Diplomacy & Crisis News

Without a doubt, the Allies defeated the Axis during World War II thanks in large part to air superiority; this air superiority was due to fantabulous fighter planes such as the P-38 Lightning, P-47 Thunderbolt, and especially the P-51D Mustang.

Yet ironically, in one of the great statistical anomalies of the war, the top-scoring individual aces of the Axis far outscored the Allies’ top aces. (An “ace” is defined as a combat aviator with a minimum of five air-to-air victories.) For example, the top three Allied aces were the Soviet Union’s Ivan Nikitovich Kozhedub (sixty-four kills); Britain’s (South African-born) Marmaduke Thomas St John “Pat” Pattle (at least forty victories, more likely over fifty); and America’s Richard Ira “Dick” Bong (forty kills). Compare and contrast those numbers with the top three Axis aces: Imperial Japan’s Tetsuzo Iwamoto (at least ninety-four victories; 202 kills personally claimed); Nazi Germany’s Gerhard "Gerd" Barkhorn (301 kills); and Germany’s Erich Hartmann (whose mind-numbing tally of 352 kills makes him the most successful fighter ace in the history of aerial warfare).

Though both sides of the war had their fair share of “aces in a day” (including America’s Chuck Yeager), the Germans also laid the claim to the fastest pilot and plane combo to achieve that rarified status: then-Major Werner Streib and the Heinkel He 219 Uhu (“Eagle-Owl”).

Where It Began: Heinkel He 219 Uhu Early History and Specifications

The Uhu made her maiden flight on November 15, 1942, and officially entered operational service with "die Vaterland (the Fatherland)" the following year. The warbird had a number of features that were then state-of-the-art, such as cannons mounted to fire at an oblique angle, the first steerable nosewheel on an operational German aircraft, and the world's first ejection seats on an operational aircraft of any nation.

The He 219’s specifications and vital stats included:

-Fuselage Length: 50 ft 4 in (15.33 m)
-Wingspan: 60 ft 8 in (18.5 m)
-Height: 13 ft 5 in (4.1 m)
-Empty weight: 24,692 lb (11,200 kg)
-Gross weight: 33,731 lb (15,300 kg)
-Powerplant: two × Daimler-Benz DB 603E V-12 inverted liquid-cooled piston engines, 1,324 kW (1,776 hp) each
-Max Airspeed: 420 mph (670 km/h, 360 kn) at 23,000 ft (7,000 m)
-Cruise Speed: 340 mph (540 km/h, 290 kn)
-Combat Range: 960 mi (1,545 km, 834 NM)
-Service Ceiling: 41,700 ft (12,700 m) (absolute)
-Armament
--two × 20 mm (0.787 in) MG 151/20 cannons in a detachable fairing under the fuselage, 300 rounds per gun (rpg)
--two × 20 mm MG 151/20 cannons in wing roots, 300 rpg
--two × 30 mm (1.181 in) MK 108 cannons, Schrage Musik (oriented 65 degrees)

Total production of the He 219 amounted to just under 300 airframes.

Where It Began Part Deux: Werner Streib’s Early Life and Mini-Bio

Werner Streib was born on June 13, 1911, in Pforzheim in the southwest German state of Baden-Wurttemberg. Werner began his military career as an infantryman in the Wehrmacht in 1934; however, he obtained a transfer to the Luftwaffe in 1936 and started as an observer in a reconnaissance unit. He later trained as a fighter pilot.

He scored his first aerial victory on May 10, 1940, setting the stage for a very successful combat record.

How It Happened: Streib’s Ace-in-a-Day Engagement

Warren Gray of Gunpowder Magazine tells the story in a September 25, 2021, article:

“[The Uhu’s] auspicious, combat debut occurred on the night of June 11 to 12, 1943, when Major Werner Streib, a Messerschmitt Bf 110G-4 Zerstörer (“Destroyer”) night-fighter ace with 50 confirmed kills to his credit already, and his radar operator, Sergeant Helmut Fischer, sitting back-to-back inside the cockpit, flew their He 219 pre-production prototype V9, recently upgraded to He 219A-0/R2 production standards, and marked “G9+FB” on the sides of the aircraft, on a nocturnal sortie from Venlo Airfield, in the German-occupied Netherlands … Streib quickly shot down a Royal Air Force (RAF) Halifax four-engine bomber at 1:05 AM, southeast of Roermond, then a second Halifax near Rheinberg at 1:20 AM, a third Halifax north of Mook at 1:55 AM, a four-engine, Avro Lancaster bomber southwest of Nijmegen at 2:16 AM, and a fourth Halifax bomber near Sambeek at 2:22 AM, for a total of five confirmed kills in a single mission, an astounding, ‘ace-in-a-night’ accomplishment. They expended virtually all of their ammunition.” 

Where Are They Now?

By the time of the collapse of the Third Reich, Werner Streib had attained the rank of oberst (colonel) with sixty-six confirmed aerial kills. He spent eleven years working in the grocery business, then resumed his military career with the post-WWII Luftwaffe (unlike the Wehrmacht turned Bundeswehr Heer [army] and the Kriegsmarine turned Deutsche Marine [navy], the German Air Force has retained its WWII moniker to the present day) from 1956 to 1966 retiring with the rank of brigadegeneral (Brigadier general). He passed away on June 15, 1986, at the age of seventy-five, and was buried with military honors at the Ostfriedhof (Eastern Cemetery) in Munich.

As for the aircraft flown by Streib on his history-making mission, there is exactly one fully intact, fully restored, surviving specimen today. Werknummer ("Work Number") 290202 is at the Smithsonian National Air & Space Museum's Steven F. Udvar-Hazy Center in Chantilly, Virginia (near Washington Dulles International Airport); I've personally toured the museum twice and recommend it highly.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a Senior Defense Editor for National Security Journal (NSJ). He is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

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North Korea’s expanding ballistic missile program, along with its advancing nuclear weapons project, is a serious and growing threat both to its regional neighbors and the United States. 

That is why the Trump administration’s quest to achieve a more stable diplomatic relationship, after literally decades of hostilities between the West and North Korea, was such a monumental move. 

