Just Too Expensive?: The U.S. Air Force’s Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter, designed to secure air superiority in future conflicts, faces financial hurdles that may halt its progress.
-Originally projected to cost three times more than the F-35, the NGAD program was paused due to concerns over affordability, raising questions about sustaining air superiority against China.
-Additionally, rising debt, military spending limits, and competing priorities, such as modernizing the nuclear triad, complicate funding for NGAD.
-As the Air Force re-evaluates the NGAD program, the broader challenge remains: Can the U.S. sustain air dominance in the Pacific amid fiscal constraints and evolving defense priorities?
Budget Cuts Threaten U.S. Air Force’s Sixth-Generation NGAD Fighter ProgramThe Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD) fighter aircraft meant to secure U.S. air superiority in the 2030s and beyond might be facing an adversary it can’t defeat: budget constraints.
The Air Force paused its sixth-generation fighter program in July after price projections showed it would cost three times more than an F-35 joint strike fighter—currently the world’s most expensive weapons program with each aircraft costing $80 million and $100 million apiece. Analysts and policymakers have criticized the Air Force’s hesitation and warned it puts U.S. air superiority at risk, especially against China. In a recent op-ed, Sens. Roger Wicker and Eric Schmitt, both members of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said the NGAD fighter’s high cost was an “unconvincing reason” to pause the program.
Convincing or not, it’s unavoidable that the Air Force, like the other services, will be facing a budget crunch in the coming years. The need to prioritize funding for more relevant budget items means that Air Force leaders are right to rethink and if needed, cancel the NGAD program.
Air Force officials have stated that they want the NGAD fighter to have range, stealth, and payload capacity superior to the F-22 fighter to contest Chinese air power in the Pacific. The manned NGAD platform will also operate with unmanned Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) as part of a “family of systems.”
However, recent aircraft acquisition programs should make policymakers wary of committing themselves to another technologically exquisite fighter jet. Cost overruns in the F-22 program forced the Air Force to cut its procurement goal from 648 to less than 200 when per unit costs rose to $143 million. Meanwhile, between October 2001 and December 2021, baseline estimates for the F-35’s total program costs increased from $233 billion to $416 billion. An April Government Accountability Office report noted that “the Air Force will pay $6.6 million annually to operate and sustain each individual [F-35] … well above the $4.1 million original target.”
Fiscal trends do not favor the defense spending increases needed to accommodate the NGAD’s costs. This year, interest payments on the federal debt eclipsed U.S. defense spending for the first time. The pain will be felt across every department and agency in the coming years as interest payments eat into a greater share of the discretionary federal budget.
Greater fiscal strain will place more pressure on an already overstretched military. Some analysts project that overall defense spending would have to increase annually by $25 billion just to keep pace with inflation. The 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy, rather than contemplate long overdue cuts to missions and force structure, called for entitlement reforms and higher taxes to fund defense spending increases of 3 to 5 percent above inflation. But it’s unlikely that Congress will do an about-face on these political nonstarters anytime soon.
Mindful of the looming budget squeeze, Secretary of the Air Force Frank Kendall stated last month that he wants the NGAD fighter to cost the same as an F-35. Yet, procuring 200 NGAD fighters, as the Air Force reportedly wants to, would still cost upwards of $20 billion. And this doesn’t include the multi-decade operation, maintenance, and sustainment costs that have made the F-35 program so expensive.
It’s also not clear a cheaper and less capable NGAD fighter would reduce overall program costs. The manned fighter would likely end up transferring critical components for its air superiority mission, such as electronic warfare capabilities, sensors, and datalinks, to CCAs. This would push the cost of CCAs up and undermine the objective of procuring thousands of cheap unmanned aircraft to fly alongside the manned NGAD platform.
The NGAD program’s prospective price tag looks even more daunting with two big-ticket items higher on the Air Force’s priority list: the modernization of the land and air legs of the nuclear triad.
The Sentinel ICBM program is a generational revamp of America’s half-century-old land-based nuclear missile force that involves modernizing 450 silos in several states, building 600 new missiles, and installing new launch control facilities. But the two-decade effort is already years behind schedule and 81 percent over budget at $141 billion.
