Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. won the Philippines’ presidential election by a landslide on 9 May and was officially sworn in on 30 June. During the election campaign, Marcos Jr. – the son of Philippine dictator Ferdinand Marcos Sr. who was ousted in 1986 – remained extremely vague when it came to describing his foreign and security policies. Some observers initially speculated that Marcos Jr. would continue to pursue the foreign policy shift towards the People’s Republic of China that had been established by his predecessor Rodrigo Duterte. Several weeks into Marcos Jr.’s presidency, however, a much more nuanced picture has emerged. It appears that the newly elected president is likely seeking to balance the Philippines’ relations with China and the US to a greater extent than his predecessor. He therefore seems to be following in his father’s foreign policy footsteps. This could open up new opportunities for cooperation between the Philippines and Germany and the EU – provided that such collaboration considers the high degree to which Manila’s current foreign policy agenda seems to be driven by domestic concerns and objectives.
Der Ansatz, der Russlands Nuklearstrategie kennzeichnet, wird im Westen oft als »escalate to deescalate« beschrieben. Demnach sei Moskau bereit, in einem Konflikt frühzeitig Nuklearwaffen einzusetzen, um diesen zu seinen Gunsten zu beenden. Die offizielle Doktrin des Kreml, Nuklearübungen des russischen Militärs und die Debatten unter politisch-militärischen Eliten deuteten bisher jedoch in eine andere Richtung. Mit dem Konzept der »strategischen Abschreckung« hat Russland vielmehr ein Abschreckungssystem entwickelt, in dem Atomwaffen weiterhin wichtig sind. Doch soll eine breite Palette an nicht-militärischen bis hin zu konventionellen Mitteln mehr Flexibilität unterhalb der nuklearen Schwelle schaffen, um Eskalation zu managen. Dies dürfte sich angesichts von Russlands Schwierigkeiten mit dem Einsatz konventioneller Präzisionswaffen im Ukraine-Krieg und der militärischen Neuaufstellung der Nato jedoch verändern: Die Rolle nicht-strategischer Nuklearwaffen in Russlands Abschreckungspolitik wird wahrscheinlich wieder wachsen. Dies wird nicht nur die Krisenstabilität in Europa schwächen, sondern auch die nukleare Rüstungskontrolle künftig zusätzlich erschweren.
Millions of Turkish voters are geared up for the twin (parliamentary and presidential) elections that are scheduled to take place in June 2023 at the latest. After nearly 20 years in power, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s rule may seem unassailable to many observers of Turkish politics. However, owing to the economic downturn and rifts in his ruling party, this will be the first election in which Erdoğan is not the clear favourite. Six opposition parties of different ideological origins have come together to pick a joint presidential candidate to stand against Erdoğan and to offer a common platform for restoring parliamentary democracy. Although the opposition alliance has reasonable chances of defeating Erdoğan’s ruling bloc, their victory would not guarantee a smooth process of transition to parliamentary democracy. If the opposition can defeat Erdoğan, the new government would need to undertake the arduous tasks of establishing a meritocratic bureaucracy, restructuring Turkey’s diplomatic course and economic policy, and switching back to parliamentary rule. Due to the opposition alliance’s diverse composition, accomplishing these goals may be as difficult as winning the elections.