One North Korean system of note is the Hwasong-7, otherwise known as the Nodong-1 intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM).

The Nodong-1 missile provides North Korea with the capability to reach out and threaten its regional neighbors both with conventional and, likely, nuclear attacks. Nodong-1 can cover all of South Korea and parts of Japan. Its accuracy, however, remains a major source of debate. Many Western analysts assess that the circular error probable for this system is one to two miles, meaning that this system is likely not as effective against military targets as it is against larger, softer targets like the cities of South Korea and parts of Japan. 

Although, these are all estimates made by the West and should be taken with a grain of salt, seeing as the intelligence picture of North Korea is even less informative to observers than black holes. 

North Korea’s Ballistic Missile Threat

One thing to keep in mind, though, is that North Korea’s overall ballistic missile threat has been growing. The technology undergirding the North Korean program has gotten better with each test launch. In turn, these launches have helped to further North Korea’s overall threat to the United States and its regional partners. 

And since 2013, when Pyongyang’s forces developed the capability to miniaturize nuclear warheads, North Korean ballistic missiles can now reliably carry advanced nuclear weapons. 

Anyway, the Nodong is especially helpful to Pyongyang as it seeks to gain leverage over its regional rivals. The presence of the Nodong system in large quantities allows North Korea’s negotiators to gain greater concessions from their rivals at the negotiating table. Should war ever erupt between North Korea and its neighbors, Pyongyang would have a significant capability to deal out death and wanton damage to its foes with the Nodong missile. 

So, it doesn’t only provide great diplomatic capital, but the Nodong-1 missile is a serious strategic advantage for North Korea’s military.

As of 2024, most intelligence assessments indicate that there are only 100 Nodong-1 launchers deployed. And since the Nodong-1 was first developed in the mid-1980s, North Korea’s ballistic missile program has truly evolved into a potent and comprehensive regional (indeed, global threat). Today, North Korea’s arsenal includes the Hwasong-12, Hwasong-14, Hwasong-15, and Hwasong-17, all of which likely overshadow the capabilities of the Nodong-1 IRBM system. 

Yet, the Nodong-1 is an important link in the evolution of North Korea’s ballistic missile program.

What’s more, the Nodong-1 is likely to be upgraded for at least the next decade before Pyongyang ever contemplates phasing this system out of its arsenal entirely. Further, as the incoming Trump administration finds its footing, it is probable that the administration will seek to rekindle its previous good relations with Pyongyang. 

A Powerful Bargaining Chip

A key element of renewed negotiations with North Korea will be in the domain of arms control. Having the 100 or so Nodong-1s still in service will force the Americans and their allies to focus and negotiate on those systems as opposed to newer ones. So, again, the Nodong-1 serves as a useful tool in terms of North Korean diplomacy with the West.

Like so many weapons in the North Korean arsenal, the Nodong-1 is derived from older Soviet-era missile technology. Specifically, the Soviet R-17 Elbrus (a.k.a. “Scud”) missile. The design was adapted by North Korean weapons designers to augment the range and lethality of its Soviet predecessor. Nodong-1 is a single-stage, liquid-fueled missile, which employs a unique combination of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH) and AK-27 (nitric acid with nitrogen oxides) for propulsion. 

What Happens If We Get North Korea Policy Wrong?

Nodong-1 is approximately 53 feet in length, with a diameter of a little less than five feet. Its range is approximately between 745 miles to 932 miles and its payload capacity is about 2,600 pounds. Nodong-1 is a serious threat to its neighbors and the North Koreans should not be underestimated. 

The fact that Nodong-1 is not even the most advanced ballistic missile in North Korea’s arsenal shows how important arms control talks will be in the new Trump administration—and the price of getting America’s North Korea policy wrong.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

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The deadly truck ramming and other violent incidents put authorities on alert as people rang in the new year.

2024 was the deadliest thus far in the war in Ukraine.

Both Russia and Ukraine lost hundreds of thousands of troops killed and wounded in the fighting. Russia, in particular, lost approximately 430,000 troops in just one year.

Costly Progress

The year 2024 will go down as the year in which the Russian military wrestled back the initiative and launched its attritional strategy.

Since January 2024, the Russian forces have been on the offensive, but it wasn’t until May that the Kremlin unveiled its attritional strategy. Under this strategy, the Russian military exchanged men for territory. Starting in May, the Russian military threw hundreds of thousands of men against the Ukrainian defensive lines. And, steadily but slowly, the Russian forces advanced, capturing important battlefield points in southeastern and eastern Ukraine.

Most of the progress achieved by the Russian forces took place in the fall.

“Russian forces made 56.5 percent of their 2024 territorial gains during the September through November 2024 period,” the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest estimate of the conflict.

In the closing days of 2024, Ukrainian commander-in-chief Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi revealed that the Russian forces took approximately 427,000 casualties throughout the year. In exchange for those casualties, the Russian forces captured about 1,609 square miles of territory in Ukraine and Russia (the Kursk Oblast salient). These numbers translate to around 267 men killed and wounded for every square mile captured. Moreover, the Russian losses translate to an average of 1,178 losses every single day, with lows in the low hundreds and highs of over 2,000 losses per day.

In terms of quality, the territory the Russian forces captured mainly comprised of farm fields and small settlements. Indeed, Bakhmut is the last major town the Russian forces captured in the war, and they did so back in 2023.

As far as losses, the Russian military has managed to recruit just enough troops through a variety of ways, including mercenaries, conscripts, and North Korean soldiers, to maintain its attritional strategy.

“Russian Security Council Deputy Chairperson Dmitry Medvedev claimed on December 24 that 440,000 recruits signed military service contracts with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) in 2024, suggesting that Russia is likely recruiting just enough military personnel to replace its recently high casualty rates one for one,” the Institute for the Study of War added.

But whether and for how long the Russian military can maintain such high recruitment levels remains the big question.

The Ukrainian Response

The Ukrainian military tried to stem the Russian progress by launching a surprise offensive against Russia itself. In early August, Ukrainian mechanized brigades stormed Kursk Oblast, which borders eastern Ukraine, and made immediate progress. In just a few days, the Ukrainians captured hundreds of square kilometers of territory and scores of settlements, creating a salient inside Russia. As a result of the Ukrainian attack, the Russian military was forced to draw forces from the fighting inside Ukraine to contain the threat in Russia.