Modernizing the air leg of the nuclear triad isn’t cheap either. The B-21 Raider will provide the Air Force with a new strategic bomber capable of executing conventional and nuclear strike missions anywhere in the world. Updated unit costs haven’t been released but industry estimates indicate the bombers could cost nearly $700 million apiece. If the Air Force follows through on purchasing 100 Raiders for its fleet, that would be a $70 billion investment with hundreds of billions more in operating expenses to be paid over 30 years. And it doesn’t end there: procurement costs for the B-21’s nuclear-armed AGM-181 Long Range Stand-Off missile will increase from nearly $300 million in FY 2026 to $2.2 billion in 2029 as production ramps up.
Finally, it’s worth asking whether the goal of achieving air superiority in a conflict with China is a realistic one. China’s geography and military modernization could offset U.S. air power’s technological advantages in several ways. Chinese air bases would largely operate in a sanctuary; regional U.S. air bases would be under constant threat from thousands of Chinese missiles. Chinese aircraft would have shorter and more secure logistics lines; U.S. warplanes would need to be sustained over thousands of miles across the Pacific.
The Pentagon’s inability to prioritize threats benefits China too. The People’s Liberation Army Air Force, which has 1,300 fourth-generation fighters and hundreds of fifth-generation platforms, is largely concentrated on the Asia-Pacific while America’s shrinking Air Force is split between Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
Matching Chinese air power in a Pacific war would be a difficult task with or without the NGAD fighter. And fiscal realities are forcing the Air Force to make tough choices about what priorities need to be funded. Service leaders are right to take a hard look at the NGAD concept before writing another expensive chapter in the Pentagon’s acquisition history.
About the AuthorMatthew C. Mai is a contributing fellow at Defense Priorities.
This article was first published by RealClearDefense.
What You Need to Know: Operation Linebacker II, the "Christmas bombing" campaign of December 1972, was a significant effort by the U.S. to force North Vietnam back to peace talks. Employing over 200 B-52s and 1,077 tactical aircraft, the operation dealt devastating blows to strategic targets in North Vietnam.
-Though it led to the 1973 Paris Peace Accords, Watergate and reduced U.S. support hindered South Vietnam’s defense, culminating in a communist takeover in 1975.
-The campaign's success demonstrated the potential for a different Vietnam outcome if sustained U.S. support had continued.
Could Linebacker II Have Changed the Course of the Vietnam War?Hard to believe as it may seem, it’s already been more than fifty years since the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps carried out Operation Linebacker II, the so-called “Christmas bombing” (exact dates December 18-29, 1972, with a single-day ceasefire on Christmas Day) of North Vietnam that drove the Communist regime back to the peace table. Contrary to the assertions of anti-American pundits in academia and the media, this operation nearly won the Vietnam War for the United States of America and its South Vietnamese ally.
Back during the actual fiftieth anniversary of Linebacker II, I was hoping to (1) publish a commemorative article in the publication I was writing for at the time and (2) convince the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation to recognize the event in some way. Both of these efforts were for naught, but now’s as good a time as any to commemorate the upcoming fifty-second anniversary of the battle … which is rather poetically apropos considering that the B-52 bomber was the biggest player in this game.
The Mission207 of those mighty B-52 Stratofortress strategic bombers—nicknamed the “BUFF” (“Big Ugly Fat Fellow” in polite company, but “Big Ugly Fat F*cker” in reality)—embarked on the raid along with fourteen tactical air groups consisting of 1,077 aircraft of all types (including the F-4 Phantom II and F-111 Aardvark to name just a couple of examples).
In exchange for the loss of fifteen B-52s and twelve tactical aircraft shot down along with forty-three killed in action and forty-nine prisoners of war (POWs), the raids utterly devastated strategic targets in North Vietnam. As noted by Mark W. Woodruff in his excellent 1999 book Unheralded Victory: The Defeat of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Army 1961 – 1973:
“Its antiaircraft system shattered, North Vietnam now lay defenseless to the American bombers, but the United States stopped the attack because there was nothing left worth attacking. Later, accounts began to surface from those with relatives in North Vietnam, who told them that ‘They were preparing white flags to surrender’ because they were convinced they were losing the war badly.”
For good measure, six North Vietnamese MiG-21 “Fishbed” fighters were shot down, including two by B-52 tail gunners Staff Sergeant Samuel O. Turner and Airman 1st Class Albert Moore.
