One Russian analyst argued that, unless Putin’s demand for guarantees that Ukraine will never join NATO is accepted, the US would see a military defeat of Ukraine, which would be “an especially humiliating re-run of recent events in Afghanistan.” Another Russian expert hinted that, unless the US ensures that Ukraine implements the Russian version of the Minsk agreements, it may risk a war in Ukraine.

The Russian foreign minister, Sergey Lavrov, confirmed that the West should accept these two conditions if it wants to avoid “Europe returning to the ‘nightmarish’ scenario of military confrontation.” Following the teleconference, the deputy foreign minister, Sergey Ryabkov, reiterated the idea, stating that if NATO refuses Russia’s right to veto the Alliance’s further expansion to the east, it will risk “serious consequences” and would lead to “its own weakened security.”

These are the most direct and bold threats that the Kremlin has issued against the West since the collapse of the USSR. There are strong signals that this brinkmanship over Ukraine is a strategic calculation, triggered by the Kremlin’s perception that both the EU and the US are irresolute. For instance, in his November 18 address at the meeting of the college of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Putin observed that Russia has managed to create a feeling of tension in the West. He went on to recommend that this state of tension “should be maintained for as long as possible” and exploited to demand “serious, long-term guarantees” to prevent NATO membership for Ukraine and Georgia. Following Putin’s videoconference with Biden, the Russian foreign ministry published its concrete demands for talks on a new European security order. Among these demands, Russia requested that NATO withdraw its 2008 Bucharest summit “open doors” pledge for Ukraine and Georgia.

Assessing the risk of war

Why is Russia so bold to directly threaten war and confront the West with an ultimatum: Either accept a war in Europe or give up the post-Soviet area? The Kremlin has come to the conclusion that there is little appetite in the West to confront Russia on Ukraine, beyond economic sanctions. Russia’s leadership has also come to believe that the West is extremely risk-averse and not ready to call the Kremlin’s bluff. The brazenness of the threats, the reference to NATO’s “humiliation” in Afghanistan, and interviews with Russian and foreign experts confirming the strategic timidity of the West – all of this speak to that. For instance, in an interview with Harvard’s Timothy Colton in the Russian newspaper Izvestia during the recent “Valday Club” conference, the newspaper emphasized the idea that Ukraine is not important to the US. In an interview with the former US ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul, the journalists of the Echo Moskvy radio station pointed out that “we sell the Americans their own fears.”

Under the current conditions, the risk of a massive conventional Russian invasion in Ukraine is very small. Russia is not yet ready for a total breakup with the West, similar to the one the USSR had, which would be very likely if it attacked Ukraine. Therefore, the question of whether Russia is going to attack Ukraine is not helpful for strategic planning. Instead, for a more effective engagement of Russia, the EU and the US should ask “What actions, short of giving up Ukraine’s sovereignty, should be taken to decrease the risk of a conventional war?”

Responding to Russia’s threats

There are three strategic objectives that the EU and the US should pursue and strengthen. They all stem from an effective crisis diplomacy rationale. First, it is necessary to signal a strong resolve to impose high costs on Russia where it is vulnerable. Second, it is necessary to make these signals credible. Third, it has to engage in intensive diplomacy to reveal that Russia’s demands are not linked to its actual security concerns. The largest vulnerability of Russia is the high military costs of an invasion. Providing defense equipment to Ukraine, deploying instructors and even small military units for joint exercises with Ukraine’s troops in the vicinity of the line of contact in Donbas and near Crimea – on a rotational basis – would serve as a passive obstruction to potential Russian attacks. These are the most effective deterrence tools, which would greatly strengthen the credibility of the resolve of the EU and the US from Russia’s outlook. Finally, the EU and the US should confront Russia’s manipulation of the “indivisible security” concept, which is a major element of its international propaganda campaign. To counter Russia’s legalistic approach and hidden agenda, they should suggest and discuss alternative proposals, for example the pact of non-aggression or a parity of forces in the border areas. The West should not ignore that its response to Russia’s threat of war is likely to affect how other international actors – for example China – view their resolve in responding to comparable challenges in other regions.

This text was also published by fairobserver.com.

Main pillars of the international development cooperation system celebrate their 60-year anniversary in 2021. The year 1961 was the starting point for key institutions established by OECD countries. US President John F. Kennedy pooled existing efforts for supporting developing nations into the mighty US Agency for International Development (USAID). In the same year, the German BMZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) was formed in the then West Germany as a dedicated ministry to support developing regions. 1961 also saw the OECD set up its Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Development cooperation was an important element of foreign policy in the period of the East West confrontation and —despites setbacks— the global aid volume has gradually expanded since.