However, the Ukrainian offensive proved to be only a temporary distraction for the Russian military.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

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The Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin a contract for 145 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets worth almost $12 billion.

An Undefinitized Contract

In the last days of December, the Pentagon awarded Lockheed Martin an “undefinitized, fixed-price incentive (firm-target), firm-fixed-price modification” to a contract for the production of 145 F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jets. The contract is worth $11.7 billion.

Essentially, the contract is an extension to a previously awarded contract for F-35s. But for legal and practical reasons, the U.S. military and some other F-35 customers order F-35s—and indeed other aircraft—in batches as opposed to making one contract for the full number. Indeed, in the case of the U.S. military, that would be mighty impractical since it has decided to order approximately 2,500 F-35s of all types for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.

This extension in the F-35 contract highlights the international nature of the F-35 program, which is one of its biggest strengths. Work for the 145 F-35s will be performed in at least four different countries (the United States, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom), and within the United States, five different states will benefit from the work (Texas, California, Maryland, New Hampshire, and Florida).

Specifically, the extension to the original contract is for the production and delivery of 145 F-35s from the Lot 18 batch. Out of these aircraft, there are forty-eight F-35A for the Air Force, fourteen F-35C for the Navy, and sixteen F-35B and five F-35C for the Marine Corps. Moreover, fifteen F-35A and one F-35B are destined for non-U.S. Department of Defense program partners, and thirty-nine F-35A and seven F-35B for Foreign Military Sales customers.

A Complex Program

As you can tell, the F-35 Program is a highly complex one with twenty member countries and three variants of the same aircraft (F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C) involved.

The twenty member countries are the United States, United Kingdom, Italy, the Netherlands, Canada, Australia, Denmark, Norway, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Belgium, Poland, Singapore, Finland, Switzerland, Germany, the Czech Republic, Greece, and Romania. Turkey was also in the program until it decided to purchase the S-400 Triumpf air defense system from Russia, thus triggering the anger of the United States and NATO and resulting in its defenestration from the program.

The total order of F-35s from these countries is approximately 3,579 aircraft. In terms of the specific variants, the F-35A is the most popular, with around 2,700 orders, followed by the F-35B, with 575 orders, and the F-35C, with 340 orders. The U.S. military is by far the largest F-35 purchaser with a total order of 2,456 aircraft (the Air Force has ordered 1,763 F-35As, the Navy 270 F-35Cs, and the Marine Corps 353 F-35Bs and seventy F-35Cs). Interestingly, the U.S. military is the only one operating the F-35C, which is designed for aircraft carrier operations.

The F-35 Lightning II is the most advanced fighter jet in the skies today and is capable of evading enemy air defenses with its stealth characteristics.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from Johns Hopkins’ School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

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The United States Air Force saw thirty-nine—or nearly 20 percent—of its fleet of 218 Cold War-era Fairchild Republic A-10 Thunderbolt II close air support (CAS) attack aircraft retired in 2024. In fact, these birds were sent to the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group (AMARG) for long-term storage at Davis-Monthan Air Force "Boneyard" in Tucson, Arizona. The cuts were double the number of A-10s that had been retired in the fiscal year 2023 (FY23), and even more, Thunderbolt IIs will face the chopping block in the coming months.

That could include the two dozen stationed in South Korea at Osan Air Base with the 25th Fighter Squadron, which is likely to return to the United States in the coming weeks, Simple Flying reported.

As part of the annual defense policy bill for fiscal year 2025 (FY25), signed into law by President Joe Biden last month, the Air Force could see its operational fleet of A-10s further reduced.

The A-10: The Unstoppable Tank Buster

Known affectionately among pilots and ground crews as the Warthog, the A-10 first entered service in March 1976, replacing the Vought A-7D Corsair as the Air Force's primary CAS aircraft. The aircraft was developed to counter a Soviet invasion of Western Europe, where it served as a modern tank buster.

It more than delivered when it went to war—albeit in Iraq rather than Europe.

It was during the 1991 Gulf War, Air & Space Forces magazine reported in 1993, that "the A-10 force was credited with destroying 987 tanks, 926 artillery pieces, 1,355 combat vehicles, and a range of other targets-including ten fighters on the ground and two helicopters shot down in air-to-air engagements. The A-10 force, flying more than 8,000 combat sorties, suffered only five A-10s destroyed (a loss rate of .062 percent)."

Over three decades later, the A-10 has continued to fly in a CAS role, and it was among the aircraft that the Air Force deployed to the Middle East in 2024. It was reported to have flown strafing runs on Iranian-backed Iraqi Shia militia columns and ISIS targets in Syria.

First Cut Wasn't the Deepest

Despite the role the aircraft continues to play, the Air Force has sought for years to retire the aging A-10, arguing that it is ill-suited to a modern conflict with a near-peer adversary such as China. Those calls for its retirement met repeated objections from lawmakers. Yet finally, in 2022, Congress approved the service's calls to begin to retire the iconic attack plane.

The U.S. Air Force has set a goal to see the last of the A-10s sent to the Boneyard by 2030.

Could The A-10 Head to Ukraine or Jordan?

Even as some in the U.S. Air Force have apparently lost faith in the A-10, there has been chatter that the Warthog should be sent to Ukraine or Jordan.

As previously reported, in July, lawmakers on the United States Senate Committee on Armed Services directed Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin III to "explore the possibility of transferring" the A-10s now being retired to the Royal Jordanian Air Force. The Warthog may be well-suited to Jordan's ongoing counter-drug campaign, which has included airstrikes on positions near the Syrian border. The Middle Eastern kingdom also played a significant role in fighting ISIS over the past decade and could likely do so again. The A-10 is an ideal aircraft for such campaigns against insurgent forces.

Jordan isn't the only nation that has expressed interest in the A-10.

The U.S. Air Force had previously discussed a plan to supply Colombia with a squadron of Thunderbolt IIs to counter drug cartels in that country, but it never moved forward.

