Defence`s Feeds

Malaysia is looking at ways to upgrade elements of its fleet of armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) to extend its operational life, even though the country is currently taking delivery of 257 AV8 8x8 vehicles from local company DEFTECH, the first of which were delivered from the FNSS production line

Key Points The USN will pursue development of a carrier-based tanker instead of a surveillance and/or strike UAV In order to accelerate acquisition of stealth technology and to increase the range of its strike assets, more F-35Cs will instead be added to the FY 2017 budget US Navy (USN) officials

Image: Textron Systems Textron Systems Marine & Land System

Americas

• Following Michael Gilmore’s thoughts on the F-35 program, his report has also shed some light on the hotly contested Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) competition. His report goes into detail on how the three offerings for the USMC Humvee replacement faired in tests. While Lockheed Martin and competition winner Oshkosh met protection requirements, Humvee producer AM General fell short. The shortfall resulted in AM General losing out on a contract potentially worth $30 billion, one of the biggest Army contracts in recent times. Lockheed Martin went on to begin a legal proceeding against the award to Oshkosh; however, these were thrown out before the new year.

• Four OH-58 Kiowa Delta helicopters are ready for export to a foreign county after landing at Redtone Arsenal prior to shipping. While details as to where the helicopters are going and at what cost have remained unknown, it is possible that they could be going to Croatia after being deemed Excess Defense Articles. Back in November 2015, the Croatian Defence Ministry announced that it had selected sixteen OH-58D helicopters that the USAF would donate to Croatia. The latest model is primarily operated in an armed reconnaissance role in support of ground troops, and could contribute to the ongoing modernization of the Croatian Armed Forces to participate in NATO operations.

• The life of the A-10 attack jet will be extended until 2022 after it was announced in Secretary for Defense Ash Carter’s 2017 defense budget preview on Tuesday. Lawmakers including former A-10 pilot Rep. Martha McSally and Sen. John McCain who supported the plane’s continuation were pleased with the announcement. The close-air support aircraft will continue to see service in the operations against the Islamic State in the Middle East where it has been supporting ground troops. The deferral of the A-10’s retirement comes as continued delays seem likely for the F-35, which is due to replace the A-10 once it comes into active service. The A-10’s ability to swoop in to heights of 50 feet above ground and engage enemies has been held up as an advantage against the F-35 by supporters.

Middle East North Africa

• Interest in providing aircraft for the Turkish Coast Guard has increased dramatically in the last week with ten more interested parties joining the initial fifteen. The twenty-five bidders are both a mix of domestic and international firms, with the most recent competitors including Lockheed Martin Mission Systems and Training and the Turkish military-software company Havelsan. Turkey plans to purchase a Beechcraft King Air 350ER for the Coast Guard, but are looking for someone to provide the integration of subsystems into the aircraft for maritime surveillance operations. As well as maritime surveillance, the aircraft will be responsible for conducting border security and search & rescue operations.

Europe

• Both Lithuania and the Czech Republic have inked contracts for new military truck acquisitions as they continue to modernize military gear. Lithuania has signed a $65 million deal with Daimler AG for 340 Unimog trucks as part of plans to increase the size of their land forces, with the establishment of another infantry brigade. The Czech Republic is to acquire 18 N3G-V trucks from local firm Tatra. The purchases are one of several contracts signed by Prague in an effort to be prepared to participate in NATO activities as well as to deal with the flow of refugees through its borders from the Middle East.

• Rheinmetall Defence is to provide a multi-million dollar deal to modernize the skyguard air defense system of an unknown international buyer. The order, worth $427 million, will be delivered between 2017 and 2020. Upgrades will include equipping the missile/gun air defence systems with advanced radar technology. Further more, the system will be outfitted with a new target tracking radar, a latest-generation friend-foe identification system as well as cutting-edge electronic warfare components. The missile launcher will be upgraded with a new state-of-the-art electronic pod, which will enhance the system’s missile capability. Variants of Rheinmetall’s anti-aircraft guns and systems are being used in over thirty countries with Thailand recently signing a contract for four Skyguard systems earlier this year.

Asia Pacific

• Israel Aerospace industries and Korean composite manufacturer Hankuk Carbon are to develop, manufacture and sell a new vertical take-off and landing (VTOL) unmanned air vehicle for South Korea. Initial aims for the UAV will be to develop a system with a 200-300kg maximum take-off weight, and it is hoped that it will have 90% of the work done domestically in Korea. Both companies are also looking into adding shipborne take-off and landing capabilities to IAI/Hankuk’s FE-Panther VTOL UAV, which will be available by the end of 2018.

• India has received the final batch of three Mi-17V-5 military transport helicopters from Russia, bringing the total to 151. The models are the most technically advanced of Rostec Corporation’s Mi-8/17 type including a KNEI-8 avionics suite. The new suite replaces the previously used multiple systems indicators with four large multi-functional that are easy to read and reduce the intensity of pilot’s workload. The completion of the sale comes as both India and Russia continue negotiations for forty-eight more of the helicopters, which are to be used in a variety of operations such as in deserts and mountains, matching the wide variety of environments found in India.

Today’s Video

• The FE-Panter UAV:

Ultra APV demonstrator
(click to view full)

In an age of non-linear warfare, where front lines are nebulous at best and non-existent at worst, one of the biggest casualties is… the concept of unprotected rear echelon vehicles, designed with the idea that they’d never see serious combat. That imperative is being driven home on 2 fronts. One front is operational. The other front is buying trends.

These trends, and their design imperatives, found their way into the USA’s Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) program, which aims to replace many of the US military’s 120,000 or so Humvees. The US military’s goal is a 7-10 ton vehicle that’s lighter than its MRAPs and easier to transport aboard ship, while offering substantially better protection ad durability than existing up-armored Humvees. They’d also like a vehicle that can address front-line issues like power generation, in order to recharge all of the batteries troops require for electronic gadgets like night sights, GPS devices, etc.

DID’s FOCUS articles offer in-depth, updated looks at significant military programs of record. JLTV certainly qualifies, and recent budget planning endorsements have solidifed a future that was looking shaky. Now, can the Army’s program deliver?

JLTV: Program & Risks ONR’s testbed
(click to view full)

The JLTV program began in 2005, with the Army’s recognition that its HMMWV contract would expire in a couple of years, and that a better vehicle was needed to face current threats. The US Army bears overall JLTV responsibility through a Joint Program Office within its Tank, Automotive, and Armament Command (TACOM) in Warren, MI. US Marine Corps participation is centered on a program office under the supervision of the Program Executive Officer Land Systems (PEO LS) Marine Corps at Quantico, VA.

JLTV has benefited from a number of military research programs. They include the Army’s Future Tactical Truck System (FTTS), as well as prototyping efforts on the Ford F350-based Ultra Armored Patrol. Ultra AP was an Office of Naval Research program, involving Badenoch LLC and engineers from the Georgia Institute of Technology’s Georgia Tech Research Institute. JLTV has its own requirements set, and was originally envisaged as having a $160 million Technology Development Phase (TDP) with 2 winners; a higher-level review increased the maximum to 3 winners, but did not increase funding.

Those TDP contracts were supposed to be placed in the 3rd quarter of FY 2008, but weren’t issued until Q1 FY 2009. Winners were subject to armor and ballistic testing, system tests, and live fire testing.

At the end of the TD phase, initial plans called for 2 System Design and Development (SDD) contract awards in Q2 FY 2011, in order to finish the base design and develop the remaining variants. That phase is now called EMD (Engineering & Manufacturing Development), and 3 contracts were issued in August 2012. Col. John Myers, Project Manager for the Army’s Joint Combat Support Services, has always said that that this will be another full and open competition – which means that losers in the TD Phase could conceivably invest, adapt, and win the SDD contract. That’s exactly what happened.

The EMD phase will be followed by a final competition that includes both low and full rate production, and the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Source Selection Authority plans to award a production contract to one winning team in 2015. Final numbers haven’t been determined yet, but the current projected quantity is about 50,000 JLTVs over an 8-year span. The ultimate value could rise to $30-40 billion over more than a decade, giving JLTV the potential to become the world’s largest single land system contract.

The JLTV Family of Vehicles JLTV family comcept
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JLTV is designed to be very modular, which could eventually lead to a dizzying array of variants if the US military wishes. Vehicles must show better performance than the current HMMWV fleet in protection, mobility in dry conditions, and other RFP areas such as power generation; and each category must also be able to tow a trailer with similar capacity. They must be externally transportable in sling mode by CH-47 Chinook or CH-53 Stalion family heavy-lift helicopters, and 2 must be transportable in a C-130 Hercules medium transport aircraft.

Initially, JLTV fell into 3 payload categories for the Technology Development phase, with individual variants in each category to come later.

JLTV Category A. General 4-seat utility vehicle, payload 3,500 pounds. May be thought of as the base vehicle, to be built during the Technology Development (TD) phase.

JLTV Category B. Will be used as the base for most variants. Payload must be 4,000 pounds, desired objective is 4,500. The TD phase will build the 6-seat Infantry Carrier and the C2OTM Command on the move variants. Category B Reconnaissance, Heavy Guns Carrier, TOW ITAS missile carrier, Medium utility, and Ambulance (3 seat + 2 litter) variants will be developed during the SDD phase.

JLTV Category C. The “small truck” class. Payload must be 5,100 pounds. The general shelter carrier and utility variant will be developed during the TD phase; its Hummer M1097 and M1152 analogues are used as mounts for semi-mobile command posts, as equipment carriers, and as light trucks. A larger (3 seat + 4 litter) JLTV ambulance variant will be developed during the SDD phase.

As the US military prepares for a production contract, the types have been set more clearly into 4 initial production variants:

• M1278 JLTV-HGC (Heavy Guns Carrier). From CAT B, accommodates mounted crew-served weapons in a protected gun mount. Some manufacturers claim that their design could comfortably step beyond .50 caliber.

• M1279 JLTV-UTL. Utility/ Cargo light truck variant, from CAT C. Unlike the others, which are all 4-seat vehicles, JLTV-UTL is 2-seat to make more room in back.

• M1280 JLTV-GP. General Purpose vehicle, from CAT A.

• M1281 JLTV-CCWC (Close-Combat Weapons Carrier). From CAT B, an anti-tank/ anti-armor platform that will employ the Army’s TOW-ITAS missile and sight system (called M41 Saber in the USMC), along with direct-fire weapons such as the M2 .50-cal machine gun.

JLTV: Goals and Constraints HMMWV, IEDed
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IED land mines were the #1 killer of American troops in Iraq, and up-armoring flat-bottomed Humvees proved to be an inadequate response. This finally led to the MRAP program at the end of 2006, which will have ordered and produced nearly 16,000 blast-resistant vehicles in less than 3 years. British experience in Iraq and Afghanistan has been similar, with 1/8 of all its casualties inflicted on troops riding in poorly-protected Land Rover Snatch jeeps. Those conditions have prompted several senior officer resignations in protest, including highly placed SAS commanders.

While some countries like Australia and Germany were foresighted enough to develop and field mine-resistant vehicles before 2001, a collective realization is sinking in across the board that up-armoring flat-bottomed vehicles with inadequate carrying capacity, in order to provide a level of protection that is better but still poor, simply will not do. Future patrol vehicles will need to be designed from the outset for blast-resistance against land mines and even car bombs.

There’s no getting around it: JLTV’s requirements will drive up the cost of Army vehicles in combat zones. Smart designs like v-hulls, composite blast pans, crushable composite structures, and improved armors do help – but they come at a cost. They cost money, and they cost weight.

Cougar MRAP et. al.
(click to view full)

The current roster of MRAP vehicles cost around $450,000-$650,000 each, with additional costs for “government furnished equipment” like remote-control turrets, electronics and radios, IED jammers, and other ancillaries. These items can drive an MRAP’s cost to nearly $1 million each, compared to a HMMWV’s $250,000 or so. Given military death benefits of about $500,000 per soldier, however, a full Hummer with all hands lost actually costs $3.25 million – and that’s just the money. There is more to cost than just procurement cost. The question is, will there be more in the budgets to cover the JLTV difference? So far, the response has been to shrink the order until it fits, while attempting to cap costs.

JLTV vehicles will be smaller and lighter than MRAPs, which tends to lower relative cost. On the other hand, they will need to use more innovative design approaches and materials, in order to deliver quality protection. Their “government furnished equipment” costs can be expected to rise in cost over time, because that has been the consistent trend over the last several decades. Final average cost for every fully equipped JLTV could conceivably reach over $700,000, and containing costs under $500,000 is likely to prove very challenging.

The laws of physics also have their say, requiring mass in order to withstand certain levels of explosive power. A military Hummer maxes out at about 12,000 pounds fully loaded. Blast resistant vehicles with MRAP protection levels begin at around 30,000 pounds when empty, and the Cougar 6×6 MRAP depicted in the photo above has a fully loaded Gross Vehicle Weight of 52,000 pounds. On the other hand, Force Protection’s Cougar 6×6 has been hit by huge IED land mine blasts involving several hundred pounds of explosives – and had every single crew member walk away from the resulting wreck.

That outcome was partly the result of design that avoids killers like flat bottoms, which often take several hits from a single mine blast as the explosion is reflected back at the ground and returns to the vehicle, over and over again. Blast-resistant vehicles are also careful about the placement of items that can be blown up into the cabin, and their bottoms avoid nooks and crannies that would act as “blast traps,” catching the force of land mine explosions like a ship’s sail catches wind. Even design has its limits, however; more weight allows heavier construction, more vehicle stability against even a deflected blast’s awesome punch, and a better ratio of protection to usable interior space.

Design a 14,000 – 20,000 pound vehicle with the same mine protection as a Cougar 6×6 is close to a “mission impossible,” though the Army seems to be asking for exactly that outcome. FY 2011 testing has begun to reveal the weaknesses inherent in that approach, as weight is already proving to be an issue for the off-road mobility that the US Marines prize so highly.

Instead, a successful and survivable JLTV program needs to be built around an inevitable set of tradeoffs. Requirements like lower height for shipboard transportability mean reduced v-hull angles, and less room between the hull and the ground when a mine goes off. Those decisions may be more compatible with off-road capability, which benefits from a lower center of gravity – up to a point. On the other hand, a complex suspension might deliver improved off-road mobility, with great clearance underneath, at the cost of extra weight, extra cost, and possibly poorer reliability. In this weight class, interlinked engineering problems make it very difficult to make just one decision.

JLTV: To Be, or Not to Be? Oshkosh M-ATV
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JLTV’s biggest challenge will be to survive as a program. The US Army and Marine Corps both face huge maintenance budget “overhangs” as a result of long and hard equipment use required on the front-lines. Even the current rate of wartime supplemental funding has left both services short of the annual funds required for full maintenance and replacement. To make matters worse, both services have large, high-profile procurement programs (Ground Combat Vehicle, V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor, USMC armored vehicle replacements) that are set to suck up massive development and/or procurement funds. Meanwhile, urgent MRAP and M-ATV “JLTV bridge buy” contracts are filling a similar niche for protected patrol vehicles, and creating a small explosion of related design ideas and in-production technologies. All the while employing a set of companies and workers with powerful local lobbying leverage, amidst an overall budgetary environment in which US military spending is expected to decline.

When seen in that light, the US military’s strategy shift away from initial visions involving large JLTV System Design and Development contracts makes a lot of sense. Instead, a set of relatively small design and development contracts, coupled with options for self-financed projects that have demonstrated success in following rounds, will give the US military its pick of 6-7 different and fully developed JLTV vehicles, all for under $300 million.

Buying the vehicles in quantity will be a different ball game, and planned JLTV numbers have declined steadily. The program’s next challenge will be to get a significant number of JLTV vehicles bought and delivered, amidst a budget environment that has moved from “tightening” to “crisis imminent”.

M-ATV’s off-road mobility, and orders to date for over 8,000 vehicles, give Oshkosh an especially strong fallback position. If JLTV falters for budgetary and technical reasons, the Army’s “bridge buy” M-ATV vehicles are already being kept in the force, alongside some of Navistar’s MaxxPro MRAPs. It wouldn’t be ideal, but those fleets could form the basis of an expeditionary force, while the military goes back to buying modified HMMWVs or other less-protected vehicles.

JLTV: Participants and Platforms BAE/ Navistar’s Valanx
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Unsurprisingly, the JLTV field has displayed a certain degree of design convergence, within a very different set of core approaches to the problem. Since the competition will remain fully open at every step, it’s worth tracking all submissions. Even if a design loses a round, private development work could still make it a winner in the next round.

Government releases initially said that the JLTV program received 7 qualifying submissions in response to its initial Request for Proposal. Phase 1 saw Technology Development contract awards to 3 winners: AM General and General Dynamics’ General Tactical Vehicles joint venture (GTV Eagle), BAE and Navistar (Valanx), and a Lockheed Martin team that features heavy participation from BAE Systems’ Tactical Vehicle Systems division in Sealy, TX.

Phase 2 awarded Engineering & Manufacturing Development contracts to 3 winners: The team of Lockheed and BAE TVS from round 1, AM General for its solo BRV-O entry, and Oshkosh for its privately developed L-ATV.

BAE Systems: Valanx (won TDP, lost EMD) Valanx & trailer
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At one time, the firms that are now part of BAE Systems had owned the world market for blast-resistant vehicles. BAE’s early lack of success in the MRAP competition was a rude shock, but a combination of acquisitions and execution brought them back to the #2 position by competition’s end. BAE firms also have a substantial combat vehicle heritage designing Bradley and CV90 infantry fighting vehicles, M113 tracked armored personnel carriers, Bv family armored all-terrain carriers, and other widely-used combat platforms. The US Army’s FMTV medium trucks offered an outstanding wheeled vehicle production background – except for one small problem. That group within BAE was already working with Lockheed Martin. BAE U.S. Combat Systems drew heavily on its combat vehicle heritage for the JLTV’s “Valanx” design, therefore, and covered its production gap with a strong alliance: Navistar, a huge commercial and military trucking firm who had finished #1 in the USA’s MRAP program. Navistar eventually split from the partnership, toward the end of the TD phase.

The Valanx reflects BAE’s combat vehicle heritage and design approaches. “Chicken tests” were performed for length of operation without oil, as were some other tests not done on normal trucks. MRAP lessons learned re: v-hull angle and materials, spacing between the “v” and ground, and aspects like fireproof spall liners were incorporated. Hull shaping and internal layout were designed to maximize sightlines, including the ability to survey the rear quadrant while sitting in the vehicle, as well as offering improved stowage. With respect to armaments, BAE’s RG-33 is reportedly the only MRAP vehicle in theater that has been equipped with a fully stabilized turret for accurate fire on the move. Their JLTV design’s body rigidity would build on that heritage, allowing the cupola hole to mount and fire substantially larger weapons than a HMMWV could safely carry.

Sightlines and stowage were only some of the user-centric design aspects incorporated into the vehicle. Close examination shows windows that are all the same, which means just one spare type to stock. The hydraulic suspension system will raise and lower the vehicle for off-roading or ship transport, but it can also pick up just one corner to make tire changes easier. The spare tire carrier is an integrated jack, and BAE claims that a “5% female” (female in lowest 5% of Army physical requirements) can change their JLTV’s tire, quickly, if required. Observers may also note the extra space from the tire to the wheel well rims; this allows units to bolt up different size wheel and tire assemblies in order to change the vehicle’s characteristics, lowering ground pressure with MRAP-size tires for off-road activities or heavier loads, or using smaller tires for less weight and more efficient on-road use.

The BAE team chose not to create a hybrid drive vehicle, on the grounds that a conventional drive train would let them meet all requirements at less weight and less cost. Instead, the Valanx’s lightweight independent suspension and drivetrain are made by Arvin Meritor, the US Army’s largest axle supplier. With that said, their Valanx does leverage BAE HybriDrive technologies used in thousands of Orion passenger buses, in order to exceed the military’s electrical power production requirements. A full set of embedded diagnostic and prognostic systems, leveraging several classified and non-classified databuses, will be used to help keep these vehicles running reliably. Navistar JLTV product page | BAE/ Navistar partnership announcement | Feb 2008 JLTV unveiling: BAE | Aviation Week article.

BAE also competed for the M-ATV interim buy, using 2 designs. One design is a lighter, improved version of their Caiman MRAP, which is derived in turn from the Army’s standard FMTV medium trucks. The second submission was a modified Valanx. Both lost to Oshkosh.

GDLS & AM General’s GTV EAGLE (won TDP, lost EMD) GTV’s design
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AM General are the builders of the current Hummer fleet. General Dynamics Land Systems builds M1 Abrams tanks, was a partner with Force Protection to deliver Cougar MRAPs via the Force Dynamics joint venture, and finally bought Force Protection in December 2011. The firm also has very strong systems integration capabilities, and is involved in key radio and electronics programs that will equip America’s future soldiers. GTV is the AM General/ GDLS joint venture for the JLTV, and Eagle is the name for their design.

In 2006, both AM General and General Dynamics were awarded JLTV “Best Technical Approach” trade studies by the Office of Naval Research. Their joint design stresses design maturity and proven components, and includes a “unique modular and scalable trailer that has mobility equal to the JLTV vehicle itself.” GDLS and AM General reportedly invested over $10 million for risk reduction development and maturation of this vehicle and its In-Hub Hybrid Electric Drive system. Their AGMV used a hexagon shaped armored capsule for its uses in mine protection, side blast deflection, and small-arms protection. GTV site | Defense Update Nov 2007 article.

Lockheed Martin & BAE TVS (TD & EMD Winner) LM/ BAE’s UVL Class C
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Lockheed Martin’s 2006 purchase of small British specialist vehicle designer HMT was an interesting shift for the firm, which has not been a major contender for military ground vehicle design. The firm has put a serious effort behind that push, however, leveraging wins for research programs like Future Tactical Truck System, and using their own private development funds. These resources were invested to build, evaluate, and refine its JLTV designs over several prototypes, and thousands of miles of testing – choices that ended up giving this team the best maturity and technical risk rating available: “Excellent/ Very Low Risk”.

Even so, Lockheed Martin knew from the outset that it would need a very serious production partner in order to field a credible design, and a credible bid. It found one early in Armor Holdings, who designed and built the US Army’s FMTV medium truck fleet. This may be the Army’s second largest vehicle fleet, with well over 40,000 trucks delivered to date plus another 2,000 or so derivative Caiman MRAPs. In 2007, a multi-billion dollar deal made Armor Holdings part of BAE “General Tactical Systems” – and created a “firewall” within BAE Systems between its 2 JLTV teams. All FMTV-related expertise remains exclusively at Team Lockheed’s disposal, and has been used to create a fully joint design and volume production plan. Other team members include Alcoa Defense (aluminum materials technology, design), JWF (machining and fabrication), plus Cummins Engine, Allison Transmission, Bosch, Meritor Defense, Lotus Engineering, L3 Combat Propulsion Systems, and Vehma International of America.

Lockheed Martin is a systems design firm at heart, and that approach became a big focus for the JLTV. Within that approach, survivability uses a wide array of techniques, including diverting energy via a v-hull; absorbing energy; visual, noise and infrared signature reduction; and ergonomics and individual reaction analysis. Team spokespeople stressed that a number of these elements are proprietary, and are not obvious from external viewing.

Producibility can easily be set aside in the rush to solve hard engineering problems. As expected given the team’s FMTV background, this was also a focus. The 3rd focus was maintainability and readiness, which is a particular strength of the FMTV truck fleet. Armor Holdings had the FMTV’s proven electronic diagnostic and troubleshooting systems, while Lockheed brought higher-level prognostic approaches derived from projects like its F-35 fighter and its accompanying fleet-wide ALIS system. In the end, their joint commitment and effort was rewarded with a TDP contract. 2006 teaming announcement | Alcoa joins the team | LM Team unveils Category C prototype | LM team Category B testing release.

Phase 2 Engineering & Manufacturing Development: Outside Entries Ocelot unveiled
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As intended, the EMD Phase bids also attracted bids that hadn’t been part of the earlier TD phase.

AM General: BRV-O (Won EMD). The day after the RFP was due, AM General announced that in addition to the GTV Eagle, it had also submitting its own privately-developed BRV-O (Blast Resistant Vehicle – Off road) as an independent bid. The firm has a set of partners, but wouldn’t discuss them, or offer specifics about their vehicle beyond boilerplate like “self-leveling suspension,” “crew capsule and modular armor”, and “C4ISR backbone”.

General Dynamics: Ocelot (???) Force Protection’s Cheetah lost the JLTV TD phase competition, then the M-ATV interim bridge vehicle competition, then faded into oblivion. The firm still has an offering in this weight class, however, thanks to Britain’s Light Protected Patrol Vehicle competition. Instead of entering the Cheetah, Force Protection worked in conjunction with its British partners to invent a modular, 7.5 ton Ocelot vehicle that could give the firm another crack at JLTV.

