Diplomacy & Crisis News

U.S. Navy Warships at a Crossroads: Overcoming China's A2/AD Challenge: For centuries, navies around the world have taken pride in their large surface warships. The dominance of these warships persisted even after the advent of submarines. In fact, during the Second World War, when submarines became a primary weapons platform for navies, the aircraft carrier stole all the headlines. 

Today, however, things are changing. 

The rise of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) means that the large surface warship’s days as the primary form of power projection in a naval fleet are coming to an end.

Consider that the Ford-class aircraft carrier, America’s newest, costs $13 billion per unit, plus hundreds of millions of dollars per year to maintain. The more numerous Nimitz-class aircraft carriers, while older than the Ford-class, are also very expensive. 

An aircraft carrier is a large, highly complex warship. Its purpose is to maneuver a floating airbase near the territory of an enemy in order to threaten that rival with precise and consistent airstrikes. 

Yet for a fraction of the cost, China’s Dong-Feng 26B missile can either sink an aircraft carrier outright or simply destroy its flight deck, rendering the carrier useless in battle. 

The carrier is the primary means of American power projection. Its absence or limitation leaves a critical gap in U.S. military capabilities. That is a strategic gap that a rival like China can easily exploit. 

It's not just aircraft carriers that are vulnerable to China’s growing anti-ship capabilities. Other surface warships are also targets. 

The Chinese military has developed a growing coterie of hypersonic weapons capabilities that it is planning to launch against incoming U.S. warships. Whatever defenses those warships have against conventional anti-ship missiles, there are no known countermeasures on U.S. warships to protect against these hypersonic systems. 

The world has already seen the asymmetrical risks posed to large surface warships in the Ukraine War. The Moskva, a Slava-class Russian battlecruiser and the flagship of the Russian Black Sea Fleet, was sunk by a Ukrainian drone in the dead of night while still docked in port. Similar attacks have targeted several other Russian surface warships since the Moskva sunk. 

All that money, all those precious resources committed to the larger surface warship fleet, and what does Russia have to show for it? 

Not a thing.

Events in the Ukraine War should be a lesson for U.S. naval planners, especially in relation to a potential conflict with China. Any such conflict, because of the geography involved, would require the U.S. Navy to lead the charge. The Navy would do so by deploying its massive aircraft carriers. 

China’s A2/AD capabilities far outstrip whatever the Ukrainians were using against Russia in the Black Sea. Therefore, the likelihood that America’s surface warships would be held at bay by China’s A2/AD forces is great.

America’s navy has no backup plan for dealing with this. 

You might believe that if surface warships are unable to do their jobs, the U.S. submarine fleet would be available. It would be, but there are a few sticky wickets involved with boomers. 

The first is that the U.S. Navy has been shortchanging its submarine fleet for years. In its budget proposal for Fiscal Year 2025, the Navy again made onerous cuts to its initial request for more submarines. 

The next problem is that naval shipyards have been in the doldrums for years. They cannot meet increased demand. This is at a time when China is rapidly expanding its navy. 

Beyond these concerns is the fact that China has developed a suite of sophisticated submarine-tracking devices.

One example is the Yaogan constellation of satellites. China aims to use this “hidden aperture radar” system to intercept radio signals from the ground and triangulate the location of warships. The Navy has a similar system. 

The Yaogan constellation joins other Chinese systems meant to track U.S. subs—some more advanced than others. 

For example, China has developed a sophisticated laser tracking system that can scour the depths of the ocean from space. Beijing’s forces also utilize less sophisticated balloons mounted with advanced sensors to track the oceans from above.

Still, submarines are much harder to kill than large surface warships. 

The Navy must focus on expanding its submersible fleet. What’s more, in the age of A2/AD, long-distance warfare will be essential. Bursting the A2/AD bubble will be key. 

Beyond submarines, then, the Navy requires a robust arsenal of unmanned drones and hypersonic weapons to annihilate known A2/AD emplacements. 

Yet the Navy isn’t investing in these systems. Instead, the Pentagon continues splurging on legacy systems—notably the costly aircraft carrier—and hoping that China’s A2/AD systems aren’t as effective as Beijing claims they are.

In other words, the Pentagon would rather spend its money enriching defense contractors instead of building relevant, cost-effective systems that can actually defeat the Chinese.

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

William Whitworth, the editor-in-chief of The Atlantic from 1981 to 2000, died at the age of eighty-seven last week. If his name escapes you, that was part of his design. After Mortimer Zuckerman hired Whitworth away from The New Yorker to run the Boston magazine that Zuckerman had just bought, Whitworth, despite having been a prominent writer and editor at The New Yorker, sublimated his ego for the next two decades at The Atlantic. He didn’t write anymore, not even an editor’s note. He didn’t network nearly as much as he could have in New York or Washington and rarely appeared on television. He was no operator. Terrifically low-key—in the spirit of his New Yorker mentor William Shawn—he submerged his whole being in the world of text and was often skeptical of the fads of the moment. You could do that then!

“Bill,” as he was known, rarely had soundbites to offer. He was not particularly quick on his feet. He was penetrating, soft-spoken, and replete with polite common sense expressed in a mild southern drawl. A native of Arkansas and a graduate of the University of Oklahoma, after he left The Atlantic, despite pleas to remain part of the East Coast media world, he quietly returned to Little Rock, where he edited books for top Manhattan publishers, making authors as varied as Conrad Black and Anjelica Huston appear at their best in print.

Bill, a liberal editing a liberal magazine, was also quietly and regularly brave. In the March 1982 issue of The Atlantic, Bill published a cover story by criminologist George L. Kelling and political scientist James Q. Wilson, “Broken Windows,” about how tolerating low-level disorder such as breaking windows and jumping subway turnstiles leads to an atmosphere of more serious crime. It was a plea based on social science for law and order. Mayor Rudolph Giuliani adopted it, and New York City became safer as a result. In the September 1990 issue, Bill published the Princeton historian Bernard Lewis’s cover story, “The Roots of Muslim Rage,” which told difficult truths about the Islamic world and helped spark Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington’s “Clash of Civilizations” theory. The April 1993 cover declared “Dan Quayle Was Right,” in which sociologist Barbara Dafoe Whitehead systematically mounted a defense of traditional, two-parent families, something that the former vice president had championed, much to the liberal media’s distaste.

All of those stories and more pushed back at elite prejudices, not just of our time but of that time, too. Bill’s open mind and determination to avoid news cycles were part and parcel of his tolerance for new and different ideas. In the 1980s, when the elite media in the United States was fixated on the wars in Central America and Lebanon, Bill and managing editor Cullen Murphy immediately grasped why I wanted to turn my attention to the Balkans, resulting in a July 1989 piece that appeared months before the Berlin Wall collapsed and two years before the start of the war in Yugoslavia. As a liberal, Bill was not especially a fan of Henry Kissinger. Yet, he published my June 1999 essay, “Kissinger, Metternich, and Realism,” which defended the former secretary of state as the greatest statesman of the age. This was in spite of a suffocating media climate of moral triumphalism and aversion to the national interest that dominated the 1990s.

Bill’s attitude to pieces he disagreed with was simple: Is this piece well-argued or not? If it is well-argued, then publish it. Because he was not an ideologue, he did not consider your argument immoral simply because he didn’t share it. He was a classic liberal in the sense that he inhabited uncertainties and thus was indefatigably curious. Moral huffiness and superiority were foreign to Bill. In this aspect, the establishment media has undergone an unfortunate transformation.

Bill hoarded stories, holding a piece for many months before he used it, a method he probably inherited from Shawn. These were the days when magazines like The Atlantic had longer lead times than they do now. He used to tell me that if a piece couldn’t hold up for many months, it was possibly of limited value in the first place. When the magazine moved to Washington in the mid-2000s, its editorial pace quickened, and The Atlantic became more in tune with the conventional sensibilities of the nation’s capital.

Bill brought the “highly-engineered” article, as he put it, to the publication. That is, every piece was combed over by a number of editors and a rigorous fact-checker. Knowing what was in store for their pieces, writers were less inclined to wing it and inject their pieces with attitude. “A long piece is never 100 percent accurate,” Bill once told me. “What happens is that with a deadline looming, you simply run out of time.”

Bill never forgot that he edited a general interest magazine. Thus, he covered what people all across America in different professional situations were interested in, not just the fixations of the bicoastal media world. He published pieces arguing against bilingual education and physician-assisted suicide and essays years and decades ahead of their time about race, the environment, and the social effects of technology. Writers and thinkers such as management guru Peter Drucker, military historian John Keegan, and environmentalist Bill McKibben achieved enhanced national stature in Whitworth’s Atlantic. I recall a snooty young interviewer from an Ivy League journalism program who remarked that The Atlantic was just so boring back then. “Boring to whom?” I retorted.

Whitworth’s Atlantic worked to unite the country because it respected all elements within it. Bill advised me to pay close attention to the great middle of the continent, where he said so many fascinating people lived and worked. Taking his advice and traveling through the Midwest, I wrote that Nebraska lay on a slab tilting upwards to the High Plains. “No,” Bill wrote to me, somewhat angrily, “Nebraska did not lay on a slab, it lies on a slab.” A stickler for usage, he was continually saddened by what he said was a decline in grammatical standards at The New York Times.

Whitworth was a formalist in writing, speech, dress, and manners, emblematic of much that journalism as a profession and our society has lost. But you don’t have to remember his name. He wouldn’t have expected you to.

Robert D. Kaplan wrote on foreign affairs for The Atlantic for thirty years until 2016. He holds the Robert Strausz-Hupé Chair in Geopolitics at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary:  While aircraft carriers are a formidable power projection tool, their effectiveness is challenged by Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategies from near-peer adversaries. The F-35C and F-35B variants, designed for carrier and vertical/short takeoff and landing operations, face operational range and combat radius limitations, potentially reducing their battlefield impact in A2/AD environments. Despite these challenges,  the F-35's capabilities against previous generations of fighters must also be considered. 

In many respects, aircraft carriers are the main weapon of the U.S. Navy and, by extension, of the U.S. military. 