Of course, aviation experts have continued to suggest that the A-10 could be the perfect aircraft for the Ukrainian Air Force, as it was designed to survive even after sustaining heavy damage and can operate from austere airfields. In contrast, the Ukrainian Air Force already operates the similar (but far less capable) Sukhoi Su-25 (NATO reporting name Frogfoot). This slow-flying ground attack aircraft has been employed to strike Russian tanks.

The A-10C Demo Team Had Its Final Show Last Year

For aviation buffs, 2024 also marked the end of the line for the A-10C Thunderbolt II Demonstration Team, which took to the skies for a final time at the Stuart Air Show in Witham Field, Florida, as part of the Veterans Day Weekend celebrations in November.

"We want to extend a huge thank you to everyone who supported us and everyone who came out to watch an amazing airframe, pilot, and team, perform for you at 1800 shows across 10 countries over the course of more than 40 years," the A-10C Thunderbolt II Demonstration Team expressed in a statement, posted to Facebook.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

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What Europe’s 1990s wars can teach the next U.S. president about Ukraine.

In the wake of the horrific Hamas attacks on Israel on October 7, 2023, the Israeli government initiated a series of strikes upon its enemies to both seek justice for the terrorist attacks upon Israel and to restore deterrence that had been lost by the attacks. 

Beginning with their counterstrike on Hamas targets in Gaza, the Israelis pushed hard against their enemies in the West Bank and Syria and even the Iranian-backed Hezbollah terrorist network to the north in Lebanon. 

Indeed, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) even managed to launch long-range strikes against the Iran-backed Houthis in distant Yemen and against targets within Iran itself.

A Dazzling Display by Israel

In the aftermath of those stunning Israeli airstrikes directed against Iranian targets, the government of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu proudly announced that it had obliterated a key component of Iran’s purportedly complex air defense network. Countless Russian-built S-300 air defense systems were destroyed by the striking F-35I Adir fifth-generation warplanes that the Israelis had deployed to attack those targets within Iran. 

Israel claims that they eviscerated the Iranian national air defense networks surrounding key targets in their nation. In other words, the Israeli military is saying that they maintain escalation dominance. With those key targets being vulnerable to repeat attacks from the IAF. 

What’s more, now that the pro-Iran (and Russian-backed) Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria has collapsed, the Israelis have taken over large swathes of the country that borders their eastern territories. The IDF is now ensconced in Syria and has created what amounts to an air corridor that its planes can use to reliably strike Iran and return to safety.

A lack of reliable air defenses means that Israel now holds all the cards in any military engagement against Iran. 

But did Israel really destroy all the air defense systems that the Iranians possessed? Surely, Iran has more systems than just the Russian-made S-300. Since the Israeli strike that knocked out all of Iran’s S-300 air defense batteries, the Islamist regime in Tehran has fought to downplay the damage. Both the Israeli government and the Biden administration have told The Times of Israel that the Islamic Republic is “essentially naked.” 

In April of last year, the Iranians expressed interest in purchasing the more powerful Russian-built S-400 air defense system. By November, though, Iran claimed it did not need the Russian system. Instead, the Iranians have the Bavar-373, which Tehran claims is comparable to the Russian S-400. According to Iranian state sources, the Bavar-373 is a long-range anti-ballistic missile defense system that can, purportedly, destroy Israeli and American fifth-generation warplanes.

Of course, the question that everyone should be asking is, why didn’t these systems knock Israel’s F-35Is out of the sky before they could obliterate the Iranian S-300 sites and sensitive Iranian military targets during their October airstrikes on the Islamic Republic? 

Iran Lacks Proper Air Defense Doctrine

The fact is that the Iranians have struggled to beef up their air defense network. That’s partly because they’ve not fought a near-peer rival since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s (and Iran barely survived that experience). 

There’s more, too. For instance, the Iranian military, on top of being saddled with older indigenously built systems, lacks the appropriate doctrine for effectively using air defense systems. While it’s true that older systems are not especially helpful against newer fifth-generation warplanes, like the F-35I, a lack of proper understanding of the science and tactics behind reliable air defenses complicates Iranian attempts at defense. 

Meanwhile, the Iranians have expanded their defensive perimeter into Shiite-controlled zones of neighboring Iraq. But that extended defense perimeter only works if, again, the Iranians are using reliable technology and have an effective air defense doctrine they’re employing.

So, yes, the Israelis have basically ensured they have escalation dominance over the Iranians. 

Israel’s Escalation Dominance 

A weakened central Syrian government in the post-Assad era is presiding over the de facto partition of Syria, leading the Israelis to take portions of western Syria near the Golan Heights.

The Israelis are trying to create an air corridor to allow their planes to strike deep inside Iran. If Iran’s air defenses are truly gone the way that Israel and the United States claim they are, then Tehran is going to be subjected to the mother-of-all air wars over the next year or so, as the Israelis seek to end the Iranian regime’s threat and the Americans back their play.

Further, the Israeli destruction of Iranian air defenses with their F-35I is a testament to the fact that the F-35, while it has certainly encountered massive problems over the course of its development, is still quite a lethal fighter.

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest, and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

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Russian social media is running wild with images of an American M1A1 Abrams Main Battle Tank (MBT) being captured by the Russian Army fighting in Ukraine. According to these Russian sources (take from them what you will), the Abrams in question is being sent back to Moscow to be reverse-engineered. Indeed, this is hardly the first American Abrams captured by Russian forces fighting in Ukraine. 

As Military Watch Magazine has assessed, since September, “the rate at which Ukrainian forces have been losing Abrams tanks has increased significantly.”  

And it isn’t just the Abrams MBT that has struggled in the muddy, blood-soaked killing fields of Ukraine. Most of the other classes of NATO MBTs have either been destroyed or rendered useless in Ukraine’s fight against the invading Russians. Even the much-ballyhooed German-built Leopard 2A6 MBTs have not fared as their proponents in NATO claimed they would.

An Incredibly Poor Performance 

Most independent analysts assess that of the thirty-one Abrams tanks handed over to Ukraine, an astonishing twenty of them have been destroyed within the first year of their deployment to Ukraine. According to Military Watch Magazine, most of the kills that the Russians have enjoyed over the Abrams tanks have been conducted by the ubiquitous “kamikaze” unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that both sides in the war have been using to terrorize each other. 