American POWs at the infamous “Hanoi Hilton” prison such as Medal of Honor recipient Admiral James Bond Stockdale noted how the raids blasted the arrogance out of their captors: “One look at any Vietnamese officer’s face told the whole story. It telegraphed hopelessness, accommodation, remorse, fear. The shock was there; our enemy’s will was broken.”
Meanwhile, Sir Robert Thompson, architect of the British victory in the Malayan Emergency anticommunist counterinsurgency campaign (1948-1960), was generally critical of the American war efforts, but lavished praise upon Linebacker II: “In my view…you had won the war. It was over! …They and their whole rear base were at your mercy.”
“Along came Kissinger and Tricky Dick/Hit ‘em where it hurt and it turned the trick/I’m an ever-lovin’ freedom-hooked Viet Vet”—Viet Vet by retired Lt. Col Dick Jonas, USAF.
The Aftermath (Short-Term and Long-Term)Thus, as already noted, the North Vietnamese sued for peace, thus resulting in the signing of the Paris Peace Accords on January 27, 1973, which in turn earned a joint Nobel Peace Prize for both Henry Kissinger and Le Duc Tho (though the latter refused the prize).
Alas, thanks to Watergate, then-U.S. President Richard Nixon’s strong leadership on Vietnam didn’t last, and his successor, Gerald R. Ford, was unable to counter the Democratic-controlled Congress’ slashing of monetary support to Saigon, leaving our South Vietnamese allies stranded. The end result was the tragedy of the Communist takeover of Saigon that secured the North’s victory, the fiftieth anniversary of which took place this past April.
What Might’ve Been?Maybe, just maybe, if the momentum from Operation Linebacker II and the resultant peace talks had been properly seized upon, and America was allowed to win, then the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) wouldn’t have fallen under the tyranny of the Communist jackboot, and perhaps a hypothetical present-day South Vietnam would’ve been analogous to the present-day Republic of Korea, a thriving free market democracy that makes its impoverished communist neighbor on the northern side of the demilitarized zone look like a joke by comparison. (In fairness, communist Vietnam did adopt the so-called “Doi Moi [innovation]” market reforms back in 1986, analogous to Deng Xiaoping’s market reforms for Communist China in the 1970s; however, both China and Vietnam remain communist countries, their longstanding mutual animosity notwithstanding.)
Maybe, just maybe, this could have prevented the mass murder of 2.5 million innocent South Vietnamese, particularly those of Han Chinese descent and/or those comprising Vietnam’s entrepreneurial class.
And maybe, just maybe, if the momentum from Operation Linebacker II and the resultant peace talks had been properly seized upon, the U.S. military wouldn’t have suffered a humiliating defeat—with insult added to injury by the knowledge that we’d won every major battle yet still lost the war—and the resultant loss of morale and reputation whose repair and healing didn’t start until the 1980’s Reagan administration and culminated in the George H.W. Bush administration’s 1991 Persian Gulf War (AKA Operation Desert Storm).
About the Author: Christian D. Orr, Defense ExpertChristian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for the National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS)
What You Need to Know: HMS Hood, the pride of the British Royal Navy, symbolized British imperial power during the interwar years. Designed under the Washington Naval Treaty, this fast and powerful battlecruiser aimed to showcase British naval dominance.
-However, during World War II, the Hood tragically met its end in a battle with Germany’s Bismarck, exposing the limitations of outdated assumptions in naval strategy.
-This loss marked Britain’s waning global power.
-Today, Hood serves as a cautionary tale for U.S. naval planners, suggesting a re-evaluation of heavy reliance on aircraft carriers and advocating innovation in military strategy.
HMS Hood’s Tragic Demise: A Cautionary Tale for U.S. Naval Strategy TodayThe British Empire was the equivalent of the world’s superpower for centuries. Since Britain successfully colonized dusty, far-flung lands from her grey rock in the North Atlantic, she was catapulted to world primacy. Her industry ensured Britain remained the world’s leader, and her Royal Navy enforced the crown’s (and, later, parliament’s) will upon the world.
But by the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries, the empire was declining.
Financialization of the imperial economy as well as the embrace of the equivalent of “free trade” started hollowing out Britain. Fierce competition from the likes of the United States and the recently united Germany also started complicating Britain’s dominance. Then, of course, some wrong turns in the military and foreign policy domain only exacerbated these woes.
Following Britain’s pyrrhic victory over the Germans in World War I, like the other “victorious” Allied nations, the empire was skittish about another great power conflict.