Aircraft carriers can project power like no other conventional weapons system. They do that through their fighter jets, which can take out warships, bomb ground targets, and establish air superiority over the battlefield.

However, near-peer U.S. adversaries have been developing Anti-Access/Aerial Denial (A2/AD) systems to restrict U.S. aircraft carriers. If a flattop cannot get close enough to the action, its impact is severely blunted. 

One response to A2/AD measures would be to fly aircraft with superior range. Yet for the F-35 Lighting II, the newest fighter jet to operate from American aircraft carriers, range might be an issue. 

The Navy uses the C version of the F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter jet, while the Marine Corps operates both the F-35C and the F-35B. (Marine aviators operate from Navy aircraft carriers and amphibious assault ships and fly alongside their Navy brethren.)

The F-35C is designed for carrier operations, while the F-35B is a Short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) aircraft that can take off and land like a helicopter. 

According to Lockheed Martin and the Navy, the F-35C Lightning II can carry about 20,000 lbs of fuel in its internal fuel tanks, which translates into an operational range of approximately 1,200 nautical miles (1,380 miles). The fighter jet can carry additional fuel in external fuel tanks, but this limits the stealth capabilities of the aircraft and largely defeats its purpose on the battlefield. 

The aircraft’s combat radius – the range a fighter jet can operate in combat conditions and with a full loadout – is much smaller. The F-35C has a combat radius of about 600 nautical miles. 

The F-35B is even more limited. It can carry slightly over 13,000 lbs of fuel in its internal fuel tanks, which translates to an operational range of about 900 nautical miles and a combat radius of 450 nautical miles. 

All versions of the F-35 can support mid-air refueling to extend their range. However, the air tanks that would do the refueling are not stealth aircraft, and refueling operations would undermine the low-observable capabilities of the F-35. Mid-air refueling in a permissive or non-permissive battle environment would range from risky to downright foolish. 

But to judge the operational range of these two versions of the F-35, we have to look at the capabilities of the fighter jets that have gone before them, namely, the F/A-18 Hornet, F/A-18 Super Hornet, AV-8B Harrier, and F-14 Tomcat. 

The F/A-18 Hornet has a combat radius of approximately 1,100 nautical miles, while the F/A-18 Super Hornet can go about 1,300 nautical miles. The AV-8B Harrier has a combat radius of 300 nautical miles, and the retired, legendary F-14 Tomcat could go approximately 285 nautical miles, which could be stretched to 650 nautical miles with external fuel tanks. 

So the F-35C has a better combat radius than the F-14 Tomcat, but half that of the F/A-18 Hornet and F/A-18 Super Hornet.

In the STOVL category, the F-35B does better than its comparable aircraft, the AV-8B Harrier, but vastly underperforms the combat radii of to the F/A-18 Hornet and F/A-18 Super Hornet. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: In a riveting NATO wargame named Operation Nordic Response 2024, the French frigate Normandie achieved a simulated victory over a German submarine in Norway. This exercise underscored the critical importance of anti-submarine warfare capabilities. Despite facing a challenging environment in the Scandinavian fjords, the French crew, utilizing the Normandie's helicopter and sonar technologies, identified and "destroyed" the German sub, demonstrating the realism and value of such training exercises. This event, part of a series of drills in the Baltic Sea and Scandinavia, not only highlights the strategic importance of the region, given its proximity to Russian military bases but also reinforces NATO's commitment to interoperability and preparedness in the face of potential threats.

In a simulated clash reminiscent of World War Two, the French warship, the Normandie, managed to “sink” the German sub. 

The exercise in Norway showed the importance of anti-submarine warfare drills. 

The French warship did not have an easy job. In the days before the clash, the German submarine delivered an imaginary torpedo hit to the Italian aircraft carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi. In similar exercises, submarines have managed to penetrate the defenses of aircraft carriers and score hits against big flattops.  

As soon as the French crew understood that an “enemy” submarine was in the area, it scrambled into action. 

One of the newest warships of the French Navy, the Normandie launched its helicopter to help spot the submarine through sonar. It soon succeeded. 

“Intelligence confirmed to us that there were no friendly submarines in the sector, so we were certain that it was an enemy submarine,” the NH90 helicopter pilot who helped track the German submarine said.  

Although the German submarine was more familiar with the Scandinavian fjords, the French crew managed to overcome its disadvantage and score a hit against the German sub. 

As soon as the French crew spotted the German submarine, it fired a munition that “destroyed” the threat, winning the day for the Normandie. 

Capt. Thomas Vuong, the commanding officer of the Normandie, told the Associated Press the exercise was “extremely beneficial, because we reach a very high degree of realism and so we better prepare our teams.”

“The fjords are a special environment, with a temperature profile different to what we know in the Atlantic. To be able to train our teams here, against this threat, is extremely valuable and extremely stimulating. This is their playing field. So they know the hiding places,” the French naval officer added. 

The clash between the two NATO warships was part of Operation Nordic Response 2024, a series of wargames in the Baltic Sea and Scandinavia. 

Although the area is surrounded by NATO countries – including Sweden, the newest member-state – Russia has a presence as well. St. Petersburg sits in the Gulf of Finland, in the region’s east. But most important is the Kaliningrad exclave sandwiched between Poland and Lithuania. Kaliningrad is essentially a big military base that houses nuclear weapons. The Russian Navy has been sending submarines in the Baltic waters to spy or to train in very realistic conditions. 

These exercises help militaries identify weaknesses and work to prevent operational mistakes. In addition, they enhance interoperability. NATO is an alliance. In a potential war with Russia, all countries would be expected to contribute to the conflict and fight closely together.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP.

Image Credit: Creative Commons. 

Summary: Just days after officially joining NATO, the Swedish Air Force marked its integration into the Alliance with the first intercept of Russian aircraft over the Baltic Sea. This operation saw Swedish JAS-39 Gripen jets joining forces with German Luftwaffe Eurofighters and Belgian Air Component F-16AM Fighting Falcons to intercept a Russian Antonov An-26 and a Tupolev Tu-134. 

The Swedish-built JAS 39 Gripen has been in service with NATO members the Czech Republic and Hungary, but on Monday aircraft from the Swedish Air Force took part in the first intercept of Russian aircraft as part of a NATO air mission. It came just a day after the Nordic nation officially the international alliance.

Swedish JAS-39 Gripen jets launched under NATO arrangements to safeguard the skies over the Baltic Sea flying with German Luftwaffe Eurofighters and Belgian Air Component (BAC) F-16AM Fighting Falcons, NATO Air Command announced. The NATO warbirds intercepted a Russian Aerospace Forces (VKS) Antonov An-26 (NATO reporting name "Cash) transport aircraft and Tupolev Tu-134 (NATO reporting name Crusty") military airliner over the Baltic region.

"This swift coordinated reaction of NATO jets from Belgium, Germany and Sweden safeguarding the skies over the Baltic Sea region underlines the close integration and responsive command and control arrangements within the Alliance," the command said in a statement.

NATO Air Command shared images from the sortie on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter.

The alliance further noted that it served as an impressive demonstration of the deep integration the Swedish Air Force has achieved with NATO Air Policing forces and the close and smooth interoperability in support of safeguarding NATO over the Baltic Sea.

NATO fighter jets regularly take to the skies to intercept and identify Russian planes flying in international airspace near member nation territory. For the German Luftwaffe, it was the second scramble since taking over the Air Policing mission at Lielvarde on March 1, while Belgian jets have been scrambled roughly a dozen times since beginning their mission at Šiauliai on December 1, 2023.

It was also last week that a pair of Swedish Air Force JAS 39 Gripen multirole fighters escorted a U.S. Air Force B-1B Lancer and B-52 Stratofortress over Stockholm to commemorate Sweden joining NATO. During the planned flight, the aircraft flew over Avicii Arena, Sweden’s Parliament House, the Stockholm Arlanda Airport, and the Uppsala Airport.

The Swedish Air Force also conducted its first reconnaissance flight near the Russian border – with one flight made by a Swedish Gulfstream S102B Korpen GIV-SP Signal Intelligence (SIGINT), a heavily modified Gulfstream IV equipped with signal intelligence gathering sensors. The aircraft reportedly flew over Poland near the borders of Russia's Kaliningrad enclave and Belarus. A second flight was carried out by a Saab 340 early warning and control (AEQ&C) aircraft over the Baltic Sea. It is capable of tracking ships, planes, and missiles up to 190-250 miles while at an altitude of 20,000 feet.

Sweden officially joined the international military alliance this month after more than two centuries of neutrality, driven by Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine two years ago.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: Over the past month, the Russian Aerospace Forces have faced significant losses, including more than a dozen combat aircraft, notably several Su-34 fighter-bombers and at least three Su-35 fighters. The Su-35, an advanced derivative of the Su-27 and intended for export, has been in Russian service since 2014 and seen action in Syria. Despite its advanced capabilities and designation as a "4++ generation" fighter, recent engagements have led to the downing of several Su-35s, with claims of at least one being a result of friendly fire. The Su-35 is praised for its versatility, maneuverability, and heavy armament but has faced criticism over its avionics compared to Western counterparts. The recent losses highlight potential vulnerabilities in its design and operational deployment. As of December 2022, Russia had 110 Su-35s, with ongoing production to replenish its forces.

Over the past month, the Russian Aerospace Forces have lost more than a dozen combat aircraft, including several of its highly touted Sukhoi Su-34 fighter-bombers, but it was just last week that at least three Sukhoi Su-35 fighter was reported to have been shot down in the past month.

According to reports on social media, the Su-35 disappeared from radar near Mariupol. The Russian Ministry of Defense has not confirmed the loss of the jet, and its downing hasn't been independently verified. However, the loss of another Su-35S was confirmed last month near Avdiivka – and there are reports that it may have been the victim of friendly fire.

As many as eight Su-35s may have been destroyed since Russia launched its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine just over two years ago.

The Su-35 is noted for being a heavily upgraded derivative of the Su-27 aircraft (NATO reporting name "Flanker") that was originally intended for export. However, it has been in service with the Russian Air Force since 2014 and made its first combat deployment in Syria in 2015 – where it was employed to provide cover for other Russian aircraft on bombing missions. It was further utilized in guided and unguided strikes against ISIS and rebel forces in Syria.