More shockingly, at least one confirmed Russian kill of the M1A1 Abrams in Ukraine was achieved by an old Russian T-72B3 MBT (thereby proving this author’s long-running supposition that the T-72 is the best tank in the Ukraine War).

Multiple media sources have interviewed U.S.-trained Ukrainian tank crews, all of whom have expressed extreme dissatisfaction with the Abrams tank. In the summation of these tank crews, their Abrams tanks are plagued with technical issues, and there is very little active defense provided against the aforementioned threat posed by Russian kamikaze drones. 

What’s more, the advances in anti-tank weaponry have complicated the ability of MBTs belonging to both sides in the Ukraine War to defend themselves. 

In the case of Russia, their 9M133 Kornet dual-warhead anti-tank weapon is a nightmare for any Ukrainian tank (as much as the NATO-provided Javelin anti-tank system is a problem that Russian MBTs struggle to overcome).

The real question that Western strategists must answer is why the M1A1 Abrams has struggled to perform well in the Ukraine War.

Wider Implications For America 

After all, the Abrams is America’s primary MBT, and the Pentagon is spending gobs of money on an updated variant of the Abrams, which will be the U.S. Army’s primary armor force for decades to come. However, if the M1A1 Abrams’ lackluster performance in Ukraine is any indication of its utility in a future war, then the Pentagon’s investment in this system might be a bad choice.

Is this really a case of the vaunted Abrams finally being made obsolete by the changing tide of warfare, or is this really a user error?

While it’s easy to simply say that the Americans have not kept pace with the changing face of war in the modern age, the fact remains that the M1A1 Abrams, along with the other tanks provided by NATO, such as the aforementioned German-built Leopards, are highly technical. It takes years for troops to master these systems. NATO expected Ukrainians under siege to learn the intricacies and innovate tactics for these systems in a few months’ time. 

Making The New AbramsX Ready For A Future War

What’s more, the tanks in question had to undergo several retrofits to better comport with the radical demands of the Ukrainian battlefield. So, between the rapid technical changes along with the novice-level crews manning these systems, to say nothing of the absurdity of placing so much hope on what amounts to a small number of tanks against such a large Russian force, the Abrams’ experience in Ukraine was doomed from the outset. 

That’s not to say that the Americans aren’t going to need to radically upgrade their existing fleet of M1A1 Abrams as well as to ensure that the new AbramsX the Pentagon is developing can better cope with the kind of anti-tank weapons and drones that adversaries will use against American MBTs in a future conflict (which is coming sooner than most people think). 

Brandon J. Weichert, a Senior National Security Editor at The National Interest as well as a Senior Fellow at the Center for the National Interest and a contributor at Popular Mechanics, consults regularly with various government institutions and private organizations on geopolitical issues. Weichert’s writings have appeared in multiple publications, including the Washington Times, National Review, The American Spectator, MSN, the Asia Times, and countless others. His books include Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower, Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. His newest book, A Disaster of Our Own Making: How the West Lost Ukraine, is available for purchase wherever books are sold. He can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Image: ArChe1993 / Shutterstock.com.

The irony of his leadership is that a seemingly transformational figure cannot embrace change.

With the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and Hezbollah in Lebanon defeated and increasingly isolated, attention turns to the Houthis in Yemen. Perhaps the strongest remaining Iranian proxy force in the region, the Houthis are certainly the most active in terms of their attacks on Israel and also on international shipping in the Red Sea. 

With confrontation between the Houthis and Israel, and perhaps America too, seems set to escalate, this will likely raise questions of whether the regime in Sanaa will prove as frail as its former partner in Damascus.  

Like Assad’s regime, the Houthis are a corrupt organization representing a narrow segment of the population, leaving the majority mired in poverty. This poverty stems less from war or sanctions and more from systemic corruption, nepotism, and deliberate isolation. These regimes facilitate depredation of the populace via a common tool kit: bribes demanded by underpaid officials, monopolized industries that benefit insiders, and rigged systems for the import of goods, as exports play little role in the ravaged economies of Iran’s satellite states. 

Reform of state institutions is implausible, as their dysfunction is a deliberate choice to ensure that the regime’s core supporters enjoy economic and social preeminence. 

The high levels of corruption and exploitation made both the Assad and Houthi regimes deeply unpopular, forcing them to depend on brutal security apparatuses to maintain power. Indoctrination through media and education, framing these governments as anti-colonial defenders of national independence, grows less convincing as public suffering at the hands of the regime worsens and as dependence on foreign sponsors, especially Iran, increases.  

Despite these parallels, key differences between the Assad and Houthi regimes suggest their trajectories may diverge. The Houthi leadership is younger and more energetic than Assad’s aging cadre. For example, Houthi intelligence chief Abulhakim al-Khaiwani is under forty, while his Syrian counterpart, Hossam Louka, was nearing sixty-five before Assad’s fall. 

Moreover, ten years after taking Sanaa, the Houthis remain in the early stages of a revolutionary extremist movement. In contrast, the Assad regime had become a stagnant, ideologically hollow dynasty after fifty years in power. 

The Houthi leaders also differ in their likely response to a challenge. Unlike Assad, who ultimately fled to Russia, Houthi leaders may return to guerrilla tactics in Yemen’s mountainous regions rather than abandoning their exile movement. Many senior Houthis have rarely, if ever, left Yemen, probably making them more inclined to resist until the end rather than seek refuge abroad. 

While the Houthis’ long-term survival remains uncertain, their regime faces a growing legitimacy crisis. Cracks in its foundations are widening, and the leadership increasingly relies on brutal violence to suppress dissent. Eventual collapse seems likely but is not necessarily imminent. 

Decisive action by regional and global actors opposing Houthi terrorism could accelerate their downfall. The U.S., Israel, and their allies should intensify political, financial, and military pressure on the Houthis. Cutting off their ability to divert humanitarian aid would significantly weaken their financial position. 