The Rise of HMS HoodIn 1922, the Washington Naval Treaty that was intended to bring balance between three great naval powers—the British Empire, the United States, and the Japanese Empire—only helped to set the stage for the next round of great power conflict, as the Japanese believed they were jilted by their World War-I Anglo-American allies. That controversial treaty, however, significantly influenced the design of multiple warships. Including the British Royal Navy’s iconic battlecruiser, the HMS Hood.
Indeed, Hood was considered the embodiment of naval prowess and was the great pride of the British fleet of the interwar years. Considered a “battlecruiser” as opposed to a full-blown “battleship” (because of the limitations imposed by the aforementioned Washington Naval Treaty), her design was inherently a compromise between the desire for naval dominance and the need for diplomacy among the great powers. Britain wanted to outgun and outrun any ship she might encounter.
So, Royal Navy designers equipped this steel beast with eight 15-inch guns in four twin turrets, capable of firing shells over 20 miles.
Her speed was legendary, reaching as high as 32 knots. Because of this, she was one of the fastest capital ships of her time. That’s because the British used oil rather than coal. As a result, this reduced the crew size needed to handle fuel (coal-powered ships required more hands to maintain the coal when underway).
The Ultimate Symbol of British Military PowerHMS Hood was the ultimate symbol of British imperial power in the interwar years. Much like America’s massive nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, Hood traveled the world, waving the Union Jack for all to see, symbolizing the reach and power of the British Empire. When deployed to international hotspots, her mere presence was enough to send rivals scattering.
Once World War II erupted, Hood was thrust into action. She was tasked with engaging targets related to German commerce. Inevitably, she was called to action against the German battleship Bismarck. It was during this operation that the limits of the HMS Hood were brutally exposed.
The Loss of the HoodWhile transiting the Denmark Strait on the evening of May 24, 1941, HMS Hood and the battleship HMS Prince of Wales engaged the legendary German battleship Bismarck and the German heavy cruiser Prinz Eugen. Within the first five minutes of the engagement, the HMS Hood, the pride of the British Royal Navy and symbol of unchecked British imperial power worldwide, was obliterated by a shell fired from the Bismarck after it penetrated Hood’s magazine, leading to an explosion that cut the ship in half.
Minutes thereafter, the HMS Hood suffered a loss of all but three of her crew of 1,418 men. The loss of Hood, and the way in which she was so quickly cut down in the prime of her service life, was a massive blow to the British Royal Navy and Britons everywhere. In many respects, her loss represented the profound decline that the British Empire had endured since the height of its empire during the Victorian Era. London had built its iconic Hood based on premises that were flawed and no longer reflective of the real strategic environment the British military faced in 1941.
A Lesson for U.S. Naval Planners TodayIndeed, the loss of HMS Hood in 1941 is a history lesson not just for understanding what declining empires look like. It’s a warning from history to current U.S. Navy war planners to challenge their best laid assumptions and plans. Notably, to have a second look at their reliance on aircraft carriers, the battlecruisers of their day.
Like the British obsession with battleships and related platforms in the interwar years, the Americans have overcommitted to their carrier force and now run the risk of losing them in unplanned for ways to adversaries who could never hope to match the power of the U.S. Navy.
Americans must stop relying on the status quo and instead begin innovating to rethink what platforms they rely upon to project U.S. military power.
About the AuthorBrandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
Image Credit: Creative Commons.
What You Need to Know: World War II saw the emergence of some groundbreaking jet fighters that revolutionized aerial warfare. The Messerschmitt Me 262 from Nazi Germany was the world’s first operational jet fighter and proved formidable in combat.
-The Heinkel He 162, another German innovation, was the fastest operational jet but plagued by design flaws. The British Gloster Meteor became the first Allied jet, achieving success against Germany’s V-1 missiles.
-The American Bell P-59 Airacomet didn’t enter combat due to underwhelming performance, but it laid the groundwork for future jets. Finally, the Lockheed P-80 saw limited WWII service, foreshadowing jet combat in the Korean War.'
Top 5 WWII Jet Fighters That Changed Aerial Combat ForeverTop five lists are virtually guaranteed to generate controversy, especially when it comes to historical weapons systems, whether we’re talking small arms, warships, tanks, or warplanes.
That’s because there are almost always going to be fanboys of candidates within a particular category that are going to kvetch “Hey, why didn’t you include [insert name of favorite plane/gun/ship/tank/whatever] on this list?