Whereas the Su-27 was initially developed to address the development of the U.S. military's F-15 Eagle in the 1970s, the Su-35 was a response to the F-16. According to its designers, as a multirole fighter, the Su-35 can be used in a variety of missions and is capable of attacking ground and naval targets, including infrastructural facilities shielded by air defense systems, as well as those located at a considerable distance from home airfields

The Sukhoi Su-35 is actually the second improved version of the Su-27M; it is a single-seat, twin-engine, supermaneuverable aircraft. It reportedly features thrust-vectoring engines in place of the Su-27's canards. Designated the "Flanker-E" by NATO, this "4++ generation" fighter has been touted by Kremlin officials as being a very capable foe to current U.S. aircraft, including the F-15 Eagle, the F-18, and even the F-35 Lightning II.

According to United Aircraft Corporation (UAC), the Su-35 "combines the qualities of a modern fighter (super-maneuverability, superior active and passive acquisition aids, high supersonic speed and long range, capability of managing battle group actions, etc.) and a good tactical airplane (wide range of weapons that can be carried, modern multi-channel electronic warfare system, reduced radar signature and high combat survivability)."     

The Su-35's armament includes a GSh-30-1 30mm autocannon with 150 rounds, along with 17,630 pounds of payload on twelve external points. It can carry a variety of air-to-air, air-to-surface, anti-radiation, and anti-ship missiles, as well as a number of TV, laser-, and satellite-guided bombs. By comparison, the new U.S.-built F-22 has just four hardpoints on its wings and three on internal weapon bays.

The Su-35 is capable of employing an entire range of existing and future air-launched air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles, including precision weapons. It carries a 30mm GSh-30-1 gun, short-, medium- and long-range air-to-air missiles, Kh-31, Kh-35U or Kh-59M anti-ship missiles and various types of precision munitions and rockets as its basic armament. The fighter integrates the IUS-35 information and control system and a phased array radar capable of detecting targets at a range of 100 km-400 km.

It has a maximum take-off weight of 34.5 tons and can accelerate to 2,500 km/h. The Su-35 has an operational range of 1,500-4,500 km and a service ceiling of 20,000 meters. The twin Saturn AL-41F1S turbofans provide the Su-35 with maneuverability that can easily match or exceed the evasion techniques of nearly all existing fourth-generation fighters. With a maximum speed of 1,550 mph and a ceiling of 59,050 feet, it is a well-armed, speedy aircraft.

Yet, Ukraine has still managed to shoot at least a few of the Su-35s out of the sky.

One issue may be that the aircraft doesn't fully live up to the hype, a point noted by The Aviation Geekclub, which quoted aviation expert Abhirup Sengupta.

"Despite being marketed as 4++ gen, Su-35 has the least capable avionics suite among its competitors. It's the only major 4th gen. aircraft without an AESA radar or any form of Sensor Fusion. The Irbis-E is marketed as having a 350 km range against 3 m^2 target while in reality that's only in cued-search in a tiny FoV. What's rarely stated is that in normal volume search that range shrinks down to 200 km," noted Sengupta.

Moreover, the expert added, that "Su-35's radar has a maximum targeting range of 250 km – even for a B-52 like target," and further suggested, "The Su-35 is definitely the most capable Fighter in Russian Air Force and there is no doubt that it presents a serious threat to any 4th gen aircraft out there. But to say that it's on the same level as today’s F-15E, F/A-18E/F, Typhoon or Rafale, much less 'superior' is defying reality."

The Kremlin was believed to have had 110 of the aircraft in its inventories as of December 2022. It is in service with several fighter aviation regiments of the Russian Air Force, including the 22nd Guards Fighter Aviation Regiment.

Production of the aircraft is currently underway at the Komsomolsk-on-Amur Aircraft Plant located in the Russian Far East (part of the United Aircraft Corporation within the state tech corporation Rostec), and according to Russian state media, it delivered the latest batch of Su-35S fighter jets in July of last year.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: The U.S. Department of Defense has green-lit the F-35 fighter jet, produced by Lockheed Martin, for full rate production, a decision coming five years later than initially planned and two decades after the contract award. This milestone is reached despite the U.S. Air Force's recent decision to cut back its F-35 purchases in 2025 to 42 aircraft. The approval was based on comprehensive evaluations, including operational and live fire tests, and regulatory compliance, marking a significant achievement for the program. Despite reaching this stage, the Pentagon has temporarily halted new F-35 deliveries pending upgrades under the Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) initiative, which aims to enhance the jet's capabilities with improved hardware and software. Meanwhile, the F-35 has also been certified to carry the B61-12 nuclear bomb, emphasizing its dual-role capacity in conventional and nuclear warfare, and underlining its strategic importance to U.S. and NATO defense strategies. Over 990 F-35s have been delivered to date, highlighting its key role in modern military operations.

The U.S. Department of Defense has approved the F-35 for full rate production. 

The announcement comes five years later than originally planned and 23 years after Lockheed Martin was awarded the contract for the multi-role fighter. It comes even as the U.S. Air Force announced it would scale back its acquisition of the fifth-generation Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II stealth fighter, with plans to buy just 42 of the aircraft in 2025.

"The F-35 achieved this milestone after considering the results from the F-35 Combined Initial Operational Test and Evaluation and Live Fire Test and Evaluation Report, System Development and Demonstration exit criteria, statutory/regulatory documentation compliance, future production strategy, and draft acquisition program baseline details,” the Department of Defense announced on Tuesday. “Proceeding to MSC/FRP requires control of the manufacturing process, acceptable performance and reliability, and the establishment of adequate sustainment and support systems.”

The Air Force has operated the F-35 since 2016, and the service plans for a fleet of 1,763 aircraft. Production was already close to capacity, but the official full-rate production designation will allow the Joint Program Office to negotiate multi-year contracts for the fighter.

"This is a major achievement for the F-35 Program," Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment Dr. William A. LaPlante said in a statement.

"This decision ­backed by my colleagues in the Department ­highlights to the Services, F-35 Cooperative Program Partners, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS)  customers that the F-35 is stable and agile, and that all statutory and regulatory requirements have been appropriately addressed," LaPlante added. "The F-35 Program is the premier system that drives interoperability with our allies and partners while contributing to the integrated deterrence component of our National Defense Strategy."

The F-35 program has delivered more than 990 aircraft to the U.S. military services, partner nations, and FMS customers.

The F-35 has also attained operational certification to carry the B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb, marking it as the first fifth-generation aircraft with nuclear capabilities.

With that milestone achieved ahead of schedule, the F-35A becomes a pivotal component of the U.S. and NATO's extended deterrence commitments. The development highlights the aircraft's versatility as a dual-capable platform, able to deliver conventional and nuclear payloads. As NATO-operated jets receive initial certification for the deterrence mission, the integration of the B61-12 further solidifies the F-35A’s role in modern warfare.

Despite these milestones, the Pentagon has stopped accepting deliveries of newly built Lightning II aircraft until Technology Refresh 3 (TR-3) is ready. TR-3 includes a series of hardware and software improvements to the F-35 that include better displays, computer memory, and processing power.

Lockheed Martin finished building the first F-35s that were to have the TR-3 improvements in July 2023. But the software wasn't ready, meaning the Department of Defense couldn't conduct the check flights required to accept delivery. 

Lockheed has stored about 70 completed F-35s until that testing concludes, which is expected to happen by mid-to-late summer. 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

NATO member-state Denmark is considering repatriating some of its F-35 Joint Strike Fighters currently used for pilot training in the U.S. 

Danish Defense Minister Troels Lund Poulsen on March 12 asked the Danish Armed Forces to prepare for a temporary repatriation of F-35 aircraft from a joint training facility at Luke Air Force Base, Arizona, Bloomberg first reported. Several European nations who operate the F-35 have aircraft based at Luke AFB to support pilot training.

The news comes amid concerns in Copenhagen about potential delays to the delivery of new fifth-generation stealth fighters. It is unclear whether Lockheed Martin can meet the July deadline for the delivery of Denmark's newest aircraft.

The Danish Armed Forces is also exploring opportunities to purchase or borrow F-35s from other nations.

Last fall, Lockheed Martin officially handed over the certificate of ownership for Denmark's F-35s to the Danish Ministry of Defense Acquisition and Logistics Organization. More than 450 Danish and allied government, military, and industry leaders gathered at Skrydstrup Air Base, Denmark, to commemorate the milestone, and more than 10,000 local citizens participated in the Royal Danish Air Force's public open house.

Copenhagen has taken delivery of ten F-35s to date. Four of them are now at Skrydstrup Air Base. Six are stationed at Luke AFB, where Danish pilots and maintainers conduct training. 

Denmark plans to purchase a total of twenty-seven F-35s. Its fleet of the multirole aircraft is meant to play a pivotal role in bolstering NATO's collective resilience in the Baltics and strengthening the alliance's ability to deter and defend against threats across all domains.

Denmark is the 10th country and the fifth European NATO member-state to operate the F-35 from its home soil. It played a critical role in the F-35 program. Denmark joined the program in 2002 as a partner during the System Development and Demonstration phase, strategically influencing technical elements of the program. 

The Royal Danish Air Force also contributed a Danish F-16 to the Joint Strike Fighter 461st Flight Test Squadron at Edwards Air Force Base, California. It served as a chase plane for the F-35 Development, Test & Evaluation program. Danish industry has also contributed to F-35 production, development, and sustainment activities and today is building parts and components for the aircraft.