Instead of subsidizing a regime that perpetuates terror and destabilizes the region, the international community should allocate resources to helping its victims and those who are trying to resist it, including Yemeni refugees abroad and Yemeni forces in southern Yemen who are fighting back against the Houthis.  

The current crises facing Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran’s Quds Force make this an opportune moment to pressure the Houthi regime. While the Houthis may have once drawn confidence from Tehran’s backing, they are likely re-evaluating that assessment in light of recent recent events in Syria. 

This may create an opportunity to pressure the Houthis into halting their Red Sea attacks. Still, even this would be a temporary respite, not a real solution to the long-term threat the Houthis pose to other states in the region, not to mention their subjects.  

This raises the question: How might the downfall of the Houthis occur?  

Real change in Yemen would require three key developments. 

First, change would require a rise in public anger from grievances held by the Yemeni population, probably related primarily to economic conditions but perhaps also to anger at the imposition of their religious views at odds with the beliefs of the majority of the population. 

Second, there would need to be a loss of favor or support from key elite constituencies, which could be Houthi bureaucrats or allied tribes on whom the regime relies to suppress dissent. 

Third, instability would have to drive a wedge within the leadership class, driven by external pressures on the regime or internal power struggles; power struggles could arise organically within the predatory and secretive regime, but they might be accelerated by sudden, significant events, such as the death or assassination of key figures within its leadership. 

Together, these factors would leave the regime in a state of disarray, unable to keep its ruthless hold on twenty million Yemenis. That could, in turn, create a momentum that the regime would find increasingly difficult to reverse. 

How this process unfolds is not under the control of anyone and certainly not of any force outside of Yemen. However, the Syrian experience suggests that continued pressure and coordination with opposition forces will be more effective than trying to negotiate with a regime devoted to internal repression and external aggression. 

Like Assad, the Houthis will someday lose power, and Yemenis will remember who helped them in their hour of need and who did not. Keeping up the pressure, military, political, and economic, is critical. Denying the regime legitimacy and opportunities to divert foreign aid is a key component of that effort. Assad’s experience shows that these tyrants do not last forever and that investing in long-term diplomatic relationships with them is a losing bet.  

Ari Heistein is an advisor to Israeli startups seeking to sell to the U.S. federal government, a consultant on issues relating to Yemen, and a nonresident fellow at the Counter Extremism Project. He has previously worked in business development for an Israeli cyber intelligence company and served as a research fellow and chief of staff at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv.

Nathaniel Rabkin worked as an Arabic translator and interpreter for the U.S. military in Iraq’s Wasit province in 2008-2009 and as an analyst embedded with the Department of Defense’s Human Terrain System in Anbar province 2010-2011. He has also performed work for several business and security consultancies and NGOs operating in the Middle East. He worked from 2013 to 2020 as managing editor of Inside Iraqi Politics, a political risk newsletter.

Image Credit: Shutterstock.com.

Confrontés aux prédations des carnassiers et à la solitude, les bergers exercent leur métier dans des conditions précaires de rémunération et d'hébergement. Une nouvelle génération milite au sein de syndicats de gardiens de troupeaux pour améliorer leur quotidien. Mais les patrons éleveurs, s'ils (...) / Mouvement de contestation, Agriculture, Syndicalisme, Travail - 2025/01

Trump’s victory in the United States has raised the stakes for key global races, from Canada to Cameroon.

From Moldova to Mexico, these conflicts are currently flying under the radar but could emerge as major flash points.

Fans of the “cowboy culture” will instantly recognize and associate the name Wrangler with a popular line of Western wear.

But clothing isn’t the only “frontier-style” product bearing the Wrangler name; it’s also been bestowed on a rimfire single-action (SA) revolver made by one of America’s Big Three handgun manufacturers. Say hello to the Ruger Wrangler .22 Long Rifle (.22 LR) revolver.

Ruger Wrangler Initial History & Specifications

Sturm, Ruger & Co. Inc. (headquartered in Southport, Connecticut) introduced the Wrangler in 2019, based on their enduringly popular Ruger Single-Six, which in turn dates back to 1953 (four years after the company was founded). As Ruger product manager Graham Rockwell said in an October 2019 interview with J. Scott Rupp of Guns & Ammo Handguns Magazine:

“Our ultimate goal was to provide yet another rugged reliable firearm to our customers at an affordable rate…With the Single-Six as our starting point, we saw an opportunity not only to use different materials but also to bring our single-action manufacturing process up to a modern level. Those two things combined are really what set the Wrangler apart from the rest of our single-action line as far as affordability.”

Those “different materials” include an aluminum alloy cylinder frame, synthetic checkered black grip panels, and a manufacturing process known as investment casting which confers the win-win benefits of being both more durable and more affordable than the manufacturing processes used by competitors such as Colt and Smith & Wesson. The guns also come factory standard with a rust-resistance and corrosion-resistant finish known as Cerakote, with color options such as black, silver, and Burnt Bronze.

Barrel length options include 3.75 inches, 4.62 inches, 6.50 inches, and 7.50 inches. The 4.62-inch version has an overall length of 10.25 inches and a weight of 30 ounces. As with the majority of revolvers, the cylinder capacity is six rounds (hence the slang term “sixgun”).

According to my colleague Peter Suciu, “As of the end of June [2020], the handgun topped the list for the best-selling revolvers to those under the age of fifty and came in second in the category—only after the hugely popular Colt Python—for shooters above the age of fifty (Source: National Shooting Sports Foundation [NSSF] data).”

Range Report and Shooting Impressions

I have thirty-five years of shooting experience under my belt, and I’ve been an actual gun owner for thirty of those years, and those of you who either know me personally and/or have read my previous firearms articles know that I’m more of a pistolero than a long gun person. As far as that pistolero experience goes, I own multiple semiautomatic pistols and double-action (DA) revolvers; in the latter category, I’m especially fond of Ruger’s GP-100 and Redhawk in .357 Magnum and .44 Magnum, respectively.

However, I have comparatively little experience with an SA revolver and have never owned one. Accordingly, I plan to remedy that in the near future by making a so-called “hogleg” my next gun purchase. Moreover, I’m fixin’ to get one in .22 caliber, since an anonymous friend of mine generously donated a giant tub of .22 ammo (mostly .22 LR, but with some .22 Winchester Magnum Rimfire [WMR] thrown in for good measure; the former can be used in my beloved Beretta M9A1-22, but not the latter).