Well, hopefully in this particular instance, there won’t be as much room for controversy, as quite simply there aren’t that many “also-rans” to choose from (at least operational examples as opposed to prototypes that didn’t make it past the prototype phase).
With that long preamble/soapbox speech aside, let’s get on with what I consider to be the five best fighter jets of World War II.
Messerschmitt Me 262 Schwalbe (“Swallow”) (Nazi Germany)This most successful example of Hitler’s so-called Wunderwaffen (“Wonder Weapon”) is a bit of a no-brainer for inclusion on this list, as the Luftwaffe’s Me 262 was the world’s first operational jet fighter as well as the only jet fighter to see air-to-air combat against manned adversaries’ aircraft in WWII, making her maiden flight on July 18, 1942, and official debuting in April 1944.
Bristling with four heavy-hitting nose-mounted 30 mm cannons (1.18 in), the Schwalbe boasted a top speed of 540 mph (Mach 0.70; 870 km/h; 469 kt) and racked up a kill-to-loss score of 542:100. 1,433 airframes were built.
Heinkel He 162 Volksjäger (“People’s Fighter;” AKA Salamander, Spatz [“Sparrow”])Ach Scheisser, that’s right, the Nazi Germans have not just one but two Wunderwaffen on this list, which just further drives home the fortuitous timing of the Allies’ victory over the would-be “Thousand-Year Reich.”
The He-162 was built by Heinkel Flugzeugwerke, the manufacturer best known for the He-111 heavy bomber that had made life miserable for Londoners during the Battle of Britain.
She made her maiden flight on December 6, 1944, and entered into official operational service with the Luftwaffe the following month.
The warbird was nicknamed “Salamander” because of the folkloric myth of the latter animal being immune to fire. However, the flying mechanical namesake was the polar opposite of fireproof; she had a rather distressing tendency to blow up in midair, due to being built with slave labor with a shoddy acidic glue holding the components together and had a distressing tendency to eat through the plywood components.
In spite of these construction flaws, the He-162 turned out to be the fastest operating jet fighter of WWII, with a max airspeed of 562 mph (Mach 0.73; 904 km/h; 488 kn). She also made history as the first operational fighter jet to feature an ejection seat.
For good measure, she was the only single-engine Axis plane that had tricycle landing gear.
In actual combat, Salamander drivers scored maybe two unconfirmed kills in exchange for the loss of thirteen Salamanders and nine pilots, including the unit commander of veteran fighter group Jagdgeschwader I.
120 airframes were built.
Gloster Meteor (Great Britain)Not to be outdone, the Allies have some entries on this list as well. The most successful of the bunch was the British Royal Air Force (RAF) Gloster Meteor, which made her maiden flight on March 5, 1943, and debuted operationally thirteen months later, making her the first operational jet of any Allied nation.
She did see combat, albeit not against manned enemy aircraft; Meteor drivers were credited with destroying more than forty-five German aircraft via ground strikes, and moreover did score thirteen air-to-air kills against the Nazis’ infamous unmanned V-1 “buzz bomb” terror weapons.
The Meteor wielded four 20mm Hispano cannon and boasted a max airspeed of 600 mph (Mach 0.78; 970 km/h, 520 kn). 250 Meteors were made during the war.
Bell P-59 Airacomet (United States of America)The Bell P-59 was the first jet plane produced in the United States, making her maiden flight on October 1, 1942. She was produced by the Bell Aircraft Corporation, the same company that produced the P-39 Airacobra and P-63 Kingcobra piston-engine fighter planes and then later became most famous for the rocket-powered X-1, which enabled the late great Chuck Yeager to become the first man to break the sound barrier.
However, unlike the previous three jet-powered warbirds on this list, there’s not much exciting to report here, as the Airacomet never saw combat. As to why this was the case, my colleague Sebastien Roblin explains in a July 20, 2020 article for The National Interest:
“[T]he Airacomets were never deployed operationally because their early, unreliable turbojets gave them a maximum speed of only around 410 miles per hour—slower than the P-51 Mustang piston-engine fighter then in service.”
Accordingly, the sixty-six airframes that were built were relegated to trainer duties instead of serving as frontline fighters.
However, the P-59 can’t be written off as a total failure, as she laid the groundwork (no pun intended) for later generations of U.S. turbojet-powered aircraft, including the next and final warbird on this list.