Copenhagen's need for the F-35 comes as Denmark and the Netherlands formally announced they will supply F-16 Fighting Falcons to Ukraine. The Royal Danish Air Force has thirty F-16s in service and pledged to provide Kyiv with 19 of the American-made F-16s later this year. It was reported earlier this month that the first of those aircraft could be in Ukraine by this summer.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: Rumors have emerged that China plans to construct a fourth aircraft carrier, possibly aiming for a nuclear-powered design, a move that could significantly boost the People's Liberation Army Navy's (PLAN) capabilities. This development follows the PLAN's recent advancements, including the commissioning of its third carrier, the Type 003 Fujian, equipped with electromagnetic catapults akin to the American EMALS system. While the United States Navy maintains dominance with 11 nuclear-powered carriers, China's potential addition signals its intention to expand its naval power. This ambition reflects China's broader goal of becoming a "blue water" navy capable of global reach, amidst increasing military spending and efforts to enhance its strategic position, particularly concerning Taiwan. This strategic move underscores the rapid evolution of the PLAN and poses a notable challenge to the U.S. and Western naval superiority.

The United States Navy operates a total of 11 nuclear-powered aircraft carriers, including 10 Nimitz-class supercarriers and one Gerald R. Ford-class super-sized flattop. Over the coming decades, the aging Nimitz-class carriers are set to be replaced on a one-for-one basis with the new Ford-class warships – ensuring that the United States remains the dominant carrier power in the world.

However, Beijing has other plans and it was just last week that rumors circulated it will build a fourth carrier. It came after Yuan Huazhi a political commissar of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and National People's Congress (NPC) deputy, told reporters that an announcement could be expected soon on a fourth carrier.

This isn't exactly earth-shattering news, as there has been speculation that it is a matter of when and not if China would begin construction on a fourth carrier, as it is now completing its third carrier, the Type 003 Fujian.

The PLAN has in just the past decade greatly expanded its aircraft carrier capabilities, which began by refurbishing an unfinished late Cold War era Soviet aircraft cruiser that was purchased from Ukraine in the 1990s. It was commissioned in 2012.

Even before news broke last week of a fourth carrier, China was already on track to have the second-largest carrier force with its three flattops – but what makes the latest revelation potentially worrisome for Washington is that there is speculation that the future warship will be nuclear-powered. Currently, only the U.S. Navy's aforementioned carriers – along with the French Navy's flagship Charles de Gaulle – are nuclear-powered, which gives the vessels unlimited range and endurance.

The PLAN already achieved a significant breakthrough with its conventionally-powered Type 003 Fujian, which is equipped with electromagnetic catapults and arresting devices that allow aircraft to be launched and recovered more frequently. It began testing the system last November. The technology is similar to the American EMALS system employed on the Ford-class.

The third and newest Chinese aircraft carrier is on track to begin sea trials later this year.

Though Beijing has made clear it aims to develop a modern "blue water" navy within the next decade, it still lacks the overseas military bases to support such ambitions. It continues to forge relations and could expand its global reach, but in the shorter term, military analysts that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may see carriers as necessary to achieve some aspirations closer to home – namely reunification with Taiwan.

As the South China Morning Post reported, aircraft carriers are believed to be crucial to operations along the Taiwan Strait, the waterway that separates the self-ruling island nation from the mainland.

Beijing's latest military budget, which was announced on Tuesday, raised funding for the Chinese armed forces by 7.2%, the same rate as last year amid aims to ramp up combat readiness as well as defense research and development.

Over the past two decades, the PLAN has rapidly expanded in both size and capability, positioning itself as a credible peer-level threat to the U.S. and other Western navies.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

I became a Republican nearly 45 years ago when I was captivated by Ronald Reagan’s vision for America. Fresh out of law school, I was a newly commissioned JAG officer in the United States Coast Guard. Little could I imagine, at that time, that a mere seven years later I would have the privilege of serving on President Reagan’s White House Staff. I would go on to serve in the White House under President George H.W. Bush and in the Pentagon as a Deputy Assistant Secretary under then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney.

As a member of the GOP, I was “all in.” At that time, the Republican party stood for a strong national defense, respect for our allies, limiting the role of government in our daily lives, and an absolute intolerance for totalitarianism wherever it existed. Reagan’s defense buildup and aggressive approach with the Soviet Union was the catalyst that helped end the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

I still believe in what made me a Republican in the first place. Most Reagan Republicans are in the same boat. That is why Donald Trump is not entitled to our votes. He has demonstrated, time and again, that he does not share the values that made us Republicans. It is, therefore, up to Trump to earn our votes.

So far, he has not. Indeed, as his hosting aspiring dictator Viktor Orban at Mar a Lago proves, he has no desire to earn them, either.

I can admit that my aversion to Trump is, at this point, personal. Yet that aversion stems from what made me a Reagan Republican in the first place. It was Reagan’s unvarnished, unironic patriotism. Those who sacrificed for America were heroes, full stop. The idea of America was greater than any individual within it.

From Day One of Trump’s first term, that sentiment has been glaringly, offensively absent. Having spent much of my career working in and with the U.S. intelligence community, his relentless mockery and unjustified criticism of my community was particularly concerning.  Reagan understood their importance and treated the Wall of Stars – a memorial to the people in the intelligence community who made the ultimate sacrifice – with the reverence it deserves. I never passed that memorial without thinking “thank God for those people.”

But not Trump. Trump used that hallowed space as a platform to whine about accurate media reporting about the crowd size for his inauguration. In that moment, it was clear that, in his mind, he was bigger than the idea of America. Patriotism was for, as he’d later say about America’s war dead, “losers and suckers.”

Reagan Republicans, take note. A Republican Party led by Trump is not one that espouses the ideals that made us Republicans in the first place.

One can go down the list of what made Reagan the leader he was and see those qualities absent in Trump.

A genuine optimism about America? Trump gave one of the darkest inaugural addresses in history and has somehow only gotten worse.

A strong military? Trump went through six Navy Secretaries in four years while doing almost nothing to strengthen our capabilities.

Supporting allies and opposing enemies? The only thing as consistent as Trump’s trashing of our allies is his support for dictators (Reagan would be appalled at Trump’s support for Putin.)

Limiting the federal government’s involvement in our daily lives? It is tough to make the case that Trump wants to do that when he’s picking fights with American companies for having the audacity to drop his daughter’s clothing line.

The only thing Trump and shares with Reagan is the slogan he stole from him.

I will admit, I am done as a Republican, at least until the MAGA branch has receded to the dustbin of history. But for those Reagan Republicans who have not yet made up their minds, I urge you not to vote for Trump simply because he is also a registered Republican. Make him demonstrate that he shares your values, your policy priorities, your commitment to a free and proud America. Make him show he honors what really makes America great: our optimism, our patriotism, and our democracy.

And if, as I suspect, he fails to convince you, be courageous. Loyalty to our nation and the principles upon which it was founded must overcome loyalty to party. Put country first.

A nation on the precipice cannot afford your blind loyalty to someone who is uncommitted to its preservation.

Robert Kelly is a retired attorney and Coast Guard Reserve captain who served in the White House for Presidents Reagan and Bush.

Summary: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, lauded for its advanced capabilities and role as a fifth-generation fighter, faces criticism for one significant limitation: its range. The F-35 variants—A (Air Force) and C (Navy)—offer a range of 1,200 nautical miles, while the B variant for the Marine Corps reaches only 900 nautical miles. This stands in contrast to longer-range aircraft like the F-22 Raptor and the F/A-18 Super Hornet, which boast ranges of 1,600 and 1,800 nautical miles respectively. This limitation is crucial for operations involving Carrier Strike Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units, especially in vast open ocean expanses where operational success depends on range and fuel economy for mission engagement and return.

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter seems to have developed from a problem-plagued development program into a reliable, everyday fifth-generation fighter.

Today, the F-35 operates as it was designed to. Yet, as some critics have pointed out, it was designed to operate in a way that hobbles the US military strategy.

Namely, the F-35 suffers from a short range.

“The A and C [F-35] variants, employed by the Air Force and Navy respectively, have ranges of 1,200nm while the B variant for Marine Corps can only manage 900nm,” Maya Carlin wrote for The National Interest. “By comparison, the F-22 Raptor can reach 1,600nm while the F/A-18 Super Hornet maxes at 1,800nm.”

For a Carrier Strike Group based F-35C, or a Marine Expeditionary Unit based F-35B, operating in the vast expanses of the open ocean, range becomes vital to operational success. And while 1,200, or 900, nautical miles may sound like a lot, remember that range and fuel economy must be budgeted engaging in the mission itself (which is often fuel intensive), and returning to the ship after the mission.

So, 1,200 nautical miles means that the F-35-launching ship must be well within a 1,200-mile radius – which is becoming more and more dangerous as defense technology improves.

The problem with the F-35’s limited range is that it draws Navy and Marine Corps ships closer to shorelines, closer to enemy defense hubs, further within the range of detection technology, and tracking technology, and missile systems.

In a conflict with, say, China, the US would be dependent upon their carrier and MEU fleets to deliver airpower, to control the airspace above wherever the conflict was being waged. Aircraft like the F-35 would be vital to the outcome of the conflict.

However, the limitations of the F-35’s range increase the vulnerability of vessels launching the ships, in part because the Chinese can narrow their search range when hunting the vessels.

One of the primary defensive measures of large vessels like aircraft carriers is the ability to hide in the open ocean. The further the range enemy targets, the larger the search radius that the enemy must search within to find the ship. The more constricted the target radius becomes, the easier the ship becomes to find.

And, of course, the closer to shore US ships must travel, the closer they are to enemy missiles.

“China has invested in conventional cruise missiles and medium to long-range ballistic missiles with an eye on denying the U.S. Navy, particularly its carriers, the freedom to operate in the South China Sea and beyond,” Carlin wrote. “For Air Force F-35s based in Japan and Korea, the transit to a potential flare-up around Taiwan would put them at the bleeding edge of their operational range.” What about aerial refueling? “Every variant of F-35 can have its range extended by aerial refueling, however, these tanker aircraft are incredibly vulnerable and the farther they can be kept from any frontline conflict the better.”

So, while the F-35’s range is not a fatal flaw, it does make the aircraft’s, and the aircraft’s support team’s, job harder.  

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

The Future of Warships: Lessons from the U.S. Navy's Engagement with Houthi Rebels: On Monday, the United States Navy conducted six defense strikes and fired 18 anti-ship missiles in Yemen in response to two anti-ship ballistic missiles that were fired by the Iranian-back Houthi rebels into the Red Sea.