With that in mind, I recently went to the excellent XCAL indoor shooting range facility in Ashburn, Virginia, to test out their rental Wrangler; this particular specimen had a 4.62-inch bbl. and the Burnt Bronze finish. To enable my evaluation, I purchased fifty rounds of CCI Mini-Mag 22 Long Rifle Ammo 40 Grain Copper Plated Round Nose ammo and a USPSA/IPSC paper target. I divvied the course into twenty-five rounds of headshots at 7 yards and twenty-five rounds of torso shots at 25 yards, delivered from a Classic Weaver Stance.

Impressions?

It had decent accuracy, once I took “Kentucky windage” and adjusted fire for a 5 o’clock hold at both distances to make up for the fact that the gun was printing extremely high left relative to my point of aim; at 7 yards, my very first shot missed the head completely! After the adjustment, I scored twenty hits in the A-zone box and four in the C-zone of the head. At 25 yards, I got six hits in the A-zone, seven in the C-zone, and the remainder in the D-zone. (For whatever reason, USPSA/IPSC targets omit the B-zone.)

I like the fact that this gun, unlike more old-school SA wheelguns, doesn’t require coming to half-cock for loading & unloading.

It also has a decent trigger.

The bladed front and integral notch rear sights provided for an okay sight picture, but not as user-friendly as those on the DA revolvers from this same manufacturer.

The extraction of empty cartridges was a major pain! Unless you align the individual chamber with the loading gate just right, the empties will stick…and even when I did get the alignment right, I often needed to work the extractor rod multiple times to clear the damn thing, which was not only frustrating as hell but also cut into my 1-hour range reservation time limit (and mind you, I still had another gun to test afterward). Thank God for the invention of both the double-action (DA) revolver (with its swing-out cylinder) and the semiautomatic pistol alike!

Bottom line, while the Wrangler is a decent gun, it doesn’t impress me as much as the company’s DA revolvers. I’m feeling strongly inclined to try out the Heritage Rough Rider, which carries an MSRP of $207.99 —and also comes with a .22 WMR cylinder as extra “bang for the buck”—before I make my final “hogleg” buying decision.

Want Your Own?

True Gun Value states that “A RUGER WRANGLER pistol is currently worth an average price of $226.90 new and $140.27 used. The 12-month average price is $225.55 new and $140.65 used.” Sturm, Ruger’s official website lists an MSRP range of $269.00 to $279.00.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

Image: Archlane / Shutterstock.com

America should give diplomacy a final shot—while preparing to use military force.

Isolating Damascus's new rulers won't moderate them.

As Q once told James Bond in “Skyfall” about his weapon: “The Walther PPK/S 9 millimeter short. It's been coded to your palm print, so only you can fire it. Less of a random killing machine, more of a personal statement.”

Thus it was in that 2012 movie that “The World’s Most Famous Secret Agent” finally received an upgrade in ballistic power from his longstanding standard model Walther PPK in .32 ACP (7.65mm) caliber that he was issued way back in the very first film in the series, 1962’s “Dr. No.”

The “nine-millimeter short” cartridge that the 2012 version of Q is referring to is better known to American gun enthusiasts as the .380 ACP (Automatic Colt Pistol); the “Short” label refers to the fact that its shell casing is 17 millimeters in length, 2mm less than that of the full-powered 9mm cartridge (aka, the 9mm Parabellum, 9mm Luger).

Having said all that, the PPK/S variant also comes in the .32 ACP chambering. So then, what truly differentiates it from the standard PPK?

Walther PPK/S Initial History & Specifications

Carl Walther GmbH introduced the PPK/S in 1968—thirty-seven years after the advent of the original PPK—after the antigun Lyndon B. Johnson administration imposed the Gun Control Act (GCA) of 1968 which, among other things, arbitrarily banned the PPK from import into the United States due to its compact size. The PPK/S circumvented the GCA by combining the frame of the 1929-vintage PP, which was deeper than the PPK, and the slide of the PPK. As noted by the Walther Arms Inc. product info page:

“An evolution of the classic PPK, the PPK/s maintains the timeless features, essence, and elegance of the original with an additional extended grip allowing for added capacity and improved ergonomics.”

The PPK/S retains the traditional double-action (TDA) trigger system of its predecessor, i.e., a heavy (13.4 lbs.) double-action (DA) pull for the first shot and a lighter (6.1 lbs.) single-action (SA) the rest of the way until the safety/decocker is applied.

Dimensions include a barrel length of 3.3 inches, overall length of 6.1 inches, height of 4.3 inches, and an empty weight of 19 ounces. Magazine capacity is seven rounds.

Range Report and Shooting Impressions

I have owned a standard PPK .32 ACP (with a stainless steel finish) since 2011, specifically one of the specimens built in the joint venture with Smith & Wesson that has an extended grip tang to offset the gun’s age-old vice of hammer bite. However, I hadn’t fired the PPK/S variant in eleven years, so I wanted to get some refresher training on it.

Accordingly, I recently went to the excellent XCAL indoor shooting range facility in Ashburn, Virginia, to test out their rental PPK/S; this particular specimen had a stainless steel finish. To enable my evaluation, I purchased fifty rounds of Speer Lawman  95-grain Total Metal Jacket (TMJ) ammo and an XCal-2 anatomical silhouette paper target. I divvied the course into twenty-five rounds of headshots at 7 yards (with the first shot of each magazine fired in DA trigger mode, the remainder in SA mode) and twenty-five rounds of torso shots (all SA mode) at 25 yards, delivered from a Classic Weaver Stance.

Impressions?

It had decent accuracy, but my Kentucky windage adjustments had to go in polar opposite directions at the two distances, i.e., a 12 o’clock hold at 7 yards and a 6 o’clock hold at 25 yards. At the 7-yard mark, my first shot went low into the target’s jawline; after the appropriate adjustment, twenty-three rounds went into the ocular rectangular scoring box, but I overcompensated and pulled high into the forehead. At the 25-yard mark, my first shot gave me an unintended head hit, as it went way high into the target’s jawline area (right alongside my unintended too-low first shot from my 7-yard string of fire); after adjusting firing, I ended up with eight A-zone hits, twelve C-zone hits, and five rounds that either hit the peripheral non-scoring zones of the target or missed altogether. Meh.