Lockheed P-80 Shooting Star (United States)Yes, I’m as surprised to be including this airplane on the list as you dear readers are to be seeing it. After all, it was during the heady days of the Korean War rather than “Dubya-Dubya 2” that the Shooting Star become America’s first jet fighter to see combat in general and air-to-air combat in particular.
However, my research for this article revealed that this warbird did in fact see limited WWII operational service—although granted without seeing actual action—which just goes to prove that you really do learn something new every day.
A brainchild of the late great Clarence “Kelly” Johnson of Lockheed’s legendary “Skunk Works” division, the P-80 (later redesignated the F-80) made her maiden flight on January 8, 1944, and entered into operational service with the U.S. Army Air Forces (predecessor of the present-day U.S. Air Force) in January 1945. Two pre-production YP-80A Shooting Star variants saw limited usage in Italy with the USAAF on reconnaissance missions, in February and March 1945.
About the Author: Christian D. Orr, Defense ExpertChristian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for the National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS).
Image Credit: Creative Commons.
What You Need to Know: The USS North Carolina (BB-55), the first of the North Carolina-class fast battleships, played a pivotal role in WWII, showcasing advanced firepower and speed.
-Designed with nine 16-inch guns and twenty 5-inch dual-purpose guns, this 35,000-ton battleship operated effectively in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.
-It supported U.S. ground forces at Guadalcanal and proved vital in the Battle of the Eastern Solomons.
-Despite sustaining damage at the Battle of Santa Cruz, the resilient North Carolina remained operational.
-Decommissioned in 1947, the ship is now preserved as a museum in North Carolina, symbolizing American strength and WWII legacy.
USS North Carolina: WWII’s Iconic Fast Battleship with Firepower to SpareLaunched in 1940 and commissioned a year later, the USS North Carolina (BB-55) was the first of the North Carolina-class fast battleships (a total of two were built). Initially designed under the constraints of the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty between the United States, the British Empire, and the Empire of Japan, the North Carolina-class fast battleships were meant to exceed the capabilities of her potential rivals.
In fact, her displacement of around 35,000 tons when fully loaded was a testament to the ways in which the treaty’s signatories were playing fast-and-loose with the treaty itself (with Japan being the worst violator of these standards).
The SpecsPossessing nine, 16-inch guns in three triple turrets, this battleship was a significant upgrade from the usual 14-inch guns found on previous U.S. Navy battleships. These bad boys could hurl 2,700-pound shells over a distance of 20 miles, giving this battleship quite a punch. Beyond those turrets were the twenty, five-inch dual-purpose guns for anti-aircraft and secondary surface combatants. The presence of these guns reflected the growing importance of defending against air attacks in naval warfare.
And she lived up to her classification as a “fast battleship.” Being able to reach up to 28 knots, the USS North Carolina was among the fastest battleships in the world at the time of her commissioning. In fact, these battleships were meant to operate alongside aircraft carriers and keep pace with faster fleet elements.
North Carolina had significant combat deployments in both the Atlantic and Pacific Theaters of World War II. Initially stationed in the Atlantic, she was meant to be a deterrent against the German Kriegsmarine (navy). It is widely believed that the presence of the North Carolina significantly contributed to the strategic balance of power in the Atlantic during the early war years.
Helping to Dim the Empire of the Rising SunIn 1942, however, the North Carolina was transferred to the Pacific Theater where she fought in the Guadalcanal campaign, providing key fire support to U.S. ground forces. At the Battle of the Eastern Solomon Islands, North Carolina’s presence contributed to the victory’s broader strategic success. She was a key player there, in fact, whose presence was decisive because of the firepower she could bring to bear.
At the Battle of the Santa Cruz Island in October 1942, North Carolina was hit by a Japanese dive bomber. The great battleship, despite suffering significant damage from the Japanese attack, remained operational—proving her resilience and worth to a Navy that was coming to favor the aircraft carrier.
Indeed, the North Carolina came to symbolize American prestige and power during the war. She evolved from a direct combatant to providing bombardment support for forces wading ashore. North Carolina provided air defense as well as fleet protection, reflecting a wider evolution in the nature of naval strategy in WWII.