"Between 2:50-11:30 p.m. (Sanaa time) on March 11, United States Central Command conducted six self-defense strikes destroying an unmanned underwater vessel and 18 anti-ship missiles in Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen. It was determined these weapons presented an imminent threat to merchant vessels and U.S. Navy ships in the region. These actions are taken to protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for U.S. Navy and merchant vessels," The United States Central Command (CENTCOM) announced.

Since the U.S. Navy began its campaign of airstrikes launched in January, it has shot down and destroyed more than 100 Houthi missiles, according to an Associated Press analysis – yet, the onslaught from the Houthi rebels has shown no signs of abating.

It bears repeating, the brave sailors on the U.S. Navy vessels need to do everything right, every single time – and an enemy only needs to get lucky once. The Houthis are now clearly playing a "long game," hoping that one time they'll actually get lucky. If – and hopefully there is not a when – such a moment occurs, America's adversaries will take note, as will the world.

It won't be remembered that a hundred missiles were destroyed. All it will take is for one to make that lucky shot. Even minimal damage would be "proof" that the U.S. Navy isn't invincible.

This begs the question, "Is the era of the big, expensive warship over?"

The answer is complex.

The fact remains that frigates today already operate with vastly smaller crews than they did just a few decades ago, and will likely continue to shrink in size. At the same time, the weapon capabilities of those warships have increased. Thus, the era of the battleship and large cruisers has long since passed, and warships will simply need to adapt as they always did.

The Royal Navy's Lord Admiral Nelson famously argued "A ship's a fool to fight a fort," but he was clearly proven wrong in how warships played a vital role in providing the firepower to allow for a successful amphibious invasion. World War Two's D-Day landings in Normandy, France, and the island-hopping campaign in the Pacific couldn't have occurred without the big guns from the battleship. Nelson can be forgiven for not being a forward thinker, and his comments were made more than 150 years earlier.

Yet, other forward thinkers, such as U.S. Army General Billy Mitchell, predicted the days of those massive behemoths would be superseded by aircraft. His portent to the potential of aviation was proven right as nearly two dozen battleships were sunk by aircraft during the Second World War. By contrast, only one aircraft carrier was sunk by a battleship – the HMS Glorious, which was retired as a battlecruiser and reconstructed as an aircraft carrier.

Yet, the real death knell for the capital ships in the Cold War was that it was determined that carrier-based aircraft and guided-missile cruisers could do the job more effectively than large battleships.

Thus we should recognize the fact that land-based missiles won't completely single the end of warships. Instead, the technology of warships will simply evolve.

The introduction of cannons didn't mean the end of warships. Instead, the wooden ships grew in size and were armed with more guns. That eventually led to the era of ironclads and then to steel warships, which further grew in size – with HMS Dreadnought ushering in the short-lived era of the modern battleship.

Bigger was better, at least until it wasn't.

Thus, the future will likely see smaller, faster warships, armed with missiles rather than big guns. Those vessels will be supported by unmanned vehicles in the air, on the surface, and under the water. But yes, the era of big, expensive warships like battleships is long over.

Even aircraft carriers may need to adapt given the advances in land-based "carrier killer" missiles. While carrier strike groups will continue to have a place in the world, those too will likely evolve. The future CSG will also likely employ drones and other systems, while the flattops and escorts will be armed with lasers to counter enemy drones, missiles, and aircraft.

The future U.S. Navy – and all naval forces for that matter – will likely be unrecognizable, but it will be an evolutionary rather than revolutionary step forward.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: The aircraft carrier, once a cornerstone of American naval power, is becoming increasingly obsolete due to the proliferation of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) technologies by U.S. adversaries like China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. These technologies make carriers, with their high costs and vulnerabilities, less effective in modern conflict scenarios, especially against China's A2/AD capabilities in potential conflicts over Taiwan or the South China Sea. Despite this, the U.S. continues to invest heavily in carriers, which also serve as cultural icons, even as their strategic utility diminishes against cheaper and more proliferate A2/AD systems.

The aircraft carrier is one of the most expensive weapons platforms in history. It helped win the Pacific Theater of the Second World War. During the Cold War, it deterred the communists. After the Cold War, it helped to preserve that hard won peace. Yet, by the 2000s—especially from the 2010s, onwards—the aircraft carrier has been the victim of extremely diminishing returns. 

Despite this, the US Navy and Congress keep throwing gobs of tax dollars at the aircraft carrier. Meanwhile, with each passing year, the aircraft carrier’s usefulness is made less so, thanks in large part to the rise of anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) technologies that America’s great power rivals (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea) are deploying with wanton abandon.

Should a conflict erupt between the United States and the People’s Republic of China, over Taiwan or for control over the South China Sea, given China’s immense A2/AD capabilities, it is likely that America’s aircraft carriers would be sidelined at the outset of the war. They are simply too expensive, too irreplaceable, and too vulnerable to China’s robust arsenal of A2/AD weapons. 

Despite these facts, the US government has invested considerable money into this platform. Further, it has become a cultural icon in the United States. 

Thus, the likelihood that anyone in power in Washington would be willing to drop the flat top in favor of more relevant weapons systems is low. Instead, these monstrosities would be tasked with ancillary missions in areas of the world where US enemies did not possess A2/AD systems.

Of course, the bigger issue for the aircraft carriers is that they are far more expensive and complex than the A2/AD weapons that threaten them. What’s more, those A2/AD systems are easy to proliferate. So, China or Russia could easily hand this technology off to other American rivals, such as Iran or North Korea or Venezuela. Any of these rival states could, in turn, give the A2/AD capabilities over to non-state actors aligned with them. 

For example, Iran has spent the last decade building up the capabilities of the Houthi Rebels based in Yemen. Today, the Houthis are terrorizing the high seas by attacking major global shipping routes in the Red Sea and Strait of Bab El-Mandeb. The Houthis already possess an impressive array of drones given to them by Iran that pose a certain level of danger to US warships. 

Should the Iranians (or Chinese or Russians) hand off the advanced A2/AD systems they possess to the Houthis, the Yemen-based Shiite Islamist terrorist group could further deny US aircraft carriers another area of operation.

The point is that the A2/AD threat is not going away. It is only becoming more advanced. And with each year that the A2/AD threat to US surface warships increases, the usefulness of those surface warships—notably aircraft carriers—diminishes to such a point that they become sunk costs, both in terms of economics as well as in terms of strategy. 

Even non-state actors, like the Houthis, could field A2/AD systems that could shield them from the US Navy’s wrath. 

For those who agree that A2/AD represents a real threat to the US Navy’s aircraft carriers but that those carriers can simply be used for other, less threatening missions, don’t kid yourselves. Once it becomes common knowledge among America’s rivals that the crown jewels of the US surface fleet can be held hostage by relatively cheap A2/AD systems, every single US foe will acquire these systems. 

Overnight, the carriers and other surface warships will no longer be the great projectors of American military power into distant lands. Instead, they will become the equivalent of a strategic paperweight. These expensive and complex systems will have less and less to do, negating any justification for their cost. 

That is, until the US military can develop effective countermeasures to the growing coterie of A2/AD systems around the world. Things like creating advanced fleets of drones to conduct long-range offensive operations in A2/AD bubbles, building workable hypersonic weapons to overcome—and destroy—any A2/AD systems that exist, constructing smaller and more maneuverable surface ships while expanding the Navy’s submarine fleet, these are all moves that will stunt and overcome the growing A2/AD threat.

Once the A2/AD threat can be mitigated, when the US military is certain it can survive prolonged contact with an enemy force in the era of A2/AD systems, only then can the Navy consider deploying its larger legacy platforms, like the aircraft carriers, into this contested battlespace. But until these necessary adaptations occur, the US Navy’s most iconic warships, its carriers, will be kept out of the fray as a wasting asset. 

The carrier's absence will leave a massive gap in America’s strategic capabilities. A gap that America’s enemies, such as China, will happily exploit.

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Can F-16 Fighters Win the War for Ukraine? Ukraine has lost the war with Russia. Whatever happens next—no matter what Western media sources may claim—the Ukrainians will not defeat the Russians, who are entrenched in their positions in Eastern Ukraine and in Crimea. The best Kyiv’s desperate leaders can hope for is to achieve a stalemate via negotiated settlement. 

But that is not what Western leaders are advising their Ukrainian clients to seek out from Russia. Instead, Western leaders are filling the Ukrainians’ minds with the siren song of airpower. 

After last year’s ode to main battle tanks from NATO nations did little to alter the direction of the war at the strategic level, one would have thought that both NATO and the Ukrainians would have learned their lesson. 

No weapons system can save Ukraine from the realities of Russian military and industrial power or from the even more painful realities of geography. 

Reason, of course, is the first victim of warfare. 

Even though NATO provided Leopard-2s and Challenger-2 tanks—to say nothing of the fact that America’s much promised Abrams tanks have yet to arrive in any substantial numbers—have done little to sway events in Ukraine’s favor, Kiev is now told that F-16 fighter jets will do the trick. 

To be clear: the F-16s will make no difference for multiple reasons.

First, these systems are secondhand warplanes that are at the end of their life cycles. Being old and sent into high-tempo aerial combat is not going to bode well for the Ukrainians. 

Second, they are being given a miniscule amount of the aging F-16s meaning these systems will not make a substantial difference. 

Third, it will take four-to-five years to fully train Ukrainian pilots to properly fly the warplanes in question. By that time, the war will have fundamentally shifted, and Russia will probably have an even stronger hand. 

Further, the older F-16s are not a match against Russia’s next generation warplanes. They might be able to be deployed for ground cover missions but these operations would be limited and hardly worth the headache. As my colleague at the Asia Times wrote a year ago on this subject, “Used F-16s at the end of their life, are not really going the war chessboard.” That was true in 2023. It is truer today in 2024. 

The sad fact is, though, Ukraine has become a dumping ground for old NATO equipment. Just look at the much-ballyhooed tanks that NATO has showered Ukraine with. 

The French have poured in lightly armored French-built AMX-10RC. These vehicles are antiques from the 1970s—and the Ukrainian military deemed them to be “unsuitable” for the combat operations that have defined the Ukraine War. 