Orders for British “Foxhounds” pushed the vehicle into production, and JLTV is a tempting target, but General Dynamics bought Force Protection in December 2011. The company could enter the Ocelot as a stand-alone JLTV EMD contender, and compete against its GTV partnership with AM General. The question is whether it will choose to do so – as its partner AM General did. The EMD phase had 7 bidders, which leaves 1 unaccounted for. If Ocelot was that missing contender, it didn’t win, but it has enough of a production base to finance improvements and enter again.

International Saratoga
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Navistar: Saratoga (Lost EMD). Navistar wound up splitting from its Valanx partner BAE Systems to offer its Saratoga design. It looks a lot like some of the v-hulled HMMWV upgrades on the market, but early reports indicate that it doesn’t use a v-hull for underbody blast protection. Navistar launched the Saratoga in October 2011, after conducting its own automotive and blast testing. Their funding as the #1 producer of standard MRAP vehicles would have helped back Saratoga’s development.

Saratoga was reportedly aimed at the HMMWV Recapitalization/ MECV competition, but that went away. As JLTV’s requirements and cost targets have shrunk, however, Navistar apparently decided that a “less is more” solution was smart positioning. An emailed release said that the decision makers at Navistar:

“…believe it is appealing to nations facing uncertain futures and limited budgets… Down the road, there may be an opportunity for Navistar to bid for a JLTV production contract after the EMD phase is complete. We will seriously consider that option.”

Oshkosh: L-ATV (Won EMD). They may have lost the initial JLTV Technology Development competition, but their immediate fallback was a huge success. A reworked M-ATV version of their vehicle won the planned bridge buys to JLTV, using a less high-tech approach. The M-ATV’s 8,000+ orders could easily finance further JLTV research to improve their team’s perceived technical maturity, while providing a potential commonality angle.

Which is exactly what happened, leading to the smaller, privately-developed L-ATV. It includes an updated TAK-4i version of the firm’s widely-used TAK-4 independent suspension system, and can add an optional ProPulse hybrid diesel-electric drive train for power storage and export.

JLTV: Contracts and Key Events FY 2016

Production RFP. AM General BRV-O

February 4/16: Following Michael Gilmore’s thoughts on the F-35 program, his report has also shed some light on the hotly contested Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) competition. His report goes into detail on how the three offerings for the USMC Humvee replacement faired in tests. While Lockheed Martin and competition winner Oshkosh met protection requirements, Humvee producer AM General fell short. The shortfall resulted in AM General losing out on a contract potentially worth $30 billion, one of the biggest Army contracts in recent times. Lockheed Martin went on to begin a legal proceeding against the award to Oshkosh; however, these were thrown out before the new year.

December 17/15: Oshkosh Corporation has been allowed to resume building tactical vehicles for the US Army. The go ahead was given after the company was forced to halt production of 17,000 Light Tactical Vehicles specified on the $6.75 billion contract which was awarded in August. Rival bidder Lockheed Martin had challenged the decision to award Oshkosh Corp the tender, bringing it to the watchdog Government Accountability Office. The GAO dismissed Lockheed’s objections, allowing the production to continue.

FY 2015

Production RFP.

September 09/15: Lockheed is protesting the award to its competitor of the massive JLTV program. The GAO said that the decision on the protest would be made before things start to close up in D.C. for Christmas. AM General, the other firm losing to Oshkosh, opted not to protest.

August 27/15: It should go without saying that yesterday’s Oshkosh award of the JLTV program may well be contested. The Army has yet to debrief Lockheed or AM General, a key step in the process toward a proper GAO protest.

August 26/15: Oshkosh won one of the largest land forces defense contracts ever, taking the $30 billion JLTV contract. The initial order for 17,000 vehicles will start replacing Humvees in fiscal 2016 and really ramp in 2018. Runner ups were Lockheed and AM General.

Dec 12/14: Production RFP. USTACOM releases the 4th and final iteration of its JLTV RFP for Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate Production (FRP). This comes right after the 3rd draft, indicating that changes were minimal. Contractors have until February 5, 2015 to send questions, with proposals due by Feb. 10. Communications with parties other than the 3 potential prime contractors will be kept to a minimum. The Firm Fixed Price (FFP) contract should last 3 years of LRIP followed by 5 years at full rate. Pricing the years out will depend of whether Multiyear Procurement (MYP) is approved by Congress. Solicitation W56HZV-14-R-0039.

Dec 02/14: 3rd RFP Draft. USTACOM releases the 3rd iteration of its draft JLTV RFP. Communication remains limited to one-on-one meetings with the 3 EMD winners, under an approved Justification and Approval that allows limited competition. There will still be a lot of work ahead even after the final RFP is issued and a contract awarded, as the pursuit of a MYP strategy at the the full rate production stage will require congressional approval.

Source: W56HZV-14-R-0039.

Nov 19/14: Limited User Testing. Limited User Testing (LUT) has been completed by the US Army and Marine Corps between September and October with the prototypes that all 3 EMD participants had provided.

Oct 8/14: 2nd RFP Draft. the US military releases their 2nd Draft RFP for JLTV. It envisions a maximum of 8 years for the production contract & options, using range pricing to determine unit prices for vehicles and kits.

Per H.1.3.1., orders could rise to 16,700 vehicles on a firm-fixed-price basis that changes using agreed yearly cost escalation, with the JLTV mission package mix determined each year from 4 options: M1278 Heavy guns carrier, M1279 Utility/ cargo, M1280 General purpose, M1281 close-combat weapons carrier. They could add up to 97 refurbished JLTV-FoVs to make 16,797, but they need to exercise the refurbished options in Lots 1-5.

The government can also order up to 32 trailers on a firm-fixed-price basis in any increment, and up to 164,697 packaged and installed kits on a firm-fixed-price basis. Sources: TACOM Warren Procurement Network, “2nd DRAFT RFP W56HZV-14-R-0039” | FBO.gov #W56HZV14R0039.

FY 2013 – 2014

Program updates; Test vehicles produced; RFP drafts begin, as initial variants become clearer.

Sept 24/14: The JLTV designs remain staples at shows like AUSA and Modern Day Marine eXpo, as the firm compete to build almost 17,000 vehicles, with the initial production contracts expected in summer 2015 (183 Army and 7 USMC). Will the military go beyond that?

“Overall, the Army aims to purchase about 49,000 of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicles, while the Marine Corps plans to acquire about 5,500 of the trucks. Both services have pledged their commitment to the program despite facing automatic budget cuts known as sequestration…. estimated the effort to develop and build the vehicles at almost $23 billion, or about $400,000 per truck, according to a 2013 report from the Congressional Research Service. Leaders have maintained each vehicle will cost about $250,000.”

We’ll see. Sources: DoD Buzz, “Army to Start Next JLTV Competition This Fall”.

Sept 5/14: LMCO. The Lockheed Martin Team’s JLTV program successfully completed the government’s Production Readiness Review (PRR) of their Camden, AK Ground Vehicle Assembly facility.

The Camden site has won a a Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award for Manufacturing Excellence before, but Lockheed doesn’t have a history with vehicles, and BAE’s Sealy, TX facility was gutted by Oshkosh’s money-losing bid for FMTV trucks. That makes this kind of approval more important to them than it is to other teams. Sources: LMCO, “U.S. Government Gives Green Light to Lockheed Martin Team’s JLTV Production Plans”.

June 25/14: Draft RFP v1. The government issues its initial draft RFP for JLTV. One advantage to EMD Phase selection: Joint Program Office JLTV will only answer questions or take comments from the 3 EMD contractors, though non-classified materials and answers will be posted and available to anyone. Sources: TACOM Warren Procurement Network, “1st Draft Request for Proposal (RFP), Attachments and Exhibits” | FBO.gov #W56HZV14R0039, “23–Joint Light Tactical Vehicles (JLTV) Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate Production (FRP) Special Notice – Draft RFP
Solicitation Number”.

Draft RFPs begin

June 18/13: Program update. Despite sequestration, JLTV program officials tell military.com that they’re on track to deliver a low-rate-initial production JLTV award to a single vendor in FY 2015. AM General, Lockheed Martin, and Oshkosh are scheduled to deliver 22 vehicles each for testing in August 2013. They’ll go through off-road and soft soil testing, shipboard and ship to shore tests, and blast testing. Testing will help create a requirements document that will be validated by late FY 2014 – early FY 2015, which in turn paves the way for an RFP. The final step is an open competition, followed by final award.

The official per-unit limit remains at to $250,000 per vehicle, thanks to on-going trade-offs throughout the Technology Development process. On the other hand, by the time the services finish adding communications, manned weapons stations or RWS, and other gear, it’s reasonable to expect a final price around $400,000 – 500,000+.

The wild card? Program managers acknowledge that another year of sequestration cuts would force new choices on the military, which could change the program. That’s very likely to happen, which could turn programs like the USMC’s HMMWV improvement (q.v. Sept 27/12) from complements to competitors. Military.com.

June 10-22/13: Test vehicles. The EMD phase vendors have manufactured their initial testing vehicles for the US government, with formal deliveries scheduled to run through August. The JLTV prototypes will receive additional “mission packages” from their manufacturers or from the government, in order to convert them to specific testing configurations like Heavy Guns Carrier. AM General | Lockheed Martin | Oshkosh Defense.

FY 2012

RFP & responses lead to EMD awards; BAE/Navistar team splits; AM General submits its own bid; USMC’s HMMWV improvement complement. Lockheed/BAE’s lineup
(click to view full)

Sept 27/12: USMC HMMWVs. Military.com reports on the USMC’s internal math, which says they won’t be able to replace 24,000 HMMWVs with 5,500 JLTVs bought around 2017 – 2022.

The rest will need to come from a HMMWV improvement program, without getting into the same “costs as much as buying new” swamp as HMMMWV RECAP. Solution? Start with a clear price limit, and try to figure out what you can afford for that. The interesting thing is that instead of focusing on blast protection, the program seems to aim at restoring vehicle performance, payload, and reliability to the level it was at before before conventional up-armoring. Military.com.

Sept 4/12: Thou Shalt not Protest. Navistar withdraws a GAO protest that it had filed just a few days earlier. According to the company they first filed their protest because of regulatory timing constraints, but after reviewing their debriefing, they decided not to proceed. BAE Systems will not challenge the award, either. Marine Corps Times.

Meanwhile Hardwire LLC announced that it was behind the mystery 7th (failed) bid. The company made blast chimney demonstrations on Humvees a couple of years ago. Defense News.

Aug 24/12: EMD triple award. 3 awards are made for the 27-month Engineering & Manufacturing Development phase, with an estimated completion date of Nov 8/14. The winners will deliver 22 vehicles within 12 to 14 months for further testing and evaluation. TACOM in Warren, MI received 7 bids, and the winners were:

Lockheed Martin Corp. in Grand Prairie, TX wins a $65 million firm-fixed-price contract. Work will be performed in Lockheed Martin’s Grand Prairie, TX facility, and BAE TVS’ Sealy, TX plant (W56HZV-12-C-0262).

AM General LLC in South Bend, IN wins a $63.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for their BRV-O. Work will be performed in Livonia, MI, and Mishawaka, IN (W56HZV-12-C-0258).

Oshkosh Corp. in Oshkosh, WI wins a $55.9 million firm-fixed-price contract for their L-ATV. Work will be performed in Oshkosh, WI (W56HZV-12-C-0264).

The awards vindicate AM General and Oshkosh’s choice to submit their own bids, while TD phase winners BAE (Valanx) and General Dynamics (Eagle) are on their own if they want to continue. Navistar (Saratoga) could also elect to continue with private development, and enter the production competition. The 7th bidder isn’t clear, but General Dynamics may have also bid its Ocelot/Foxhound.

BAE has the most interesting decision, as they remain involved in EMD through their participation in the Lockheed Martin-led team. A win with Lockheed would keep their Texas plant alive and in position to contest the next FMTV medium truck contract, which Oshkosh is now known to have bid at a significant loss. Shareholder dissatisfaction makes a repeat of that strategy unlikely for Oshkosh, which must give BAE hope to recapture the Sealy factory’s cornerstone. Their Valanx is associated with other facilities. Is it better for BAE to hedge its bets with Valanx development, or keep the development money for other things and go all in with Lockheed Martin? See also US Army, belatedly | FBO.gov | AM General | Lockheed Martin | Oshkosh | James Hasik sees industrial considerations in the award, and explains further.

JLTV EMD Phase

March 27/12: RFP bids in. BAE, Lockheed Martin, and Oshkosh announce their JLTV submissions. The due date had originally been March 13/12, but it was extended. The government plans to award up to 3 JLTV EMD contracts in June 2012, for delivery of 22 prototype vehicles and other equipment for testing.

AM General announces the next day that in addition to its joint GTV submission with General Dynamics Land Systems, it will be submitting a design of its own called the BRV-O (Blast Resistant Vehicle – Off road). AM General developed the vehicle itself, and says it has put BRV-O through 300,000 miles of road testing. It also says that it has a number of industrial partners for system integration, etc., but won’t name them.

BAE US Combat Systems’ JLTV team includes Northrop Grumman for systems integration, Arvin Meritor for the suspension, and now Ford for the engine. Their Valanx will use the same Power Stroke 6.7 liter turbocharged diesel that powers Ford’s commercial F-series trucks. BAE describes it as having “class-leading fuel economy and the best horsepower and torque of any engine in its class,” and told DoD Buzz that when Navistar and BAE Systems split, and BAE Systems needed a company to build them an engine, Ford was the obvious answer.

The partnership between General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General has confirmed that they’re bidding a design called the EAGLE. This double-v hull design is not the same as GD MOWAG’s light patrol vehicle offering that used to be based on the HMMWV, and now (EAGLE IV) uses the Duro truck as its base.

Lockheed Martin’s JLTV team includes BAE Tactical Vehicle Systems in Sealy, TX, plus Cummins Engine, Allison Transmission, Bosch, Meritor Defense, Lotus Engineering, L3 Combat Propulsion Systems, and Vehma International of America. Their release touted the weight and cost savings in their revised designs, using a combination of digital engineering analysis, virtual design builds, component tests and physical stress testing. BAE-TVS appears to be positioned as the manufacturing centerpiece, and has capacity after Oshkosh bid below cost to take their FMTV truck contract away.

Navistar has split from BAE Systems, and is offering its Saratoga design, which looks a lot like some of the V-hulled HMMWV upgrades on the market. Navistar launched the vehicle in October 2011, after conducting its own automotive and blast testing. Navistar Defense President Archie Massicotte said that: “The Saratoga is a solid design and now that we have seen the requirements of the JLTV migrate toward our vehicle capabilities, we are in a position to modify the Saratoga to fit those requirements.”

Oshkosh, as predicted, is entering its L-ATV derivative of the popular M-ATV, which has become the US military’s most widely ordered blast-resistant vehicle. Their bid includes their new and improved TAK-4i independent suspension, and an optional Oshkosh ProPulse diesel-electric hybrid powertrain.

Force Protection, which has been absorbed into GD Land Systems, was silent on whether or not it bid its Ocelot.

Bid surprises for some

March 4/12: Not that people doubt the Army’s ability to deliver a JLTV vehicle with HMMWV size and MRAP-level protection for $250,000… but they do. The Army is responding. Lt. Gen. Bill Phillips, principal military deputy to the assistant secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics and Technology:

“In July [2011], the Army released the “Decker-Wagner” review of its acquisition processes… Phillips said the Army has already implemented 29 of the 76 recommendations in the report, and will implement a total of 63 of those recommendations total — with the majority complete by the summer… Now, he said, the service is looking at what capabilities a requirement provides, is it feasible in terms of execution on the timeline, and is it affordable.

One beneficiary of the Army’s new acquisition processes is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. Phillips said the JLTV might have cost the Army close to $500,000 per vehicle if the Army had gone forward with the strategy it had during the technology development phase of the vehicle. Today, he said, as a result of how the Army changed the way it does requirements “we are confident we can bring this vehicle in for less than $250,000.”

Acquisition processes don’t change the laws of physics. Phillips cites the successful MRAP program as a reason for faith, but those vehicles cost over $500,000 each, and were far heavier than JLTV’s goal. The proof will be in the delivery.

Feb 28/12: Col. Dave Bassett, the project manager for Army tactical vehicles, tells the AUSA conference that he has confidence in the coming responses to JLTV. In his opinion:

“Industry, they don’t need another two years to design this vehicle… They are ready now to respond with mature designs to our solicitation.”

Jan 30/12: JLTV EMD RFP. FBO.gov solicitation #W56HZV11R0329:

“The solicitation for the JLTV EMD phase… shall be conducted on a source selection basis utilizing a “tradeoff” process to obtain the best value to the Government. The full and open competitive source selection process will result in an award to up to three firm-fixed price contracts for the EMD(Engineering & Manufacturing Development) phase focusing on fabrication, assembly, integration, testing and test support, and related requirements in accordance with the contract and the JLTV Purchase Description. Each JLTV Contractor shall deliver prototype vehicles, ballistic structures, armor coupons, additional test assets, and contractor furnished kits, trailers and data requirements. Contract award is currently planned for June of 2012. “

The response date in March 13/12. Per the program’s original plan, vendors that were not picked for the initial JLTV development phase can enter vehicles in this competition.

EMD phase RFP

Jan 26/12: Saved by the budget? Preliminary FY 2013 budget materials discuss coming shifts in Pentagon priorities, as the defense department moves to make future cuts. The JLTV ids an exception, however: “HMMWVs – terminated upgrades and focused modernization resources on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle,” in line with recent US Army declarations. Pentagon release | “Defense Budget Priorities and Choices” [PDF]

The US Army declares that it will not pursue offerings of upgraded HMMWVs, and intends to stick with the JLTV program, following an agreement with the Marine Corps. The question, of course, is whether Congress will go along with this decision. Lexington Institute.

Jan 17/12: Testing warnings. The Pentagon releases the FY2011 Annual Report from its Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation (DOT&E). The JLTV is included, and tests indicate a couple of warning signs. To sum up: they need roads, reliability has been poor, MRAPs are uncomfortable, and the laws of physics haven’t been repealed.

“During TD testing, all vendor vehicles experienced difficulty with mobility in soft soil due to vehicle weight and other vehicle design factors. In the TD, the reliability of vendor vehicles demonstrated between 71 to 902 Mean Miles Between Operational Mission Failure (MMBOMF) versus the required 3,600 MMBOMF. The Army increased the underbody threat requirement during TD to be equivalent to the protection provided by the [heavier M-ATV] vehicle. The ability to achieve the increased level of protection while also satisfying other JLTV requirements [DID: like, say, mobility in soft soil] is not known.”

Mobility will be an especial issue for the US Marines. The testers also complained about communications integration, and the same visibility and internal layout issues that have bedeviled other blast-resistant designs. BAE’s Valanx was supposedly designed to offset that, but:

“All three JLTV vendor vehicles had problems demonstrating functionality of government furnished command, control, and communication equipment in vehicles… Lack of adequate storage space for ammunition, restricted visibility due to small windows, positioning of window panels, and uncomfortable seats with poor seating arrangements were common problems between vendor prototypes and variants.”

Oct 10/11: NAV Saratoga. Navistar Defense introduces its Saratoga light patrol vehicle at AUSA. It’s initially aimed at the HMMWV Recapitalization/ MECV program, but ends up becoming Navistar’s JLTV offering. Navistar | Aviation Week Ares | Defense Update.

Oct 3/11: JLTV EMD RFP Draft. The latest Army-Marine Corps JLTV solicitation favors existing designs over new, and may lead to the program’s demise in favor of recapitalized and modified HMMWVs.

The $250,000 target cost will be a challenge all by itself, but the new solicitation may actually kill JLTV altogether, by driving both new and existing designs out of the competition. By reducing expected production to just 20,000 vehicles over 8 years (3 LRIP, 5 full-rate), it becomes more difficult for firms to recover costs for new designs. On the other hand, demands to hand over technical data rights, and a plan to re-compete the production contract for the winning vehicle after several years, make it unattractive for firms to place a valuable existing design at risk. US Army TACOM Page | FBO.gov | Defense News | Lexington Institute.

FY 2011

Oshkosh debuts L-ATV; JLTV cut rumors prod Plan Bs. L-ATV
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Sept 13/11: OSK L-ATV. Oshkosh unveils its smaller “L-ATV” protected patrol vehicle, which it describes as fully compliant with all JLTV program specifications. The firm was eliminated from the technical demonstrator contract phase, but the next phase will be re-opened to outside bidders. Oshkosh did the expected thing, and leveraged its M-ATV win to fund development.

The L-ATV will feature the improved TAK-4i independent suspension, which “uses a proprietary technology to deliver 20 inches of independent wheel travel – 25 percent more wheel travel than any vehicle in the U.S. military’s fleets.” It can also raise or lower the vehicle, ensuring transportability in ships and aircraft, while still offering enough height for all-terrain mobility and mine blast protection.

Sept 13/11: JLTV future. The Senate Appropriations defense subcommittee moves to cancel JLTV in their version of the FY 2012 defense bill, which would shift the MECV upgraded HMMWV effort into JLTV’s place. If the curt remains final, which is a long way from happening. AOL Defense.

April 28/11: As the teams prepare for the JTLV Engineering & Manufacturing Development contract awards in early 2012, BAE and Navistar’s Team Valanx adds Northrop Grumman to their consortium.

Northrop Grumman will serve as the C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance) lead, responsible for the integration of command and control hardware and software, computers and communications equipment, and sensors and sensor suites for intelligence gathering and force protection. BAE Systems.

Oct 25/10: JLTV future. BAE’s Plan B: v-hulled HMMWVs. At AUSA 2010, BAE Systems announces its “Integrated Smart V,” a lightweight monocoque V-hull HMMWV that reuses a large percentage of existing HMMWV components, including the power train and wheel assemblies. It adds a layered monocoque hull with a V-shaped underbody that totally encapsulates the crew, and BAE line lead Chris Chambers adds that “…using clips attached to the monocoque V-hull, the ISV provides a rigid, uncompromising protection solution at an affordable price.”

BAE’s ISV solution comes as budget cuts make JLTV an attractive target, and the USMC looks for an option that will meet its height requirements for stowage aboard ship. They’re not the only firm to be thinking along those lines – Textron has a “capsulized” HMMWV of its own, and have teamed with another firm that has done work along similar lines: Granite Tactical Vehicles. HMMWV ISV could also offer an emergency HMMWV fleet recapitalization option that would bring new work to BAE’s land systems business, which has been hurt by its loss of FMTV truck production, and by the end of MRAP main production orders. BAE Systems.

FY 2010

Australia contracts; Army strategy leaves JLTV in question; Interest from India. Ocelot modularity
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Aug 17/10: JLTV future. DoD Buzz reports that the US Army’s latest Tactical Vehicle Strategy looks like bad news for the JLTV, with small buys spaced over time to equip deployed units. Bottom line?

“Here’s the basic plan. Overall, the Army will shrink its fleet of HUMVEEs, MRAPs and medium trucks to 244,000 by 2025 from its current 260,000. How? The service will rid itself of 4,000 of the hardest to maintain and most beat up MRAPS by 2025. It will scrap the 28,000-strong M35 fleet and replace it with new FMTVs for a fleet total of 76,000. That will mean a total reduction of 4,000 trucks. The HUMVEE fleet will shrink the most, going from 101,000 to 35,000 by 2025. But there appears to be one big hole in the Army plan. It does not project how many Joint Light Tactical Wheeled Vehicles it will be. The strategy’s answer: TBD.”

See the full Army Tactical Vehicle Strategy [PDF].

Aug 9/10: Australia. The General Tactical Vehicles JV between General Dynamics and AM General in Sterling Heights, MI receives a $9 million cost-share contract for the design and development of 3 JLTV subconfigurations for Australia, and the delivery of 2 JLTV subconfiguration vehicles and 1 companion trailer for government testing.

Work is to be performed in Livonia, MI (47%); Sterling Heights, MI (41%); Muskegon, MI (9%); and South Bend, IN (3%), with an estimated completion date of May 19/11. JLTV bids were solicited on the World Wide Web with 7 bids received by the US Army TACOM Contracting Center in Warren, MI (W56HZV-09-C-0108).

June 23/10: Australia. Lockheed Martin Corp. in Owego, NY receives an $8.5 million cost-plus- fixed-fee contract. They will design and develop 3 JLTV sub-configurations for Australia with right-hand drive, and deliver 2 JLTV sub configurations vehicles and 1 companion trailer for Australian government testing.

Work will be performed in Owego, NY, and the contracted is expected to run until May 19/11. Bids were solicited on the World Wide Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s TACOM Contracting Center in Warren, MI (W56HZV-09-C-0109).