Gone But Never ForgottenWhen the war ended, and both aircraft carriers and missiles became a key factor in modern warfare, the role of battleships, like the North Carolina, faded away. The fast battleship was decommissioned in 1947. But her legacy lives on today. She was donated to the state of North Carolina, the state after which she is named. Today, one can visit the North Carolina as it is a museum ship open to the public.
The fact that the Navy opted to make her a museum ship rather than to break her down for scrap, like they did with so many other legendary WWII era warships, should prove to you just how important and iconic of a battleship the USS North Carolina was. She was an essential player in the history of our country.
We must never forget the service she and her legendary crew performed in helping to defeat some of America’s greatest foes in WWII.
About the Author:Brandon J. Weichert, a National Interest national security analyst, is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, the Asia Times, and The-Pipeline. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His next book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.
North Koreans are involved in combat on European soil. Not that long ago, such a headline would have triggered disbelief or amazement. But in this day and age, the fact that Pyongyang would go to such lengths in supporting Moscow’s war against Ukraine should come as no surprise.
Russia is going all in when it comes to its special military operation and the parallel fight against the West. Having North Korea onside, a rogue country sanctioned by the UN, can only strengthen Moscow’s position. Since 2022, Pyongyang has become one of the Russian military’s principal ammunition suppliers from abroad.
Since last August, North Koreans have reportedly shipped 3 million rounds of 152-millimeter artillery shells, the main caliber Russia and its Cold War-era allies both rely upon. Kim Jong-un’s troops are now fighting in the Russian Federation’s Kursk region, part of a counteroffensive aimed at dislodging the Ukrainian forces.
The Kremlin sees no risk in bringing the North Koreans to the frontlines, despite reports that the Chinese leadership is not exactly thrilled. As all bets are off, Russia is not averse to undermining several UN Security Council resolutions that it originally endorsed.
The benefits for North Korea are straightforward, too. Kim is relishing an opportunity to bloody some elite units, providing them with real-time frontline experience, which could prove useful in a putative clash on the Korean peninsula.
As Russia is paying, Pyongyang could also make money by taking the lion’s share of its mercenaries’ earnings. Much like Russia itself, the North Korean regime defies an international order that seeks to it. It proves its capacity to be a spoiler, far away from the homeland, which raises its overall political stock.
For all its symbolic value, the impact of the North Korean deployment should not be exaggerated.
The 8,000 to 12,000-strong contingent is not likely to make a huge difference on the battlefield, where Russia’s daily casualty rates are reaching staggering levels. Though these are elite forces on paper, their performance might turn out to be wanting.
For one, they are likely to experience difficulties in integrating with their Russian counterparts and the overall chain of command due to the language barrier. Indeed, there is already a report about Russian servicemen coming under friendly fire from North Koreans. All things considered, Russia does not gain all that much from bringing in Kim’s troops.
Pyongyang could be cashing in most of the profits from the transaction. Reliance on North Korea points to a major weakness for the Russians. Instead of soliciting support from far-away partners such as the North Koreans or Iranians, whose services and supplies do not come for free, Moscow could have rallied its “allies” from the Collective Security Treaty Organization.
On the top of the list is Belarus, where the regime’s stability hinges on Russia’s military muscle. Furthermore, Belarusian troops speak Russian, use Russian kits, and practice regularly with their Russian colleagues. However, while Belarus provided a launching pad for the initial phase of the Ukraine invasion, it is now keeping a low profile.
Belarus’ president, Aleksandr Lukashenka, is happy to recover at least some of his lost room for maneuver vis-à-vis Russia.
Russia presents itself as the spearhead of a worldwide struggle against the West. It uses every opportunity to demonstrate that its friends in order to constitute a cohesive bloc, lately during the BRICS+ summit in Kazan, Russia.
Rather, you have countries like Iran and North Korea willing to take a gamble on Russia’s war, making money and scoring political points. The great majority, including China, the big beast in the room, prefers to hedge bets and work with both Moscow and its Western adversaries. North Korea is the exception, not the rule.
Dr Dimitar Bechev is the Director of the Dahrendorf Programme on Europe in a Changing World based at Oxford's European Studies Centre. He is also a Senior Fellow at Carnegie Europe. His books include Turkey under Erdoğan (Yale UP, 2022), Russia Rising: Putin's Foreign Policy in the Middle East and North Africa (IB Tauris, 2021), and Rival Power: Russia in Southeast Europe (Yale UP, 2017).
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