Nevertheless, the French sent them by planeload into Ukraine. 

The handful of British Challenger-2 tanks were also older variants. The 14 or so advanced German-built Leopard-2 main battle tanks were insufficient in number to do much more than get in the way on the Ukrainian battlefield (after it took far longer than the Ukrainians expected to get these units into position). 

Lastly, the Americans promised an astonishing 31 M1 Abrams tanks…only to admit shortly after they declared that these war machines were being given to the Ukrainians that the bulk of the shipment would be composed of out-of-order and older variants because the US arsenal lacked adequate numbers of more modern variants of the Abrams.

So, there is a pattern to NATO aid in this conflict. The aid is almost always insufficient to the task at hand. Just as with the tanks, the systems being promised are too old to be useful and are never given over in abundance (because the West lacks sufficient numbers of any major weapons platform, thanks in large part to the shabby state the defense industrial base is in). What’s more, they rarely arrive in a timely fashion. All this leads to the same dreadful place: no weapon system given to Ukraine by NATO will turn the tide of the war. 

Rather than cling onto the delusion that Ukraine’s slipshod, underdog army is going to somehow overcome the numerical and technological advantages of the Russian military and liberate the Russian enclaves of Eastern Ukraine or Crimea, Kiev’s leaders should have been feverishly negotiating with their Russian counterparts for a ceasefire before Moscow decides to simply ground down the Ukrainians. 

No amount of F-16s, at this point in the war, will help. 

Washington and Brussels should stop overpromising and under-delivering to the Ukrainians. They’re getting innocent Ukrainians killed and needlessly dragging on the war. Negotiate an end to the war and quit trying to find and use a NATO silver bullet. NATO’s arsenal of democracy has run empty and replacements aren’t coming anytime soon.

Brandon J. Weichert is a former Congressional staffer and geopolitical analyst who is a contributor at The Washington Times, as well as at American Greatness and the Asia Times. He is the author of Winning Space: How America Remains a Superpower (Republic Book Publishers), Biohacked: China’s Race to Control Life, and The Shadow War: Iran’s Quest for Supremacy. Weichert can be followed via Twitter @WeTheBrandon.

Summary: As the Russo-Ukraine War extends into its third year, Russia's military shortcomings are increasingly evident, particularly in its failure to dominate the airspace over Ukraine. This situation highlights the limitations of Russia's air force and its reliance on the Sukhoi Su-57, a fifth-generation fighter jet with significant potential but plagued by production delays and technical issues. Despite its advanced capabilities and potential role in enhancing Russian air superiority, only a small number have been deployed. The Su-57's struggles reflect broader challenges in Russia's military operations, even as it gains pop culture prominence in films like "Top Gun: Maverick."

With the Russo-Ukraine War entering its third year, Russia’s military struggles are clear to see. 

The war has become a conflict of attrition. Russia is not gaining meaningful amounts of territory, and surprisingly, it is failing to control the airspace above Ukraine. That failure emphasizes the shortcomings of Russia’s air force. It draws attention to the jets at Russia’s disposal – and the jets not at Russia’s disposal, namely, the fifth-generation Sukhoi Su-57.

The Su-57 is a fifth-generation multirole fighter. The jet’s first flight took place in 2010, yet all these years later, only 32 have been built. (Production began in 2019.)

Consistent setbacks and delays have hampered the Su-57s production, but even the completed aircraft often fail to impress, as Alex Hollings of Sandboxx News wrote: 

“Radar cross-sections (RCS) are subject to a great deal of debate online and should always be taken with a grain of salt, but expert assessments of the Su-57 suggest that it boasts an RCS of about .5 square meters – which is about the same as a 4th generation F/A-18 Super Hornet when flying without ordnance and 5,000 times bigger than the F-22 Raptor.”

Hollings continued, “Stealthy woes aren’t the Su-57s only problem – delays in Russia’s 5th generation engine program have left its Felon fleet operating the same AL-41F1 engines found in Russia’s non-stealth but highly capable 4th generation Su-35S. A Rand Corporation analysis of the aircraft’s advanced 360-degree sensor suite posits that the system itself remains incomplete as well, likely hindered by international sanctions placed on Russia following its 2014 invasion of Ukraine.”

Still, the Su-57 is a capable aircraft, as defense expert Christian Orr writes: 

“All of these woes plaguing the Su-57 doesn’t mean the F-22 or F-35 pilots – or especially pilots of the 4th generation fighter planes – can afford to take [the Su-57] lightly.” 

Indeed, the Su-57 is still an advanced fighter jet with a 360-degree thrust vectoring control that facilitates nuanced maneuverability. The Su-57 also has impressive speed, maxing out around Mach 2. 

Despite the flaws, the Su-57 would likely make a positive contribution to Russian objectives in the skies over Ukraine – if the Russians could only bring it to the fight.

While the Su-57 has not appeared regularly in Russian force structures, the jet did appear in the top grossing film of 2022, Top Gun: Maverick. Well, technically the jet featured was not acknowledged as the Su-57, and the operator remained unidentified. But the jet depicted was clearly the Su-57, albeit in CGI form. 

In Top Gun, the Su-57 appears menacingly at the film’s climax, flying over Tom Cruise’s shoulder as he pilots a resurrected F-14 Tomcat. The Su-57 is depicted as lethal and advanced, earning the respect of Cruise’s character. Cruise manages, of course, to defeat two Su-57s when they both come in for a close look at Cruise.

Keep an eye out for the Su-57 in the Top Gun 3, if not over the skies of Ukraine.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.

China’s economy is in a grim place these days, far from the past when many journalists and politicians praised Beijing’s policies and spoke of that economy’s imminent dominance. Beijing just released a 5 percent real growth target for 2024, the same pace as last year. Much of the forecasting community is rightfully skeptical of whether that kind of growth is possible. A lot of skepticism remains over last year’s figure. Whether China hits the target or not hardly makes a difference. The important point is that 5 percent is only about half the growth pace averaged in past years. Something clearly has gone wrong.

Very little in Chinese economics has looked good since the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020. The nation’s population and, critically, its labor force are shrinking. A property crisis continues to weigh on building, home buying, and real estate values, and hence on the consumer as well as business confidence. China’s once-exuberant consumers remain reluctant to spend. Private businesses have reduced their levels of investment, expansion, and hiring. A huge overhang of questionable debt—from defunct developers as well as local governments that have long depended for revenues on real estate development—has hamstrung the ability of Chinese finance to support economic growth. Meanwhile, Western and Japanese businesses continue to diversify supply chains away from China, slowing the growth of buying and the flow of investment money into the country. Accordingly, Chinese exports—the economy’s mainstay—have suffered, and though shipments rose in the opening months of 2024, they remain anemic compared with past years. Meanwhile, governments in Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo have replaced their former support for Chinese development with open hostility.

In this sorry picture, there is plenty of blame to go around. China’s property developers were less than prudent in their use of debt and the locations for some of their projects. If American, European, and Japanese businesses had shown good judgment, they would never have created such a heavy dependence on China in the first place and would not have had to engineer a withdrawal. Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo should have known from the start that once China achieved sufficient development, Beijing would pursue its interests more aggressively. However, for all the mistakes of others, most of the blame for China’s problems belongs to the nation’s leadership in Beijing.

Take China’s demographic problem. Birth rates have been so low for so long that China lacks a sufficient flow of young people into the workforce to replace the large numbers now retiring. A limited workforce has already constrained production potentials and will do so increasingly for some time to come. This is very different from China’s gloried economic past. When China first opened its economy in the late 1970s, the country had an abundance of working-age people eager for gainful employment. In no small respect, this demographic reality powered the economy’s astounding growth of almost 10 percent a year, year after year. But with this age cohort retiring and few replacements, the older, favorable demographic has turned on its head.

Though much of the developed world faces the same problem, China’s situation is especially severe, largely because of Beijing’s policies. When the country first opened to the world, then-President Deng Xiaoping wanted to free up as much of the labor force as possible. To relieve potential workers from family obligations, he promulgated the “one-child policy,” effectively making it a crime for a family to have more than one child. It worked for economic growth for a long while, but Deng failed to consider its long-term implications. His policy lies at the root of today’s severe shortage of young workers. In recent years, Beijing has recognized the problem and rescinded the one-child rule. However, after years of dominating family decisionmaking, it has become part of Chinese culture. The recent change in the law has produced no increase in Chinese fertility rates, which continue to fall. Even if it did raise fertility rates, it would take fifteen to twenty years to make a difference in China’s available workforce.

Another policy error has compounded this demographic problem. Since the future of high technology demands a highly educated workforce, China has poured funds into higher education for years. It graduated engineers and scientists at such a rapid rate that American commentators routinely point to the figures with quavering voices and fearful eyes. Had China also adjusted its economy toward services, it would have worked well. But that did not happen. Instead, China’s economy continues to depend in no small measure on lower-skilled and low-technology products. Assembling iPads does not require a degree in electronic engineering, and certainly, neither does making shirts for the American market. Because of this, China, while suffering a labor shortage in manufacturing, also faces a surplus of college graduates. Today in China, factory owners go begging for workers, while the country records a nearly 20 percent youth unemployment rate. The rate is so embarrassing that Beijing has discontinued publishing such statistics.

Policy failures also surround the severity of the country’s property crisis. These began quite some time ago when Beijing enthusiastically encouraged residential development, pushing local governments to get involved and providing easy credit for developers and homebuyers. Because China had a housing shortage in the late twentieth century, this policy seemed well-founded. But Beijing carried on with it even after the housing stock had caught up with the nation’s needs. At its height, residential real estate development amounted to an astronomical 30 percent of the economy. Developers, following Beijing’s lead, became ever more leveraged and pursued projects in dubious locations. Then, in 2020, Beijing abruptly removed the support, so fast, in fact, that neither developers nor homebuyers had time to adjust. Failures were inevitable. They began in 2021, with the announcement by the giant developer Evergrande that it could not service its some $300 billion in liabilities.