June 17/10: Australia. The BAE Land Systems – Navistar – ArvinMeritor team hands over 3 Australian JLTVs in a ceremony at West Point, MS. All 3 types are represented: a Category A General Purpose vehicle, a Category B Command and Control on the Move vehicle and a Category C Utility/cargo variant. The prototypes are very similar to American JLTV models, but include requested Australian modifications and a right-side driver. They will undergo tropical environment, reliability testing, and blast testing in Australia.

BAE Systems is Australia’s largest defense company, employing more than 6,000 people at 100 locations across Australia. BAE Systems.

May 26/10: Australia. Australia’s Overlander Phase 4 will have 3 new competitors. Australia’s Minister for Defence Materiel and Science, Greg Combet, announces that Thales Australia, Force Protection Europe, and General Dynamics Land Systems will each receive 6-month contracts worth up to A$ 9 million each, in order to develop “Protected Mobility Vehicle” prototypes. Those prototypes would compete against any winners from the American/Australian JLTV competition, for a roughly A$ 1 billion, 1,300 vehicle contract.

Force Protection is partnered with England’s Ricardo to develop the modular Ocelot, which is also competing for a similar contract in Britain. Bushmaster MPV manufacturers Thales Australia have designed a smaller vehicle called the Hawkei, named after one of Australia’s Death Adders. Their partners include Boeing Defence Australia, PAC Group, and Israeli armor manufacturer and designer Plasan Sasa. GDLS has several options, including a lighter variant of their RG-31 with Oshkosh’s TAK-4 suspension upgrade, currently serving with the US military in Afghanistan. As noted above, they are also partnered with Humvee manufacturer AMC General for the JLTV competition. Australian DoD | Force Protection | Thales Australia.

Made in Australia option

May 3/10: BAE. The BAE Systems/ Navistar/ ArvinMeritor team announces the handover of 7 JLTV prototypes and 4 companion trailers to the U.S. Army. The mix of vehicles included 2 JLTV Category A General Purpose vehicles, 4 JLTV Category B Infantry Carriers, and 1 Category C Utility Carrier. The team is now focused on completing the build of 3 additional variants and a companion trailer, to be delivered to Australia in June 2010.

Sites participating in this team’s JLTV development include: York, PA; Ontario, San Diego and Santa Clara, CA; Dearborn Heights, Sterling Heights and Troy, MI; Minneapolis, MN; Johnson City, NY; Austin, TX; Nashua, NH; Reston, VA; Melrose Park and Warrenville, IL; Fort Wayne, IN; West Point, MS; Huntsville, AL; and Laurinberg and Aiken, SC. Navistar.

April 28/10: GTV. The General Tactical Vehicles (GTV) team of General Dynamics Land Systems and AM General delivers 7 JLTV prototypes, plus 4 trailers and supporting equipment to the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps for Technology Development (TD) phase testing. The TD phase includes a 12-month test and evaluation process at Aberdeen Proving Grounds, in Aberdeen, MD, and at the Yuma Proving Grounds in Yuma, AZ. The delivery is ahead of schedule, and follows GTV’s previous ahead-of-schedule deliveries of armor samples, ballistic hulls and spare parts.

Don Howe, is the GTV senior program director, and David Caldwell is GTV deputy program director. Howe says that GTV has invested in additional JLTV vehicles and trailers as part of its independent R&D program. GD release.

March 30/10: GAO Report. The US GAO audit office delivers its 8th annual “Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs report.

Because the program is at such early stages, the GAO report is more of a quick update than in-depth analysis. The JLTV program completed Preliminary Design Reviews during the summer of 2009, Critical Design Reviews are planned for early fiscal year 2010, and by Q4 FY 2011 (summer), the program expects to begin engineering and manufacturing development. FY 2008-2010 RDTE (Research, Development, Testing & Evaluation) funding is $306.68 million ($16.44 million Army, $143.24 million USMC).

Feb 25/10: LMCO. Lockheed Martin unveils its 4th operational JLTV prototype at the AUSA convention in Ft. Lauderdale, FL. It’s a 2nd variant of the original Infantry Carrier JLTV Category B model, which was unveiled in October 2007. Lockheed Martin’s team introduced their Category C Utility Vehicle in February 2008, and its Category A General Purpose Mobility model in October 2008.

Currently all of the Lockheed Martin JLTV prototypes are in system test, where they have accumulated over 30,000 combined test miles, more than half of which have been conducted off-road. Lockheed Martin.

Nov 4/09: The General Dynamics/ AM General joint venture, General Tactical Vehicles (GTV), announces that they are the first JLTV contractor to complete the JLTV Critical Design Review, adding:

“GTV is transitioning into the vehicle and trailer build and test phase for the JLTV units deliverable to the government in the spring of 2010 under its technology development contract awarded last October.”

Oct 6/09: Australia and… India? Aviation Week’s Ares reports that India is in discussions to join the JLTV program, and Australia has given notice that will continue their participation into the next phase. Meanwhile, the 3 selected vehicle teams are about 1/3 of the way through the existing phase, with Preliminary Design Reviews done and Critical Design Reviews coming up over the next 2 months.

With respect to a potential threat from the existing Oshkosh M-ATV, JLTV program officials state that the programs share 320 mission requirements, but JLTV adds another 580 to create a full Hummer-like family of light tactical vehicles. They see the programs as complementary, which could be true if the 580 additional requirements are dfficult for M-ATV to meet within its existing design. It would take a budget crunch to really test those theories – but one may be coming.

FY 2009

JLTV Tech Dev contracts; GAO denied TD protests; Australia is in; British won’t be buying. Lockheed’s Aussie JLTV
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Sept 30/09: Australian contracts. The US Army and Marine Corps formally awarded Technology Development (TD) contract modifications to each of JLTV’s 3 industry partners in accordance with the Australian Project Arrangement (PA). Under the original US contracts, each of the JLTV industry teams are delivering ballistic testing sample and a number of ballistic hulls for evaluation at Aberdeen Test Center, followed by prototype vehicles and trailers during April/May 2010, for 12 months of Government Testing at Aberdeen Test Center, MD and Yuma Test Center, AZ.

Program leaders on each side include USMC JLTV program manager Lt. Col. Ruben Garza, and Lt. Col. Alistair Dickie of the Australian Army. At present, 2 Australian Co-operative Program Personnel are supporting the JLTV Program Management Office at Selfridge Air National Guard Base in Harrison Township, MI. Australian vehicles will add reliability and performance testing for up to 15,000 miles per vehicle, followed by shipment to Australia for tropical environment testing, and additional reliability and ballistic testing. To this effect, US Army TACOM notes independent modifications made to BAE Systems, General Tactical Vehicles and Lockheed Martin contracts during July and August 2009:

BAE Systems Land & Armaments: Deliver 3 right-side operation JLTV vehicles and one companion trailer: a JLTV-A General Purpose Mobility, a JLTV-B-C2OTM/AU Command Control On-The-Move, a JLTV-C-UTL/AU Utility Vehicle-Shelter Carrier, and a JLTV/T-AU Prototype Companion Trailer.

General Tactical Vehicles (GTV): Design 3 right-side operation JLTV vehicles (Payload categories A, B, and C) and then build 2 (categories B and C), along with one JLTV-T/AU Prototype Companion Trailer.

Lockheed Martin: Design 3 right-side operation JLTV vehicles (Payload categories A, B, and C) and then build 2 (categories B and C), along with one JLTV-T/AU Prototype Companion Trailer.

Australia TD contracts

June 30/09: M-ATV. The US government awards the first big M-ATV delivery order, in order to field 5,244 vehicles in 2009-2010 that will act as a front-line bridge in Afghanistan between the limitations of existing Hummers and MRAPs, and JLTV. The initial $1.056 billion delivery order for 2,244 vehicles goes to Oshkosh, whose design is based on their MTVR medium truck and has a Gross Vehicle Weight of 16.5 tons/ 32,500 pounds. Additional orders follow.

The result could revive Oshkosh’s design for subsequent rounds of the JLTV competition, either as a solo venture or via renewed cooperation with Northrop Grumman. Read “M-ATV: A Win, at Last, for Oshkosh” for more.

March 18/08: Australia. Liberal Party opposition leader Malcolm Turnbull criticizes Australia’s involvement in the JLTV program, drawing a response from the Labor Party government. Turnbull:

“We’ve had another issue that we’ve raised in the Parliament this morning about a new armoured vehicle which should be made in Australia. The Thales company, which makes the Bushmasters in Bendigo, has been making these armoured vehicles in Australia for the Australian Army very successfully and the Government is looking for a new vehicle and it is actually inviting an American company to make a prototype… they say they are committed to jobs and yet every example…”

Australia has already raised its quota of Bushmaster MRAP vehicles several times, and the vehicle has a dedicated niche in Project Overlander. That niche is different from the JLTV’s niche, however, which is why American firms are submitting different vehicles. With respect to LAND 121 (Overlander) Phase 4, Mnister for Defence Joel Fitzgibbon notes that the original announcement had said that local Australian options would also be explored. An RFP to local industry is due in April 2009, and the DoD is expected to present options to the government in late 2009. Malcolm Turnbull interview transcript | Ministerial response.

Feb 26/09: Sub-contractors. ArvinMeritor, Inc. announces that they will be the JLTV drivetrain supplier for the Lockheed Martin team, which includes BAE General Tactical Systems; and for BAE U.S. Combat Systems, who leads the BAE/Navistar team. ArvinMeritor began working on new products and technologies for the JLTV program in 2006, participating in the Nevada Automotive Test Centers (NATC) Combat Tactical Vehicle Technical Demonstrator program.

Their solutions for the JLTV program include the Meritor lightweight, high mobility independent suspensions, an integrated all-wheel drive system, a central tire inflation system, semi-active damping, and MeritorWABCO hydraulic braking systems with electronic stability control.

Feb 26/09: LMCO. Lockheed Martin unveils a 4th JLTV prototype at the AUSA 209 conference; it is a 2nd variant design of the JLTV-B infantry carrier. All of the Lockheed Martin JLTV prototypes are in system tes, and have accumulated over 30,000 combined test miles, more than half of which have been conducted off-road to simulate mission conditions. Lockheed Martin release.

JLTV evaluations
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Feb 17/09: GAO – Protests denied. The US GAO rules on JLTV protests from Northrop Grumman Space and Missile Systems Corporation, and Textron Marine & Land Systems Corporation. The protests are denied, allowing the JLTV program to move forward as the winning contracts are “unfrozen”.

The full decision was released to the public in early March 2009. See the bid evaluation grid at left for the 3 winners, and the 2 protesters. Northrop Grumman’s offering had by far the lowest cost of these 5, at an estimated $32.95 million compared to the overall average of $50.1 million. Their design and technology was considered to have moderate technical risk, however, which can result is escalating future costs once development begins. The winning bidders’ had better technical maturity and integration ratings than Northrop Grumman’s; only fellow protester Textron’s entry was worse, and at an estimated development price of $53.32 million.

Since the “Technical was significantly more important than logistics commonality, which was more important than cost; cost and past performance/small business participation were approximately equal in importance,” in the RFP criteria, the GAO saw no reason to overturn a selection made on that basis. Other areas of protest, including the adequacy of the GD/AMC team’s small business contracting plan, were also deined. Full decision re: file #B-400837 | Full decision, PDF format.

GAO go-ahead

Nov 17/08: No British JLTV. Aviation Week reports that Britain will not be part of the JLTV program via its Operational Utility Vehicle Systems (OUVS) project, even though a joint working group was set up with the JLTV program in Q3 2008. Britan’s minister for defense equipment and support Quenton Davies reportedly said that:

“The JLTV capability is a replacement for Humvee and performs both a utility vehicle and patrol vehicle role. It therefore goes beyond the requirement for OUVS and the two parties have agreed that there is not enough synergy to warrant collaboration on the acquisition of vehicles at this time.”

Britain already has 400 JLTV type patrol vehicles on order: Iveco’s Panther /MLV/ Lince, which is also in servce with or ordered by Italy, Belgium, Croatia, The Czech Republic, Norway, and Spain. It should be entering service in Iraq and Afghanistan in 2009.

The British aren’t coming

Nov 7/08: GAO protest. Northrop Grumman and Oshkosh Defense file a formal protest with the US Congressional Government Accountability Office (GAO), requesting a review of the JLTV evaluation conducted by the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Source Selection Authority (SSA). They claim that the SSA misapplied the stated evaluation criteria, by giving design maturity more weight than advertised; did not make the value of a demonstrator vehicle clear; “relied unreasonably on company self-evaluations of design maturity and failed to conduct an adequate, independent assessment”; and undervalued their lowest cost bid.

The firm further charges that these changes amounted to an “unannounced agency decision to transform the solicitation from a TD (Technology Demonstrator) phase to a defacto System Development and Demonstration (SDD) effort.” That might be a very wise move for the JLTV program, but the government must advise bidders of any material shifts to a program’s criteria or direction during the bid process.

Contract awards are held up until a GAO protest ruling is issued – see Feb 17/09 for resolution. NGC release.

New dawn?
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Oct 29-30/08: JLTV TD contracts. The US Army issues contract releases on DefenseLink, as well as longer articles on Army.mil, as it makes 3 awards. See US Army: Army awards development contracts for JLTV | Army awards three Joint Light Tactical Vehicle technology phase development contracts || Defense News | Defense Update | WIRED Danger Room | Bloomberg | Crain’s Detroit | Milwaukee-Wisconsin Jounral Sentinel re: Oshkosh elimination | South Bend Tribune re: AM General. Also:

Oct 30/08: BAE Systems Land & Armaments-Grounds System Division in Santa Clara, CA won a $40.5 million cost share contract for the JLTV’s 27-month technology development phase. Work will be performed in Santa Clara, CA, Warrenville, IL, Johnson City, NY, and Troy, MI, with an estimated completion date of Jan 31/11. Bids were solicited via the Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s Tank & Automotive Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0426). BAE release | Navistar release.

Oct 30/08: General Tactical Vehicles in Sterling Heights, MI won a $45.1 million cost share contract for the JLTV’s 27-month technology development phase. As noted above, GTV is a joint venture partnership between AM General and General Dynamics Land Systems. Work will be performed in Livonia, MI, Sterling Heights, MI, Muskegon, MI, and South Bend, IN, with an estimated completion date of Jan 31/11. Bids were solicited via the Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s Tank & Automotive Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0430). GTV release at: Geeral Dynamics | GTV | AM General.

Oct 30/08: Lockheed Martin Systems Integration in Owego, NY won a $35.9 million cost share contract for the JLTV’s 27-month technology development phase. Work will be performed in Owego, NY, and Sealy, TX, with an estimated completion date of Jan 31/11. Bids were solicited via the Web, with 7 bids received by the US Army’s Tank & Automotive Command in Warren, MI (W56HZV-08-C-0431). Work in Sealy, TX involves its core partner, BAE Systems’ Armor Holdings. Lockheed Martin release.

Tech Development Phase

Oct 29/08: Australia in. Australia’s Labor Party Defence Minister Joel Fitzgibbon announces that the Government has given approval to commence planning for Phase 4 of the multi-billion dollar LAND 121 “Overlander” project. Phase 4 will replace some of the Australian Defence Force’s 4,200 Land Rovers with a fleet of protected light mobility vehicles.

As part of their plan to examine all of their options, Australia has decided to participate in the JLTV’s technology demonstration phase. This is not a total commitment to the JLTV program’s 3 contenders, however; Australia’s DoD will also engage with industry to explore other options. Ministerial Speech | Australian DoD release.

Australia joins

FY 2008 and Earlier

Getting it together. USMC HMMWV, Iraq:
Fill ‘er up!
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August 2008: The US Army and Marine Corps present their synchronized joint wheeled vehicle strategy.

Feb 5/08: JLTV RFP. An RFP for the JLTV’s Technology Development Phase is issued to industry.

Dec 22/07: JLTV ADM. The Pentagon’s Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics USD (AT&L) signs an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) directing the JLTV Program to move from the Concept Refinement Phase into the Technology Development Phase (TDP) of the DOD System Acquisition Process. Source: CRS.

November 2007: The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB)”…concerned that the Pentagon’s multi-billion dollar procurement plans for a raft of new tactical wheeled vehicles may be laden with excessive redundancy,” directs the Army and Marine Corps to develop and present a strategy by March 31/08. In the same month, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) calls for a similar assessment by July 1/08. The OMB report is extended to that date, in order to synchronize the 2 requests.

Sept 2007: JLTV dis-approval. The Pentagon’s acquisition executive, John Young, dis-approves the JLTV RFP, and directs the US Army and Marines to “go back to the drawing board and develop a robust technology development phase.” Source: CRS.

November 2006: JLTV approval. The US military Joint Chief of Staff’s Joint Requirement Oversight Council (JROC) approves the JLTV program. Source: CRS.

Additional Readings

• US Army TACOM – Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). In light of the GAO protest, see esp. question #40 in the April 9/08 Q&A.

• AM General – BRV-O mini-site

• BAE Systems – The Valanx. The BAE/ Navistar/ Northrop Grumman team.

• General Tactical Vehicles – Official Site. The GDLS/AM General team.

• Lockheed Martin – Joint Light Tactical Vehicle.

• Navistar – International Saratoga.

• Oshkosh Defense – JLTV: Joint Light Tactical Vehicle

Key Background

• US Congressional Research Service (updated Aug 28/08) – Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV): Background and Issues for Congress. “Some analysts say that unless the Pentagon can convincingly demonstrate that JLTVs are unique vehicles with capabilities not found in HMMWVs, ECV2s, and MRAPs, it will likely be difficult to justify a service-wide “pure fleet” of well over 100,000 JLTVs at the current estimated cost. Army and Marine plans to “mothball” a large portion of the $23 billion-plus MRAP fleet might also prove to be contentious unless JLTVs can provide comparable or superior troop protection.”

• Badenoch LLC – The 7 Forensic Causes of Injury or Death in Military Vehicles. Defensive systems must account in some way for all 7.

• Breach Bang Clear – JLTV and MRAP vs. Reality: Part 1 | Part 2. By Survival Consultants International’s David Woroner. Explains some of the physics involved in explosions, and in penetrating weapons like RPGs. Conditionally in favor of the program, but argues that JLTV will need to be able to add better armor than is currently available, in order to remain viable over the long term. Also notes the maneuverability issue of tracks vs. wheels.

Related Efforts & News

• Badenoch LLC – Ultra AP. A concept vehicle used by the US military to refine its ideas about JLTV. This page includes a number of up-close, in-depth explanations of the vehicle’s innovative design features; they are quite extensive.

• DID – M-ATV: A Win, at Last, for Oshkosh. The $3.3 billion, 5,244 vehicle program will field front-line vehicles designed to bringe the gap between MRAPs and the JLTV. Oshkosh’s winning entry is based on its MTVR medium truck, and has a GWV of 32,500 pounds (16.25 tons).

• DoD Buzz (Sept 27/12) – Marine Humvees get a second life

• The Australian (Oct 23/10) – Innovation saving our soldiers’ lives. Goes into a number of Austrlian R&D efforts aimed at improving vehicle protection.

• Ground Combat Technology (August 2010) – As The JLTV Program Moves Through The Technology-Development, Its Unique Advantages Emerge

• Defense News (Aug 4/08) – DoD’s JLTV Becoming International Effort. Cites interest from Australia, Britain, and other NATO and non-NATO countries. Quotes Army Col. John Mysers: “They have spent time interacting with the Army on requirements. Industry is ready for this… If we are learning enough in the TD phase, we could have an abbreviated SDD phase. We’ll have vehicles that have demonstrated core capabilities… We will have achievable requirements. We told industry in advance of the RFP [request for proposal], ‘This is where you want to focus your efforts and R&D funds.'”

• Defense News (June 16/08) – Lockheed To Unveil Adaptable Vehicle for U.K. Needs. Offers a window into Lockheed’s ground vehicle investments, and into future British needs that will either parallel or merge with JLTV.

• Motley Fool (Jan 10/08) – Who Wants to Be a 70-Billionaire?

• DID (May 5/06) – DefenseTech’s Hybrid Reality Check. Fielding military hybrid vehicles may be more challenging than expected.

• DID (May 24/05) – Shadow Hybrid Vehicle to Become a Power Source. Winner of this RST-V technology demonstration program for a hybrid-powered reconnaissance vehicle that could be carried in a V-22? General Dynamics Land Systems.

Appendix A: Phase 1 Technology Development’s Losing Teams FP’s Cheetah:
Nowhere to run
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With so many contenders, a number of participants were assured of walking away disappointed. Adding these 5 teams to the 3 winners gives 8, but TACOM reports only 7 qualifying bids. The GAO would later clarify somewhat, by saying that there were 8 initial respondents, and 6 teams who were invited to bid. TACOM will not reveal who did not submit a bid, but a fully open EMD system development contract award ensures that any of these teams could conceivably continue investing, and find themselves back in the running.

DID offers all 5 partnerships that stated plans to contend for JLTV TD. We also explain why we’re not likely to see any of them return to the JLTV competition.

Force Protection and DRS. The life-saving performance of Force Protection’s Cougar and Buffalo vehicles in theater triggered the USA’s MRAP vehicle program, and the firm has been working on its lighter Cheetah vehicle for a couple of years. Despite a big jump on its competitors in testing and feedback from the US military, however, Cheetah did not make the final 3. That failure is a huge blow to Force Protection, who also dropped to a distant 3rd place in the USA’s MRAP competition, as orders for their Cougar MRAP vehicles faded toward the end. Force Protection partnership release | Cheetah product page.

The firm’s remaining hope was that Cheetah’s developed and tested status would lead to “interim bridge buys,” to fill the USMC and Army’s M-ATV needs for lighter blast-resistant vehicles between now and 2014. To that end, they brought the Cheetah within their Force Dynamics joint venture with GDLS. The M-ATV effort also failed, which doomed the Cheetah.

Force Protection formally wrote off its investment in the Cheetah, and no longer publicizes it as an offering. The company’s acquisition by General Dynamics removed the firm from any list of future contenders.

Blackwater and Raytheon. This was the most interesting partnership on a corporate level. Blackwater’s contract security forces have their own array of equipment; some is bought off the shelf, but the firm has quickly turned its field experience into a range of fielded designs for everything from protective vests, to blast-resistant vehicles, to a surveillance blimp. This JLTV design was reportedly based on a cut-down version of their Grizzly mine-resistant vehicle, with Raytheon acting as the electronics integrator.

A win for Blackwater (now Xe) would have had seismic implications, creating the potential for controversy on a political level, and invidious comparisons from a military procurement standpoint. The effective dissolution of Blackwater’s equipment group, and massive changes to the company, ensure that they won’t be back later on. Defense News report | Tactical Life feature | Blackwater USA vehicles video.

Team Boeing. Boeing seems like an unlikely contender for a vehicle program, but their key roles in the US Army’s Future Combat Systems program and Britain’s FRES armored vehicle program do give them credibility. Their main JLTV partner was Textron, whose comparatively lightweight M1117 Guardian ASV armored cars failed the extra-tough MRAP competition tests – but have been ordered by the hundreds in separate contracts to equip American military police and some foreign forces. Other JLTV partners included Boeing’s Future Combat System prime partner SAIC, Ford (engine options and power train), MillenWorks (offroad racing and rapid prototyping heritage, LTV design was reportedly the base), and Carlson Technology (maintenance and pit stop engineering experts). Their design featured a hybrid engine, and a full electric drive train that doesn’t need to be mechanically coupled to the engine. Boeing release.

The JLTV competition has changed significantly since then. Boeing would have to make wholesale changes to their design in order to compete, and they’ve shown no public interest in doing that.

KMW/ L-3’s F2USA
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KMW and L-3. Germany’s KMW is a global military vehicle leader, with products that include everything from Dingo 2 mine-resistant vehicles, to tiny air-portable Wiesel tracked infantry enhancement vehicles, to Leopard 2 tanks. KMW offered its new F2 wheeled vehicle family as a JLTV contender, using L-3 as its American partner and electronics integrator.

The F2 builds on KMWs Fennek reconnaissance vehicle design, which has been adopted by several European armies, and has seen combat use by Dutch and German forces. Fennek’s strengths include a low detection profile across the spectrum, very good mobility, long range, and excellent self sufficiency. Fennek’s mine protection is not seen as a similar strength, though the F2 presumably included additional protection. KMW partnership announcement | F2 family product page.

Unlike its fellows in this section, the Fennek remains a well-regarded, established product in the global defense space. It’s also a high-end product, designed for advanced reconnaissance missions. JLTV’s new price targets aren’t a fit for the Fennek.