Nobody ever accused the PPK series of having a smooth DA trigger or a crisp SA trigger. When I commented on this to the Range Safety Officer (RSO), he replied half-jokingly. “Yeah. But they go great in tuxedos.”

The sights were decent (red-painted dot sights, not to be confused with electronic red dot sights).

Reliability-wise, there was one instance—at the thirty-three-round count—where the slide failed to go fully into battery as a result of unlocking my wrist prematurely; any semiauto pistol should be fired from a locked wrist in order to prevent jamming, and this sense of urgency goes double for pocket pistols. Anyway, a quick smack on the back of the slide (as prescribed by self-defense guru Massad F. Ayoob) remedied the situation.

Last impression: .380 ACP ammo is freaking expensive!! 

Bottom line: It was a fun experience overall. But while I may purchase a PPK/S .380 somewhere down the road, both as a complement to my .32 PPK and for its own pop cultural significance, it’s simply not at the top of my wish list right now.

Want Your Own?

True Gun Value states that “A WALTHER PPK S [sic] pistol is currently worth an average price of $499.17 new and $368.52 used. The 12-month average price is $671.13 new and $504.40 used.” Walther’s official website lists an MSRP of $969.00 for both the black and stainless steel finish…unless you elect for the fancier walnut grips over the standard black plastic grips, in which case you pay thirty bucks extra.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch , The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

Image: Robert Sarnowski / Shutterstock.com

As my fellow firearms enthusiasts are all too well aware, ammo is expensive. Gone are the good old days when you could go into Wally World and purchase a Winchester Value Pack 100-round box of 9x19mm 115-grain full metal jacket (FMJ; aka “hardball” or just plain “ball”) practice ammo for roughly $10 (which equates to 10 cents per round); nowadays that same product will cost you around $28.50.

A large part of this is due to inflation, though ammo prices started spiraling since the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. So then, that leaves gun hobbyists with this question: are we going to have to continue to bite the bullet, or are there alternatives? Luckily, there are, thanks to imports from non-Western ammunition manufacturers. Today, we’ll look at two such examples, namely BPS of Turkey and MaxxTech of Bosnia.

BPS Ammo Basics

As per the manufacturer’s official website:

“BPS Balıkesir Patlayıcı Maddeler Sanayi ve Ticaret A.Ş. [Balıkesir Explosives Industry and Trade Inc] established in 2014 to produce small arms ammunitions and shotgun cartridges in Türkiye at international standards, works with all its might to offer reliable, effective and innovative products with the production capabilities, capacities and technologies it has developed over the years.”

The Balıkesir portion of the name is in homage to the city where the company is headquartered. BPS was founded by Mehmet Akif Yavaşca and Müşteba Yavaşc. According to Ammo, BPS products have the pluses of not only being inexpensive—I’m guessing part of this is due to the exchange rate of the Turkish lira (TRY) to the U.S. dollar (USD)—but also “High quality brass [which] is great for reloading.” The minuses are the potential for hard primers and the fact that the brand’s only offerings are 9mm Parabellum and 12-gauge shotgun shells.

I obtained my BPS 9x19mm 124-grain hardball ammo from Royal Tiger Imports (RTI) (from whom, on a separate note, I also obtained really good deals on a 6.5mm Carcano rifle and ammo), headquartered in Melbourne, Florida. Currently, RTI has individual fifty-round boxes of the stuff for $12,99 and 1,000-round cases at $229.99.

MaxxTech Ammo Basics

MaxxTech by GH Ammunition was launched in 2002 and is made by Pobjeda Technology in the city of Gorazde, Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to Ammo, this company’s products have a good reputation for accuracy and reliability in addition to being affordable; like with the TRY-USD exchange rate, I imagine the favorable exchange rate of the Bosnian convertible mark (BAM) to the USD is a big help. The downside is the relative lack of variety of calibers (though they’re better than BPS in that regard), the lack of more self-defense-appropriate bullet configurations such as jacketed hollowpoints (JHPs), and complaints from some shooters of MaxxTech ammo being too dirty.

I bought my boxes of MaxxTech 9x18mm Makarov 92-grain FMJ at The Nations’ Gun Show in Dulles, Virginia. Truth be told, I don’t remember exactly what I paid for the stuff, but I do remember being quite pleasantly surprised with the price. For what it’s worth, GunMag Warehouse is currently advertising fifty-round boxes at $19.99, whilst Ammo To Go is selling 1,000-round bulk rate cases for $339.95 (averaging out to 34 cents per round).

Range Report and Shooting Impressions

I’m quite happy with the performance of both of these ammo brands through my personally owned handguns: in the case of the MaxxTech 9x18mm, we’re talking about my Bulgarian-made Pistolet Makarova (PM; Makarov Pistol), and in the case of the BPS 9x19mm (AKA 9mm Luger, 9mm Parabellum), I test-fired the round through my beloved Beretta 92FS, CZ-75B, Glock 26, and P-35 Browning Hi-Power (BHP).

All gave me sufficient accuracy for headshots at 25 yards and torso shots at 50 yards. The only hiccups from a reliability standpoint were one stovepipe (it felt and sounded like a squib load) and one extraction failure with the BHP; but then again, my BHP (which is of 1967 vintage) has been acting rather quirky as of late, so maybe I need to have a gunsmith look her over.

About the Author: Christian D. Orr

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force Security Forces officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon). Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU). He has also been published in The Daily Torch, The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security, and Simple Flying. Last but not least, he is a Companion of the Order of the Naval Order of the United States (NOUS). If you’d like to pick his brain further, you can ofttimes find him at the Old Virginia Tobacco Company (OVTC) lounge in Manassas, Virginia, partaking of fine stogies and good quality human camaraderie.

Image: Shutterstock.

From India’s relations with rivals to Sri Lanka’s democratic shift, here’s what to keep an eye on this year.