In response to this emergency, Beijing did nothing, and so the crisis metastasized. The growing overhang of questionable debt left Chinese banks and other financial institutions unable to support new investments in any area of the economy. With millions of homebuyers who had prepaid apartments that were never constructed, more bankruptcies ensued. Confidence throughout the household sector cratered. Few were willing to put money at risk, buying rates fell, and with the drop in demand, so did real estate prices. The damage that declining property values did to household wealth depressed confidence and, with it, anyone’s willingness to spend. By the time Beijing finally acted late last year, some twenty-four months after the problems first became evident, the remedies they offered were far from sufficient to address a problem that had already festered for years.

Nor are these policy mistakes, severe as they are, all that Beijing has done to screw up China’s economy. Its zero-COVID policy exacerbated much that was already wrong. That policy kept China under lockdowns and quarantines long after the rest of the world began its recovery from the pandemic. Indeed, Beijing waited until early 2023 before it lifted severe restrictions on productive activity and on the movement of people and goods. These restrictions’ legacy has left households less confident than ever in the security of their finances and incomes and made them even more reluctant to consume than they were, much less make an investment in a new home. Private Chinese businesses, too, have lost confidence in the future and cut back on any expansion plans. It did not help that Xi Jinping, during the lockdowns, went out of his way to denigrate private business owners for following the interests of their firms instead of those of the Chinese Communist Party. Xi, now desperate to get the economy moving, has since changed his tune, referring to these business owners as “our own people,” but the damage was done.

The shutdowns also disillusioned Japanese, American, and European businesses about sourcing from and investing in China. Earlier in China’s development, businesspeople all around the world not only saw the attraction of low Chinese wages but also the reliability of Chinese operations. They met the terms of the contracts and delivered on time. Attitudes had begun to change even before the pandemic. Beijing’s insistence that foreign firms operating in China had to have a Chinese partner to whom they had to transfer technologies and trade secrets began to chafe increasingly. Chinese production and sourcing also lost appeal due to its reputation for bullying. Beijing has resorted to punitive tariffs on unrelated issues. It imposed severe duties on Australian goods in retaliation for Canberra’s questions about the origins of COVID-19. It Beijing threatened to cut off supplies of rare earth elements to Japan over a sovereignty dispute in the East China Sea. On top of these irritants, the seemingly arbitrary shipping interruptions greatly reinforced doubts about the once-revered reliability of Chinese sourcing.

Beijing also played its cards wrong with Washington, Brussels, and Tokyo. Not too long ago, China had considerable goodwill with all these nations. There was widespread support for Chinese development. It was thought that it would bring China into the community of nations as a positive economic and diplomatic influence. Had Beijing resisted the impulse to bully and use its blunt power at every turn, it might have kept that goodwill for longer. However, having reached for its guns and shown no interest in compromise with any of its trading partners, China has generated considerable hostility in all these capitals. Tokyo is leading a joint effort of G-7 nations to procure rare earth elements outside China. Brussels is seeking penalties against China for dumping underpriced products on European markets. Washington has blocked China’s trade in high-technology items and has forbidden American investments in Chinese technology. None of this helps China’s economic prospects.

China’s leadership seems to have awakened to the need to help the economy. It has recently announced a one trillion yuan ($139 billion) program to stimulate economic activity. It is far from certain that this program will get the economy back on track. Its focus on the kinds of huge infrastructure projects China has previously promoted suggests that Beijing is not yet aware of the roots of the economy’s problems. Nor is it apparent that such projects will pay off as they once did. Massive infrastructure projects in less developed economies tend to have huge returns, but that is not as certain in the more fully developed economy China has become. A “tell” that Beijing may be aware of these constraints lies in its decision to use what it describes as “ultralong” bonds to finance the infrastructure spending. Long financing maturities announce that Beijing does not expect a payoff any time soon.

It is not a pretty picture. Although there is no indication that China will implode or cease to be a major economic and diplomatic power, these facts should nonetheless force a major rethink of all forecasts of imminent Chinese dominance.

Milton Ezrati is a contributing editor at The National Interest, an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Human Capital at the University at Buffalo (SUNY), and chief economist for Vested, the New York-based communications firm. His latest books are Thirty Tomorrows: The Next Three Decades of Globalization, Demographics, and How We Will Live and Bite-Sized Investing.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Ecuador is in the midst of a dire security crisis as violent drug gangs wreak havoc on the once-peaceful Andean country, prompting a spike in migrant outflows to the United States as well as the consolidation of a new illicit narcotics hub in South America. The United States has responded to Ecuador’s rapid decline in stability by ramping up coordination and engagement with the government of President Daniel Noboa. However, a decision by the Biden administration to explicitly link support for Ecuador to the war in Ukraine has put Ecuador in an even more vulnerable position.

What happens in Ecuador does not stay in Ecuador. Drug trafficking organizations from across the globe have worked to solidify their hold in Ecuador and create a new narcotics trafficking center in South America, ramping up the flow of deadly illegal drugs into the United States. At the same time, the wave of violence in Ecuador is exacerbating the region’s migratory crisis, with a 368 percent increase in Ecuadorians arriving at the U.S. border from 2022 to 2023. Additionally, over the past several years, China and Russia have turned Ecuador into a critical political and economic foothold, making the country’s current crisis a unique opportunity for the United States to regain dwindling influence in its hemisphere.

All of this led the United States to rightly offer support to Ecuador in recent months as it engages in a perilous fight against violent drug traffickers. A planned weapons swap was a key pillar of the renewed effort by the United States to support Ecuador by empowering its underequipped security forces. Under the deal, the United States would have sent Ecuador $200 million in modern weaponry in exchange for Ecuador’s aging Soviet-era equipment, including Mi-8 and Mi-17 helicopters, BM-21 Grad multiple rocket launchers, and Strela-2 and Igla man-portable air defense systems.

The Biden administration planned to send these weapons to Ukraine and support the fight against Russia’s invasion. It is unclear how useful Soviet-era equipment dubbed as “junk” by Noboa would be to Ukraine. Ecuador was reportedly aware that the United States would send its weapons to Ukraine, but Noboa says he was caught off guard when this was made public by the Biden administration.

The Biden administration’s diplomatic missteps and tunnel vision have now put Ecuador in an even more precarious position as its government struggles to regain control from violent drug gangs. Predictably, Russia, a top trading partner for Ecuador, has retaliated against the small South American country by imposing a painful ban on a series of key agricultural imports from the small South American nation. Ecuador’s fragile economy cannot afford to sustain such a blow, particularly as Noboa works to fund a needed increase in security spending for the country. Unsurprisingly, Ecuador has called off the weapons swap with the United States, leaving it to contend with Russia’s punishing trade restrictions and a lack of new U.S. equipment.

In short, the Biden administration’s handling of this situation has been an unmitigated disaster. The effort has displayed a lack of seriousness from the Biden administration that plays into negative stereotypes about inconstant U.S. engagement in Latin America. The entire episode, from the country’s security crisis to the collapse of the weapons deal, exhibits the troubling consequences of U.S. inattention to its hemisphere. As conflicts much further away absorb Washington’s attention, the Biden administration has stood by as counternarcotics capabilities are actively dismantled by governments from Mexico to Colombia, flooding our hemisphere and countries like Ecuador with criminality.

Ecuador’s decision to call off the weapons deal also shows how a lack of U.S. engagement has given Moscow the power to set the terms of U.S. cooperation with its neighbors and otherwise willing partners. Ecuador remains economically beholden to Russia in part because the United States has refused to move on a trade agreement with the country in recent years. And Russia’s influence in the region dwindles in comparison to China’s. Washington’s number one adversary has taken full advantage of the U.S. absence from Latin America. If U.S.-China tensions do boil over on the other side of the Pacific, Beijing will leverage its regional influence in much the same way Moscow has done in Ecuador, but on a much larger and more dangerous level.  

It is not too late to enact a course correction. Washington should handle crises in the Western Hemisphere with the seriousness and attention they deserve. In the case of Ecuador, the United States must ensure that its support for Ukraine does not come at the cost of confronting threats to security and stability in its own hemisphere. To this end, congressional oversight and pressure should be brought to bear. Going forward, a new U.S. administration must work to ensure that neither Moscow nor Beijing are in a position to veto U.S. engagement with our neighbors.

Andres Martinez-Fernandez is a senior policy analyst at the Heritage Foundation’s Allison Center for National Security. Follow him on X @AndresMartFern.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Last month, the European Union introduced its thirteenth sanctions package against Moscow. In 2021, before the invasion of Ukraine, Russia ranked among Europe’s top trading partners. Two-way commerce in goods and services totaled €257 billion. By December 2023, sanctions had reduced these trade flows by more than two-thirds. As the second anniversary of Russia’s invasion has passed, it’s worth asking what can actually be achieved by further constricting two-way commerce.

History may already have answers to this important question. Over the past century (and stretching back to the Napoleonic era), economic sanctions have sought objectives echoing criminal law: deterrence, rehabilitation, deprivation, and retribution. How do these objectives stack up in the current case of Russia? Deterrence has been elusive. In 1960, there were twenty active sanctions cases worldwide. By 2014, that number had reached 170. This sharp escalation indicates that past episodes did not seriously deter new offenders—neither countries that abused human rights, staged military coups, sought nuclear weapons, nor invaded their neighbors. After Russia seized Crimea in 2014, the tepid U.S.-EU sanctions package hurt individual Russian firms and a few oligarchs but did not deter Putin’s massive assault against Ukraine in February 2022. Threats President Biden and European leaders voiced in the weeks before the invasion likewise had no impact on Putin’s war plans.

The rehabilitation record since 1914 shows instances of success through economic sanctions but seldom in cases against major or even middle-sized powers. Analysis by the Peterson Institute indicates that sanctions achieved some (rarely all) of the enactors’ foreign policy goals in just a third of cases since the First World War. However, successes are concentrated in sanctions against small countries with weak governments:. Regime change in Chile in 1973 and the reversal of the Ivory Coast coup in 2000 are illustrative.