NGC/ Oshkosh concept
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Northrop Grumman and Oshkosh. Oshkosh produces the US Marines’ MTVR medium truck, and the Army’s FHTV heavy trucks. The firm struck 3 different MRAP partnerships (PVI’s Alpha, Thales Australia’s Bushmaster, i3/Ceradyne’s Bull) – then struck out in the competition, while its competitor Navistar vaulted into the #1 spot. Northrop Grumman led this partnership, which leveraged Oshkosh’s vehicle manufacturing experience, its MTVR trucks’ TAK-4 off-road suspension, and its heavy truck work with ProPulse(TM) hybrid drive technology

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Guest article by Sebastian Sobolev and Aleksandar D. Jovovic

Some years back, global defense companies flocked to the Indian defense market in search of opportunities that could offset declining home budgets. India’s attractiveness as a market was understandable: the country was embarked on an ambitious military modernization program to mitigate perceived threats from neighboring Pakistan and to compete with China in the maritime, air and land domains.

These initiatives ballooned military procurement accounts, which grew at an annual rate of 14% between 2005 and 2010. Yet contractors soon found themselves frustrated by opaque bureaucratic procurement processes, onerous domestic offset and work share requirements, and seemingly endless delays. With the emergence of a new government, what’s ahead for India?

The Indian Market: Structure, Inertia & Movement

India has made attempts to reform its procurement processes in the past; can contractors, foreign and domestic, expect anything different this time? The real battle may center on the competitive nature of India’s domestic defense firms, with the outcomes impacting opportunities for global defense providers. If Western defense suppliers are to compete in the Indian market, they would be well-served to understand the roots of the Indian procurement process, its current trajectory, and the potential opportunities that recent reforms may create.

Development of defense industrial capacity has been a key priority for India since the Nehru administration. Investment in the sector was seen as a means of spurring economic development, providing regional employment, and avoiding dependence on either Cold War bloc. Because development of this sector was a strategic economic and security priority, it was always centrally controlled, a structure that persists today. The choice of whether to import, co-produce, or indigenously develop a defense capability is made at the political level of the executive and Defense Ministry bureaucracies. Much of the decision-making authority beyond that lies with the Defense Research and Development Organization (DRDO), which governs the R&D and production activities of the state-controlled defense industries (DPSUs).

This structure also governs how foreign suppliers interact with indigenous industries. It imposes offset obligations, mandates technology transfer requirements, and, up until recently, it dictated which local institution a foreign supplier had to partner with on a given project. Waiving this last requirement has the potential to improve the business environment for foreign companies in India by introducing an element of competition into the indigenous industrial base. This will be particularly meaningful if India’s vibrant private sector is invited to the table.

As the initial cycle of great expectations deflated, some firms chose to shift their focus away from the Indian market entirely. Others settled in for the long haul, trading their rushed marketing campaigns for patience, and working to better understand what programs and requirements were real and enduring.

As downward budgetary pressure persists in the United States and Europe, companies continue to look abroad for growth opportunities, and the size of India’s defense budget and the scope of its modernization ambitions have again drawn attention. In the midst of this, India has experienced a transformational election, bringing to power a new and dynamic leadership armed with a strong parliamentary majority and public mandate for change.

Almost immediately, India extended its prohibitive FDI restrictions on the defense sector from 27% to 49%. Soon after, the Modi government took the radical step of decoupling the high profile corruption investigation of AgustaWestland from the firm’s ongoing support and supplier activities, as well as allowing the company to continue – with some restrictions – to place bids on upcoming rotorcraft programs. But clues on the trajectory of the defense market may be most evident in India’s domestic competitive landscape, rather than high profile developments involving foreign firms.

The Public – Private Divide IAF’s 748M Avro
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India’s private firms have been angling for a greater defense market share, with a few wins in areas such as shipbuilding. But even here, complex efforts such as the P-75 submarine program have been channeled to teams of foreign and Indian public sector shipyards.

The upcoming Avro transport aircraft replacement is the next test opportunity for foreign technology players and India’s private sector. However, in true statist fashion, the private sector was promised this program by decree, rather than real competition with the public sector’s HAL and others.

Other privately-owned firms have trumpeted their greater play in the defense sector. The Tata Sons conglomerate included defense in its major investment drive, while Larsen and Toubro announced a $400 million expansion in naval shipbuilding, and have set a target of growing their defense business fourfold. Mumbai-based Mahindra, which has boasted a modest defense footprint in land vehicles and naval subsystems since India’s independence, is investing in radar and aerospace production.

Shifts in favor of India’s private sector have yet to materialize, however, putting considerable onus on the new government and its implementation – rather that regulation – of the defense procurement portfolio.

Foreign providers face similar quandaries: the Avro replacement program is also illustrative in this regard. The government had admirable ambitions to source this (foreign-designed) platform competitively, but its approach to the competition bears the hallmarks of centralized control that have defined the procurement process. The government dictated the terms, limiting suppliers and imposing considerable requirements for domestic industrial participation. The result was a dearth of interest from foreign suppliers, as well as complaints from local Indian partners that the small batch of aircraft to be made in India rendered required investments uneconomical. As of this writing, they have yet to receive a bid, and the competition has been extended. Barring a sudden turnaround, the program appears to be headed for cancellation and re-competition.

Another critical airborne program has suffered similar fates in the past. India’s Light Utility Helicopter program (LUH), the replacement of the revered but dated Chetak and Cheetah fleets, has now been cancelled twice. This program could shape up to be a true competition between the private and public sectors, in each case paired with foreign partners in a “buy and make Indian” program, requiring local assembly and content. Rather than simply assign this effort to one or the other side, India’s procurement officials may create a true competition. Indeed, the public sector HAL has been positioning and developing in-house IP for some time, via its Druhv and indigenous LUH programs.

Ultimately, the driver of true competition, as well as commensurate foreign engagement, lies in the severe capacity constraints faced by India’s public sector defense industry – first and foremost by the aforementioned HAL.

Recent history does contain some bright spots for American suppliers doing business in India. Despite the loss of the $12 billion Medium Multi-Role Combat Aircraft (MMRCA) competition to Dassault, Boeing has exported several high-end platforms to India, including the P-8i maritime surveillance aircraft and the forthcoming AH-64E Apache attack helicopter. Interestingly, the Apache is being sold with no expectation of co-production or technology transfer. Lockheed’s C-130 franchise has done well for itself in India, with repeat sales of its J-series Super Hercules. In this case, India’s private sector has embedded itself in the supply chain, with a Tata-Lockheed Martin JV supplying aerostructure components that include the center wing box.

Conclusion C-130J-30 departs
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Ultimately, the real question in India is the extent of true domestic competition for defense funding. Will the new government open the market sufficiently to allow the private sector to compete and win, resulting in greater non-public sector investment in R&D and production capabilities? The circumstances seem favorable: this government is more committed to competition, has a more instinctive understanding of for-profit industry, and harbors greater awareness of the severe capacity constraints of the traditional public sector undertakings.

It is through this prism that global industry should consider its opportunities. The desire for more indigenous development and production will continue in an avowedly nationalist government. Nevertheless, global defense firms may be able to develop deeper and more fruitful partnerships with emerging private sector defense firms in India, perhaps even leading to greater exports of Indian content – much praised, but rarely experienced to date.

While higher FDI limits, greater flexibility in domestic industrial partnerships, and recent Western successes in exporting to India’s defense market are legitimate causes for optimism for foreign suppliers, aspects of India’s procurement process are likely to shed their bureaucratic and centrally-controlled past very slowly. India’s modernization ambitions are likely to continue drawing attention from Western contractors, but success in India will remain a longer-term proposition than the conventional wisdom of years past had suggested.

Avascent is the leading strategy and management consulting firm serving clients operating in government-driven markets. Sebastian Sobolev is a Project Manager, and Aleksandar D. Jovovic is a Principal. Use these links to reveal their emails and contact them.
Updates

February 4/16: India has received the final batch of three Mi-17V-5 military transport helicopters from Russia, bringing the total to 151. The models are the most technically advanced of Rostec Corporation’s Mi-8/17 type including a KNEI-8 avionics suite. The new suite replaces the previously used multiple systems indicators with four large multi-functional that are easy to read and reduce the intensity of pilot’s workload. The completion of the sale comes as both India and Russia continue negotiations for forty-eight more of the helicopters, which are to be used in a variety of operations such as in deserts and mountains, matching the wide variety of environments found in India.

January 28/16: The Indian government has released a new policy paper outlining a revision to its current procurement structures. The Defence Procurement Policy 2016 (DPP-2016) aims to make the country’s defence industry more lucrative and reduce delays by eliminating repetitive procedures to the process. A new category that has been given the highest priority in how India gains its weapons has also been created named the Indigenous Design, Development and Manufacturing (IDDM). At present, the categories designated from highest to lowest priority are Make India, Buy and Make (India), Buy and Make Global, and Buy Global. However some commentators have said that the new category may confuse matters further as it seems to be a hybrid category of the Make and Buy categories, resulting in different interpretations of under which category a prototype will be developed.

August 6/15: With Indian defense exports slowly climbing, Tata Motors has delivered 585 military logistics vehicles to the UN mission in Mali, MINUSMA. The Indian firm also won a contract with the Indian government in July to supply over 1,200 6×6 trucks to the Indian Army. The delivery to MINUSMA took approximately five months and will equip Mali’s neighbors.

Additional Readings Global Programs

• DID – India Selects Airbus A330 MRTT in Aerial Tanker Competition.

• DID – India Refurbishing its AN-32 Transport Fleet. In Ukraine.

• DID FOCUS – Surya’s Chariots: India’s AWACS Programs.

• DID – India & Israel’s Barak-8 SAM Development Project(s).

• DID – C-17s for India: 10 Aircraft by 2015.

• DID – India Buys C-130J-30 Hercules for Special Forces.

• DID FOCUS – Procurement Nadir: India’s Murky, Messed-Up Howitzer Competitions.

• DID FOCUS – India’s Light Helicopter Contract Hits Turbulence, Stalls. Again.

• DID – India’s Light Transport Competition: Follow Avros to Exit.

• DID – India’s Mid-Tier Maritime Patrol Aircraft Competitions.

• DID – An MRAP for India. BAE joint venture with Mahindra didn’t work, folded, but Mahindra can sell Casspir derivative.

• DID – P-8i: India’s Navy Picks Its Future High-End Maritime Patrol Aircraft.

• DID – India’s Fighter Upgrades: Mirage 2000s Finally Get a Deal.

• DID FOCUS – India’s M-MRCA Fighter Competition.

• DID FOCUS – India’s Project 75 SSKs: Too Late to Save the Submarine Force?

• DID – Upgrades At Last: Keeping India’s U209 Subs Afloat.

• DID FOCUS – LCA Tejas: An Indian Fighter – With Foreign Help.

• DID – May day: India’s New Basic & Intermediate Flight Trainers.

• DID – Hawks Fly Away With India’s Jet Trainer v2 Competition.

• DID – Israel Sells Heron UAVs to India.

• DID – India Buys GPS-Guided “Cans of Whup-Ass”. WCMD cluster bombs for its Jaguars.

Overarching Issues

• DID – India’s DRDO Rethinking the Way it Does Business. Updated in 2010, some readings updated to 2012.

• DID – Anti-Submarine Weakness: India Has a Problem.

• DID – Indian Naval Air Defenses: Another Avoidable Crisis.

Russian Cooperation

• DID – India Moves to Boost Anti-Tank Capabilities. Shells, laser-guided weapons, and missiles.

• DID FOCUS – PAK-FA/FGFA/T50: India, Russia Cooperate on 5th-Gen Fighter.

• DID – India’s Fighter Modernization: Add MiG-29s to the List.

• DID – MTA: HAL and Irkut’s Joint Tactical Transport Project.

• DID – India Ordering, Modernizing SU-30MKIs.

• DID FOCUS – India’s Nuclear Submarine Projects. Including a Russian lease.

• DID FOCUS – INS Vikramaditya: India’s New Carrier.

The Indian Navy is set to stage the International Fleet Review (IFR) 2016 in the Bay of Bengal, off the Visakhapatnam coast, Andhra Pradesh, India.

On 4 February, the inauguration of the thermosolar plant NOORo I took place in Ouarzazate, within the NOORo solar complex, which, once completed, will be the largest on the planet.

The US Navy and the UK Royal Navy have successfully concluded a week-long mine hunting exercise in the Gulf.

The US Navy's Wasp-class amphibious assault ship USS Bataan (LHD 5) has completed sea trials after undergoing a major shipyard maintenance availability period over the last 12 months.

LED lighting technology solutions provider Revolution Lighting Technologies (RVLT) has assigned specialty advisor Cohen Group to analyse and strategise the company's actions to help bid for future LED retrofit contracts with the US Navy.

Meggitt Training Systems has been awarded a $7.19m delivery contract by the US Marine Corps (USMC) Systems Command (MARCORSYSCOM) Program Manager for Training Systems (PM TRASYS) to deliver indoor simulated marksmanship trainers (ISMT) systems.

Afghanistan’s parliament has relocated to a new building of Indian construction in Kabul. Moreover, a date has finally been set for the next parliamentary elections. With the parliament’s term extended until the elections, it has another year of sessions, which raises the issue of its very legality. AAN researcher Salima Ahmadi (with contributions from senior analyst Thomas Ruttig) explains how the two chambers are elected and how they function, focusing on the lower house. Salima also looks at the dispute surrounding the legal status and legitimacy of the parliament, and comes to the conclusion that, constitutionally, there is no provision that authorizes the president to extend the parliament’s term.

On 13 January 2016, a week before Members of Parliament (MPs) went into winter recess (a 45 days break, see here), the members of the Wolesi Jirga, the Lower House of Parliament, held their first session in the new parliament building. The new complex is a “symbolic gift of democracy”  by the Indian government to Afghanistan. It covers 100 acres of land and its construction, which began between 2007 and 2009 (depending on the source), cost 200 million US dollars. The complex includes two session halls, one for the Wolesi Jirga, with a capacity for 294 seats and one with 190 seats for the Meshrano Jirga. Both leave space for the eventuality of an increase in the houses’ membership. Additionally, the building comprises five halls for parliamentary commission sessions, conference, press, computer and dining rooms, a library and a mosque able to accommodate 400 worshippers. Working offices for MPs have yet to be built but there is a plan to add them in the future. In 2005, former King Zahir Shah, then President Hamid Karzai and then Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, laid the foundation stone (see here). The new central building – a mixture of Moghul-style and modern architecture, with a copper dome and marble works, is named “Atal Block”, after former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. It was inaugurated on 25 December 2015 by Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi during an official visit to Kabul. (Read the full text of his inauguration speech here.)

Exterior of the new parliament building while still under construction (Photo Credit: Baser Mobarez)

Of some symbolism, perhaps, is that the new parliament complex is located close to the Dar-ul-Aman Palace in the southwest of Kabul, built under King Amanullah (1919-29) by German architects but destroyed beyond repair during a 1990 military coup attempt. Often mistakenly referred to as the ‘King’s Palace’, it was originally meant to house the first Afghan parliament.

The ruined Dar-ul-Aman palace. Photo: Thomas Ruttig.

Despite the new parliament building having already been inaugurated, various sections remain unfinished. As the author observed at the end of January, carpeting, furniture and other interior elements are still missing. There are also problems with the sound system in the Wolesi Jirga hall that make it difficult for reporters and observers to make out MPs’ discussions. The Indian cabinet has approved additional funding to address these problems. Like the old building, the new one is not equipped with an electronic voting system. Thus, red or green cards are still used as ‘no’ or ‘yes’ votes.

The Meshrano Jirga (parliament’s upper house), the commissions of the lower house and other parliamentary staff continue to work in the old parliament building. All members of staff are expected to start work in the new building before 6 March 2016, the beginning of the new session.

Facts and Figures

The National Assembly (Shura-ye Melli) of Afghanistan consists of two houses, the Wolesi Jirga (House of People) and the (De) Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders), also known as the Senate. This bicameral model was inaugurated in the 1964 constitution and the stipulation was renewed in the 2004 constitution. The current Wolesi Jirga represents the 16th legislative term since parliament was first established under reformer-King Amanullah (1919-29) (1), and the second legislative term following the collapse of the Taleban regime.

According to the Constitution, the Wolesi Jirga has 249 members and 68 of those seats are allocated to women through a quota system. Currently, however, there are 69 women in parliament as one woman was able to secure enough votes to enter parliament even without this quota. The Constitution stipulates that there must be “at least, on average” two women from each of the 34 provinces (Art 83). Of these 68 seats, three are allocated to Kuchi women. (2)

Members of parliament are elected in a general election every five years – the last election took place in 2010. The one following this should have been held at the latest by June 2015, but has now been scheduled for 15 October 2016 – AAN analysis here.

The overall membership of the current Wolesi Jirga has been reduced from 249 to 246 as a result of terrorist attacks, whereby three MPs were murdered. (3) However, there is a legal provision stipulating that their seats be left open. Between 2005-10, when there was an even higher number of such incidents, victims were simply replaced. The candidate who had secured the next largest number of votes would assume the vacant position. However, given that he/she may have been a political opponent, this practice, which was widely known as the “assassination clause,” was seen as possibly encouraging of such acts. Therefore, this practice was altered and   now only those MPs who die of natural causes are replaced, and only “if more than one year remains until the end of the term of office of Wolesi Jirga.” (4) So far the only MP replaced has been Shahnaz Hemati from Herat province, who died in a car accident. The next female runner up for Herat province, Semin Barakzai, took her seat.

Other replacements of MPs occurred because at least seven MPs from the current parliament resigned ahead of the 2014 presidential elections in order to campaign for presidency or other key positions in the government. The parliament replaced the resigning MPs, including Haji Mohammad Mohaqqeq, Sayyed Ishaq Gailani, Sayyed Hussain Anwari, Abdul Rab Rassul Sayyaf, Shah Abdul Ahad Afzali, Sayyed Hussain Alami Balkhi, and Ibrahim Qasemi. However, later on in 2014, other MPs resigned as well ahead of the second round of the presidential elections because they were hoping for key positions in the new government (such as ministers, for example.) Those who resigned were not replaced, as this parliament entered its last year of tenure.

The Meshrano Jirga has 102 members, three individuals from each of the 34 provinces. A third of them are appointed by the president for a five-year term, but President Ghani has just extended the term of these appointed members until the end of the 16th period of the Wolesi Jirga (see here). The remaining two thirds are elected from both district and provincial councils. The members of each of the 34 provincial councils must elect one parliamentary representative from among themselves, as should all district council members for each province. Half of the president’s appointees should be women. The Meshrano Jirga also has two seats reserved for Kuchi and two seats for the disabled and impaired. (5)

As no district council elections have yet taken place, it was decided on 20 February 2011 by presidential decree (during Hamed Karzai’s tenure) to put in place an interim measure to temporarily fill the missing seats of the district council representatives with 34 provincial council representatives. Thus, instead of selecting only one provincial council representation for the Meshrano Jirga, each provincial council selected two.  However, on 18 January 2015, President Ghani informed the Meshrano Jirga in a letter that “he could not nominate anyone for the Senate seats reserved for district council representatives” – and that therefore the Meshrano Jirga would only consists of 69 members until the district council elections are completed.

How is the Wolesi Jirga elected?

Neither the Afghan Constitution nor the Electoral Law specify which electoral system is used for the parliamentary elections. Article 24 para 1 of the 2014 gazetted Election Law  notes that the candidates with the most votes will be awarded a seat. A system based on the Single Non-Transferable Vote (SNTV) was eventually chosen. (6)

In a SNTV system, candidates run as individuals (as independent or political party candidates) but not on a party list. Candidates also stand in multi-member constituencies and the female quota has to be figured in. Constituencies are the same throughout the 34 provinces. The number of seats is allocated according to their respective population size. For example, in Kabul province there are 33 Wolesi Jirga seats, out of which nine are for females. These seats are then given to candidates who receive the most votes, regardless of gender. If, however, female candidates do not win at least the number of seats reserved by law for their province, the women who win the most votes among all female candidates will then be allocated those reserved seats. This prevents the fixed quota from indirectly setting a limit on how many female candidates can be elected in each constituency.

Controversially, while ten seats in the Wolesi Jirga are reserved for Kuchis, none are set aside for the Hindu or Sikh minorities (see AAN’s previous report here). This proposal was part of a reform packet submitted by the Electoral Reform Commission, however it was rejected by parliament.

How does parliament function?

According to the Afghan constitution, the parliament is the highest legislative organ in the country (Art 81) and has the power to ratify and approve laws, legislative decrees and budgets (Art 90). All legislation must be approved by both Houses and endorsed by the president. (7) Each House has an administrative board (the president, the vice-presidents, the secretary and assistant secretary) as outlined in chapter 3 of the Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga that prepares and presides over the plenary sessions, standing commissions (ad-hoc commissions can also be appointed for specific tasks), a Committee of Presidents (of the Commissions), joint committees (between the upper and lower house, and within the lower house) and a General Secretariat (in charge of the minutes of the meetings and in control of the speakers list).

The Wolesi Jirga holds regular plenary sessions three times a week, on Saturdays, Mondays and Wednesdays. From 6 September 2015 to 20 January 2016, the Wolesi Jirga held 51 plenary sessions. Each year the parliament has two sittings, divided by a winter (45 days: 20 January to 5 March 2016) and a summer recess (45 days: 23 July 2015- 6 September 2015). The Wolesi Jirga’s president/speaker of the house is elected for the term of legislature, which is five years. The remainder of the administrative board (the first, second vice presidents/speakers, secretary and assistant secretary) is elected for a one-year term. Following the winter recess, there is a vote under the supervision of the Speaker of the House, Abdul Rauf Ibrahimi, to elect new first and second vice presidents, and both a secretary and an assistant secretary to the Wolesi Jirga.

In the plenary sessions, all MPs must be present and these sessions are broadcast live on the parliament’s own TV channel. Each session has two parts, the ‘free hour’ discussion (usually from 8:00 to 10:30 am), in which MPs can suggest topics or make statements and set the agenda for the session. In the latter part, only those issues approved in advance by the Committee of the Heads of the Wolesi Jirga’s commission are discussed. Key government officials may be summoned, questioned and – if 2/3 of those MPs present agree – subjected to a vote of no confidence. Since the end of the summer recess, two ministers have been summoned but both survived a vote of no confidence.

Standing Commissions of the Wolesi Jirga

Commissions are specialised bodies that deal with specific issues on different topics. They discuss and review draft legislation before it is added to the plenary session’s agenda for discussion and vote. The commissions hold sessions twice a week, on Sundays and Tuesdays.

There used to be 18 standing commissions of the Wolesi Jirga (see list of commissions and members in Dari) but on 28 December 2015 the House amended its Internal Rules of Procedures and reduced their number to 15. (8)

There are no strict criteria for how an MP becomes a member of one of these commissions, or of which one. The Wolesi Jirga Rules of Procedures only indicate that “each member based on their profession and experience could choose a committee,” and that “each Standing Committee shall be composed of 10 to 25 Members.”

A low attendance rate in the Wolesi Jirga was also reflected in the commissions, and reported to affect the quality of their work. Many MPs complained about flaws and problems in legislation put up for voting in the plenary. Talking to AAN, legislator Haji Abduh, head of the Judicial and Justice Commission, stated that “out of 25 members only about five to seven showed up in the commission meetings.”

Security challenges

During the Wolesi Jirga’s first post-Taleban term, mainly individual MPs were targeted by insurgents; now it seems the parliament has also become a target. During its session on 22 June 2015, the Wolesi Jirga hall was attacked precisely when MPs were due to review the government nominee – Muhammad Masum Stanekzai – for the defence minister’s position. The attack began with a suicide car bomb detonating at the front gate of the compound. While the attackers were unable to penetrate the parliament building itself, the explosion caused damage to the structure and slight injuries to observers. No MPs were wounded or killed but two passers-by, a woman and a child, died while dozens of others were injured (see report here). In another incident in November 2014, Shukria Barakzai, an outspoken MP and women’s rights advocate, survived a suicide attack on her vehicle near parliament, on the Dar-ul-Aman Road; she was slightly wounded.

Is parliament legal at the moment?

The current Wolesi Jirga was elected on 18 September 2010 and its regular term was supposed to end on 22 June 2015. The Afghan Constitution states in Article 83 “…the work period of the House of People shall terminate, after the disclosure of the results of the elections, on the 1st of Saratan [22 June] of the fifth year [of its term] and the new parliament shall commence work.” This effectively means that new parliamentary elections should have taken place and the election results announced before 1 Saratan 1394 (22 June 2015). The new parliament should have started work on that date. However, elections were postponed as the NUG (National Unity Government) had promised an electoral reform (see previous AAN report here. Given this has not happened, there is now some confusion both within and outside parliament as to whether the current Wolesi Jirga is even legal.

The current parliament’s mandate expired on 22 June 2015 without new representatives having been elected and without a new election date having been set at that point. In order to avoid a legal and constitutional vacuum that might have led the country even deeper into crisis, President Ashraf Ghani extended the parliament’s term on 19 June 2015. (9) It allowed MPs to continue their work until the next parliamentary elections were held – whenever that would be.

The extension of the parliament’s tenure was welcomed by some MPs, who believed it to be a necessary step to prevent a deepening crisis in the country. Some of them may have been motivated by the chance to remain in their positions in order to enjoy their privileges and powers. Other MPs and some legal experts – including the typically vocal and popular Ramadan Bashardost – vehemently opposed the decree. By invoking popular hearsay, he indirectly accused MPs from the first group of “trading” with government leaders, extending parliament’s term “in exchange for collecting votes in their favor in the second round of presidential elections.”  Gul Rahman Qazi, a law professor and chairman of the Constitutional Oversight Commission in the previous administration, stated “at the outset of the new government, first our executive power lost its legitimacy, because it is formed based on a so-called political agreement.” “Apart from that, we are witnessing that the judiciary’s power is being run by an acting head that entirely has no legitimate reference in the constitutional law, either. As a final point, we have our legislative power, whose term will end,” (see here). According to MPs and experts, the extension of parliament is “arbitrary” and a “violation of the constitution,” and the continuing functioning of the House of Representatives beyond 22 June 2015 illegal.

The debate about the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the Wolesi Jirga’s continuing work has caused many MPs to stop coming to (most of) the plenary sessions. The attendance rate – already low and often too low for a vote – has sunk to an alarming level. Some MPs only turn up when votes are due, particularly regarding new government appointments. A number of MPs, including Bashardost, Baktash Seyawash and Farkhunda Zahra Naderi, as well as around 20 others, have ceased to attend plenary sessions altogether as a sign of protest, while stopping short of officially resigning (this group have also boycotted appointment sessions.) Nevertheless, MPs in nearly all sessions demanded that an election timeline, including a new election date, be set.

That parliament in its diminished form rejected the presidential decree on the Structure, Authorities and Duties of the electoral bodies (part of the demanded electoral reform, see here), reflects the controversy between the Ghani camp and the Abdullah camp about what exactly should be reformed in the legal and institutional framework of the elections. It also shows that both camps are able to muster a quorum when such key decisions have to be taken.

But even in this, there is a problem of legality. According to the constitution, the Wolesi Jirga does not have the authority to alter election-related laws in the last year of its tenure. Current confusion regarding the Wolesi Jirga’s legal situation as well as the election issue in general, including the need for electoral reform and what this should entail, is the result of half-solutions for legal and technical problems that have been mounting since the first electoral cycle of 2004/05. This not only throws into question the legality of the forthcoming elections (possibly going ahead without significant reform), but also the legitimacy of some of Afghanistan’s key institutions.

(This dispatch will be followed by an analysis of what the Wolesi Jirga did during its last sitting from 6 September 2015 to 20 January 2016, and how it performed.)

 

(1) The constitution (nezamnama) of 20 Hamal 1302 (9 April 1923) established an advisory “State Council,” consisting of equal numbers of members appointed by the king and elected “by the people.” Neither the overall number of council members nor the election system was specified.

(2) The second clause of Article 83 of the Constitution stipulates “the number of the members of the House of People shall be proportionate to the population of each constituency, not exceeding the maximum of two hundred and fifty individuals. Electoral constituencies as well as other related issues shall be determined by the elections law. The election laws shall adopt measures to attain, through the electoral system, general and fair representation for all the people of the country, and proportionate to the population of every province, on average, at least two females shall be the elected members of the House of People from each province.” For some provinces – such as Nimruz, Panjshir and Nuristan – with a relatively small population, the total number of seats in parliament might equal the total number of seats reserved for women per province (see a previous AAN report here).

Based on a complicated system of seat allocation, some provinces might in fact also have fewer than two seats reserved for women. As stated in the law, it is important to note that on average at least two seats should be allocated – meaning not every province will have exactly two seats for women.

(3) Overall, in two parliamentary terms, 14 members of the Wolesi Jirga and 3 members of the Meshrano Jirga have been killed in suicide attacks. In the second parliamentary term, three MPs were murdered. In 2011, Mohammad Hashem Watanwal, an MP from Uruzgan province, was killed. Later that year, Abdul Mutaleb Beg, an MP from Takhar, was assassinated. In 2012, Ahmad Khan Samangani, from Samangan province, was killed (see here).

(4) According to a long-term parliamentary observer, with whom AAN spoke, there had been a vote at one point during the 15th legislative term when Qanoni was the speaker, where the MPs voted to only replace those MPs who die of natural causes. Furthermore, the Analysis of the Electoral Legal Framework of Afghanistan (2006) by Dennis Ennis, discusses options for the replacement of elected members who due to death or other reasons can no longer hold his/her seat. He mentioned a December 2005 Presidential “decree amending the Electoral Law to provide for by-elections when elected members die of unnatural causes,” which AAN was not able to locate and which has also never been put in practice.

(5) Article 84 of the constitution stipulates that Meshrano Jirga members sent through the district councils are elected for three-year terms, those through the provincial councils for a four-year term and those nominated by the president for five-year terms, adding to Afghanistan’s already full electoral calendar. The individuals elected lose their membership in the related council and are replaced by the runners-up in the elections for the respective council.

(6) The final decision in favour of SNTV was taken by President Karzai who, in May 2004 (before the presidential election) effectuated a cabinet decision to that avail. This, however, was preceded by an intervention by then US president George W Bush, as described by Scott Smith, himself a former UN official in Afghanistan, in his book Afghanistan’s Troubled Transition (quoted from the first Indian edition, New Delhi 2012, 160): Then US ambassador Zalmai Khalilzad “intervened brusquely at a meeting with United Nations officials and diplomats in Kabul to declare that he had just spoken to President Bush, who said ‘SNTV is the choice. SNTV is going to happen.’”

The AREU, that had already dissected the SNTV system in detail in this 2004/05 briefing paper, concluded in another 2004 report authored by Andrew Wilder: “SNTV (…) is the wrong system for Afghanistan.” (on p 45)

In a 2012 report, AREU further wrote:

In Afghanistan, the birth of SNTV was initially something of an accident, engendered by a widespread distrust of political parties associated with the Communist and civil war eras, a misunderstanding of the implications of having a single vote for individual candidates in large multi-member constituencies, and a possible strategy on the part of the executive to limit the emergence of organised opposition. In 2004, a provincially-based list PR system was promoted by the UN as the most appropriate for elections to the Afghan Wolesi Jirga, but there was reportedly a misstep in the adoption of the rules when they came before the cabinet. After the UN-crafted proportional electoral system was poorly explained by an Afghan cabinet minister, President Karzai changed the proposed provincially-based list PR system to SNTV by simply pronouncing that voters would select a candidate rather than a party, list or block, and that candidates could not show party affiliation on the ballot. The electoral law decreed in 2004.

Thus announced that voters would choose between individual candidates rather than parties, but still in the multi-member provincial constituencies originally intended for use in the list-PR system. There has also been significant speculation that, while Karzai’s distaste for parties may have been genuine, the administration’s adoption of SNTV (or at least its support of its continued use into 2005 and beyond) was also a strategic calculation aimed at weakening parties’ potential as sources of political opposition.

More information about SNTV technicalities in Afghanistan in this fact sheet jointly written by the UN and one of Afghanistan’s former electoral bodies here.

(7) Rule 89 of the Rules of Procedures of the Wolesi Jirga – the text of a Bill approved by the House of People shall be submitted to the House of Elders.

Rule 90 – If one House rejects or amends the Bill approved by the other, a Joint Commission composed of an equal number of Members from each House shall be formed to resolve the difference, in accordance with article 100 of the Constitution.

The Standing Committee responsible for the Bill shall propose Members to sit on this Commission and the list of members must be approved by the House in a plenary sitting.

(8) The Counter-Narcotics Commission was included in the Health, Youth, Work and Labour Commission, the Martyrs and Disabled Commission was included in the Nomads, Tribal Affairs and Refugees Commission and the Lower House Commission on MPs’ Rights, Protection and Privileges was included in the Complaints and Petitions Commission.

(9) It is not quite clear by what measure the term was extended. International media claimed that it was done by a presidential decree (see here and here). However, Afghan media described the process as the president making a statement/declaration/proclamation, the Wolesi Jirga then discussed it and approved it by majority vote. See here in English, and here (statement approved by majority vote), and here (statement) in Dari.

Building on a long and successful history of developing, integrating, testing and assuring naval Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) and combat systems for the UK Royal Navy, QinetiQ is a…

Americas

• A recent report from the Pentagon’s top weapons tester has raised serious questions over the F-35 program’s “unrealistic test schedule”. Michael Gilmore’s annual F-35 report released on Monday follows a recently leaked memo from December 2015 that highlighted issues over the jet’s software development. The report flags these testing issues as potentially delaying the operational evaluation by up to a year, with flight testing not likely to be completed until at least January 2018. It had been initially hoped that testing would be completed by August 2017, after program re-baselining in 2012. As a result of these delays, Gilmore also warned against current block buying of the fighter with 250 planned to be locked-in before the (Initial Operational Test and Evaluation) IOT&E. At present, 150 fully operational jets have been delivered by Lockheed and will all require extensive modification to the Block 3F standard once development concludes.

• Ahead of the Pentagon’s February 9 official budget release, Defense Secretary Ash Carter mapped out his spending priorities on Tuesday. Among the plans include a $13 billion plan in funding for a new submarine to carry nuclear ballistic missiles over the next five years. This would be broken down into $4 billion towards research and development of new submarines, with $9 billion spent on procurement funding. The Navy may also see twelve more Super Hornet’s procured to make up for shortages caused by delays to Lockheed’s F-35 program, and longer-than-expected repair times for current Boeing F/A-18 jets. The budget also outlines a total 322 F-35s across its A, B and C models but following the recommendations in Michael Gilmore’s most recent report, this could be more wishful thinking than the eventual reality.

Middle East North Africa

• Last weekend’s expected signing of a deal for Kuwait to purchase twenty-eight Eurofighter jets has been put off. Italian Ministry of Defense officials cited “procedural” delays on Kuwait’s behalf, and that no clear date had been set. It had been expected that the deal would close quickly after some initial delays over pilot training had pushed an agreement into 2016. News of the deal came as Kuwait’s initial plan to purchase F-18 Super Hornets from Boeing was scrapped after their frustration over congressional delays in gaining approval for the sale. The loss of the sale to the Eurofighter has put into question the security of some jobs at Boeing’s St. Louis plant. The plant specializes in the manufacture of the Super Hornet, and were set to start production of the $3 billion deal before the change.

• The UAE is to acquire more of the Finnish Patria AMVs 8×8 armored wheeled vehicles. With a first batch ordered by the Emirates in 2008, Patria will provide forty more of the AMVs in a contract worth $41 million with options to purchase a further fifty. Construction of the hulls has been outsourced to Polish partner Rosomak SA, and they will be fitted with additional armor and mine protection, along with remote weapon stations armed with 12.7 mm machine guns or 40 mm automatic grenade launchers. The Patria AMV has been used in Afghanistan, Chad and is also participating in ongoing Saudi-led operations in Yemen. UAE involvement in the country has included daily air strikes along with a ground presence that has included claims of having hired Colombian mercenaries to fight there.

Europe

• The UK Ministry of Defence has signed contracts in the amount of $1.58 billion for a new military training fleet. Under the UK Military Flight Training System (UKMFS), approximately half the sum will go to Affinity Flying Services who will provide the aircraft that will be used at different stages of the training. Affinity, which is a joint venture between Kellogg Brown and Root Ltd and Elbit Systems UK, will provide three aircraft types as well as their maintenance and support. The remaining funds have been awarded to Lockheed Martin and Babcock, who have been selected to deliver all of the ground based training equipment and infrastructure to support the delivery of the fixed wing training capability. When fully operation in 2019, student pilots will learn initially on the Grob 120TP “Prefect” before going on to take part in either Multi-Engine Pilot Training on the Embraer “Phenom” 100 or Basic Flying Training on the Beechcraft “Texan” T-6C.

• French procurement agency DGA announced the finalizing of an order with Lockheed Martin for four C-130 aircraft. The models to be delivered are two standard C-130J transports, and two KC-130Js equipped for in-flight refueling of helicopters. While the exact figure of the deal is unknown, the core value of the deal is around $355 million, slightly more than the $340 million set aside in the revised multiyear defense budget for acquiring four C-130s. The orders will plug a growing capability gap in the French military caused by the Airbus A400M program. Development of the multi-purpose A400M has seen delays in delivery as Airbus looks to fix technical problems over inflight helicopter refueling capabilities, and for paratroopers to be able to jump from the side door.

Africa

• Equatorial Guinea will receive two C295 transport aircraft after officials visited Airbus’ plant in Seville last week. The planes will add to the central African nations rather modest fleet of mostly Russian made transport and fighter aircraft. The first, due in September of this year, will be used primarily for personnel transportation, medical assistance and evacuations. The second will be configured to operate on surveillance missions over the country’s territory and coastal waters. The C295 is becoming a popular selection for many militaries in Africa, with Ghana, Algeria and Egypt just a few who operate or have ordered the plane. Airbus sees sales of at least fifty C295s going to the continent over the next decade.

Asia Pacific

• The Malaysian Army’s purchase of six MD 530G Scout Attack Helicopters will include a custom weapons package including a complete missions management system not found on previous models. This will include a stores management system and helmet mounted cuing system for integrated target identification and tracking, and allows laser-guided rocket and Hellfire capability. With increased range over other models, the helicopters will be stationed with the Eastern Sabah Security Command. In 2013, a three week insurgency and standoff erupted in Sabah after Fillipino militants landed in the area making territorial claims as the Sultanate of Sulu.

Today’s Video

• Following the recent sale to Malaysia, a look at MD Helicopters latest MD530G Scout Attack Helicopter:

Italian Eurofighters
(click to view full)

The multi-national Eurofighter Typhoon has been described as the aerodynamic apotheosis of lessons learned from the twin engine “teen series” fighters that began with the F-14 and F-15, continued with the emergence of the F/A-18 Hornet, and extended through to the most recent F/A-18 Super Hornet variants. Aerodynamically, it’s a half generation ahead of all of these examples, and planned evolutions will place the Eurofighter near or beyond parity in electronic systems and weapons.

The 1998 production agreement among its 4 member countries involved 620 aircraft, built with progressively improved capabilities over 3 contract “tranches”. By the end of Tranche 2, however, welfare state programs and debt burdens had made it difficult to afford the 236 fighters remaining in the 4-nation Eurofighter agreement. A 2009 compromise was found in the EUR 9 billion “Tranche 3A” buy, and the program has renewed its efforts to secure serious export sales. Their success will affect the platform’s production line in the near term, and its modernization plans beyond that.

Eurofighter: Design & Evolution Eurofighter, Spain
(click to view full)

The Eurofighter program emerged out of a long and conflicting set of multinational efforts to design a new European fighter. By 1983, Britain, France, Germany, Italy and Spain had coalesced around the Future European Fighter Aircraft (FEFA) program. That partnership lasted only until 1985, as differences with France over carrier compatibility, weight limits, and French insistence on the lead industrial role, ended their partnership. Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain established Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH in 1986 to manage the Eurofighter project, while France went its own way and developed their Rafale fighter.

Both projects went on to develop clipped delta, canard-equipped twin-engine fighters, whose “radar shaping” designs significantly lowered their radar signature compared to earlier fighters like the Mirage F1, Tornado, or F/A-18A-D Hornet. Even so, it would be a misnomer to call these European jets stealth aircraft. The standard term is a “4+ generation” fighter, distinguishing them from “5th generation” aircraft like the American F-22A Raptor and Indo-Russian PAK-FA.

While the Rafale’s development emphasized weapon load and multi-role capabilities, squeezed budgets and ample fleets of strike aircraft led Eurofighter’s partner nations to focus on the air superiority role. An excellent aerodynamic design, very good thrust-to-weight ratio, and fast slew-and-point capability was fused with a very integrated set of electronic sensor and defensive systems, including a pilot-friendly cockpit design that offered the first use of voice commands in a fighter. This made Eurofighter’s Typhoon very capable in its chosen aerial role, able to compete with or best serving opponents short of the American F-22A.

Typhoons even proved capable of armed supercruise during 2011 Libyan operations, but this was only possible with low-drag “4 + 2” air-to-air missile configurations, at high altitudes, to Mach 1.2.

PIRATE IRST:
B-2, ICU
(click to view full)

For air-to-air combat, the Eurofighter currently relies on long range detection using its mechanically-scanned, phased array ECR-90 CAPTOR radar and PIRATE IRST(Infra-Red Search & Track) system, coupled with a good array of advanced air-to-air weapons. Non-British Eurofighters will also have a 27mm Mauser cannon on board, considered by many observers to be the best fighter cannon on the market.

On defense, the Typhoon’s Praetorian (formerly EuroDASS) self-protection suite is designed for 360 degree coverage, with high automation. The Defensive Aids Computer (DAC) controls a package that includes Towed Radar Decoys, a Missile Approach Warner (MAW), wingtip ECM pods, and a Countermeasures Dispensing System (CMDS). They are integrated with each other, and with the Eurofighter’s radar and IRST.

Unfortunately for the consortium, this aerial combat strength ended up being the flip side of their biggest weakness. Initial “Tranche 1” machines were severely hobbled on the export market by their poor ground attack capabilities, a serious weakness in a world of multi-role fighters. When combined with the plane’s $100+ million cost, the result has been a slew of lost export competitions. Dassault’s Rafale, which had gaps of its own, could not capitalize on that failing, and is still looking for its first export win. Embarrassingly, the Eurofighter has usually lost to modernized, multi-role versions of the very F-16s and F-15s it was meant to supplant. That, in turn, has affected both prices and the pace of upgrades.

A list of current weapons may help snap the plane’s evolution into clearer focus:

As the list above notes, the Tranche 2 fighters that began delivery to member countries in 2008 have added precision ground attack capabilities under programs like P1E, but still fall well short of the full capabilities and weapon arrays offered by competitors like the American F/A-18E/F Super Hornet and F-15E Strike Eagle. Their lack of a helmet-mounted display (HMD) compounded this issue, preventing the Typhoon from taking full advantage of its new air-to-air missiles, and detracting from their ground attack capabilities. A BAE “Striker” HMSS Helmet-Mounted Display is in low-rate production now, but it didn’t become operational until 2011.

Tranche 3 Eurofighters will reportedly be based on the Tranche 2 standard, with provisions for dorsal conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) that can extend range while creating minimal drag. The other big change involves upgraded power systems and electronics that can more easily support future growth and upgrades. The weapon bus can handle fiber optic cabling, onboard computing is upgraded, and a high speed data network improves sharing with weapons or other platforms. The most important upgrade remains a CAPTOR “E-Scan” Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar to replace the ECR-90. Industry is developing it for a 2015 delivery date, but there doesn’t seem to be a contract framework in place. The lack of an AESA radar leaves the Eurofighter a generation behind its American counterparts in radar technology, and until it catches up, it’s likely to suffer in export competitions.

F-35A Lightning II
(click to view full)

Even as these upgrades are being discussed, however, the Eurofighter’s export window as a leading-edge fighter choice is closing. The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is aerodynamically inferior, but it offers a stealth fighter with a tested AESA radar, a wider array of sensors, and sensor fusion at an even higher level. By the end of this decade, 5th generation projects like the Russo-Indian PAK-FA will also become viable choices for some export targets.

Successful upgrades can keep the Eurofighter Typhoon competitive, even in that environment, if its production line lasts long enough. The key word will be “competitive.” As an example, see this comparison of the Eurofighter vs. Saab’s single-engine contemporary, the 4+ generation JAS-39 Gripen. Saab already has a development contract for an ES-05 Raven AESA radar, and is significantly ahead in weapons integration:

Eurofighter: What’s Next? A Weak Core Eurofighter 2020
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Tranche 3 aircraft are expected to deliver a few important new capabilities, including an AESA radar and Conformal Fuel Tanks. At present, however, only Tranche 3 Eurofighters are designed to add CFTs. The biggest question at present is whether Tranche 3A aircraft will be the only CFT-capable Typhoons. The status of core countries’ Tranche 3B orders is very unclear, but Britain and Germany have already firmly ruled out further buys, and it appears likely that Tranche 3A will be the last production order from the original member countries.

In 2011, Eurofighter’s CEO placed the end of production at 2015, barring a major export win like India or Japan, or a Tranche 3B purchase from the consortium partners. By 2014, that date had been revised to 2017/18, but 2015 still marks the point that parts of the supply chain will begin to stop.

This will leave core countries with smaller fleets, for 2 reasons. One is limited orders. The other is Typhoon fleets that won’t serve in parallel. UK Air Chief Marshal Sir Glenn Torpy has said that he expects the RAF to operate on the basis of a Typhoon fleet of 120 aircraft. By the time the last jets of the 3A tranche come into service, between 2015 and 2020, the first batch of Tranche 1 Typhoons would be approaching the end of their life. This is likely to be true in other partner countries as well. A 2009 Der Spiegel article illustrates some of the issues in Germany, for instance:

“The German air force didn’t get the first jets until July 2006. It now has 38 Eurofighters. But 14 of them have been sent back for repairs. Some of them still suffer instrument failure during flights. Of the six single-seat aircraft at the Neuburg air base only four are fit for service on average. That’s just enough to provide day and night cover for Germany’s airspace. The defense ministry recently admitted to budget committee members that the approved sum of [EUR] 14.7 billion would only be enough to pay for 143 Eurofighters. Parliament would have to approve an additional [EUR] 3 billion if the air force was to get the planned 180 aircraft…”

Upgrade Lifeline? IPA7 tests KEPD-350s
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At the same time, remaining aircraft in these existing fleets offer strong opportunities for piecemeal upgrades, from moves to give Tranche 1 planes precision ground attack capabilities, to helmet-mounted sights, AESA radar retrofits, and even thrust-vectoring engines to create super-maneuverability. Conformal fuel tanks (CFTs) could also become possible, if Eurofighter devises an appropriate upgrade process. It would be logical to make that part of a life-extension structural refit, which would help existing customers keep expensive investments in service for longer. Key export order competitors like the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, F-15 Strike Eagle, F-35 Lightning II, JAS-39 Gripen, Rafale, and Russian SU-30MKx/SU-35 already field every one of these capabilities – but none currently field all of them.

Weapon upgrades are absolutely expected. Expansion of the Typhoon’s ground attack weapon choices is an ongoing process. MBDA’s medium-range stealthy Storm Shadow cruise missile is in testing for full integration by 2015, reportedly thanks to Saudi Arabia and Oman. Taurus’ similar KEPD 350 will undergo partial testing at the same time. Saudi Arabia also reportedly wants to add the French Damocles surveillance and targeting pod, which makes sense because the Israeli LITENING-III runs up against their boycott.

Storm Shadow
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In the air, 2017 is expected to mark full integration of the long-range Meteor air-to-air missile.

Over the medium term, planned weapons reportedly include Diehl’s medium-range PILUM and HOSBO glide bombs, short-range MBDA Brimstone light strike missiles, and possibly their longer-range SPEAR-3 successors. Raytheon’s AGM-88 HARM anti-radar missiles have been discussed, and they would fix a critical deficiency for an important mission. So, too, would anti-ship missiles, which all of its competitors already carry. None of these items come with a schedule, however.

National budgets will play a role in the pace of these upgrades, as they have throughout the Eurofighter’s history. The question, for current and future customers, is timing. Until integration is done, the absence of key capabilities like long-range precision strike and anti-radar missiles will continue to hobble the Typhoon’s positioning as a fully multi-role aircraft.

What has changed now is the consortium’s seriousness about winning exports, along with a dawning understanding that most of these upgrades are now basic requirements for serious players. The question is whether this understanding came too late.

Exports Required Eurofighter Display
click for video

Export wins will be necessary in order to finance the full range of timely improvements, and keep the line open past 2017/18. An August 30/09 Financial Mail article reported that Eurofighter GmbH was hoping for sales of 300 Eurofighter Typhoon to 10 export countries by 2020, but that will be very challenging.

The Eurofighter’s cost of $100-140 million each is already creating tough sledding against F-35 stealth fighters whose production quantities will eventually create prices in the $100 million range, and F/A-18 Super Hornets or JAS-39E/F Gripens that can be sold for around $60-70 million. With existing operators interested in selling some of their aircraft, even an export win or 2 may not change the Eurofighter’s overall production numbers.

The Tranche 3A release from Eurofighter cited active export campaigns in Switzerland, India, Japan, Romania, Greece, and Turkey, while “exploring possible opportunities” in South Korea, Bulgaria, Croatia, et. al. Romania (F-16s) and Turkey (F-35A) never went ahead with a real competition. Subsequent losses in Brazil (JAS-39E/F Gripen), India (Rafale, unfinalized), Japan (F-35A), South Korea (F-35A), Switzerland (JAS-39E Gripen, canceled by referendum), and the UAE (TBD, q.v. Dec 19/13 entry) have hurt.

Greece, which canceled an order for 30-60 Eurofighters in 2005, and bought F-16s instead, still had plans for an additional next-generation fighter buy to counter Turkey’s planned purchase of 100 F-35As. With Greek finances in tatters, however, don’t hold your breath.

After that, Eurofighter’s options narrow sharply. On the bright side, the Gulf states of Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar all have fighter competitions in progress, and successful sales to Saudi Arabia and Oman help the Typhoon’s chances within the Gulf Cooperation Council.

With Japan and South Korea out, the once-promising Asian market has few options left for Eurofighter. A MiG-29N replacement competition in Malaysia has run into trouble due to finances, and they are exploring leasing deals. That will be a tough win for Eurofighter. In Europe, Eastern European countries like Bulgaria and Croatia would normally be problematic sales due to the Eurofighter’s costs, but Germany is pushing hard, and offering umbrella maintenance agreements and training packages. Even if they succeed, however, the end result is just a handful of sales.

Typhoon at Sea? Naval variant, cutaway
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India was pitched with very explicit offers to have their needs and investments drive the Typhoon’s future enhancements, and significant roles for Indian industry. At Aero India 2011, Eurofighter and BAE even unveiled an initial internally-funded design for a navalized Eurofighter than can operate from aircraft carriers. In a direct nod to potential Indian sales, they touted the plane as being able to take off from “ski jump” carriers without catapults – a design that describes all of India’s current and planned carriers, as well as the initial design for Britain’s own Queen Elizabeth Class. Eurofighter GmbH describes the goal as 95% commonality with land-based aircraft, and required changes as “limited… include a new, stronger landing gear, a modified arrestor hook and localised strengthening on some fuselage sections near the landing gear, as well as updates the EJ200 engines,” which could include thrust-vectoring as well as structural reinforcement.

It didn’t help. India picked the French Rafale, which already has a carrier-capable version, as their future M-MRCA medium fighter. The Indian Navy is currently flying MiG-29Ks as its naval fighters, and plans to add Indian-designed LCA Naval light jets.

Britain could have been a long-shot backup option, but they’re planning to use the F-35B from future carriers, which won’t be fitted with steam catapults and arrester wires after all.

Brazil might have been a future option, on the assumption that they will replace their aircraft carrier at some point. Unfortunately for Eurofighter, Brazil picked Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen as their future air force fighter, and Saab also has plans for a naval variant.

That leaves a carrier-capable Eurofighter variant without a plausible future customer.

Eurofighter: Industrial Structure & Orders IPA7 over Manching
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Technically, the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) is the customer for the Eurofighter project. Eurofighter GmbH is the contractor, with joint ownership by all of the key industrial partners: BAE Systems, EADS, and Finmeccanica. Overall, Eurofighter GmbH cites a total of 100,000 supported jobs in 400 companies across Europe.

Aircraft production work shares were designed to correspond to the number of aircraft ordered under the 1998 Umbrella Contract:

• 37.5% UK (232). BAE Systems: Front fuselage including foreplanes, canopy, dorsal spine, tail fin, inboard flaperons, rear fuselage section.

• 30.0% Germany (180) EADS Deutschland: Main center fuselage. Airbus spinout Premium AEROTEC is the main sub-contractor.

• 19.5% Italy (121). Alenia Aeronautica: Left wing, outboard flaperons, rear fuselage sections

• 13.0% Spain (87). EADS CASA: Right wing, leading edge slats

The Eurofighter’s 2 EJ200 turbofans deliver 20,000 pounds thrust each in reheat mode, and are manufactured by the EUROJET partnership of Avio (Italy), ITP (Spain), MTU Aero Engines (Germany) and Rolls-Royce (UK).

The Euroradar consortium supplies the ECR-90 CAPTOR radar, and is developing the “E-Scan” AESA successor for introduction by 2015. It is led by Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Sensors and Airborne Systems in Edinburgh, UK (formerly BAE Systems Avionics), and also includes EADS and Spain’s Indra.

The Eurofighter contract was designed to protect the fairness of each participants’ agreed manufacturing work shares, by making it very expensive to back out of committed orders. On the other hand, European defense spending continues to decline due to pressure from welfare state commitments and debt burdens, even as European military operational deployments and their costs have increased. Hence the fractious contract negotiations around Tranche 3, and also the investigation of foreign sell-offs by the member countries.

In June 2009, the partners took a diplomatic way out, splitting Tranche 3 into 2 parts. At the end of July 2009, the 4 partner nations placed a EUR 9 billion Tranche 3A order, which will keep production going for several more years. The table below summarizes the Eurofighter’s evolving production plans, from the original 1985 plan to the 1998 agreement, and then planned and actual orders for each production tranche.

Note that 24 of Britain’s Tranche 2 aircraft have been diverted to Saudi Arabia, in order to satisfy Saudi demands for early delivery. In response, Britain ordered 24 more Tranche 3 aircraft as replacements. In practice, this means that Britain has ordered only 16 of its originally planned 88 Tranche 3 Eurofighters – and high-level statements indicate that Tranche 3A agreement absolves Britain of the need to place any further Eurofighter orders. Other reports explain the gap by claiming that the other 48 British Tranche 3 aircraft will go to Saudi Arabia, meaning that all of Saudi Arabia’s 72 planes will have been siphoned off from British orders.

Maintenance contracts to keep the fleets in service involve a small core of multi-national contracts for key systems and general service, followed by a number of national umbrella contracts to address other areas, and then a set of national maintenance agreements that are less comprehensive. See the chart below for tracking of the main support contracts currently underway:

Contracts & Key Events New dawn, or twilight?
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DID coverage focuses on purchases related to consortium aircraft buys under Tranche 3, platform improvement efforts, international opportunities, and sales. See the “Additional Readings” section for coverage of the comprehensive support contracts for the various countries, and of the Saudi and Austrian export deals.

2014 – 2016

Germany confirms no Tranche 3B, but how much will they have to pay?; German maintenance costs an issue; Eurofighter needs new orders, soon. with Brimstones

February 3/16: Last weekend’s expected signing of a deal for Kuwait to purchase twenty-eight Eurofighter jets has been put off. Italian Ministry of Defense officials cited “procedural” delays on Kuwait’s behalf, and that no clear date had been set. It had been expected that the deal would close quickly after some initial delays over pilot training had pushed an agreement into 2016. News of the deal came as Kuwait’s initial plan to purchase F-18 Super Hornets from Boeing was scrapped after their frustration over congressional delays in gaining approval for the sale. The loss of the sale to the Eurofighter has put into question the security of some jobs at Boeing’s St. Louis plant. The plant specializes in the manufacture of the Super Hornet, and were set to start production of the $3 billion deal before the change.

January 28/16: After delays in gaining approval from the US to buy new F-18 Super Hornets, Kuwait instead looks set to sign contracts for twenty-eight Eurofighter Typhoon jets to replace their older F-18s. An official in the Italian Ministry of Defense said minister Roberta Pinotti would visit Kuwait on Sunday to sign papers finalizing the deal estimated to be worth $8.7 billion. Talks had been ongoing since November with issues over pilot training delaying the deal, but should be completed within eighteen months. The switch in allegiance will no doubt annoy manufacturer Boeing, and may see renewed frustrations over the lengthy congressional approval process for foreign military sales.

December 14/15: Kuwait’s purchase of 28 Eurofighter jets from Finmeccanica is set to experience further delays, as contracts may not be signed until 2016. The CEO of Finmeccanica expressed concerns last week, saying that he did not expect a sale to be agreed upon before December 25. The $9 billion purchase has been delayed repeatedly since a memorandum of agreement was signed in September. Reasons for the delay have apparently arisen due to disagreements over pilot training and the dispatching of specialized personnel. On December 1, the Kuwaiti government requested parliament to release a supplementary budget of $20.4 billion to fund military weapon purchases over the next ten years.

November 30/15: A $9 billion Eurofighter sale to Kuwait has been delayed. Italian defense company Finmeccanica announced that problems with pilot training and the dispatching of specialized personnel has resulted in the deal being postponed until mid-December. An initial memorandum of agreement for 28 fighters was signed in September and it was hoped contracts would have been signed by November. Kuwait is one of several Gulf nations currently driving to acquire high-tech aircraft and weaponry to protect themselves from neighbouring Iran as well as internal threats in the region.

November 13/15: BAE Systems is slowing Eurofighter production in order to sustain production lines out past 2018, in addition to cutting jobs on the fighter’s UK production line. The decision reflects the company’s orderbook, covering production orders which conclude in 2018 and an expected uptick in production as a result of an order for 28 Eurofighters by Kuwait, following an agreement between the Italian and Kuwaiti governments earlier this year; however a finalized deal has yet to materialize.

October 19/15: In further bad news for the German Eurofighter program, a malfunction with the aircraft’s external fuel tank grounded [German] the fleet from flying with the additional fuel pod attached, reducing the ability of the fighters to operate at longer distances. One of the German contingent of Eurofighters deployed to the Baltic region saw one of its fuel tanks fall off last week, leading to the grounding. This follows news earlier this week that the German government has temporarily suspended deliveries of new Eurofighters, citing manufacturing defects. German press also reports [German] that the EUR1 billion ($1.27 billion) contract to develop the CAPTOR-E radar system for the fighter, signed in November 2014, is now delayed by five months, as well as being above budget.

October 14/15: Germany’s Defence Ministry has halted deliveries of Eurofighter Typhoon fighters following the discovery of a technical fault with the Airbus-manufactured jets. The technical problem is thought centered around the connection between the aircraft’s vertical stabiliser and the fuselage. This is the second time quality control measures for the European fighter have caused problems, with manufacturing defects in September 2014 [German] also leading to a suspension of deliveries. In both cases BAE Systems was the consortium member responsible for manufacture of the defective parts; however this latest problem is not thought to pose any immediate flight safety issues for operators of the aircraft.

September 14/15: Kuwait is buying 28 Eurofighters through the Italian government, following an order for a dozen of the aircraft in December 2012. The order is the first in three years for the multinational Eurofighter, with the Eurofighter consortium’s partner company Alenia Aermacchi reportedly having led the marketing campaign in the Gulf state. Oman similarly ordered twelve of the multi-role fighters in December 2012, with the aircraft already in operation with six national air forces.

Dec 12/14: Weapons. BAE announces that the 1st Brimstone trial onto a Typhoon was completed, following a June 19/14 award to study integration between the missile and the aircraft. The firm says that “6 Brimstone missiles were fitted to the aircraft, each wing carrying a launcher with three missiles. Training missiles were used for the purposes of the trial and demonstrated that the weapon can be fitted to the aircraft.” Of course that’s not the toughest part in such an endeavor, and full integration is not expected before 2018.

November 2014: Weapons. The 1st release of a Storm Shadow cruise missile was performed successfully by the Italian IPA2 test aircraft, following initial tests in August. Now that inert drop tests and store release trials were performed, Phase 3 will involve environmental data gathering, followed by additional flights to assess handling qualities.

BAE Systems was also able to test the installation of a Storm Shadow onto a RAF Typhoon. Source: Eurofighter.

Captor-E concept
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Nov 19/14: Sensors. NATO’s Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) finally signs a EUR 1 billion/ GBP 800 million / $1.273 billion contract with Eurofighter Jadgflugzeug GmbH to finish and integrate Euroradar’s Captor E-Scan movable AESA radar (q.v. March 22/12, July 30/12, Nov 15/13, Oct 17/14), whose absence is currently a big disadvantage compared to every other top-tier fighter on the market. This deal was supposed to be done by the end of 2012, and the delay has been costly, but better late than never.

Captor-E is touted as having an unspecified “very large” antenna size that’s expected to be comparable to F-15s (APG-82v1) and F-22As (APG-77). That means more raw power for performance, and more T/R modules available for specialized functions; though materials, build quality, and the number of the T/R modules will all modify final performance statistics. Instead of using a fixed mounting like American fighters and the French Rafale, Eurofighter’s Captor-E will be mounted on a movable plate for an extremely Wide Field of Regard (WFoR). The current contract release appears to have expanded the touted FoR from about 120 to 200 degrees, thanks to the combination of mechanical movement and electronic beam steering. Eurofighter sees that capability as very useful for fire-and-evade dogfighting maneuvers that use the Eurofighter’s speed and maneuverability to their fullest, without breaking the launching fighter’s radar lock. The tradeoff is paid in poorer reliability and higher maintenance costs, compared to a fixed AESA array.

The contract value for Finmeccanica alone will be EUR 400 million, as the leader of the Euroradar consortium. Finmeccanica-Selex ES will produce the new radar at its facilities in Edinburgh, UK and Nerviano (Milan), Italy while Finmeccanica-Alenia Aermacchi’s Turin, Italy site will be responsible for the navigation systems during the integration phase. Airbus DS in Germany, and Spain’s Indra, round out the consortium. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter And NETMA Sign One Billion Euro Radar Contract” | UK MoD, “€1 billion contract to develop cutting-edge radar for Typhoon” | Airbus Group, “New radar ensures superiority of the Eurofighter” | Finmeccanica Selex ES, “€1 billion contract signed between the Eurofighter consortium and the inter-governmental agency NETMA” | Defense News, “Action Pending on AESA Radar for Typhoon”.

CAPTOR-E AESA Radar

Flying low…
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Oct 17/14: P1E. BAE Systems announces that deliveries of Eurofighter Typhoon Phase 1 Enhancement upgrades have created 17 P1Eb standard aircraft in service with the RAF. A further 18 are to be delivered by April 1/15, under a EUR 1.2 billion program that will eventually convert all 67 Tranche 2 Typhoons in RAF service; BAE offers a useful summary of key features.

Now that the UK has completed testing and undertaken initial fielding, the upgrade package will also become a proven installation option for other Eurofighter Tranche 2 customers, beginning in 2015. Meanwhile, future P2E and P3E upgrades are being planned, but the biggest wild card and competitive disadvantage remains:

“Eurofighter is still waiting for the partner nations to sign a production contract for the introduction of the Captor-E [AESA radar]…. A program source confirmed that the signing of the deal had slipped to the end of 2014, and “the staffing process within some partner nations is taking more time than originally planned.” “Germany is still sorting out some details,” a second source said.”

Sources: BAE Systems, “Royal Air force now flying their most advanced fighter jets ever” | Defense News, “British RAF Now Flying Improved Typhoon Aircraft”.

Sept 30/14: Defects. Germany suspends their remaining 32 Eurofighter deliveries, pending resolution of a manufacturing defect and negotiations re: what to do about it. They also sharply cut the estimated number of safe flying hours in each of their 108 delivered Eurofighters to just 1,500, and Austria and Britain are apparently taking similar measures. The timing is terrible, coming on the heels of revelations that budget cuts have forced the German armed forces into deep disrepair, with most of its key equipment unready for war.

BAE Systems and Britain’s RAF reportedly discovered that some of the rivet holes in the rear fuselage of the jet were drilled in ways that could introduce splinters and cracks into the rear fuselage, giving it less ability to resist wear and tear. That section is built by BAE, and tests are underway to get a more precise estimate of the effect on the fighter’s safe lifespan.

Meanwhile, the problem isn’t an immediate safety issue, and the Luftwaffe won’t hit even this low hours limit until 2018, so the planes aren’t grounded. Exports to Oman and Saudi Arabia are expected to continue.

Note that 1,500 flight hours is a ridiculously short life span, even for fighter jets whose forecasts in a capable military amount to just 150-300 hours per plane per year. Base figures of 5,000 – 8,000 are expected, with deep repair and refurbishment extending some airframes to around 10,000. The original official limit of 3,000 hours was itself just half of the Eurofighter Typhoon’s 6,000 hour design life, with the expectation that hard flight data would extend the official limit as experience offered greater certainty. It’s a very German approach, but the introduction of a big uncertainty is pushing estimates the other way for now. Sources: German Bundeswehr, “Eurofighter: Flugbetrieb der Luftwaffe aktuell nicht von industrieller Flugstundenreduzierung betroffen” | Der Spiegel, “Desolate Bundeswehr-Ausrustung: Hersteller warnt vor Mangeln am “Eurofighter” | Defense-Aerospace, “Eurofighter: Air Force Flight Operations Currently Not Affected By Flight Hours Reduction” | Agence France Presse, “Germany ‘erring on side of safety’ regarding Eurofighter defect” | Reuters, “UPDATE 2-Manufacturing flaw halts some Eurofighter deliveries” | Reuters, “Austria says Eurofighter has part problem” | SwissInfo, “Austria says Eurofighter has part problem, some deliveries halted” | Russia Today, “Eurofighter hull hitch: Germany halves fighter flying hours” || Der Spiegel, “Marodes Material: Bundeswehr erfullt Nato-Anforderungen derzeit nicht” (re: massive disrepair in armed forces) | Deutsche Welle, “Bundeswehr struggles with faulty defense equipment”.

Manufacturing defect could shrink fighter lifespan

Aug 5/14: Weapons. Italy’s Alenia Aermacchi has confirmed that the 1st phase of tests for Storm Shadow long-range cruise missile integration (q.v. July 26/13, Nov 20/13) is complete.

They add that the fighter will be able to carry 2 Storm Shadows and up to 8 air-to-air missiles. That’s a good load for fighting your way in and out, which is useful to customers like Saudi Arabia and Oman who are paying for the work. The ability to add drop-tanks would be another valuable load-out, extending the Storm Shadow’s reach. Countries like Britain would find that exceedingly useful, but weight and aerodynamics make this combination a more challenging load-out. Perhaps Tranche 3 upgrades and Conformal Fuel Tanks (q.v. May 13/14) can offer this capability in a more elegant way. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Success For Italian Eurofighter Storm Shadow Trials”.

July 16/14: HMD. BAE unveils its Striker II Helmet-Mounted Display (HMD), which builds on the original Striker system flying with Eurofighter and Gripen fleets.

The new system removes the need for night vision goggles, integrating a center-mounted ISIE-11 sensor based on Intevac Photonics’ patented electron bombarded active pixel sensor (EBAPS) advanced imaging sensor technology. The result is brighter and lighter than standard HMD/NVG combinations. the system is fully digital, and new hybrid opto-inertial technology is designed to reduce jitter and other syncing issues as the HMD tries to stay aligned with the pilot’s head movement and display its symbology. Sources: BAE Systems, “BAE Systems Unveils Digital Striker II Helmet-Mounted Display System with Superior Tracking, Night Vision Capabilities”.

June 19/14: Weapons. BAE announces an initial GBP 5 million study contract from the British Ministry of Defence, to conduct initial integration studies for the dual-mode radar/laser guided Brimstone 2 short-range light strike missile. Brimstone is already operational on Britain’s Tornado GR4 strike fighters, and this is an expected development that will improve the Typhoon’s capabilities for close air support against land targets and swarming motorboats.

Initial wind tunnel tests are already underway at Warton, Lancashire, and the study also intends to explore a common launcher for future derivatives like the 75+ km SPEAR 3 light strike missile. The target date for Brimstone 2 integration is 2018. Sources: BAE, “UK Study Contract Awarded to integrate Brimstone 2 onto Typhoon”.

June 10/14: Crash. A Spanish Eurofighter Typhoon crashed just before landing at Moron de la Frontera AB, killing the pilot. The pilot was an experienced flyer with 600 flight hours in the type, and the cause is under investigation.

It’s the first Spanish Air Force plane to go down, though a consortium prototype and a Saudi Eurofighter have crashed in Spain within the last decade. Sources: The Local – Spain, “Eurofighter jet exploded shortly after 2pm shortly after take-off for a routine practice mission” | Reuters, “UPDATE 2-Eurofighter jet crashes at Spanish base, killing pilot” | UK Daily Mail, “Eurofighter jet crashes just short of southern Spain airbase runway killing pilot”.

Spanish crash

June 9/14: Weapons. The Eurofighter’s weak weapons array has come back to bite it again, this time in Malaysia and Qatar. In “response” to this demand for “maritime attack capabilities,” which all of its competitors already possess in full:

“Peter Maute, the head of combat aircraft sales at Airbus Defence, said the Boeing Harpoon and MBDA’s Marte and Sea Brimstone missiles were being considered as possibilities…. work on the weapons was done by Eurofighter in its development simulator but that full integration would have to await a customer. Qatar and Malaysia are known to have stipulated a maritime-strike capability for their next purchase of combat jets.”

One hears “discussion,” study” and “plan” a lot, with respect to key Typhoon capabilities. In a competitive market, that doesn’t substitute for action. If you await a customer, you’ll be watching them buy something else: F-16s with Penguin Mk3s, F-15s with SLAM-ERs, JAS-39 Gripens with RBS-15s, Rafales with Exocets, Russian jets with Kh-31/ Kh-35s, or Super Hornets with Harpoon and SLAM-ER anti-ship and land strike missiles. It’s also doubtful that most customers would consider the short-range Brimstone missiles to be a “maritime attack capability,” unless one confines potential targets to small boats. Sources: Defense News, “Eurofighter Studying Missiles To Give Typhoon Maritime Attack Capability”.

May 21/14: P1Eb. Eurofighter GmbH formally unveils the Phase 1 Enhancements B package in Berlin at the ILA 2014 airshow. It’s essentially the EP2 capabilities (q.v. Oct 30/13) of enhancements to the existing radar for Meteor missile compatibility, DASS defensive system improvements, MIDS/Link-16 interoperability updates, as well as Flight Control System (FCS) and the Utility Control System (UCS) improvements. Plus Storm Shadow cruise missiles, which weren’t announced in EP2 because payments are coming from outside the core group. Storm Shadows should be integrated by 2015, but full Meteor long-range air-to-air missile integration isn’t scheduled until 2017.

The FCS/UCS upgrades will inprove compatibility with future civil airspace requirements, and also allow the pilot to switch seamlessly between air-to-air and air-to-ground modes.

Overall, there’s less here than meets the eye. The Eurofighter’s aerial performance is very good, and they have a reputation for implementing very good pilot interfaces. With the exception of Meteor, however, comparable or better capabilities are already fielded in competitive aircraft like the F-15. This is more of a partial catch-up than a paradigm shift in anything. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter Unveils ‘Paradigm Shift’ In Capability At Berlin Air Show”.

May 13/14: CFTs. BAE Systems has begun wind tunnel tests for conformal fuel tank designs, based on a “geometrically perfect 1/12th scale model” of the Tranche 3. The CFTs are created using additive manufacturing, then attached and removed for the tests.

CFTs are one of the big changes inherent in the Tranche 3 aircraft, which will form a small portion of the core partners’ Typhoon fleets. Removing drag-creating fuel tanks from underwing hardpoints is a big plus, but a great deal depends on good design. Boeing and Northrop Grumman managed to craft CFTs that added 3,500 pounds of fuel to the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, while creating nearly zero drag at sub-sonic speeds. Even those CFTs impose a trans-sonic penalty, which will be an issue for Super Hornets, but the Eurofighter has such a good power to weight ratio that a minor trans-sonic penalty won’t matter. Sources: BAE, “British Engineers test new configuration of fighter jets in high speed wind tunnel”.

April 30/14: Germany – Costs. Germany’s Bundesrechnunghof (Federal Court of Auditors) publishes a supplementary annex to its 2013 report, and the Eurofighter is one of their subjects. The press release goes over known ground by saying that the EUR 11.5 billion budget will buy just 140 planes, instead of 180. What’s new is an acknowledgement that Eurofighter maintenance costs continue to increase, driven by added need for support and spares, and that life-cycle costs are expected to be roughly double the 1997 estimate of EUR 30 billion.

2011 and 2012 reportedly had the Eurofighter fleet consuming about 1/3 of the air force’s maintenance budgets, even though the fleet was smaller than planned and didn’t reach its maximum flight hours. By 2020, the fleet is expected to rise from 86 to 140, and flight hours would roughly triple to 28,400 per year. A comparative graph in the full report shows the rising operating & maintenance costs from the F-4F Phantom, to the Tornado fleet, to the Eurofighter fleet. The United States has seen similar trends as it fielded each new generation of fighters, but the Tornado is known to be a maintenance problem, and the Eurofighter still graphs significantly above it.

The Bundesrechnunghof adds that even Germany’s Ministry of Defence doesn’t seem to know the full cost, and explains the Ministry’s rationalizations for not knowing. Other countries seem to manage such things, somehow. Perhaps the Germans could visit those countries and find out. Sources: German FCA, 2014 Pressemitteilung 04 – Bemerkungen 2013, weitere Prüfungsergebnisse [Press release] | “2013 Bemerkungen – Weitere Prufungsergebnisse – Nr. 09 “Kostentransparenz beim EUROFIGHTER herstellen” [Eurofighter summary, incl. link to full report] | Langfassung der Bemerkung Nr. 09 [Full report, PDF].

German costs

Feb 27/14: Pessimism, or Realism? Airbus CEO Tom Enders doesn’t sound very sunny about Eurofighter’s future:

“Enders said he’s also “not very optimistic” about securing further deals for the Eurofighter combat jet…. “We do hope we can still score one or two other successes in exports,” he said. “But we also have to prepare for a scenario — due to lack of export orders plus cancellations from others — that we’ll have to ramp down production of this otherwise very impressive aircraft sooner rather than later.”

Sooner would be an end of production in 2017, which means that preparations within the supply chain would begin sometime in 2015. Sources: Bloomberg BusinessWeek, “Airbus CEO Says Turkish Delay in Taking A400M Threatens Ramp-Up”.

Feb 25/14: Germany. The Handelsblatt business daily says that Airbus is demanding EUR 800 – 900 million in compensation for Germany’s Tranche 3B cancellation. Britain finessed its absence from Tranche 3B by substituting Saudi jets, which were bought under a direct government-to-government deal with Britain, but the other partners aren’t able to do that.

That’s a steep price. Negotiations are expected, but even if Germany ends up paying in full per their original contract, it will still be a small percentage of what they would have paid to buy 37 new Typhoons. Obvious options involve some shifting of payments into R&D or upgrade work, or a refundable “export loan” whose repayment depends on reaching a certain number of fighter exports.

The larger question for Eurofighter GmbH is whether financially fragile Italy and Spain take the same approach as Germany, or stand by their Tranche 3B orders. Sources: Sky News Australia, “Airbus ‘wants money’ for scrapped jets” | Frankfurter Allgemeine Wirtschaft, “Airbus will Entschadigung fur abbestellte Eurofighter”.

Feb 20/14: Germany. German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen removes 2 senior procurement officials: Stephane Beemelmans and Detlef Selhausen. Part of the issue involves Eurofighters, specifically, a EUR 55 million euro (~$75 million) settlement to Germany’s MTU in lieu of EUR 340 million for Eurofighter Tranche 3B engine work. Not bad, but Bundestag budget committee approval is required for contracts over EUR 25 million, and the payment was authorized without that. Relationships with these individuals were already tense, so that was the end of the road. Sources: Defense News, “Germany Plans Procurement Overhaul After Program Missteps” | Der Spiegel, “Rustungsprojekt “Eurofighter”: Verteidigungsministerium gab Millionensumme ohne Bundestagsvotum frei” | Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, “Wie von der Leyen aufräumen will”.

Feb 19/14: Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia finalizes their contract for 72 fighters, agreeing on price escalation terms to upgrade the fighters bought under the Salaam program toward Tranche 3 standard (q.v. Feb 21/13, Aug 1/13, Dec 19/13). BAE was very involved in the process, but because the underlying agreement is actually with the British government, the amendment must also be negotiated between the governments involved.

BAE had continued Eurofighter deliveries during the long negotiations, which meant rising amounts of cash committed without booking any profits. Clearing this issue up frees BAE to deploy its cash reserves more freely, while also removing a source of uncertainty for potential Gulf Cooperation Council customers.

The firm describes the settlement as “broadly consistent with the Group’s prior trading outlook for 2013.” That outlook (q.v. Dec 19/13) estimated a 6-7 pence earnings per share drop without any agreement, or about GBP 250 million (~ $410 million) maximum, based on total shares revealed in a recent transaction. That’s on top of the original GBP 4.43 billion pounds/ $7.4 billion. Sources: BAE Systems, “Agreement on Salam Price Escalation” and “Feb 20/14 Transaction in Own Shares” | Reuters, “UPDATE 2-BAE Systems agrees pricing on Saudi Eurofighter deal”.

Saudi finalization

Feb 19/14: Germany. News reports are describing a German decision to cancel 37 Eurofighters, based on Deputy Defense Minister Stephane Beemelmans’ testimony before their the parliamentary defense committee. That isn’t quite true.

What it means is that Germany doesn’t intend to pay for a Tranche 3B, which would have included 37 fighters to finish their agreed purchases. A Tranche 3B offer was reportedly extended to the core countries by Eurofighter on June 9/10, but Europe’s financial woes have left the core partners uninterested. Indeed, Germany ended their plans for a Tranche 3B order back in 2011 (q.v. Oct 21/11). 2014 was supposed to be a year of decision for the core countries, but with Germany and Britain on the sidelines, Spain or Italy become that much more difficult to convince.

The wording of the July 31/09 Tranche 3A agreement, and of the broader Eurofighter partnership agreements, determine how much the decision costs Germany in cancellation fees. Britain found a way to disclaim any Tranche 3B buy the moment the Tranche 3A contract was signed, but they appear to have done so by shifting Saudi exports under their own account, which avoids any penalties.

Unless Eurofighter GmbH finds additional orders somewhere, the production line will begin shifting toward upgrades and maintenance only in 2015 (q.v. Jan 25/11). Sources: Reuters, “Germany cancels delivery of last 37 Eurofighter jets: source” | Handelsblatt, “Deutschland bestellt 37 Eurofighter wieder ab”.

Feb 9/14: Italy. The center-left Democratic Party is reportedly preparing a policy document that would cut F-35 buys from the current reduced plan for 90 F-35A/Bs to around 45 planes, while trying to make Italy invest in Eurofighter’s Tranche 3B buy.

Significant reductions in planned buys by Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, etc. will all hit Italy’s own F-35 Final Assembly and Check-Out plant. Part of the party’s push despite this incentive is ideological, reflecting a bias that’s in favor of European defense programs and less friendly toward the USA. Part of it reflects a level of general uneasiness with F-35 costs, capabilities, and delivery dates. Sources: Defense News, “Italian Lawmakers Consider New Cuts to JSF Purchase”.

Jan 15/14: Testing. Test flights with the KEPD 350 cruise missile begin from at Manching Military Air Systems Center, north of Munich. They’re technically part of the Storm Shadow integration program, thought the KPED 350 won’t be fully integrated, and will include flutter tests, air data system large store interference assessment and aerodynamic data gathering. Sources: Eurofighter, “Eurofighter Typhoon: Flight tests with Taurus KEPD 350 missile started”.

2013

Saudis abandon local assembly; Competitions in Denmark, South Korea; Problems in Germany?; Testing begins for Storm Shadow & KEPD 350 missiles; Tranche 3 flies; 400th delivered; New CEO has a big job ahead. Saudi Eurofighters
(click to view full)

Dec 19/13: Low Rents of Arabia. A BAE investors release suggests that the UAE “have advised that they have elected not to proceed with [Eurofighter] proposals at this time,” and adds that negotiations with the Saudis over Tranche 3 upgrades to their Al-Yamamah buy of 72 planes may be deadlocked.

The UAE’s decision is a very big blow to the Eurofighter’s future in the Gulf. A UAE buy offered the prospect of sustaining production for several years beyond 2018 by making Eurofighter the GCC’s de facto standard fighter, just as key competitions in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar were coming up. If the UAE goes back to the Rafale instead, their fellow Mirage 2000 operator Qatar becomes a much harder target for Eurofighter, and the standardization momentum that was bringing unlikely customers like Bahrain to the table evaporates.

The British government tried to use diplomacy on Eurofighter’s behalf, but they may have done more damage than good. None of the Gulf Cooperation Council were pleased with Britain’s failure to support the Syrian rebels. They were even less pleased when Britain’s government pushed hard for an Iranian nuclear deal that most of them regard as both catastrophically stupid and directly threatening. In contrast, France has played a leading role in pushing the Syrian issue, and was a very public dissenter regarding the Iranian deal. Sources: BAE, “BAE Systems – Status of prospective business in the UAE and Salam pricing discussions” | The Telegraph, “Blow for Britain and BAE Systems as UAE rules out Eurofighter deal” | The Telegraph, “David Cameron’s Typhoon debacle a sign of Britain’s declining Arabian influence”.

UAE loss

Dec 9/13: Tranche 3. British Single Seat aircraft #116 conducts the 1st Eurofighter Tranche 3 flight, with pilot Nat Makepeace at the controls. The biggest differences from earlier versions include a structure that can mount dorsal conformal fuel tanks; and a modified nose with a new internal structure, power, cooling and electronics for the future E-Scan AESA radar.

Another development aircraft has been modified to take an E-Scan development radar for testing purposes. It’s currently being prepared at Warton, UK, ahead of its coming 1st flight. Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3 Takes to the Skies” | BAE Systems, “Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3 Takes to the Skies”.

1st Tranche 3 flight

Dec 4/13: #400. The 400th Eurofighter Typhoon has been delivered. The single-seat fighter in question was handed over to the German Air Force at Cassidian’s Military Air Systems Center, located in Manching, Southern Germany. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, “Eurofighter Typhoon Marks Delivery of 400th Aircraft”.

#400

Nov 27/13: Testing. Flight tests of the Storm Shadow missile (q.v. Nov 20/13) begin from Alenia Aermacchi’s Flight Test Centre at Decimomannu Air Base, in Sardinia, Italy. Sources: Eurofighter, “Eurofighter Typhoon: Flight tests with Storm Shadow missile started”.

Nov 22/13: Industrial. BAE and Finmeccanica’s Selex ES announce a teaming agreement to provide Electronic Warfare Operational Support (EWOS) for future Eurofighter Typhoon customers, “and the Eurofighter Typhoon core programme where appropriate.”

Electronic warfare is often a pretty “black box”, as-is affair, but its importance makes it something that customers want to be able to modify for local threats and local needs. Technology has made that ideal easier, as software-defined digital systems are fielded. The flip side is that full export customer access to key items like threat libraries and operational modes creates a greater attack surface area for the core countries’ enemies to steal secrets. Under this agreement, the partners pledge to provide willing customers with a “sovereign” EWOS capability. That word is usually associated with full ability to maintain and modify a system, but absent further details, use of the word alone isn’t something to rely on.

Selex ES SVP Electronic Warfare, Chris Bushell, adds that the partners have “agreed to also look at non-Typhoon EW support solutions where there is mutual benefit to doing so.” Sources: BAE, “Boosting Eurofighter Typhoon Electronic Warfare Support”.

Nov 20/13: Weapons. At the Dubai Air Show, Eurofighter GmbH commits to full integration of the stealthy, medium range GPS/IIR guided Storm Shadow cruise missile by 2015. Storm Shadows are already used by Eurofighter customers in Britain, Italy, and Saudi Arabia (q.v. July 26/13). Ground tests are complete, and flight tests will begin using the IPA2 test aircraft upgraded to the P1E equipment standard.

The similar KEPD 350 missile in service with Germany and Spain won’t be fully qualified, but it will be flight tested at the same time on the IPA7 test aircraft. That will cut time and costs if a customer decides to spend the money and pay for full integration. Sources: Eurofighter, “Flight tests for Storm Shadow and Taurus stand-off precision missiles announced”.

Nov 15/13: CAPTOR-E AESA. The Eurofighter’s new AESA radar has finished its 4-nation program review at Cassidian’s site in Ulm, Germany, with antenna, repositioner, and Antenna Power Supply and Control Unit results that meet the theoretical design.

Next, the antenna sub-system will go to Selex Edinburgh for integration and test with receiver and processor. Final integration of the Captor-E radar into Eurofighter test plane IPA5 is planned in springtime 2014. Source: EADS Cassidian, Nov 15/13 release.

Nov 12/13: Bahrain. Flight International quotes Col. Salah Al-Mansoor from the Royal Bahraini Air Force’s planning headquarters, who says that Bahrain will be upgrading its 21-plane F-16 fleet to roughly F-16V status from 2014-2018, under a deal whose initial outline is already agreed with Lockheed Martin. Bahrain would represent the 3rd such F-16 upgrade, after Taiwan and South Korea. Major upgrades under the Common Capability Integration Program will reportedly include an AESA radar (NGC APG-80 or SABR, or Raytheon RACR), new cockpit displays, the Link-16/MIDS datalink, software upgrades, and Lockheed’s AN/AAQ-33 Sniper surveillance and targeting pod. Al-Mansoor also mentions GPS-guided JDAMs, an upgrade to AIM-9X short range air-to-air missiles, and “the D-model version of Raytheon’s AIM-120 AMRAAM”. That last is unlikely; the AIM-120D isn’t approved for export, and is still working toward Initial Operational Capability in the USA.

Col. Al-Mansoor says that the kingdom is considering a follow-on order of new F-16s, adding that “We must analyse and determine the cost of the future force structure.” The RBAF’s 16 F-5E/F fighters need replacement, and a winner is expected to be announced in January 2014 at the Bahrain international air show. BAE’s Eurofighter remains the front-runner, but the same outlay that would buy just 12 Eurofighters would net Bahrain around 20-22 F-16E/F Block 60s or similar F-16V equivalents, with all of these upgrades already baked in.

Questions remain. Can Bahrain buy new F-16s and Eurofighters, given the need to aid countries like Egypt and pacify its own restive population? Is the F-16 CCIP + Eurofighters their best Plan B, or could they decide to operate an all-F-16 future fleet of upgraded and new fighters, offering lower short and long-term force structure costs, and commonalities with the nearby UAE? Finally, what about Gulf monarchs’ growing wariness concerning US intentions and support? How will that play into Bahrain’s decisions? Flight International, “Bahrain to launch F-16 upgrade in 2014”.

Nov 4/13: Tranche 3. The 1st Tranche 3 Typhoon (BS116), has successfully completed engine ground runs at Warton, UK, from green screen checks through Stage C checks of the engine’s integration with all onboard systems. 1st flight is expected to take place before the end of 2013 – and does, in December. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, Nov 4/13 release.

Oct 30/13: EP2. The NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) signs a development contract with Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH for Evolution Package 2. It includes enhancements to the existing radar, DASS defensive system, and MIDS/Link-16 system, as well as Flight Control System (FCS) and the Utility Control System (UCS) improvements to inprove compatibility with future civil airspace requirements. MBDA’s Storm Shadow cruise missile isn’t mentioned (q.v. July 26/13).

Development is supposed to be done by the end of 2015. Earlier reports (q.v. July 30/12) suggested that the radar enhancements may involve a new AESA system, but current sources indicate that EP2 this just adds Meteor missile capability to the existing Captor-M radar (q.v. June 18/13). Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, Oct 30/13 | AIN, “Eurofighter Signs New Contract, Describes AESA Radar Status”.

EP2 development

Oct 28/13: P1E. The Eurofighter Typhoon Phase 1 Enhancements (P1E) program has finished flight testing in Manching, Germany and Getafe, Spain, and will be ready for installation and retrofit on existing Tranche 2 aircraft by the end of 2013.

P1E implements full Air-to-Surface capability, with full integration of a Laser Designator Pod (RAFAEL LITENING III), full smart bomb integration (Paveway laser-guided, and dual-mode Paveway IV/ EGBU-16 GPS and laser), Helmet Mounted Sight System upgrades for ground attack use, Mode 5 Identification Friend or Foe, improved Radios and Direct Voice Input, Digital integration of Short Range Air-to-Air Missiles (full IRIS-T integration with HMSS for high off-boresight shots, and allowing future AIM-9X integration), and an updated MIDS/Link-16 Datalink for wider interoperability. All of these enhancements will come factory-installed in Tranche 3 aircraft. Sources: Eurofighter GmbH, Oct 28/13 | Aviation Week, “Partners Chart Course For Eurofighter Typhoon Enhancements”.

Tranche 2 P1E upgrades approved

Aug 19-20/13: South Korea. Conflicting messaging from DAPA and contractors give a somewhat muddled picture, but the upshot is that Eurofighter was disqualified on a questionable technicality, and the F-35 for budgetary reasons, apparently leaving the F-15SE as the de facto winner. That was reversed in late September, when South Korea’s government decided to cancel the competition and start over. In effect, they’ve signaled that it isn’t really a competition, they want the F-35. Which is confirmed in November, when the F-35 is picked as a sole-source winner. Read “South Korea’s Reboots F-X Multi-Role Fighter Buy, Wants 5th Gen” for full coverage.

Loss in Korea

Aug 7/13: Bahrain. BAE Systems says that Bahrain “has expressed an interest in Typhoon and the British government are leading very early discussions”. That’s new, and the motivation is interesting.

Bahrain’s King Hamad al-Khalifa reportedly told British Prime Minister David Cameron that they were interested in buying Eurofighter jets to “create a cohesive defence system between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)” nations. Saudi Arabia is the linchpin of the GCC, and Oman is a respected member. This is a clear dividend from their purchases, and the king’s comment may also be good news for prospective sales in the UAE (40-60 jets), Kuwait, and Qatar. At the same time, every one of these sales is expected to be hotly contested, with competition in place or expected from Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Lockheed Martin’s F-16E/F, and Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen. Reuters.

Aug 1/13: Saudi Arabia. BAE’s 2013 Half-Year Results says that deliveries have resumed, with the Saudi fleet up to 28 fighters, construction beginning on new facilities, and pilot training in-country progressing:

“Four Typhoon aircraft were delivered in the first half, adding to the initial phase of 24 Typhoon aircraft deliveries between 2009 and the end of 2011…. A [GBP] 0.3bn contract was signed in March for the construction of airfield facilities at King Fahd Air Base in Saudi Arabia. Discussions on the provision of maintenance and upgrade facilities in-Kingdom, and further capability enhancement of the Typhoon aircraft remain ongoing. Under an order received at the end of 2012 to deliver training to the RSAF, the first graduation ceremony of cadets from the King Faisal Air Academy was held in May [2013].”

With respect to finalizing terms for Tranche 3 upgrades, BAE’s accompanying presentation cites “good progress,” and says “Significant trading bias to second half anticipated.” Translation: we expect a deal before the end of the year. That will need to be taken care of before BAE can talk about further sales, though they do cite a “KSA B2” opportunity as one of their top prospects. Half-Year Results statement [PDF] and presentation [PDF] | Daily Mail.

July 26/13: Storm Shadow. AIN reports that key Tornado upgrades may end up being funded by Saudi Arabia and Oman. RAF assistant chief of the air staff AVM Ed Stringer says that “Storm Shadow will be on the Typhoon sooner than you think.” From “Middle East Customers Funding Eurofighter Upgrades”:

“…further indication that some key upgrades to the combat jet are being funded by Saudi Arabia and possibly Oman. The four original partner nations have proved reluctant to collectively fund in the near term enhancements… such as integration of the MBDA Storm Shadow cruise missile. The four partners have also so far failed to approve full development of the Captor-E AESA radar by the Euroradar consortium…. “Other Typhoon customers are involved [in providing] funding profile,” [RAF Air Vice Marshal Ed Stringer] added…. During a briefing at the IDEX show in Abu Dhabi earlier this year, a BAE Systems official said that the Storm Shadow would enter flight-test on the Typhoon this year because this is a requirement of the Royal Saudi Air Force.”

The RSAF already uses Storm Shadow missiles on their Tornado strike fighters.

July 7/13: Germany. Der Spiegel takes a strafing run at the Eurofighter program in Germany, pointing out both its budget overruns, and citing recent documents that discuss safety and quality issues with the planes. Germany and the other Eurofighter partners are expected to make their Tranche 3B decisions sometime in 2014, so the articles feed into a live political debate as an election approaches.

On the budgetary front, the Bundestag approved EUR 14.7 billion for 180 fighters, but Der Spiegel says that EUR 14.5 billion has already been spent on just 108 machines. The current Bundeswehr estimate is reportedly EUR 16.8 billion for 143 fighters (Tranche 1 through 3A) by 2018. That would average out to EUR 117.5 million/ $157 million per plane.

The 2nd issue involves quality control problems. On Oct 1/08, the military did not extend the Manching, Bavaria plant’s license to remain a Bundeswehr aviation site. Aircraft were still accepted after more detailed inspections, but that could leave the government liable in the event of a crash on German soil. Later, on April 18/13, an auditor from the Bundesamt fur Ausrustung, Informationstechnik und Nutzung der Bundeswehr (BAAINBw) in Koblenz cited the ejection seats as a fleet-wide problem area. Der Spiegel alleges that German quality control and inspections have suffered as a result of austerity measures and military “reforms,” but it isn’t the first time this has been publicly cited as an issue. In August 2010, an RSAF Lt. Col. and member of the Saudi Royal family was killed in a 2-seat Typhoon crash near Moron, Spain, when his parachute separated from the harness. His Spanish counterpart ejected safely. The accident led the RAF to modify its fleet’s ejection seat harnesses. Der Spiegel re: budgets [in German] | Der Spiegel re: reliability [in German] | Reuters.

Program problems

July 5/13: South Korea. DAPA suspends bidding on its fighter competition, after none of the entries (Eurofighter, F-15SE, F-35A) could meet South Korea’s industrial demands, and performance specifications, and budget limits. Something clearly has to be rethought, if South Korea wants those fighters. If they don’t drop the number bought, then either the budget must be increased, or cost-adding elements like industrial offsets need to be revised, or the performance specifications need to be relaxed and new competitors contemplated. Yonhap | Yonhap follow-on.

July 2/13: P1E Weapons. BAE announces that they have finished initial Paveway IV GPS/laser guided bomb trials with a Eurofighter, as part of the Phase 1 Enhancement Programme that will give Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 2 planes independent precision strike capabilities. Other elements of the program include the LITENING laser designation & surveillance pod, and EGBU-16 Enhanced Paveway laser/GPS guided bomb. BAE Systems.

June 20/13: Qatar. AFP says that the Middle Eastern Emirate intends to launch its RFP for 24-36 fighters “soon.” They own a fleet of Mirage 2000-5s, which recently flew to enforce the no-fly zone over Libya.

French President Hollande will visit Doha for high-level economic talks on June 22, and France has close ties with the Emirate, but the Qataris aren’t waiting around. They reportedly spent time in May 2013 evaluating the Eurofighter Tornado with the RAF, and will soon host a Eurofighter team in-country for flight trials. Boeing also remains in the mix. Agence France Presse.

June 19/13: Industrial. New Eurofighter GmbH CEO and former Airbus Military head Alberto Gutierrez seems to understand what his firm needs to do. Now, can he do it? He tells Reuters:

“In this market, where we are, there is competition and we have to keep on going, finding out whatever improvement is available to catch up, to make the product cheaper and a way of getting into decisions leaner and faster…”

All true. The problem is, he has just admitted that his plane is behind competitors in key areas, too expensive, and hobbled by an industrial structure that doesn’t foster either lean costs or fast action. Fixing even 1 of those problems is a serious challenge. Fixing all 3 in time to land new orders, before the plane goes out of production, while keeping governments from derailing improvement plans, starts edging toward “Mission: Impossible” territory.

June 18/13: Weapons. Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH signs a full weapon system integration contract with the NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA) for MBDA’s Meteor long-range air-to-air missile. This will reportedly include 2-way datalink integration, which will offer parity with the JAS-39 Gripen and an advantage over the Dassault Rafale.

Germany became the last of the 6 core Meteor partners (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden) to sign a contract for missile stocks, on May 31/13. The NETMA contract completes the other coverage loop, and means that MBDA now has contracts to integrate its missile onto all 3 originally-envisaged platforms: the Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon, and Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen.

BAE had done some preliminary work (q.v. June 20/11, July 11/12) in Britain, which led to an unguided test firing (Dec 6/12). That was an excellent set of 1st steps to cut integration time for everyone, but that isn’t the same as full integration. Further design and test work on the missile system will continue at Alenia Aermacchi, BAE Systems, and EADS Cassidian… which doesn’t seem like a very efficient way to conduct things.

What the releases don’t say is when integration will be complete. Eurofighter GmbH has now confirmed the date as 2017. That’s about 3 years later than Saab’s JAS-39 Gripen (2014), and later than original Eurofighter forecasts of mid-2015, and but a year earlier than the French Rafale (2018). Eurofighter | MBDA | UK MoD | Aviation Week.

Full Meteor air-air missile integration contract

June 7/13: Engine. EUROJET Turbo GmbH celebrates the delivery of its 1000th EJ200 production engine, of over 1,500 orders places so far. This one was assembled at ITP for Spain, and the firm touts 789 engines in service so far on operational Eurofighter Typhoons. To date, the engines have accumulated over 390,000 flying hours. Eurojet [MS Word] | Eurofighter.