Main pillars of the international development cooperation system celebrate their 60-year anniversary in 2021. The year 1961 was the starting point for key institutions established by OECD countries. US President John F. Kennedy pooled existing efforts for supporting developing nations into the mighty US Agency for International Development (USAID). In the same year, the German BMZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) was formed in the then West Germany as a dedicated ministry to support developing regions. 1961 also saw the OECD set up its Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Development cooperation was an important element of foreign policy in the period of the East West confrontation and —despites setbacks— the global aid volume has gradually expanded since.

Main pillars of the international development cooperation system celebrate their 60-year anniversary in 2021. The year 1961 was the starting point for key institutions established by OECD countries. US President John F. Kennedy pooled existing efforts for supporting developing nations into the mighty US Agency for International Development (USAID). In the same year, the German BMZ (Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development) was formed in the then West Germany as a dedicated ministry to support developing regions. 1961 also saw the OECD set up its Development Assistance Committee (DAC). Development cooperation was an important element of foreign policy in the period of the East West confrontation and —despites setbacks— the global aid volume has gradually expanded since.

Die Ergebnisse der heutigen Sitzung des Rates der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) kommentiert Marcel Fratzscher, Präsident des Deutschen Instituts für Wirtschaftsforschung (DIW Berlin), wie folgt:

Die EZB hat die in sie gesetzten Erwartungen erfüllt und ein Ende des Notfall-Anleihekaufprogramms PEPP zum Ende des ersten Quartals 2022 bekannt gegeben. EZB-Präsidentin Christine Lagarde hat signalisiert, dass die EZB sich in den kommenden zwei Jahren möglichst viel Flexibilität bewahren will, um auf mögliche Rückschläge in der Krise genauso reagieren zu können wie auf einen unerwartet starken Inflationsdruck. Die EZB wird daher ihre Anleihekäufe durch andere Programme im kommenden Jahr nur graduell zurückfahren.

Die EZB hat ihre Prognosen angepasst und sieht die Inflation im Euroraum ab 2023 wieder in Einklang mit ihrem Inflationsziel von zwei Prozent in der mittleren Frist. Auch wenn die Inflation im nächsten Jahr über dem Ziel der EZB liegen dürfte, so sieht die EZB keine Anhaltspunkte für eine permanent zu hohe Inflation. Die Wirtschaft Deutschlands und des Euroraums dürfte trotz pandemiebedingt zu erwartender Rückschläge in den kommenden zwei Jahren stark wachsen und den Trend der Zeit vor der Krise wieder erreichen.

Es wird in Deutschland in den kommenden Monaten einige Enttäuschung geben, dass die EZB ihre expansive Geldpolitik nicht so schnell beendet, wie die US-Notenbank Fed dies nun signalisiert hat. Die wirtschaftliche Erholung in den USA ist der im Euroraum jedoch deutlich voraus. Die signifikante finanzielle Fragmentierung im Euroraum dürfte sich als Bremse für den Ausstieg aus der expansiven Geldpolitik erweisen. Ich erwarte daher frühestens für das zweite Halbjahr 2023 erste vorsichtige Zinserhöhungen durch die EZB.

Am 1. Januar 2022 wird Frankreich turnusgemäß die EU-Ratspräsidentschaft übernehmen. Wie erwartet, hat sich Paris dafür ambitionierte Ziele gesetzt. Fraglich ist jedoch, in welchem Maße diese umgesetzt werden können, denn der europäische Kontext ist schwierig und die anstehenden Präsidentschaftswahlen in Frankreich verkürzen den Zeitraum für entsprechende Aktivitäten. Ein Misserfolg würde sich nicht nur negativ auf Europa, sondern auch auf Deutschland und die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen auswirken. Es liegt daher im Interesse der neuen Bundesregierung, Frankreich beim Ratsvorsitz zu unterstützen. Auf diese Weise könnte sie dem Koalitionsvertrag Taten folgen lassen, in dem als Ziel formuliert ist, die EU handlungsfähiger zu machen, Europas strategische Souveränität zu erhöhen und die deutsch-französische Partnerschaft zu stärken.

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On December 15th, IPI together with the Permanent Mission of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the UN cohosted a virtual policy forum on “Legal Avenues to Fight Climate Change.”

COP26 marks a critical moment to update humanity’s plans for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Although a growing number of countries are establishing carbon neutrality targets and low-carbon solutions, the international community is still way off the 1.5-degree target set by the Paris Agreement. Meanwhile, the impacts of climate change are accelerating around the world – in an increasingly devastating manner. The UN Secretary-General has called for far-reaching changes, the need for bolder plans to reduce emissions and to live up to the promises made.