Contrary to those successes, strong sanctions against Saddam Hussein in Iraq and the ayatollahs in Iran did not change their territorial or nuclear objectives. Even against small autocratic countries, notably Cuba and North Korea, decades of sanctions have not yielded rehabilitation. Venezuela, under the grip of dictator Nicolas Maduro, now threatens neighboring Guyana despite a multitude of U.S. sanctions. For Ukraine, history records no instances where economic sanctions have rehabilitated the military goals of a major power—not Germany and its allies in the First World War, not Germany and Japan in the Second World War, not China in the Korean War, not the USSR in the Cold War, and not Russia in the Ukraine War.

That leaves deprivation and retribution as reasonable objectives for sanctions against Russia. Consider deprivation. Russia has lost direct access to European, American, and other allied markets for a wide range of military components. In turn, Russia has repurposed domestic factories to produce military rather than civilian goods—tanks rather than autos—while seeking transshipments through friendly or neutral intermediaries such as Kazakhstan, China, and Turkey. Russia has also purchased substitute drones and artillery shells from Iran and North Korea and basic semiconductors from China. While deprivation is a worthy goal and accompanies all wartime sanctions, troublesome leakages must be expected for a target with the geographic and economic magnitude of Russia.

The remaining objective is retribution—punishment for its own sake. At the outset of the invasion, the United States and EU imposed far stronger sanctions on finance and trade than Russia ever expected. It was widely predicted that the Russian economy would suffer a double-digit decline. To be sure, the Moscow stock market and the ruble both collapsed, but they soon recovered. As the IMF recently reported, the Russian economy contracted only 1.2 percent in 2022 and even grew 3.6 percent in 2023. This reflected both Russia’s ability to sell huge volumes of oil at discounted rates to its friends and the stimulus of war production.

But it would be wrong to conclude that ordinary Russians escaped Western retribution. Shortages are widespread, and as the war drags on, they are getting worse. Retribution seeks to punish officials and oligarchs. However, elites can always provide for themselves and pass on the suffering to lesser mortals. This is the experience of multiple sanctions episodes. During the First World War, some 300,000 persons in Central Europe died from the Allied naval blockade. In contemporary times, the sad story finds echoes in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Zimbabwe, Venezuela, and today Russia.

U.S. and EU sanctions have clearly inflicted misery on ordinary citizens. It must be asked whether retribution for its own sake accomplishes the military and economic aims of Washington and Brussels. Working-class people have no political power, and yet political elites threaten their livelihoods as part of a broader global power struggle. Russian, European, and American workers all have practically no say in the trade actions their leaders choose to enact, yet they bear the eventual consequences. Decades of research and historical insight attest to the harm inflicted by punitive sanctions. National leaders should put time and effort into designing alternative policies to punish international wrongdoing.

Gary Hufbauer is a Nonresident Senior Fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics.

Image: Shutterstock.com. 

Summary: The U.S. Navy's Fiscal Year 2025 budget request highlights a strategic shift towards prioritizing current operations, personnel, and innovative technologies like unmanned systems. With a modest 0.7% increase to $257.6 billion, the plan reduces the research and development budget by 2.7% and military construction by over 26%. The Navy will request funding for six new warships, down from seven, emphasizing readiness and adaptability to immediate threats, particularly from China. Major programs like the F/A-XX next-generation strike fighter see funding cuts, while investments in current aircraft and a focus on the Virginia-class submarine program reflect a balanced approach to maintaining naval dominance.

The U.S. Navy in its latest budget request moved several modernization programs to the proverbial backburner. The service will trim its research and development budget by 2.7% while cutting its military construction spending by more than one-quarter (26.1%). 

According to its Fiscal Year 2025 budget request, the Navy will only request six new warships, down from a previously planned seven.

The request calls for $257.6 billion in FY25 for the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. That figure is up 0.7% from the FY24 request, which Congress has yet to pass more than five months into the fiscal year. The Department of Defense's overall spending plan has also been capped at a 1% increase compared to FY24 under the Fiscal Responsibility Act, which dictates FY24 and FY25 spending levels.

Navy officials intend to prioritize current operations and personnel, along with small unmanned systems and the Pentagon-led Replicator program, which could yield faster results for the fleet, Defense News reported. The service remains focused on the near-term. It considers the 2020s a decade of concern, especially due to the potential for China to invade Taiwan.

"Our request prioritizes readiness and people in a constrained topline. The DON strategically allocates resources to our operations and readiness accounts to position the Nation's Naval Force forward in defense of our interests today,” the Department of the Navy announced March 11. “It enables our Naval and Marine forces to respond to contingencies, enhance interoperability with allied navies, and adapt to the emerging threats and opportunities in the maritime domain. 

“Our request continues to show we are developing strong warfighting teams, recruiting/retaining talented people, and ensuring our quality of service meets the highest standards." 

About $1 billion in funding for the development of the U.S. Navy's next-generation strike fighter has been delayed – a move senior leadership said was necessary to maintain readiness.

The FY25 budget requests include $16.2 billion for the procurement of 75 aircraft along with modifications, spares, and support equipment. These include thirteen F-35Cs, thirteen F-35Bs, and fifteen CH-53Ks. 

The figure is down from the requested $17.3 billion in FY24 that covered 88 aircraft, including nineteen F-35Cs and sixteen F-35Bs.

More significantly, the Navy will "rephase" the development of the F/A-XX across the Future Years Defense Plan, budget documents show. The FY24 budget sought $1.5 billion to develop and design the future aircraft and its enabling technology, but for FY25, the U.S. Navy has only called for a third of that.

"We're still committed to the F/A-XX," Rear Adm. Ben Reynolds, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget and director of the USN Fiscal Management Division, said on March 8, Janes reported. "We're rephasing as the technology matures."

The F/A-XX is intended to replace the F/A-18 Super Hornet. The scaled-back budget is likely to be unwelcome news to top aerospace contractors, but Lockheed Martin might be pleased that the U.S. Navy remains on track to acquire eighty-two F-35Cs and eighty-two F-35Bs across the Future Years Defense Program.

"We're absolutely committed to the capacity and lethality of the carrier wing," Reynolds also told reporters last week. "The capacity [and] the firepower of the air wing is orders of magnitude above anything else that [the Defense Department] has."

That Sinking Feeling 

The U.S. Navy's FY25 budget request includes money for just one Virginia-class attack submarine instead of the planned two. The service has been buying attack subs at a rate of two per year since FY11, but industry has not kept up in recent years, delivering closer to an average of 1.2 boats annually. The boats set to be delivered this year are arriving on average 30 months late, and the Navy has delayed several major shipbuilding and modernization efforts. In that context, the sea service opted to save some $4 billion in the FY25 spending plan by nixing the second Virginia-class sub.

"We did reduce the funding to one Virginia-class submarine in FY25. But we maintain the funding for nine out of the planned 10 Virginia class [during the five-year FYDP]," Under Secretary Erik Raven told reporters.

The one FY25 Virginia-class boat delivered this year will be the first of the new Block VI design.

The Navy also requested $586.9 million for its SSN(X) next-generation attack submarine design and development efforts. That is up from the $544.7 million it requested in FY24. 

The service requested $102.7 million for its DDG(X) next-generation destroyer concept, down from FY24's $187.4 million request.

Author Experience and Expertise: Peter Suciu 

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

Summary: The U.S. Navy's recent decision to reallocate about $1 billion in funds earmarked for the development of the F/A-XX, a sixth-generation strike fighter, highlights the ongoing tension between maintaining current military readiness and investing in future capabilities. This move, driven by budgetary constraints and the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023, delays significant progress on the F/A-XX, impacting the timelines for potential contracts with major aerospace contractors like Boeing, Lockheed Martin, and Northrop Grumman. The Navy's prioritization of current operational readiness over long-term modernization efforts, despite a defense spending cap that significantly exceeds that of its nearest competitors, China and Russia, underscores the strategic challenges faced in balancing immediate needs with future threats.

The U.S. Navy announced yesterday that it will withhold about $1 billion in funds that were earmarked for the F/A-XX project. Navy leadership said the decision to reallocate funds away from the effort to develop a sixth-generation strike fighter reflects the priority of current readiness levels over modernization efforts.

“The funding delay means any major decisions about awarding a contract on the program will be kicked down the road,” Breaking Defense reported, “unwelcome news to the country’s top three aerospace prime contractors – Boeing, Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman – which have all signaled their intent to fight for a production contract.”

“We’re absolutely committed to the capacity and lethality of the carrier wing,” said Rear Adm. Ben Reynolds, deputy assistant secretary of the Navy for budget. “The capacity, the firepower of the air wing is orders of magnitude above anything else that [the Defense Department] has.”

The F/A-XX was originally projected to receive about $1.5 billion in Fiscal Year 2025, but constraints from the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 2023 “forced the Navy to disperse much of that money into future budgets,” so the F/A-XX was slashed. 

“The FRA, signed into law last June, provides an FY25 defense spending cap of $895 billion, and the Navy and Marine Corps’ share of that topline under the newly-released budget is $257.6 billion,” Breaking Defense added in its report. 

For perspective, consider that the $895 billion defense spending cap is about three times higher than the military spending of second-place China, and ten times as much as the world’s third-biggest defense spender, Russia. 

“In terms of what comes at the top of the list, it is readiness. It is people. It is the today issues that we have to get on top of,” Under Secretary of the Navy Erik Raven told reporters. “Where our guidance directs us to take risks is in future modernization.”

The F/A-XX is a next-generation strike fighter project that will eventually phase out the F/A-18 Super Hornet. Details about the F/A-XX’s specifications have not been made public. Pentagon officials have suggested that the Navy and Air Force will not collaborate on a joint design as they did with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Last summer, a spokesperson said the Navy had “identified operational reach, capacity, long range kill chains, autonomy, and next generation survivability as key enablers in the Air Wing of the Future and supporting Family of Systems.” That’s a lot of military-industrial marketing-speak, but we can expect the F/A-XX to be significantly more advanced than the F-22 or F-35. 

The Navy has pared down its F/A-18 purchases with the expectation that the F/A-XX will come online soon. With F/A-XX development delayed, the decision to stop buying new F/A-18s will probably face renewed scrutiny.

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken.