Defence`s Feeds

During the third Helicopter Tactics Instructors Course (HTIC), aircrew members from across Europe were working hard to master their skills. With successful delivery of the ground and simulator phase at RAF Linton-on-Ouse in the UK, and the phase at Vidsel test range near Lulea in northern Sweden, twelve student instructors from Austria, Germany, Sweden and the UK graduated from the course with Bronze or Silver HTI qualifications, corresponding to their experience and skills level.

It was the first case that the HTIC was delivered under an EDA Category B Programme with its own approved Programme Arrangement signed in March 2015 by Germany, Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The HTIC as a multinational tactical training course involved four helicopter types: Austrian Kiowa, Swedish Air Force Blackhawk and NH90, Chinook from the UK. It engaged more than one hundred military and civilian staff, and included more than two hundred hours of live flying.

The aim of HTIC is to teach experienced helicopter aircrew how to instruct tactics in the air and on the ground. It covers topics such as fighter jets evasion, electronic warfare against surface to air radar threats, convoy escort, vehicle check points and operating in the low-tech threat environment.  

A wide range of assets to provide the correct learning environment were required. The excellent support was provided by the Swedish Armed Forces with their Gripen fighter jets from 211 and 212 Squadron, the SK60 trainer aircraft and the ground-based radar defence systems as well as by the UK with their Hawk aircraft from 100 Squadron.

For the first time, the Staff Instructors included graduates from the previous courses. The two returning Swedish Instructors prove that the course can be self-sustaining and is able to achieve its aim of developing an internationally recognised cadre of tactics instructors who, in turn, can continue to deliver courses in the future. 

The HTIC is a high-value, intensive course that forges close links between all participants, creating a tight-knit community. Experience and knowledge are shared openly and honestly, and working on the principle of adopting best practices, continual improvement and standardisation serve as a constant theme. Everyone works together, harmonising tactics, techniques and procedures, with ever closer interoperability being the final goal. Through this international training, crews prepare for the coalition operations for the future. They train the way they fight so that they can fight the way they have trained – together! 

More information: 

• Helicopter Initiatives project page
• News "Third helicopter tactics instructor course launched" (2 September 2015) 
• The EAATTC15-3 factsheet is available here
• More information on the EATF is available here 

The public hearing will present an overview of the current CSDP partnerships with third countries and organisations, the possibilities of evolution and general tendencies.
Location : Altiero Spinelli 1G-2
Programme
Programme
Presentations
Presentation by Rory Keane, Head of the UN Liaison Office for Peace and Security, Brussels
Presentation by Prof. Dr. Joachim A. Koops, Dean of Vesalius College & Director, Global Governance Institute (GGI)
Source : © European Union, 2015 - EP

Consider a group of cavemen leaving the cave to go hunting a dinosaur. The dinosaur is bigger, stronger and faster. Death is certain for the cavemen and yet with spears and rocks the dinosaur is felled – the team splitting into three groups and surrounding the dinosaur without a

In the aftermath of the November 13 attacks in Paris, one is left to wonder if these incidents, happening as they did in the midst of the worst humanitarian crisis of the century, were by accident or design. Millions of refugees have been fleeing the Middle East and North Africa h

We are currently conducting some research exploring the current use and future applications for additive manufacturing (AM) processes in the defence and aerospace sector.<

The decline (by almost a fifth) in the area of land in Afghanistan planted with opium poppy in 2015 came as a surprise to many. Poppy cultivation in Afghanistan had been on the rise since 2010, when an opium poppy blight halved opium production and triggered a subsequent hike in opium prices. However, the decline is largely due, it seems, to natural causes – crop failure in the traditional opium-growing heartland of the south – and market fluctuation, rather than anything the government or outside agencies have done. Moreover, the trend was bucked in areas of the north and west, where farmers, especially those living in insecure areas, have been putting more land under poppy cultivation. AAN’s Jelena Bjelica, who has been scrutinising the 2015 UNODC Opium Survey, reports.

The amount of land under opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan fell by 19 per cent in 2015 compared to the record high of 224,000 hectares in 2014. (1) These figures can be found in the 2015 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Opium Survey Executive Summary released on 14 October 2015. The most significant reason for the drop in cultivation appears to have been repeated crop failures in the south and southwest regions of Afghanistan where, traditionally, most of country’s illicit crop has been cultivated. Poor harvests driven by drought and mono-cropping which exhausts the soil and encourages diseases and pests, especially poppy blight, led farmers to sow less of their land with poppy this year than last (see Afghan opium expert David Mansfield’s analysis here) and previous AAN reporting on this from 2010.

Cultivation in the southern region decreased by 20 per cent. In Helmand alone, reported UNODC, cultivation dropped to 86,400 hectares, from the previous year’s 103,240 hectares apparently and in Kandahar, there was a larger relative decrease in cultivation, of 38 per cent (2).

The opium market in Afghanistan does not necessarily play by the standard economic rules when it comes to demand, supply and prices affecting farmers’ planting decisions. In 2014, for example, UNODC thought that the demand for ready cash from those competing in the presidential and parliamentary elections was one reason why cultivation was so high. Opium is also different from other crops because as well as providing an income, when it is dried it can be stored for several years, so also functions as capital and savings. Nevertheless, price and supply do still matter. One key factor behind the reduced cultivation this year, according to the UN and other observers, was the large amount of opium stockpiles.

UNODC also cited increased eradication of poppy crops this year as having reduced the area under cultivation. 40 per cent more land was reported eradicated – from 2,700 hectares in 2014 to 3,760 hectares in 2105. However, that is still a tiny percentage of the overall area under cultivation.

UNODC Regional Representative for Afghanistan and Neighbouring Countries Andrey Avetisyan also said there had been better coordination in the most insecure areas, which led to more eradication in 2015. This was especially the case, he said, during “the spring offensive in Helmand’s Sangin district where, after [Afghan army] operations, the Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan forces eradicated the opium poppy fields immediately.” However, on the seizures side, there has been something of a decline since 2013. The Counter Narcotics Police carried out 3,243 law enforcement operations in 2013, compared to 2,734 operations in 2014 (4) and, by the end of September 2015, had carried out just over 2,000 operations.

A bad harvest

Not only was less land planted with poppy this year, but what was grown had a lower yield. The average opium yield fell to 18.3 kilograms per hectare in 2015, a 36 per cent decline, compared to 28.7 kilograms per hectare in 2014.

Together with the lower opium cultivation, this meant opium production (5) in Afghanistan in 2015 was almost half (48 per cent) of what it had been in 2014; UNODC estimated a 2015 harvest of 3,300 metric tons compared with 6,400 metric tons in 2014.

AAN compared UNODC’s opium yield estimates for the last six years by analysing the data from the annual Afghanistan Opium Surveys in the period of 2009 to 2015. The chart below shows a trend of a gradual decrease in the opium yield over this period. According to a UNODC crop-monitoring expert, the decrease is due to “less rotation of crops in the fields over a period of several years.” This lack of rotation resulted, he said, in poppy plants producing fewer bulbs in 2015 (instead of six to seven on average, this year there were only three to four per plant). UNODC also reported a lower density of crops in the fields. Satellite images clearly show visible patches of soil in some fields that further contribute to a lower yield per hectare. The UNODC expert explained “the decrease of approximately 40,000 hectares could also be [due to] fields left unsown for the crop rotation [being left fallow].”

That lower yield was seen even in Kandahar where (as reported by Associated Press in May 2015), traders had distributed genetically-modified poppy seeds to farmers just before the planting season (in parts of Kandahar and Helmand poppy is planted twice a year). These seeds were supposed to boost the yield and shorten the growth cycle of the plants. According to a UNODC crop expert, the seeds originate in China where legal opium poppy cultivation is undertaken for pharmaceutical use, as is the case in over a dozen countries. “The genetically modified seeds shorten the growth cycle of the plant – to one to two months, instead of five to six months,” the UNODC expert told AAN, “but the resin production is pretty much the same as with the Afghan seeds.” (3)

Average Opium Yield. Table: AAN (based on UNODC Opium Survey Data 2009-2015)

Opium cultivation and insecurity on the rise in the north and west

The national decline in opium cultivation and production was, however, bucked in parts of the north and west. In 2015, farmers in eight provinces (Kabul, Kunar, Baghlan, Faryab, Sar-e Pol, Uruzgan, Badghis and Ghor) sowed more opium than in the previous year. In the north, Faryab and Sar-e Pol had significant increases in cultivation, up by 451 per cent and 70 per cent respectively, while, in the west, Badghis and Ghor’s cultivation increased by 117 per cent and 249 per cent respectively.

Several factors may have been causing this rise. There is a well-documented correlation between insecurity (both physical and human/livelihoods insecurity) and poppy cultivation in Afghanistan, including, for example, by David Mansfield. The reason for this is that opium is a low risk crop (unless repeated mono-cropping has led to failed harvests) in a high-risk environment. It is a natural choice for farmers living with an insurgency.

Looking at insecurity patterns in northern and western provinces where the cultivation has significantly increased, AAN compared district level cultivation and security incidents using data provided by UNODC and an independent organisation observing the security situation in Afghanistan. Quantitative analysis confirmed the correlation between increased insecurity and an increase in poppy cultivation, except in the case of Sayyed district of Sar-e Pol province and Lal wa Sarjangal district of Ghor province.

In Faryab’s Qaisar, Gurziwan and Kohistan districts, where the UNODC data showed a significant increase in cultivation, 360 incidents involving armed opposition groups, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and/or criminals in the period from October 2014 to September 2015 had been recorded. The data set shows that these incidents in the three districts constituted a third of all reported incidents in all the 14 districts of Faryab province. As reported by AAN in April 2014, the Taleban had stormed parts of Qaisar district, occupied villages and swept Afghan National Police (ANP) and Afghan Local Police (ALP) out of their checkpoints. (See AAN previous reporting on rising insecurity in Faryab, in 2014 here and in 2013 here).

For Sar-e Pol province, UNODC recorded a significant increase in poppy cultivation in the district of Sayyad. (6) AAN has previously reported on the Taleban establishing footholds in far-flung areas of Sayyad and Kohistanat districts (see AAN 2015 report here). In Sayyed district, which did not show a significant increase in insecurity, there are indications that the Afghan Local Police (ALP) are themselves involved in cultivation. In a phone interview, a provincial council member from Sar-e Pol told AAN, “This year’s government plan to eradicate opium poppy fields was prevented by the local ALP commander and his sub-commanders, who are supporting the farmers who are growing illicit crop and are protecting them from the government.”

Shifting to the north-western province of Badghis, UNODC data shows three out of its eight districts had a significant increase in poppy cultivation. At the same time, the number of incidents in these districts (Ghormach, Qadis, Ab Kamari) made up a little over half (55 per cent) of the total number of incidents reported for Badghis over a one-year period. The majority of these incidents were related to the armed opposition. (7) The cultivation in Badghis has been steadily on the increase since 2009, reaching a high of over 12,000 hectares this year.

A prominent elder from Badghis described to AAN how farmers had enjoyed “capacity building” in how to grow and harvest poppy in recent years: labourers travelling south to work had brought back skills to their home province. He also blamed the increase in cultivation on the classic dilemma facing farmers in an insurgency-plagued province: try to get non-opium produce to faraway markets (in Herat or Mazar) through insecure areas or wait for the opium traders to come to the door who will buy your harvest from you directly.

In the province of Ghor, a significant increase in opium poppy cultivation was recorded in half of the districts of the province, namely in Chaghcharan, Dawlatyar, Lal wa Sarjangal, Pasaband and Taywara. Since 2012, when Ghor lost its poppy-free status (8), opium poppy cultivation in the province has been steadily on the rise (see previous AAN reports from 2013 here and here). According to available security data, from October 2014 to September 2015, 144 incidents (or 44 per cent of the total number of reported security incidents) in Ghor were recorded in these five districts. (9)

What to plant next year?

Farmers and traders usually wait for the price spike that generally occurs in the autumn before they sell their stocks. By September, however, the farm-gate and traders’ prices of dry opium had already started to increase. The farm-gate price for a kilogram of dry opium was 155 US dollars and the traders’ sale price was 164 US dollars for the same unit that month. Both had increased by 12 per cent compared to the same period in 2014, according to the Afghanistan Drug Price Monitoring Monthly Report, which is jointly compiled by the Afghan Ministry of Counter Narcotics and UNODC Kabul and published in September 2015. If prices continue to rise, this could trigger a new increase in cultivation next year. However, we may see fluctuations in prices in the coming months, says UNODC, given the increased number of security forces along the Tajik-Afghan border who could disrupt regular smuggling routes.

The decline in cultivation and production this year should make no-one too hopeful that this year’s figures represent the start of a downward trend. Opium poppy is an annual crop so trends need to be measured in longer time periods.

Opium poppy also remains easily Afghanistan’s most valuable export crop. (10) The net export value of last year’s opium harvest was estimated by UNODC at 2.7 billion US dollars or 13 per cent of nation’s licit GDP. This figure is especially large compared to other agricultural exports, dwarfing the second most valuable agricultural export – dried fruit and medicinal plants; in 2014, for example, these were worth only 234.7 million USD (according to the Afghan Chamber of Commerce and Industries, quoted in the UN Secretary General’s February 2015 report). Opium exports also dwarf Afghanistan’s total legal exports: in 2014, these were valued at just 571 million USD.

Poppy cultivation and opium production may have decreased this year, but, by itself, this gives little reason for optimism. As head of UNODC Avetisyan put it, “One year’s result is not a trend.”

(1) In 2015, the area of opium cultivation amounted to 183,000 hectares.

(2) UNODC warns that due to methodological changes, the actual extent of change (increase/decrease) needs to be taken with caution, especially in Badghis, Kandahar, Nangarhar and Zabul, “which were particularly affected by the shift to the new methodology” (see page 6 of Afghanistan Opium Survey 2015: Executive Summary).

(3) The price of Chinese seeds is seven to ten times higher than that of Afghan-grown ones. According to the Afghanistan Drug Price Monitoring Monthly Report in September 2015, the price for a kilogram of Afghan-grown poppy seeds was 39 Afghani (about 0.60 US dollars) in Kandahar.

(4) In 2014, the Counter-Narcotics Police of Afghanistan operations resulted in seizures of 4,146 kilograms of heroin, 6,361 kilograms of morphine and 69,169 kilograms of opium. Moreover, a total of 45 heroin-manufacturing laboratories were dismantled (UN Secretary General Report on Afghanistan A/69/801*–S/2015/151* available here).

In 2013, the counter-narcotics police had conducted 3,243 operations, seizing 7,157 kilograms of heroin, 23,979 kilograms of morphine, 115,650 kilograms of opium and dismantled 71 heroin manufacturing laboratories. (UN Secretary General Report on Afghanistan A/68/789–S/2014/163 available here)

(5) UNODC only reports ‘potential’ opium production per year, thereby acknowledging the limitation in its estimation formula: as it is an illicit crop, getting accurate figures is not so easy.

(6) According to available security records, only some incidents, as few as eight, were recorded in the period from October 2014 to September 2015. Of these eight incidents, two were crime-related, one was initiated by the Afghan National Security Forces, while the remaining five involved the armed opposition.

(7) Statistics based on the data set provided by an independent organisation observing the security situation in Afghanistan for the period October 2014 to September 2015.

(8) A province is defined as ‘poppy-free’ by UNODC when there are less than 100 hectares of poppy cultivation.

(9) Only three incidents were reported in the district of Lal wa Sarjangal in Ghor province in the period October 2014 to September 2015. A safe district, nonetheless, it has shown a rise in poppy cultivation.

(10) 90 per cent of world illicit opiates are still produced in Afghanistan. Opiates are a common name for opium and its derivatives morphine and heroin. It was estimated that 52 per cent of Afghan opium is converted into heroin or morphine within Afghanistan, according to the UNODC Opium Survey 2010.

Swiss / German SIG Sauer P226 Pistol

Ministers of Defence today met in the European Defence Agency (EDA) Steering Board, under the chairmanship of Federica Mogherini as the Head of the Agency. The EDA presented progress on the four capability programmes and initial roadmaps for potential future cooperative programmes: Biological Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (Bio-JDEAL), medical evacuation and anti-tank weapons. Minister of Defence also discussed the three year planning framework detailing the Agency’s work plan and priorities for 2016-2018 as well as the resources required to support this.

 

Three Year Planning Framework and 2016 General Budget

Federica Mogherini in her capacity as Head of Agency invited the Steering Board to approve the 2016 EDA General Budget of €33.5m. 

Approval of the EDA budget requires unanimity. Despite very positive feedback by Member States on the work and support by the Agency, there was no unanimity on the increased budget. Instead, the budget will remain at this year’s level – €30.5m (zero growth).

 

Implementation of Key Taskings and Next Steps

Ministers of Defence welcomed the progress achieved in the four capability programmes: Air-to-Air Refuelling, cyber defence, governmental satellite communications, Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems.

Given the increasingly volatile and challenging security environment in and around Europe it is equally important that other critical capability priorities as identified in the Capability Development Plan also be addressed. Potential future cooperative activities require guidance to avoid fragmentation, focus future investment and give clarity to defence industry.

Ministers of Defence have today adopted the initial roadmaps for potential future cooperative programmes as proposed by the Agency: Biological Joint Deployable Exploitation and Analysis Laboratory (Bio-JDEAL), Medevac and Anti-Tank Weapons.

Bio-JDEAL: The proliferation of biological agents means the biological threat to Member States’ forces employed on operations remains real. Furthermore, the use of biological weapons or devices, particularly by non-state actors, can have a disproportionate effect on morale. Enhancing CBRN capabilities in operations has been outlined in the Agency’s Capability Development Plan as a priority action.

In order to counter these threats and assess the risk of exposure, a biological laboratory which could be deployed at short notice by a Member State would be able to:

• Conduct unambiguous in-theatre biological threat identification;
• Provide threat information to Command, enhancing the protection of EU forces and local populations and thus limiting casualties;
• Maintain Member States’ freedom of movement and action.

Following today’s approval, the roadmap foresees start of the expert group’s work still this year with a view to producing a Common Staff Target by the end of 2016 and a possible project launch by the end of 2017.

So far, eight Member States (Luxembourg, Slovakia, Romania, Germany, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Spain, Italy) and Norway have expressed interest in this project.

 

Medevac: Effective medical evacuation is a fundamental requirement for any military operation. Cooperation, interoperability, as well as common training, is paramount for Member States to constitute reliable MEDEVAC capabilities. As with the previous proposal, enhancing this capability is a priority action of the Capability Development Plan which was endorsed by Member States.

Following Minister’s endorsement, the work will start with a study on “Interoperability in Forward Aeromedical Evacuation with Rotary Wing” which will be launched this year. Based on the outcome of the study, the Agency will make proposals on possible interoperability activities and training.

This work builds on interest shown by seven Member States (Luxembourg, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Austria, Finland, Germany, the Czech Republic and Italy).

 

Anti-tank weapons: Anti-Tank capabilities are still of fundamental importance in the context of National security strategies. Some Member States still have in service equipment designed in the late 1970s which will become obsolete in the near future; they will need to consider upgrade or replacement of their systems. Others are willing to address the anti-tank weapon gap by developing new capability requirements potentially through joint procurement programmes.

To move ahead quickly, the Agency will together with Member States evaluate possible urgent requirements for commercial off-the-shelf solutions still in 2015. This project represents also a quick win opportunity for Pooling & Sharing.

Anti-tank is a domain where work will build on interest shown by nine Member States (Estonia, Romania, Finland, Sweden, Hungary, Ireland, Lithuania, Greece, Latvia) and Norway.

On 16 November 2015, the European Defence Agency (EDA) conduced its Annual Conference to address most up-to-date questions on the condition of European defence, and to propose a way ahead in various defence-related areas.  

Hosted at the Brussels’ Albert Hall, the conference gathered about 400 frontline leader and decision-makers in European defence from the worlds of military, politics, industry and academics. The conference began with one minute of silence to pay tribute to the victims of terror attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. 

Welcome speeches 

Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive urged for more cooperation in defence: “it needs to be part of our DNA,” and the necessity to underpin a political will by actions: “We will only be able to adequately respond if the Union’s foreign policy ambitions are backed by the right defence capabilities at the right time, supplied by a globally competitive and technologically advanced industrial base in Europe.”

Elżbieta Bieńkowska, the European Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and Small Medium Sized Enterprises (SME), a keynote speaker, stressed that Europe is able to provide security and contribute to international peace and stability. She underlined the importance of synergies between defence and industry. She also presented the EU Commission’s  approach to defence, the work plan to follow as well as some ideas for stimulating defence research. Among other things, she insisted on reversing declines in spending to stimulate research: “European funding of research priorities can be a strong tool to bring all relevant actors together.”

Roundtable talks on defence capabilities 

During the first roundtable discussions Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, General Mikhail Kostarakos, (designate) Chairman of the EU Military Committee, Giovanni Soccodato,  Executive Vice President Strategy of the Markets and Business Development at Finmeccanica and Daniel Koštoval, Deputy Minister for Armaments and Acquisition of the Czech Republic, shared their ideas on how to improve EU defence capabilities. 

Among the conclusions of the vivid discussions, there was a need formulated to noticeably increase defence cooperation and restrain from spending in national isolation on defence capabilities. The lack of a proper political guidance as well as too much of a national focus were recognised as prime reasons for a too slow-paced progress in terms of cooperative capabilities development. A financial aspect and a popular phrase “doing more with less” was considered outdated by the speakers who underlined the gravity of European defence capabilities. In this context, a new financial instrument, the VAT exemption for EDA-led programmes and projects, was accessed positively.

Second part of the conference

The second part of the conference initiated Conrad Bruch, Director of Defence at the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg, who took the floor on behalf of Etienne Schneider, Vice-Minister, Minister of Economy & Minister of Minister of Defence: “We welcome work on a global strategy that will encompass all the tools at our disposal to create a stronger and more secure Europe,” he said. He also emphasised that closer cooperation is necessary to avoid threats and challenges to “come closer”, and gave examples of  Luxembourg’s involvement in cooperative projects and missions. 

Special addresses 

The highlight of the annual conference were two special addresses delivered by Federica Mogherini, Head of the European Defence Agency, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, and Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General. Both prominent guests emphasised solidarity, partnership of the EU and NATO as well as the need to stand united to face the current threats. The both condemned the terrorist attacks conducted on 13 November 2015 in Paris. “We will strengthen our resolve,” Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, stated. 

“We cannot afford to act without a rational strategy and a vision what we want to achieve and how we want to get there,” said Federica Mogherini about a global strategy for Europe that is currently being prepared. As she admitted, defence and security will be part of each chapter. Federica Mogherini also stated that the EU is a security provider for many and it is ready to mobilise all the instruments, including the military ones. She reassured the need to cooperate with the EU neighbours and emphasised the relations with NATO.  “There is no security without defence, there is no defence without capabilities and no capabilities without industry,” said Federica Mogherini addressing the capability dimension of defence and stressed the important role of the European Defence Agency when it comes to deepening cooperation and capability development. 

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General stated that “security is interconnected” and reassured that both organisations are determined to develop closer cooperation. He also listed possible areas for stronger partnership, including countering hybrid threats or helping partners in neighbourhood. “We share the same values and commitment to freedom, democracy and human rights. Those valued are under threat; this is what we saw in Paris on Friday. Those values must be defended by us. That is why we work together and that is why we will take our cooperation to the next level: not just side by side but also hand in hand,” said Jens Stoltenberg about the EU-NATO partnership.  

Roundtable talks on defence research

The second and also the last panel discussion of the Annual Conference brought defence research on the agenda. Recognised as a key factor for capability development, defence research funding has experienced a significant decrease in the recent years. Along with the Preparatory Action, the EU might finance defence research for the first time in history, which may steer research development. 

The experts – Michel Barnier, Special Adviser to the European Commission President on defence matters, Antoine Bouvier, President & Chief Executive Officer of MBDA Millie Systems, Ana Gomes, Member of the European Parliament and Tassos Rozolis, Chief Executive Officer of AKMON and Chairman of the Hellenic Manufacturers of Defence and Security Material Association – discussed the requirements to set the level of ambition in Research & Technology and to define a way ahead. They also stressed the need to translate political will into concrete programmes and procurements in order to help a strong European defence industry base to develop. Ideas of balancing the co-existence of Small Medium Sized Enterprises (SMEs) and big players as well as the implications of dual-use technologies were also widely discussed. 

A final word

"There is no alternative to defence cooperation," said Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive, in a summary for this year’s Annual Conference. He also underlined the necessity of better spending of available resources and supporting industry in order to develop a strong European industry base.  

More information 

• EDA website on Annual Conference 2015 
  
  
  
  

More than 400 participants attended this year's EDA Annual Conference. High-level speakers shared their vision on European defence cooperation. Several of the speeches are now available here below.

Elżbieta Bieńkowska, European Commissioner responsible for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and SMEs opened the conference with a keynote speech underlining the importance of synergies between defence and industry. 

Federica Mogherini, Head of the European Defence Agency, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission and Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary-General of NATO delivered special addresses emphasising among other things EU-NATO complementarity and partnership in facing common challenges.

You can access their speeches as well as the welcome word of Chief Executive Jorge Domecq via the links below.

More information:

• News "The first part of EDA Annual Conference" (17 Nov 2015)
• News "EDA Annual Conference: the second part" (17 Nov 2015)
• PDF "Welcome words by Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Opening keynote speech by Elżbieta Bieńkowska, European Commissioner" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by HR/VP Federica Mogherini" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg" (17 Nov 2015)
• EDA Annual Conference 2015

In this interview, Anthony Bargar,Cyber Security Specialist at US-based Sypris Electronics, discusses the best ways to upskill cyber teams and detailing the current demand for cyber security solutions. He also explains the evolving nature of cyber threats facin

In July 2015, Hacking Team (HT), a well-known cyber surveillance firm, was itself the victim of a cyber attack, losing over 400GB of confidential data that included source code, internal documents and sensitive emails. Found among the data – which was subsequently dumped online f

The second part of the European Defence Agency (EDA) Annual Conference held on 16 November 2015 was built around a question on research opportunities at the EU level.

Prior to the fruitful discussions on various aspects of research and the “dual-use” concept, the floor was taken by Mr Conrad Bruch, Director of Defence at the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs of Luxembourg, who represented Etienne Schneider, Vice-Minister, Minister of Economy & Minister of Minister of Defence: “We welcome work on a global strategy that will encompass all the tools at our disposal to create a stronger and more secure Europe,” he said and continued: “We need to become more effective in facing crisis, we have the right tools and structures at our disposal,” he said, also mentioning the role of the European Defence Agency.

Special addresses

Jens Stoltenberg, NATO Secretary General, and Federica Mogherini, Head of the European Defence Agency, High Representative and Vice-President of the European Commission, marked their presence during the conference and delivered special addresses. “We cannot afford to act without a rational strategy and a vision what we want to achieve and how we want to get there,” said Federica Mogherini about the upcoming global strategy, stating that defence and security will be part of each chapter. High Representative also emphasised the European Defence Agency’s achievements in terms of capability development.

A common element of speeches of both Federica Mogherini and Jens Stoltenberg was the focus placed on the EU-NATO complementarity and partnership in facing common challenges. As NATO Secretary General stated: “European security is interconnected”. He also emphasised that determination for closer cooperation is on both sides: “it is not something we should do but something we must do.”

Roundtable 2 „New research opportunities at EU level: a game changer for the industry?”

The discussions of the second roundtable were steered by Michel Barnier, Special Adviser to the European Commission President on defence matters, Antoine Bouvier, President & Chief Executive Officer of MBDA Millie Systems, Ana Gomes, Member of the European Parliament and Tassos Rozolis, Chief Executive Officer of AKMON and Chairman of the Hellenic Manufacturers of Defence and Security Material Association.

The speakers were especially referring to the reduced  funding of European defence research as well as the Preparatory Action, which is expected to include financing defence research by the EU budget for the first time in history.

“No Member State has the means to ensure the full capability spectrum,” admitted Michel Barnier. Antoine Bouvier drew attention to the need of identifying the level of ambition and “set a new dynamics in Research & Technology”. Also Ana Gomes stated there is a need for political will that will be translated into concrete programmes. Tassos Rozolis called for an industrial strategy so that “the industry knows where it should go” and underlined the importance of practical implications of the programmes that shall lead to procurements.

The Annual Conference was summarised by the EDA Chief Executive, Jorge Domecq.

More information:

• News "Annual Conference 2015: Speeches available" (17 Nov 2015)
• News "The first part of EDA Annual Conference" (17 Nov 2015)
• PDF "Welcome words by Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Opening keynote speech by Elżbieta Bieńkowska, European Commissioner" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by HR/VP Federica Mogherini" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg" (17 Nov 2015)
• EDA Annual Conference 2015

The first part of this year’s European Defence Agency's (EDA) Annual Conference “European Defence Matters” has been accomplished. Prominent decision-makers and frontline leaders in European defence from the worlds of military, politics, industry and academics met on 16 November 2015 to discuss European defence.

The conference participants observed one minute of silence to pay tribute to the victims of terror attacks in Paris on 13 November 2015. In the light of these tragic events, the discussion on European defence has been given a very realistic dimension, proving that European defence does matter.

“Crisis situations are not reducing; they are on the increase. The demand for the EU to act as a security provider will continue to increase. We will only be able to adequately respond to this if the Union’s foreign policy ambitions are backed by the right defence capabilities at the right time, supplied by a globally competitive and technologically advanced industrial base in Europe,” said Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive. He also underlined the necessity to underpin political will by actions, and to translate it into military objectives. Jorge Domecq stressed that “Cooperation in defence is not a natural reflex. It needs to become so: to be part of our DNA.”

Keynote Speech

A keynote speech was delivered by Elżbieta Bieńkowska, the European Commissioner for Internal Market, Industry, Entrepreneurship and Small Medium Sized Enterprises (SME). She underlined the importance of synergies between defence and industry. She also presented the Commission’s approach to defence, the work plan to follow as well as some ideas for stimulating defence research.

Elżbieta Bieńkowska stressed that Europe is able to provide security and contribute to international peace and stability. Regarding research, she insisted on reversing declines in spending to stimulate research: “European funding of research priorities can be a strong tool to bring all relevant actors together.” "We will only be successful if we are work together: the Commission, the European Parliament, the European Defence Agency, the European External Action Service and the Member States and industry,” she concluded.

Roundtable 1: „European defence capabilities: what’s next?”

The first roundtable discussions on the European defence cooperation and capabilities were led by prominent guests: Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert, Minister of Defence of the Netherlands, General Mikhail Kostarakos, (designate) Chairman of the EU Military Committee, Giovanni Soccodato,  Executive Vice President Strategy of the Markets and Business Development at Finmeccanica and Daniel Koštoval, Deputy Minister for Armaments and Acquisition of the Czech Republic.

The panel discussion raised the question of the future of European defence capabilities. Moreover, defence cooperation was analysed from a political, military and industrial viewpoint.

Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert assessed that “we do not need more wake-up calls” and insisted that the only way to protect national sovereignty through military means is by defence cooperation. She also called for sharing plans for capability development plans among the Member States.

General Mikhail Kostarakos drew attention to the defence spending stating that “to do more with less” is no longer a good solution as it may lead to loosing combat capabilities.

Daniel Koštoval emphasised that “a political will is required to allocate more money to defence and formulate where we are going”. He also identified the need to maintain “balanced armies” taking into consideration the whole spectrum, the light and heavy equipment. 

Giovanni Soccodato stressed the need for a common European market and a proper environment  for defence industry to consolidate.

The speakers recognised an important role of the European Defence Agency to play in terms of capability development.

More information:

• News "Annual Conference 2015: Speeches available" (17 Nov 2015)
• News "EDA Annual Conference: the second part" (17 Nov 2015)
• PDF "Welcome words by Jorge Domecq, Chief Executive of the European Defence Agency" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Opening keynote speech by Elżbieta Bieńkowska, European Commissioner" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by HR/VP Federica Mogherini" (17 Nov 2015)
• Video "Special address by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg" (17 Nov 2015)
• EDA Annual Conference 2015

Continuing my preference to poke at the sacred in military affairs, #CCLKOW this week presents the conundrum of what should be done with the ISIS rank and file in Iraq. Inspired by an article which tells a simple tale of one Iraqi ISIS fighter, this week’s post is focused on the singular question of how the various parties – local, regional, and global – will move forward when the war machine is defeated. Read the post, consider the issue, and join the discussion on Twitter on the hashtag.

 

The Nazi enterprise and war machine were unmistakably a blight upon history and the very complexion of European civilization. They fundamentally altered the demographics of a continent and laid bare the basest of human potential. Whether by ruthless war or an even more sinister program of genocide, the death toll for which they were responsible still boggles the mind. At the end of the war, it was very clear that those in positions of authority would have to be held responsible for these acts. Nevertheless, while the leadership was held to account, it was equally recognized that to punish the collective rank and file of the German armed forces would serve no purpose.

In the wake of a very dark night in Paris, the furthest thing from anyone’s minds is the thought of humanity for any ISIS fighter.

But I read today an article, “What I Discovered from Interviewing ISIS Prisoners,” by Lydia Wilson of ARTIS Research, about the profile of the average Iraqi who has joined the fight. I would highly recommend that folks go forth and read the whole thing, both to understand this piece as well as for the general consideration of the conflict in Iraq. However, what matters to this post is what came at the very end, this excerpt which confronts the reader:

These boys came of age under the disastrous American occupation after 2003, in the chaotic and violent Arab part of Iraq, ruled by the viciously sectarian Shia government of Nouri al-Maliki. Growing up Sunni Arab was no fun. A later interviewee described his life growing up under American occupation: He couldn’t go out, he didn’t have a life, and he specifically mentioned that he didn’t have girlfriends. An Islamic State fighter’s biggest resentment was the lack of an adolescence….They are not fueled by the idea of an Islamic caliphate without borders; rather, ISIS is the first group since the crushed Al Qaeda to offer these humiliated and enraged young men a way to defend their dignity, family, and tribe. This is not radicalization to the ISIS way of life, but the promise of a way out of their insecure and undignified lives; the promise of living in pride as Iraqi Sunni Arabs, which is not just a religious identity but cultural, tribal, and land-based, too.

The purpose of highlighting this point is not to join the chorus of blame, which serves little purpose beyond political point scoring. Rather, it is to shed a small bit of the light of humanity upon the issue of these ISIS fighters.

Returning to the opening, somehow, in the thoughts of leaders at the end of WWII, it was recognized that there was something in the German experience of the period between the end of WWI and the rise of Hitler’s Reich which made the horrors of that regime more palatable than rationality. If you want a visceral understanding of those dark days, I can recommend nothing more highly than the 1925 opera “Wozzeck” by Alban Berg. (Full version here.) The dismal and blighted life of the characters is set against possibly the most chilling and discordant music which combine to reflect the cost of the past war and the sense that something far worse was coming. If the mass of the population fell prey to Hitler’s awful promise, it is not difficult to understand why or how. And contemplating the lives of Iraq’s generation which had no youth, a similar perspective is possible.

Nothing can excuse the decisions and choices of the ISIS leadership. A Nuremberg of their own awaits those who survive to the end. I have a very special place of vengeance in my heart for those who have unleashed this current hell upon the region and now to Europe and very likely beyond. However, whether the same standard applies to all must be in some doubt. At the end of mankind’s last worst moment, some bit of humanity prevailed. After so much death and horror, perhaps it was decided there had been enough. We should consider that the same may be true in this time as well, that this interregnum of violence is not best ended with a further orgy of death.

And so my simple question for this week is, can we imagine any space for humanity for Iraq’s lost generation swept along by the currents of an abhorrent promise?

 

In the international discussion on Pakistan´s many problems, the low-level conflict in its Balochistan province does not get much attention. The issue of nuclear arms, for instance, is considered more immediately frightening; Balochistan is just the area where these arms are tested. But the province is also the arena for a long-standing, complex and multi-faceted conflict, which, with every new upturn, is becoming more intractable. Even in Pakistan itself, the situation in Balochistan tends to be ‘crowded out’ by other dramatic events. The lack of media access to areas under military control is another cause for whatever goes on in Balochistan to remain in the background. Yet, the province is crucial to several infrastructural mega-projects, among them the huge investment programme signed with the Chinese government in April 2015. These projects are regional in nature – and so is the conflict in Balochistan. Ann Wilkens, member of AAN’s Advisory Board, provides an overview of this complex issue and concludes that political dialogue is urgently needed, if economic investment is to bring the intended, regional uplift and, most importantly, bring peace to a long-suffering population.

The province, the people

With around 46 per cent of the total area, Balochistan is Pakistan´s largest province, but it has the smallest population, representing around five per cent of the country’s total. (1) This is not the only dichotomy. While, as the name indicates, Balochistan is the home of the Baloch, there is also a large Pashtun contingent, making up around 40 per cent of its population, and the Pashtuns form the majority in the province´s capital, Quetta. Another spill-over from Afghanistan, dating back to the rule of Abdul Rahman Khan in the 1890s, is the Hazara community, who form the third largest ethnic group, also with a strong presence in Quetta. Another ethnic group, normally included in the Baloch but originating from Southern India, are the Brahui, whose Dravidian language is spoken by a dwindling population mainly in central Balochistan, notably in and around the former princely state of Kalat, the historic centre of the Baloch quest for self-rule.

Balochistan is the least developed province of Pakistan. Marginal living conditions have prompted a large part of the population to leave in search for a better existence, mainly in Karachi or abroad. But the province has huge reserves of natural gas, as well as other natural resources yet to be fully explored, which have the potential to provide a basis for economic development. Geographically, it is on the path of several regional infrastructure projects, which have been stalled for various reasons, one of them being the lack of stability in the region, including in Balochistan. Thus, lack of stability results in lack of development, while lack of development is also a major source of instability.

Economic migration aside, the Baloch are spread over three countries. The largest group is in Pakistan, around six million, but there is also a sizable Baloch population in Iran, around two million, and a smaller group in Afghanistan, estimated at around 600,000, most of them in the southwestern province of Nimroz. (2) Balochi is an Iranian language (like Farsi, Pashto and Kurdish). The majority of the Baloch are Sunni Muslims. For the Iranian Baloch in the equally deprived Iranian province of Sistan Balochistan, the marginalisation of the Sunni sect is an important reason for conflict with the Shia-led theocracy in Teheran, regularly resulting in attacks directed at the Iranian state, which in turn accuses Pakistan of hosting these opponents (see for instance here).

Regional interface

During the course of the Pakistani Baloch insurgency, the militants among them have become increasingly secessionist and are now commonly referring to Pakistan as an occupying state, rather than a problematic homeland. In Pakistan, after the breakup of the original nation and the forming of Bangladesh in 1971, secessionist talk has been a trigger of existential anguish, and that may be one reason why intransigence rather than dialogue has been characteristic of the Pakistani state’s response to Baloch insurgencies. Moreover, although rooted in a more or less secular orientation, many militants are becoming increasingly radicalised in religious terms, in tune with a growing global movement of religious extremists transcending national borders.

With the concept of ‘Greater Balochistan’ overshadowing the borders of three countries, the Baloch national issue provides a reflection of the Kurdish conflict in the Middle East, as well as other areas around the world where ethnic, linguistic and cultural identity do not square with geographical boundaries. From the point of view of the Baloch tribespeople, many of them still nomads, their territory stretches across the boundaries between Pakistan, Iran and Afghanistan, a vast area where they believe they have ancestral rights to move around.

From the point of view of the three governments involved, however, such movements add to the already complicated relations between them. Support for each other’s rebel groups is a component in this picture, which may be used in a tit-for-tat manner. For instance: India, claiming that Pakistan is infiltrating insurgents across the Line of Control into India-controlled Kashmir, may respond by cooperating with Afghanistan to support Baloch rebels. Pakistan may be irritated when Baloch leaders fleeing from Pakistani security forces are allowed to settle in Afghanistan, but Afghanistan may then point to the presence of the leadership council of the Afghan Taleban, known as the Quetta shura, on Pakistani territory.

At the same time, there are grave, humanitarian aspects of the cross-border movements. While large waves of Afghan refugees have been received in Pakistani Balochistan, particularly during the last decades of war, there are also Pakistani Baloch refugees in Afghanistan (for more on the latter, see here).

Quite another facet of the regional interface is the drugs trade, which continues to flourish in what looks like a rare bird of functional, regional cooperation. This is a sign that, when profits are high enough, barriers can be transcended: where there is a will, there is a way.

A history of insurgency

Historically, Balochistan has never been a comfortable part of the Pakistani nation state which was initiated with the division of the subcontinent in 1947 and promoted by a movement of Urdu-speaking, urban Muslims in what is now northern India, who never had much in common with Baloch tribesmen. British Balochistan, which did not include the princely states, was integrated into Pakistan with a special status as a Chief Commissioner´s Province, and was raised to the status of Governor´s Province only in 1953. As for the 570-odd Indian princely states, four of which were in the territory of today´s Balochistan, the provision was that they could opt for independence but, in the end, most of them were integrated into either India or Pakistan. However, for the Baloch princely states, a history of extended autonomy made the situation more fluid, especially for the most well-known one, the Khanate of Kalat, which wanted to retain its independence and tried to establish itself as a tribal monarchy. This did not succeed for long and its accession, under pressure, to Pakistan in March 1948 triggered the first wave of armed revolt against the state.

The imposition of military rule in Pakistan on 6 October 1958, when General Ayub Khan took over the country as ‘Chief Martial Law Administrator’, again exacerbated the situation in Balochistan, where tribesmen refused to turn in their weapons at the local police stations. The following scheme of assembling all of West Pakistan into ‘one unit’ (as opposed to East Pakistan, later Bangladesh) was bitterly opposed until 1960, when the rebels thought they had negotiated an exception to this policy, as well as safe conduct and amnesty for themselves. Instead, they were arrested and seven of them executed. This did not end the opposition to Ayub Khan´s centralisation efforts and a third round of conflict characterised the latter part of the 1960s.

The fourth, and more extensive, uprising in Balochistan came in 1973, again as a reaction to the thwarting of provincial autonomy. After the loss of Bangladesh, Pakistan´s president Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto wanted to strengthen centralised rule in what was left of the country. He was also under pressure from the Iranian government, which feared that its Baloch province might be drawn into a movement towards strengthened indigenous rule in Pakistan´s Balochistan. On a flimsy pretext, Bhutto dismissed the elected provincial government and used the ensuing calls for secession as an excuse to send in the army. The armed clashes peaked in the winter of 1974-75, but did not cease until three years later, when Bhutto was overthrown by General Zia ul-Haq, who again imposed military rule but at the same time tried to restore peace in Balochistan through political and economic means. Accordingly, there has been no consistent and direct link between military rule in Pakistan and active conflict in Balochistan. Rather, disregard for Baloch sensitivities has run through Pakistan´s short history, under various rulers.

The fifth, and still ongoing, Baloch uprising started in 2004, during the military rule of General Pervez Musharraf. While the Marri and Mengal tribes had been at the centre of previous rebellions, this time it was the Bugti tribe that led the uprising and was subsequently targeted. On 26 August 2006, Nawab Akbar Bugti, who besides leading the Bugti tribe had also served as both governor (1973-74) and chief minister (1989-90) of Balochistan, was killed in a clash with the army at his hideout in the hills in north-eastern Balochistan. This provided the nationalist rebels with a martyr of renown beyond the province.

Economic issues were at the centre of this round of conflict, among them the construction of the Gwadar port without much Baloch participation in either the decision-making process or the actual construction work. Another bone of contention was the distribution of the proceeds from the Sui gas fields, situated in the Dera Bugti area, as well as the distribution of the gas itself (which was said to be used to heat Punjabi homes and run Punjabi industries, while the Baloch were literally left out in the cold). Enhanced military presence in the Sui area followed from the conflict, and then subsequently added to it.

Human rights abuses and violence

As usual in situations of conflict, human rights suffer. Among the Pakistanis who have ‘disappeared’ during recent years, presumably after having been abducted by the security forces, young Baloch nationalists form a distinct and particularly recurrent group. Many of them have later turned up as corpses by the roadside bearing marks of torture. Despite attempts by various organisations, including Pakistan’s Supreme Court, to map the disappearances (see for instance here) and end the impunity surrounding them, no clarity has been achieved and bereaved families are still looking for closure. Accordingly, the number of victims cited in this context differs widely, from the tens to the ten thousands – it should be safe to say that at least hundreds of Baloch have disappeared in this way.

The conflict between Baloch nationalists and the Pakistani state aside, the continuing turmoil and lack of strong governance in a multi-ethnic setting has brought a wider range of serious crimes against human rights, as well as a high level of criminal activity, both of which add to the difficulties faced by civilians trying to build a decent life. Various actors are contributing to this sad state of affairs, sometimes reflecting conflicts of interest between different population groups, and sometimes lending themselves to exploitation by, for instance, anti-state militants and/or perpetrators of sectarian violence. Punjabi settlers in the province, in many cases going back several generations, have been targeted by Baloch nationalists, leading to the exodus of a relatively well educated segment of the population. The Hazara Shia population in Quetta has also been particularly targeted, through a series of sectarian bomb attacks leading to hundreds of casualties.

The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

It is in this environment of multi-faceted conflict that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor programme (CPEC) is anchored. The programme amounts to over 45 billion US dollars and was agreed between the two countries in April 2015. The corridor has its starting point in the Chinese-built port of Gwadar, on Pakistani Balochistan’s southern coast at the Arabian Sea, and is linked to Chinese-funded, infrastructural mega-projects that are regional in nature, (for more, see here).

The programme has been flaunted as a turning point for the fragile Pakistani economy and an upcoming backbone of regional connectivity, which is supposed to create jobs and prosperity for everyone, the Baloch included. The government’s reasoning seems to be that, once the recalcitrant Baloch nationalists discover the benefits of improved infrastructure, they will return to the fold of the Pakistani motherland. However, until this spirit of cooperation takes root, the Chinese workers involved in the project will be protected by an additional security division comprising army battalions, as well as civil armed forces.

This smacks of wishful thinking. At the core of the recurrent insurgencies lies the resentment that the Baloch have been marginalised in their own country, and that Punjabis in particular, and the Pakistani state in general, are colonising and exploiting them. For the insurgents the socio-economic backwardness of the province serves as proof that this is so, whereas, on the government side, the argument may go the other way around: Balochistan is perceived to be poor and backward as a consequence of a tribal structure which benefits only self-serving feudal lords and stands in the way of the government’s efforts towards progress and development. So far, neither side has shown much willingness to negotiate and compromise, with both sides preferring to play a zero-sum game. The looming presence of a growing number of Chinese labourers and engineers, working under armed protection, seems more likely to increase the tensions than soften the positions. Even if the programme delivers all the goods promised, it is difficult to see how the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor programme can become the silver bullet leading to stability in Balochistan. Again, the province seems to be stuck in a vicious circle: investments could bring stability, yes, but investments need stability to be carried out and take effect.

Opening for political settlement?

While throughout the history of Pakistan coercion has been the main instrument in dealing with Baloch insurgency, there have also been recurrent attempts to settle the conflict through dialogue and compromise. The present time seems to be such a period, or to at least have the potential to become one. In an interview with the BBC Urdu service in August 2015, Brahumdagh Bugti, the grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti and the most well-known of the Baloch separatist leaders, did not exclude talks with the government, provided that military action was ended and security forces withdrawn from Balochistan. Even the core question of separation could be discussed, according to Bugti, “if our friends, allies, comrades and the Baloch people want this.” From the government side, the chief minister of Balochistan welcomed this conciliatory overture and expressed the hope that talks might start after the recent Eid holiday. According to a recent report, talks have, indeed, been going on between the two sides and Brahumdagh Bugti might soon return to Balochistan, after having been in exile since the death of his grandfather in 2006.

However, facts on the ground still send mixed signals. Enforced disappearances are still reported and security operations have escalated as a result of the National Action Plan to crack down on terrorism, which was adopted after the army school massacre by the Pakistani Taleban (the TTP), in Peshawar in December 2014. According to the provincial interior minister well over 8,000 people had been detained by the end of September 2015, while over 200 persons had been killed in these operations. Among them, presumably, is Allah Nazar Baloch, the leader of the Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF), who was reported killed by security forces in an intelligence-led operation in July 2015. Allah Nazar was the most prominent of the Baloch separatist leaders still in Pakistan. His organisation has been behind a number of deadly attacks, including the one that killed three Chinese engineers in Gwadar in May 2004.

Still, the recent overtures indicate an increased willingness for dialogue on both sides and, thus, provide hope that the vicious circle characterising the development in Balochistan, where rounds of violence have continuously fed into each other, could finally begin to be reversed. Concrete and constructive commitment is now needed. The urgency of the situation is underlined by global trends. The winds of radicalisation continue to sweep through the Muslim world, carrying with them, first and foremost, frustrated young people with poor prospects, such as potential Baloch militants.

In Pakistan´s turbulent history, Balochistan seems to have always come in as the last priority. In the long run – and it is already a long-running conflict – this high-handedness may backfire, and, with it, the infrastructural investments now set in motion. On the other hand, in the alternative scenario of serious dialogue aimed at solving political and economic grievances, these investments could enhance the peace dividend in a long-suffering but potentially prosperous part of the world.

 

(1) Figures differ between different sources. The figures cited here are taken from “Jago Pakistan – Wake Up, Pakistan”, Report of The Century Foundation International Working Group on Pakistan, May 2015, 53.

(2) These figures, by no means exact, are weighted from several, different sources.

 

Sources:

Axmann, Martin: Back to the Future, The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915-1955, Oxford University Press 2009

Lieven, Anatol, Pakistan, A Hard Country, Allen Lane 2011

Jalal, Ayesha, The Struggle for Pakistan, A Muslim Homeland and Global Politics, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2014

Indian Shaurya Short- and Medium-Range Ballistic Missile

The on-going “exodus” of Afghans – now the second largest group entering the EU – has contributed to the increasing refugee numbers across Europe. This, in turn, has led to heated debates and an increased political polarisation between pro- and anti-refugee movements and parties. As governments and citizens struggle to handle the influx of refugees, their numbers – real and perceived – have become an instrument in domestic politicking. Several countries have tightened their laws and tried to close their borders, while others are considering doing so. Germany, whilst it initially generally welcomed refugees, has begun to take a much tougher line, for example, declaring it will deport Afghan asylum seekers whose applications are rejected. AAN co-director, Thomas Ruttig, pulls together figures, looks at trends and disentangles categories of refugees that are often mixed in the political debate. He also refers to an extensive interview with Richard Danziger, head of the office of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) in Afghanistan, which can be listened to exclusively here (link at the end of the text).

Europe has been facing an enormous influx of refugees (1) this year. Most have been coming from Syria, whilst Afghans make up the second largest group. Social services in the receiving countries are increasingly strained, particularly at the local level. Citizens, politicians and governments are more and more split about whether to welcome the refugees or to increase the legal and practical hurdles for their entry. Xenophobic political groups are becoming more vocal as they try to push governments to take a more restrictive stance, but their impact on recent election results has been mixed so far: a win in the Swiss general election and gains lesser than predicted in the Danish one and in the Vienna mayoral elections. (The Austrian capital is on a major transit route for refugees travelling to Germany and northern Europe.)

Several countries, including Germany and Austria, have amended laws to try to deter more refugees from entering. Sweden became the latest country to re-introduce temporary border controls on 11 November. In late October, Germany as the first country announced specifically that it considers deporting Afghan refugees who have had their asylum applications rejected; the statement came from interior minister Thomas de Maizière whose portfolio includes refugee affairs. A final decision, though, has not been taken yet, and foreign minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier has reportedly called such deportations “barely possible” given a “dramatic” deterioration of the security situation in Afghanistan. (2) There is also the suggestion by the interior ministry to deny Afghan refugees access to German language courses, which are key to integration arguing that refugees from countries with an acceptance quota below 50 per cent had “no prospects to stay” in Germany. (46 per cent of Afghan asylum seekers, on average, were given a refugee status or some other form of protection in 2014; the latest available data, for October 2015, indicated a 44.9 per cent acceptance rate.)

The EU has failed so far to come up with a system of burden-sharing that is acceptable to all member states. At the same time, large numbers of volunteers continue to work to accommodate the refugees and help fill the gaps when authorities are either unable or, sometimes, even unwilling, to find ways to cope.

With the increasing political polarisation, refugee figures have become a tool in mainstream domestic politics. Figures are sometimes exaggerated and often mixed up, and categories confused (see footnote 1 again). For example, the number of people entering Europe differs from the number of asylum requests. At the same time, the numbers of asylum requests are also higher than that of the actual asylum seekers, as many refugees request asylum in several countries during their odyssey through Europe. Similarly, in August 2015, of the 11,522 Afghans who entered Germany, only 2,270 requested asylum.

The deportation debate: Germany

Germany, once considered one of the EU countries with the softest line on refugees, was the first country where the government has confirmed that it has plans to deport large numbers of Afghan refugees whose asylum application had been rejected after years of allowing them to stay. According to Pro Asyl, the largest non-governmental organisation in Germany working in this sector, 7,000 Afghans might be affected by this threat of deportation.

Other European countries have already deported rejected Afghan asylum seekers, including Norway and Sweden. In Great Britain, the deportation of 60 Afghans as part of a larger group, was stopped in August 2015 at the last minute, after the Lord Chief Justice ruled it was only safe to return Afghan asylum seekers if sent to the three provinces of Kabul, Bamiyan and Panjshir (read here and here).

As is the case in many countries, the deportation debate in Germany focuses on whether the security situation in Afghanistan allows for deportations and whether there are, at least, ‘safe areas’ within the country to which people could ‘return’. The government says yes, while commentators, even on mainstream government-funded media, have, in an unprecedented way, sharply attacked the government’s arguments. One commentator , on Germany’s TV channel for the world, Deutsche Welle, called the generally overly positive portrayal of the security situation in Afghanistan by the government “untenable,” particularly after Kunduz, the former main base of the German ISAF troops, fell into the hands of the Taleban for two weeks in September/October this year. Up until 2009, the German government did not even accept that a “war” was going on in Afghanistan. After the Taleban takeover of Kunduz, interior (and former defence) minister de Maizière only commented that “of course, in Afghanistan security is not as good as elsewhere.“ (3)

Meanwhile, a report by the German Embassy in Kabul quoted in the media has come to more grave conclusions. The report speaks about an “extension” of Taleban influence, a “highly” or “extremely” dangerous situation in half of the country’s districts and a “rapid” deterioration of the security situation even in areas so far considered safe and (cited here, in German). According to conflict and peace research institutes (see, for example, here), the conflict in Afghanistan is still a “high-intensity internal armed conflict”. This is also proven by the rising rate of civilian casualties (AAN analysis here).

Another remark by the minister – that “as large amounts of development funds are sent to Afghanistan, one can expect that Afghans remain in their country” – was called “particularly cynical” by another commentator on the leading TV network, the ARD.

One point of debate is how the large numbers of Afghans leaving their country would further increase the burden on Germany. According to a report by the German Joint Analysis and Strategy Centre for Illegal Migration (in German: Gasim) up to 100,000 Afghans currently leave their country every month. (4) Gasim reports are not usually publicly available, and its figures were first published in the right-wing daily newspaper Die Welt on 28 September 2015. It seems that, in this case, the report had been intentionally leaked, possibly to influence the heated political debate taking place, even within Chancellor Angela Merkel’s coalition.

According to Richard Danziger, head of the Afghanistan office of the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), his organisation does not have figures on the number of Afghans leaving the country:

Yes, I think we can talk about an exodus, [but] to be frank, we cannot talk about numbers. We know the numbers on arrival in Europe. Now we have been looking at all possible sources of information: passport applications, we talked with the [authorities at the] airport; we have offices at the border with Iran, so we looked to see whether there had been more deportations, which could mean more people on the way to Europe. We haven’t been able to piece anything together that could really give us the [full] information.

We do know the people are selling more bus tickets to Nimroz [province bordering Iran] for example. We know from the people at the airport – there are not many flights to Iran but – that flights to Iran are full of young men but return flights are definitely not full at all, so that’s an indicator. So, yes, I think we can talk about an exodus but we cannot put a number on it.

With regard to the often-cited increase in passport applications at the Afghan interior ministry’s passport office, Danziger urges caution, even though the indications are that numbers are increasing. The number of passport applications had indeed increased from about 3,000 per month earlier in the year to almost 8,000 by late September 2015, as reported by German broadcaster ARD quoting the office’s head General Sayed Omar Sabur from Kabul.

According to Danziger, the rush to obtain a (new) passport has also been attributed partially to the government implementing an international aviation regulation in May 2015 that no longer allows Afghans to use their old handwritten passport for travel abroad. This decision is almost certainly, or at least in part, the result of pressure on the Afghan government by western countries, where such passports have not been used for a long time and are looked upon with suspicion. Given the already difficult situation and lengthy procedures in Kabul to obtain a visa for nearly any country, this has put many Afghans into a state of near panic, as they fear they may no longer be able to travel in the future. This includes, in particular, students and post-graduates who have received overseas fellowships, and families who need to take relatives abroad for medical treatment (for Afghans, the most popular destination is India). Other applicants hope to obtain a passport in order to look for work in Iran, Turkey or the Gulf states.

Furthermore, not everyone who leaves Afghanistan necessarily arrives in Europe (let alone Germany). There are many stories of Afghans, who were discovered and detained by Iranian authorities, either at the Afghan, or the Turkish border, and then sent back to Afghanistan. Those who do eventually make it to Europe often do so only after a long and arduous journey, as Danziger also points out:

You have to consider that those people arriving in Europe now may not have left this year, because a lot of people move in stages. They may go to Iran, work to get enough money, go to Turkey, work [again]. They might have left in the past year, or two years ago.

The Afghan Ministry for Refugees and Returnees estimated, in a statement published on 2 November 2015 that, altogether, 120,000 Afghans have left the country this year, both “legally and illegally.”

General refugee figures

According to the latest UN estimates nearly 800,000 refugees crossed the Mediterranean into Europe this year. More than 218,000 did so in October 2015 alone — which is a record monthly tally and higher than the overall figure for the entire year of 2014, which was 216,000. By far most of them crossed the sea from Turkey to Greece, which is the preferred route for Afghan refugees, who usually travel via Iran and Turkey. Others crossed the Turkish-Greek or Turkish-Bulgarian land borders.

An incident at the border between Bulgaria and Turkey on 15 October 2015 was the latest “milestone” (as stated by Bulgarian President Rossen Plevnelyev) in the drama that refugees go through: a young Afghan – his name continues to remain unreported – became the first refugee shot dead at an EU border. The authorities of Bulgaria, where the incident happened, claim he was hit by a stray warning shot fired at a group of about 50 young Afghans trying to cross the border illegally. Many more refugees, among them many Afghans, have lost their lives when their boats have sunk in the Mediterranean. (5)

According to the latest available official EU figures, there were 399,000 “first-time asylum seekers” in the first half of 2015 in all EU countries combined. These figures, and all the following ones, are based on the first and second quarter reports by Eurostats, an EU agency  (see here and here), unless otherwise sourced.

Germany had the highest number of asylum applications in the first half of 2015 (154,000 = 39 per cent of all submitted in Europe), followed by Hungary (65,400), Italy (30,100) and France (29,800). Taken by per capita of their population, Hungary, Austria, Sweden and Germany were at the top during that period. By October 2015, the total number of asylum seekers in Germany for that year had already increased to 331,226, according to official national figures. Sweden had 120,000 asylum applicants at the same point, compared to 75,000 in 2014.

The Afghans among the refugees

Over the first and second quarters of 2015, Afghans became the second largest group among the asylum seekers after the Syrians. According to the UN estimates, 19 per cent of the nearly 800,000 refugees that crossed the Mediterranean were Afghans, some 150,000 people.

In the first three quarters of 2015, 88,205 Afghans requested asylum in all EU countries. In the first quarter, they represented seven and in the second quarter 13 per cent of all EU asylum seekers (third quarter figure not yet available). At the end of the second quarter, the number of Afghans was 39,900 altogether, showing that the third quarter number was more than double that of the first two quarters together. By comparison, 37,810 Afghans had requested asylum across the EU in 2014 and 22,580 in 2013.

Most Afghans requested asylum in Hungary and in Germany in the first half of 2015. Hungary registered 17,660 Afghan asylum seekers – almost half the overall EU figure. Germany received 20,434 asylum requests (6.2 per cent of all asylum seekers in the country in this period) from January to October 2015, while 82,817 Afghans arrived there in the same period, 31,051 in October alone (up from 11,522 in August). According to these figures, Afghans were still only the fourth largest group of asylum seekers in Germany. In the first and second quarters, Afghanistan was not even among the top ten countries of origin.

The relatively low number of asylum seekers, compared to the number of arrivals, in Germany reflects the fact that only a relatively small portion of the incoming Afghans actually remain in the country. Only one in four Afghans coming to Germany asks for asylum there. Many travel to other countries, or are sent back to other EU countries (based on the Dublin Regulation that stipulates that a refugee must apply for asylum in the first EU country of entry). Alternatively, the choice is to go underground without applying. (6)

The situation in Sweden, for example, is different. According to Swedish officials, almost all refugees arriving in the country also apply for asylum there; only a few travel on to Norway. By 1 November 2015, Sweden had 21,551 asylum applications by Afghans. Between 2 and 8 November only, Sweden had over 10,000 incoming refugees, 42 per cent of them (4,333 individuals) Afghans. Of those, 2,299 were unaccompanied minors. In January this year, only 350 Afghans arrived in Sweden.

In 70 per cent of all Afghan asylum cases registered in the EU in the second quarter of 2015, a refugee or other protection status was granted. Germany’s overall acceptance rate for Afghans was 44.9 per cent from January to October 2015, based on 4,929 cases decided in this period. In 1,361 of these cases (27.6%), the applicants were recognised as refugees; only 37 of them (0.75%) were granted full political asylum, which would allow for full integration. 853 (17.3%) received a ‘non-refugee’ status of protection. 574 (11.6%) applicants were rejected; the other applications were solved in other ways, mainly by handing over the cases to other countries based on the Dublin agreement. By comparison, the number of cases decided in 2014 was almost three times higher, with 12,999, at a 46.9 per cent recognition rate. Also, the percentage of Afghans granted full political asylum in general is very low but was higher in 2014, with 1.2 per cent (87 cases).

In practice, most Afghans have been staying on, regardless of their status, as the German government (and many others in the EU) had exempted them from deportation for humanitarian reasons due to the on-going war in their country. These Afghans have now become increasingly vulnerable to deportation, particularly in Germany.

Historically, Europe has absorbed at least three earlier large waves of Afghan refugees: first, after the Soviet invasion in 1979, second, after the mujahedin victory in 1992, and, third, after the Taleban takeover in 1996 (read here and here). The Afghan community in Germany, the largest in Europe, grew from 51,370 in 1994 to 126,334 in 2009 (49,081 of them holding German citizenship). Afghan refugee communities – some of them significantly larger than in Germany – exist in Pakistan, Iran, Russia, Gulf countries, the US and Canada.

Reasons for the Afghan exodus

German ambassador Markus Potzel, in an interview with IRIN news agency published on 10 November 2015, remarked that Germany understood the reasons people were leaving Afghanistan to be “bad security, bad economy, bad prospects, no trust in the National Unity Government” but also added that his country’s authorities were “overwhelmed” with processing the growing number of asylum requests and that “the mood among the [German] population has changed. Instead of welcoming them, people are more and more afraid.”

A central element in the current debate is whether the refugees arriving now represent asylum seekers, civil war refugees or economic migrants. In the case of Afghans, at least, this distinction is often difficult to make. Danziger, in his interview, spoke of reasons related to: “a mixture of insecurity and the poor economy. One feeds into the other. […] There isn’t anyone saying I am just leaving because of the insecurity or I am just going for an opportunity to make a living or a better living.” He also mentioned the “family pressure on young people,” who are sent abroad as an “anchor” in case the situation deteriorates further. This is not surprising: the older generation of Afghans have witnessed no less than nine mostly violent regime changes since 1973.

Danziger in his interview also discusses the “brain drain” that is harming Afghanistan, given the many young Afghans among the refugees who could be a key resource for any reconstruction of the country. He mentions also that many of them may not be fully aware of the obstacles they are likely to face on their journey to Europe:

Every Afghan knows what is going on in the Mediterranean, the deaths and so forth. I think what they are unaware of is what is awaiting them in Europe – that you do not automatically get asylum, that in each country the laws are different, that while your asylum application is up you cannot work, that you are not put up in a great flat. So, it is really about telling them what they need to expect. Then they have to make their own decision.

In terms of stemming the tide of the “exodus,” he outlines several possible paths for action: donor countries must “put Afghanistan back on the radar,” “live up to the commitments they made on financial support for the government,” and, also, “really face up to the fact that they have to completely review their migration or immigration policies.” He pointed out finally that “Afghans actually have a very good reputation as immigrants, in terms of not being happy to [rely on] hand-outs, getting on finding jobs, opening businesses etc.”

The interview with Richard Danziger, recorded by ARD South Asia correspondent Sandra Petersmann, has been partly published by the ARD. AAN has acquired the full version, which can be listened to here, with the kind permissions of both interviewer and interviewee.

 

(1) Article 1 of the Geneva Refugee Convention, as amended by the 1967 Protocol, defines a refugee as:

A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

In this text, the author uses the term “refugee” in this meaning.

At the same time, “refugee” is also a legal term under national law. In Germany, this term is used for people whose application for political asylum has been accepted. This group is divided into two sub-categories: (a) those who have received political asylum (they can stay for an unlimited time); and (b) those who have been recognised as a “refugee”, which grants them temporary protection and their cases are reviewed after a certain period. Persons who do not qualify as a “refugee”, but are threatened by the death penalty, torture or other grave violations upon return to the country of origin, can be granted “subsidiary protection” according to EU law. There is also the option of “protection from deportation” to particular countries, including provisions for rejected asylum seekers. Status (c) and (d) can be terminated at any time. After a recent change of law, a deportation does not need to be pre-announced. This means that the refugee cannot employ legal means to contest the deportation.

For those granted the status of refugee or any other status of protection, the term “refugee” will be qualified in this text.

(2) This statement, given through his political director to the CDU/CSU (the largest governing party) group in the Bundestag, was reportedly based on an internal assessment of the security situation of the German embassy in Kabul.

(3) Members of the German government spoke about a “stabilisation mission” (Defence Minister Franz Josef Jung, 2009) and “war-like conditions” (his successor Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg, also in 2009). In 2010, Guttenberg switched the terminology to a “civil war with international participation,” saying it was “colloquially a war,” but not in legal terms. The UN, when mandating the ISAF troops with Resolution 1386 (2001) of the Security Council, avoided such a definition and made ISAF a peace-enforcing mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. According to the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict (RULAC) project of the Geneva Academy of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, the conflict in Afghanistan is a “high-intensity internal armed conflict” between the Afghan government “assisted” by international forces and “non-state armed groups.”

(4) The following institutions contribute to Gasim reports: the Federal Police (formerly Federal Border Police), the Federal Criminal Police Office (the ‘German FBI’), the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, the foreign and domestic intelligence services (BND and Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution) and the foreign office.

(5) There are at least three projects that try to document, by name, the refugees killed on their way to Europe: the “List of Deaths” of the Amsterdam-based NGO United against Racism, the blog Fortress Europe by Italian journalist Gabriele del Grande and The Migrant Files, a journalist consortium that tries to merge the former two. Neither has the name of this Afghan.

(6) Moreover, decision-making on asylum cases is lagging behind. In the second quarter of 2015, 117,800 applications were decided upon in all EU countries. 46 per cent of them received a positive answer, granting the applicant either refugee or another protection status. Among the cases on which decisions were taken were only 2,500 who were Afghans. In Germany, by the end of 2014, Afghans, on average, had to wait more than 13 months for their cases to be decided. Austria – which is among the top four countries taking in arriving Afghan refugees (10,500 in the first eight months of 2015) – just changed its law so that Afghans have to wait for a decision, possibly up to three years. Finland recently stopped processing asylum claims from Afghans for ‘security concerns’. (The country had 9,276 asylum-seekers this year so far. )

Although relatively small in scale, Russia’s military operation in Syria has highlighted some major improvements in Russian military capabilities.

Beyond its purely geopolitical goals, Russia’s operation in Syria has been designed to test improvements in Russian military capabilities that have resulted from the military reform carried out over the last seven years and to highlight these improvements to potential adversaries. While the jury is still out on how successful the operation will be in helping the Syrian government turn the tide against its various opponents, it has already shown that the military reform has resulted in a significant increase in Russia’s warfighting capability.

Compared to the 2008 Georgia War, which was the last time the Russian Air Force operated in a combat environment, the Russian military appears to have made great strides in increasing operational tempo and improving inter-service integration. It has also made significant advances in its ability to carry out expeditionary operations and showcased its recently developed stand-off strike capability.

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Originally published by the Lowy Institute Interpreter. Click here to read the rest of the article.

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