While efforts are underway to reach the goals set in the Paris Agreement, there is also an increasing trend to resort to legal action to address climate change. Climate litigation is on the rise at the international, regional and national levels. Currently, there is a call by some for an advisory opinion by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the rights of present and future generations to be protected from negative impacts of climate change as well as the possibility of requesting an advisory opinion on oceans and climate change from the plenary of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). The International Law Commission (ILC) also included the topic of sea-level rise in relation to international law in its program of work and addresses possible legal effects or implications of sea-level rise in the areas law of the sea, statehood and protection of persons affected by sea-level rise. Moreover, a road for international criminal proceedings once a crime of ‘ecocide’ has been codified and included in national penal laws and possibly the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). Regional as well as domestic courts are also facing an increasing number of cases on climate change leading to landmark cases – most notably the ruling of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands that the Dutch government has an obligation under the European Convention on Human Rights to protect the rights to life, private and family life from the real threat of climate change.

Opening Remarks:
H.E. Mr. Christian Wenaweser, Permanent Representative of the Principality of Liechtenstein to the UN

Speakers:
H.E. Mr. Odo Tevi, Permanent Representative of Vanuatu to the UN
Ms. Christina Hioureas, Chair of UN Practice, Foley Hoag
Ms. Kate Mackintosh, University of California, Los Angeles School of Law
Ms. Patricia Galvao Teles, Member of the International Law Commission

Moderator:
Dr. Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, IPI President and CEO

Mira Milosevich-Juaristi. Comentario Elcano 33/2021 - 15/12/2021

El régimen de Lukashenko ha estado organizando traslados de refugiados de Irak, Afganistán, Yemen y Siria a los países occidentales y creando una crisis migratoria en la frontera oriental de la UE.

Die Klimaverhandlungen in Glasgow verliefen überraschend produktiv. Mit den Be­schlüssen des »Glasgow Climate Pact« stehen die Europäische Union und ihre Mitglied­staaten nun vor weiteren Aufgaben. Bis zur nächsten Vertragsstaatenkonferenz in Ägypten Ende 2022 (COP27) gilt es, das Ziel der langfristigen Begrenzung des Tempera­turanstiegs auf 1,5 Grad noch stärker in den Mittelpunkt zu rücken und dafür Zusagen und Maßnahmen großer Verschmutzerländer einzufordern. Die Finanzierung der Kli­mapolitik ist zudem noch nicht in einer Weise gesichert, die wieder mehr Vertrauen auf Seiten der Entwicklungsländer schafft. Um die Klimakooperation international zu beschleunigen, wird es 2022 in besonderem Maße auf Deutschlands G7-Vorsitz an­kommen. Dabei muss die Bundesregierung auch die G20-Staaten in den Blick nehmen und in der Europäischen Union die Verabschiedung des Fit-for-55-Pakets vorantreiben.

The UN Security Council is expected to renew the mandate of the UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in December 2021. Discussions on MONUSCO’s mandate come at a crucial moment for both the country and the mission. Recent political developments have given new momentum to efforts by the Congolese government to implement its comprehensive reform agenda, but continued political competition and persistent insecurity in the country’s eastern region present serious risks. The UN presence in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) is also undergoing a significant reconfiguration, driven by MONUSCO’s phased and progressive transition.

In this context, the International Peace Institute (IPI), the Stimson Center, and Security Council Report co-hosted a virtual roundtable discussion on November 23, 2021. This roundtable offered a platform for member states, UN stakeholders, civil society representatives, and independent experts to share their assessments of the situation in the DRC in a frank and collaborative environment. The discussion was intended to help the Security Council make more informed decisions with respect to the prioritization and sequencing of MONUSCO’s mandate and the mission’s strategic orientation and actions on the ground.

Workshop participants felt that MONUSCO’s mandate and existing activities position the mission to advance its strategic priorities while also managing its own transition. With a somewhat improved domestic political environment and the growing alignment between the Congolese government, its neighbors, and international partners, the UN has a valuable opportunity to consolidate and build on this progress. Based on this workshop, suggestions for revisions to the MONUSCO mandate include:

• Integrating the mission’s transition plan and benchmarks into the new mandate;
• Ensuring that the mission has the mandate and resources to undertake the transition in a flexible, integrated, and inclusive manner;
• Capitalizing on the mission’s good offices to maintain dialogue between political coalitions prior to the 2023 election cycle;
• Encouraging international and regional support for the Congolese government’s 2021–2023 program of action;
• Balancing robust protection responsibilities in eastern DRC with flexible and responsive approaches to protection in other parts of the country; and
• Prioritizing inclusive and locally led approaches to stabilization and transitional justice.

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Félix Arteaga y Luis Simón. ARI/106 - 13/12/2021

La Alianza Atlántica ha convocado una Cumbre de jefes de Estado y de Gobierno en junio de 2022 en Madrid para aprobar un nuevo Concepto Estratégico que actualice el de Lisboa de 2010.