1,000th EJ200

May 23/13: South Korea. EADS Cassidian reportedly announces that they would invest $2 billion in the K-FX fighter development project, and help market the plane internationally, if the Eurofighter is chosen for F-X-3. Investments would include a maintenance repair and overhaul (MRO) facility that could extend to the KF-X, and an aerospace software center.

It isn’t a bad idea for EADS. Barring multiple orders from new sources, it’s very unlikely that the Eurofighter will still be in production by 2022. Upgrades and maintenance will continue for some time, but the C-203 KF-X design could offer EADS a new option to sell, with a fundamental design that can improve toward stealth fighter status. The question is whether South Korea wants to go forward. Yonhap News.

April 5/13: South Korea. An un-named military official tells the government’s Yonhap News Agency that after 2 years of discussions and negotiations with DAPA, EADS has changed its industrial offer. Instead of having the first 10 made in Europe, the next 24 made using Korean components, and the last 26 assembled in Korea, EADS has offered to build just 12 in Europe, with the other 48 Tranche 3 planes at KAI in South Korea.

The news report is imprecise, leaving the question of structural manufacturing vs. kit assembly unaddressed. It also fails to address how EADS can promote the idea of 20,000 South Korean aerospace jobs for a 5-year period, when the company also says that building the Typhoon for the much larger orders of the core country participants created just 10,000 jobs in Europe. On its face, the statement seems less than plausible, but it does point to the likelihood of significant structural manufacturing in Korea. Yonhap.

April 4/13: South Korea. The ROKAF has picked Taurus’ KEPD 350 long range cruise missile for their future fighter force. They’ll have to pay extra to integrate it with their F-16s and F-15Ks. The proposed F-15SE Silent Eagle is different enough that it will probably require added testing, so Eurofighter may garner a slight advantage from German & Spanish plans to add the KEPD 350 to Eurofighter by 2015. Read “Korea’s F-X Multi-Role Fighter Buys: Phases 2 & 3” for full coverage.

March 26/13: Tranche 3. The Tranche 3 Instrumented Production Aircraft 8 test plane has joined all major structural pieces, and moves on to the next production station on the final assembly line in Manching. Work is now focused on hydraulics, defensive aids, test flight instrumentation, and electrical systems with over 110 km of complex special cabling.

IPA8 will play an important role testing and integrating new features like the AESA radar, new weapons, etc. EADS Cassidian.

March 13/13: Denmark. The Danes pick up their fighter competition as promised, following their announced hiatus in April 2010. Invited bidders include the same set of Lockheed Martin (F-35A), Boeing (Super Hornet), and Saab (JAS-39E/F) – plus EADS (Eurofighter), who had withdrawn from the Danish competition in 2007. The goal of a 2014 F-16 replacement decision has been moved a bit farther back, and now involves a recommendation by the end of 2014, and a selection by June 2015.

The Flyvevabnet are reported to have 30 operational F-16s, with 15 more in reserve, out of an original order of 58. Past statements indicate that they’re looking to buy around 25 fighters as replacements, but there are reports of a range from 24-32, depending on price. Danish Forsvarsministeriet [in Danish] | Eurofighter GmbH | Saab | JSF Nieuws.

Feb 21/13: Saudi Arabia. BAE’s end of year investor presentation [PDF] discusses changes in Saudi Arabia, including a contract amendment that formally abandons Saudi plans for a final assembly line in-country. That insistence had been holding up deliveries, and the remaining 48 aircraft will begin arriving in 2013. Meanwhile, work to “expand the multi-role capabilities” of Saudi Typhoons continues, as do negotiations to continue expanding those capabilities toward Tranche 3 levels.

Pricing remains an issue several years after the contract, and the next stage of support contracts is also in long negotiations:

“Under the Saudi British Defence Co-operation Programme (SBDCP), orders totalling £3.4bn were awarded for support through to 2016, including the provision of manpower, logistics and training to the RSAF…. The initial three-year Typhoon support contract finished at the end of June and two subsequent six-month extensions have been secured. Discussions continue with the customer on the next five years of support. Discussions on Typhoon price escalation with the Saudi Arabian government remain ongoing. Negotiations are also ongoing for the provision of maintenance and upgrade facilities in-Kingdom, and further capability enhancement of the aircraft.”

Feb 11/13: DACT distilled. A veteran Eurofighter test pilot doesn’t see the logic behind Lockheed Martin test pilot Bill Flynn’s recent claim that an F-35 will beat any 4+ generation aircraft, including the Eurofighter Typhoon:

“The F-35 thrust to weight ratio is way lower [than Eurofighter] and its energy-manoeuvrability diagrams match those of the F/A-18…. starting from medium altitude and above, there is no story with a similarly loaded Typhoon…. [F-35] Transonic acceleration is… better than in an F/A-18 or F-16, but mainly due to its low drag characteristics than to its powerplant. That means that immediately after the transonic regime, the F-35 would stop accelerating and struggle forever to reach a non operationally suitable Mach 1.6…. The Typhoon will continue to accelerate supersonic with an impressive steady pull, giving more range to its BVR (Beyond Visual Range) armament…. Angle-of-attack is remarkably high in the F-35, as it is for all the twin tailed aircraft, but of course it can not be exploited in the supersonic regime, where the limiting load factor is achieved at low values…. Excessive energy bleeding rates would operationally limit the F-35 well before its ultimate AoA is reached.”

Both Britain and Italy will eventually find out for sure, as they will soon have both types in service. Italy will be the best test, as its F-35As are more capable dogfighters than Britain’s F-35Bs. About 2 months earlier, the Aviationist had canvassed Italian pilots, who fly both the F-16 and the Eurofighter, for their opinion concerning those 2 platforms:

“During more or less a decade of service with the Italian Air Force, the F-16 has been extensively used to train Typhoon pilots in WVR engagements. According to the Italian pilots, the F-16 matches the F-2000 under 10,000 feet. But above FL100 the Typhoon becomes quite difficult to beat since its superior aerodynamics give the Eurofighter can out maneuver the Viper at every engagement.”

Sources: The Aviationist, “No way an F-35 will ever match a Typhoon fighter jet in aerial combat” Eurofighter test pilot says” | and “How does the F-16 perform against its adversaries in dogfight?”

vs. F-35 & F-16

2012

EUR 2 billion support deal; Oman buys 12; India loss. Eurofighter & Paveways
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Dec 21/12: Oman. It isn’t Christmas over there, but the RAFO is getting a present anyway. The Sultanate signs a GBP 2.5 billion (about $4.057 billion) deal with Britain for 12 Eurofighters, and 8 Hawk LIFT advanced trainers. This makes them the Eurofighter Typhoon’s 3rd export customer, a status they share with their neighbor Saudi Arabia. The deal includes in-service support, and deliveries are expected to begin in 2017.

See “Oman’s Air Force Upgrades: From Jaguars to F-16s & Eurofighters” for full coverage.

Oman buys 12

Dec 6/12: Weapons. 1st firing of MBDA’s Meteor long range air-air missile from a Eurofighter Typhoon. It’s part of Britain’s Future Enhancements Flight Test Programme, and builds on BAE’s unpowered trials to verify safe separation. The flight trials were conducted with integrated support from QinetiQ and MBDA. BAE | Eurofighter.

Nov 29/12: UK Updates. BAE Systems has finished upgrading 43 RAF Eurofighters under the Retrofit 2 program, which began as its own effort but was subsumed into the wider Typhoon Availability Service (TAS) contract. Their Tranche 1 Block 5 standard installs the PIRATE forward looking infra-red (FLIR) system, improves air-to-air capability; and adds precision strike by using a combination of Paveway II family laser-guided bombs, and RAFAEL’s LITENING-III surveillance and laser designator pod. Eurofighter GmbH.

Nov 6/12: UAE. British Prime Minister David Cameron issues a joint communique with the UAE. The 2 countries will improve their defense ties, with specific commitments that include:

“Deepen our defence ties by; continuing the development of our joint plans for the security of the UAE and wider Gulf region; increasing our joint exercises and training; and by investing in the British military presence in the UAE.

Establish a defence industrial partnership that involves close collaboration around Typhoon and a number of new technologies.”

The Eurofighter is competing with France’s Rafale for a 60-plane buy, and these sorts of agreements are normal under the circumstances. It’s also normal for specific defense deals to depend on the customer’s final choice, though the joint communique includes economic relations beyond defense. UK PM | Reuters.

Nov 6/12: Flight costs. From Britain’s House of Commons:

Mr Ellwood: To ask the Secretary of State for Defence what the average hourly cost was of flying the Typhoon fighter (a) with and (b) without fuel costs. [126215]

Mr Dunne [holding answer 1 November 2012]: The standard marginal flying hour cost for a Typhoon is £3,875, including the cost of fuel. Excluding fuel costs the figure reduces to approximately £2,670.”

Even GBP 3,875 (about $6,200) is considerably cheaper than published American fighter costs per flight hour. The comparable F-15 Eagle family is generally quoted as being in the $17,000 – $30,500 range. The difference has less to do with the respective machines, and more to do with differing approaches to calculating those costs, especially in one’s choice of what to include. A standard calculation method would be informative, but it doesn’t exist.

RAF flight costs

HEA
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Oct 16/12: HMD. Eurofighter GmbH touts the new “Head Equipment Assembly (HEA), developed by BAE Systems’ Electronic Systems, [which] comprises the aircrew helmet and all the sub-system elements needed to display a real world overlaid picture on the helmet visor.” The accompanying video has a Typhoon pilot explaining why this is so powerful, and expressing his belief that it’s impossible to beat an enemy if they have a system like this and you don’t. “Once you’ve had this helmet on, you don’t ever want to be without it.”

All well and good, but American fighters have had these capabilities for almost a decade now. A fact that they have used to their advantage in international competitions against the Typhoon, and against other fighters like the French Rafale that lack an accompanying HMD.

Why HMDs matter

July 2012: Japan. The Japanese Ministry of Defense releases its “Defense of Japan 2012” White Paper. Among other things, it explains exactly why the F-35 won. All 3 contenders fulfilled all mandatory requirements, but the F-35 was rated as the overall winner based on the 2nd stage evaluation of capability, industrial participation, cost, and support.

Part of the problem is that Japan simply accepted Lockheed Martin’s paper performance and cost promises at face value, in the absence of data. Even then, the Typhoon was seen as the most fuel-efficient plane, and its bid had the best industrial benefits for Japan. On the other hand, EADS and BAE had trouble meeting Japan’s purchase cost targets while giving Japanese firms all of that work, and picking EADS/BAE would have meant deviating from Japan’s strongly American industrial links and equipment infrastructure. The Eurofighter Typhoon also had a compatibility problem with the JASDF’s KC-767 aerial tankers, who don’t carry hose-and-drogue refueling pods. KC-767 retrofits would have been required, driving up the program’s expense. Read “Japan’s Next Fighters, From F-X Competition to F-35 Buys” for full coverage.

Luftwaffen
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July 30/12: Eurofighter vs. F-22. Combat Aircraft leaks some results from the 2012 Red Flag exercises. WIRED Danger Room:

“In mid-June… [8] Typhoons arrived at Eielson Air Force Base in Alaska for an American-led Red Flag exercise involving more than 100 aircraft from Germany, the U.S. Air Force and Army, NATO, Japan, Australia and Poland. Eight times during the two-week war game, individual German Typhoons flew against single F-22s… The results were a surprise to the Germans and presumably the Americans, too. “We were evenly matched,” Maj. Marc Gruene told Combat Aircraft’s Jamie Hunter. The key, Gruene said, is to get as close as possible to the F-22 … and stay there. “As soon as you get to the [close-in] merge … the Typhoon doesn’t necessarily have to fear the F-22,” Gruene said.”

That’s interesting, and an impressive testament to the Eurofighter’s design and ergonomics. On the other hand, let’s acknowledge that it isn’t exactly easy to “get to the merge” against an opponent who is invisible to your radar at range, moving up to 50% faster than you are, and able to see you just fine on their own radar.

vs. F-22

July 30/12: AESA. NETMA(NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency) has reportedly issued an RFP to Eurofighter GmbH for the development of an E-Scan Active Electronically Scanned Array Radar. Eurofighter CEO, Enzo Casolini says the 2015 target remains, per announcements in June 2011:

“The timescale is to answer the RFP by October this year and to have an agreement with the nations by the end of the year. The target is to have a contract by the middle of next year and to have an E-Scan entering into service by 2015.”

See: Arabian Aerospace.

July 11/12: Weapons. BAE describes cockpit assessment trials for the long-range Meteor air-to-air missile. They took pilots from “each of the Eurofighter nations,” and put them through a range of scenarios in a modified simulator. That led to a series of recommendations for the final cockpit design.

On the one hand, getting the user interface really right pays big dividends in combat. On the other hand, the fact they’re doing these exercises a good indication of how early they are in the process. It also points to how much more is involved in this sort of thing, beyond just hanging a new missile on a pylon. BAE Systems.

July 10/12: Gulf opportunities. Reports from Farnborough shed some light on potential Eurofighter Typhoon sales to Oman, Qatar, and the UAE.

Dassault has been sounding quite confident about the Rafale’s ultimate prospects in the UAE, but BAE Systems’ business development director Alan Garwood told Reuters that he believed the UAE’s interest is “real and genuine,” adding that they “could tell by the questions they were asking us that they were serious.” BAE is still working with the British government to put together a package for 60 planes. With the loss in India, and the near-certain demise of Tranche 3B, the UAE represents the fighter’s largest near-term opportunity. Oman is a higher-odds opportunity, and Garwood said that:

“We’ll start formal negotiations [for 12 jets] with Oman towards the end of August [2012] I would imagine. The two governments have targeted it for completion this year and we want it done this year as well… I see no reason why we shouldn’t be able to do that.”

With respect to Qatar, he would say only that: “We are talking to the Qataris quite a bit.” That’s normal in a competition like this, which is reported to include Boeing’s F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault’s Rafale, Lockheed’s F-35A Lightning II, and Saab’s JAS-39E/F Gripen. Reuters | WSJ’s The Source blog.

July 9/12: Upgrades at last? At the opening of the Farnborough defense exhibition, British Prime Minister David Cameron discusses the Eurofighter’s future:

“Typhoon’s growth potential is huge and the four partner nations, Italy, Germany, Spain and the UK have agreed the next steps required to further exploit this. The integration of the METEOR missile, an Electronically Scanned Radar, enhancements of the Defensive Aids System, further development of the air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities and integration of new weapons.”

With Tranche 3B fading away, and India out as a big export win, upgrades like these are the only way to keep part of the manufacturing base going for much longer, and are also its best hope for landing significant export orders. The question is when some of these upgrade “agreements” will become signed contracts with actual dollars behind them. Read “Eurofighter’s Upgrades: Enough? In Time?” for more.

March 30/12: “Contract 1”. Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH signs a major 5-year contract with NATO’s Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency (NETMA), to support the fleet of Typhoon jets across the 4 Eurofighter core nations: Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK. The overall contract total is not disclosed, but is estimated to be around EUR 2 billion (currently $2.66 billion).

BAE estimates its share of the total at GBP 446 million (about EUR 533 million). Finmeccanica estimates its share of the total at “more than EUR 500 million.” EADS declined to give figures.

“Contract 1” replaces previous Integrated Logistics Support (PC1-11) contracts and a number of sustainment contracts, covering items like day-to-day support, studies, and customer queries and investigations. It also includes continued development, testing, and upgrade work on the fighters’ systems. Replaced contracts will morph into Contract 1 over a period of time, but they will not include any of the major support contracts announced by various member countries in 2009. Eurofighter GmbH | BAE | Finmeccanica | Defense News.

“Contract 1” for support

March 30/12: #321. A Finmeccanica release notes that so far, the consortium has delivered 321 Eurofighter Typhoons to customer nations.

March 22/12: AESA – just a sim. EADS Cassidian touts the benefits of an “E-Scan” AESA radar for the Eurofighter, and touts its operation of the largest assembly line in Europe for the individual transmit/ receive modules that make up those radars.

The German BWB’s 2-year study, using IABG GmbH’s MILSIM (man-in-the-loop simulator), is nice enough. What it isn’t, is a development and production contract. American F-15 Strike Eagles, F-16s, and F/A-18E/F Super Hornets are offered with AESA radars right now. France’s Dassault just received the 1st RBE2-AA AESA radar for its Rafale production line. Saab is well underway developing its own ES-05 Raven AESA radar for the JAS-39E/F Gripen NG, which will join the Eurofighter’s notional AESA design in using a pivoting plate approach. They’re doing so in conjunction with Finmeccanica’s SELEX Galileo, the current leader of the Euroradar consortium. Unless the Eurofighter consortium and its governments get moving soon, their fighter will begin to find itself at a severe disadvantage in international competitions.

Jan 31/12: India loss. Dassault’s Rafale is picked as the “L-1” lowest bidder for India’s 126-aircraft M-MRCA deal, even after the complex life-cycle cost and industrial calculations are thrown in. Some reports place its cost as $5 million lower per plane. Next steps include the negotiation of a contract, in parallel with parliamentary approval and budgeting.

Until a contract is actually signed, however, India’s procurement history reminds us that even a “close” deal is just 1 step above a vague intention. The contract may take a while. Even the French government sees a deal as only an 80% probability within 6-9 months. The budgeting is likely to be even trickier. The IAF’s exclusion of cost considerations in picking its finalists means that the only question now is: how far over the stated budget will a full Rafale buy go? Some reports place the deal’s cost at around $15 billion – an increase of up to 50% from previous estimates. If economic downturns or squeezed defense budgets make those outlays a big enough issue, early enough in the process, it could have the effect of re-opening the competition. British PM David Cameron has expressed an intent to change India’s mind, and both Saab and Boeing are still positioned within India, in order to be ready for a renewed opportunity.

Eurofighter’s problem is that it’s hard to see how it might succeed in a competition that was re-opened for financial reasons. Dassault | President Sarkozy [in French] | Economic Times of India, see also their timeline | Indian Express | Rediff (thanks for using our descriptions, sans attribution) | Times of India || Aviation Week | BBC | UK’s The Guardian | Reuters report and expert roundup.

India loss

2011

HMD at last; Tranche 3 sub-system contracts; German cuts to 3B plans; Competitions in Bulgaria, India, Japan (loss), South Korea, UAE; Opportunities in Indonesia & Turkey?; AESA by 2015?; Paveway IV and EGBU-16 bomb tests; PILUM glide bomb; Naval Eurofighter; Negative British NAO report; 100,000 flying hours. Eurofighter over Dubai
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Dec 20/11: Japan loss. Japan’s Ministry of Defense announces that Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II has won the F-X competitive bid process for 42 planes, beating the Eurofighter and Boeing’s F/A-18 Super Hornet International. As F-4 replacements, the F-35As will have an air defense role, but Japan does have a large cadre of dedicated F-15Js to perform that mission. Conclusion? Their undeclared role is as strike fighters.

Note that there’s still an F-XX program in the future, aimed at replacing Japan’s F-15Js. Numbers as high as 100+ planes have been floated, but that will depend on both economic straits, and local geopolitical threats. Read “Japan’s Next Fighters, From F-X Competition to F-35 Buys” for full coverage.

Japan loss

Nov 16/11: UAE. The UAE is either engaged in the mother of all hardball negotiations, or the potential Rafale sale is crashing. Critical comments at the highest levels are accompanying the invite to Eurofighter, strengthening the belief that the Typhoon is more than just a stalking horse to lower the French bid.

The question is, how big is the opportunity? Reports have surfaced that the UAE may be about to cut its planned new jet order, regardless of its choice, and buy more of its unique F-16E/F Block 60s. Read “Derailed Denouement in Dubai: What’s Up With the UAE’s Fighter Deal?” for a snapshot.

Nov 13/11: UAE. Flight International reports that the UAE must have liked their October briefings re: Eurofighter’s capabilities, because they’ve asked Eurofighter GmbH for an RFP bid to replace their current fleet of Mirage 2000-9s. The UAE has been in negotiations to buy Rafale planes for several years now, but hasn’t been able to clinch a deal.

It’s hard to tell if the UAE is just looking to add pressure and get a better price from Dassault, or if their interest is serious. One sign that they might be serious is the fact that they’ve also received classified technical briefings regarding the F-15E Strike Eagle and F/A-18 Super Hornet, but haven’t asked for RFP bids from the Americans. Flight International believes that this may be a prelude to consideration of the stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle or F/A-18 Super Hornet International for the UAE’s planned 2018-2025 fighter modernization. The obvious 3rd contender there is Lockheed Martin’s F-35.

Nov 12/11: Eurofighter GmbH touts their Dubai flying display, complete with a graphic showing their impressive flight plan.

They also tout a range of technologies that they hadn’t advertised much before, including thrust-vectoring engine nozzles, an AESA radar, and MBDA’s Marte anti-ship missile. The release appears to blur the line between concepts/plans, and field-ready equipment.

Oct 21/11: Germany & Tranche 3B. Germany announces further defense cuts, which include a proviso that their Eurofighter orders will end at Tranche 3A, instead of adding another 37 planes in a Tranche 3B.

With Britain also saying that Tranche 3Ais the end, and the governments of Spain and Italy under severe financial strain, it appears less and less likely that there will be a Tranche 3B. The question is how to escape termination costs. Negotiations can be expected, but one option is to count future exports as re-sales of scheduled orders from existing partner countries. Aviation Week.

Aug 18/11: Sub-contractors. Finmeccanica’s SELEX Galileo contracts with BAE Systems Manufacturing at Hillend in Fife, in GBP 20+ million procurement and electronic manufacturing services contract related to Tranche 3A’s Captor radars. Work at the Hillend facility will run from 2011-2013.

BAE’s release adds that the facility has won over GBP 165 million in Captor and Typhoon DASS orders, over the last 12 years.

July 20/11: South Korea. As South Korea’s DAPA eases the criteria to try and foster more competition, DAPA’s Col. Wi Jong-seong says that “Russian aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi expressed its intent to compete in the fighter jet procurement project early this year.” The report quotes him as saying that Sukhoi’s T-50 PAK-FA will be up against Boeing’s stealth-enhanced F-15SE Silent Eagle, Lockheed Martin’s F-35 Lightning II, and the Eurofighter Typhoon. Assuming we don’t have an FX-II competition repeat, where all competitors but one drop out.

At this point, FX-III is being touted as a 60 jet buy of high-end fighters, with a budget of 8.29 trillion won ($7.86 billion). Eurofighter reportedly offered a better deal than the F-15K in F-X-2, but lost. The firm recently proposed to phase in Korean assembly for Phase III, with the 1st 10 made in Europe, the next 24 using Korean components, and the last 26 assembled in Korea. Korea Times.

June 27/11: Weapons. Diehl BGT and Israel’s RAFAEL unveil a new weapon for Eurofighter at the 2011 Paris Air Show. The PILUM long-range glide bomb concept has a range variously reported as 100-160 km/ 62 – 99.5 miles, but it’s a developmental weapon, so exact figures remain to be proven. PILUM uses RAFAEL Spice’s combination of GPS/INS and imaging infrared guidance, within Diehl’s HOSBO modular glide bomb system. HOSBO is a steamlined glide bomb that can carry a modular payload, including warheads of various sizes and types, even warheads designed to disrupt electronics. This JSOW Block III competitor will be able to attack defended targets, vehicles, ships, or even smaller targets. It will be integrated on Germany’s Tornado and Eurofighter aircraft. Will the Saudis, who fly both types, want any? Diehl BGT release | Jerusalem Post.

June 24/11: HMD. A Reuters report offers an update on progress with the Eurofighter’s BAE “Striker”/ HMSS helmet-mounted displays. HMDs are now considered a standard feature for fighter jets, as they’re required in order to take full advantage of new short range air-to-air missiles, and boost ground attack capabilities.

British RAF pilots tested the first helmets in summer 2010. So far, about 50 total helmets have been delivered to Italy, Germany, Spain and UK, at a delivery rate of about 8 per month, but none are being used over Libya. They’re expected to become operational in the RAF by the end of 2011.

June 22/11: AESA. After a year of preliminary industry funding, Eurofighter GmbH and Euroradar agree to continue development, and announce 2015 as the target date for entry into service of a Typhoon with the new “E-Scan” AESA radar. A later date wasn’t really feasible, given the delivery schedules involved in critical competitions like India’s M-MRCA. Indeed, even a 2015 date could be a disadvantage as the Eurofighter competes with France’s Rafale, which has begun testing its own RBE2-AA. The firm does say that:

“The new AESA array, larger than the ones available to our competitors thanks to the Typhoon’s voluminous radome, will be fitted on a repositioner that will provide a wider field of regard when compared to those installed or scheduled for introduction on other fighters. The new radar will offer customers the freedom to retrofit their existing Typhoons when required.”

E-Scan AESA date announced

June 20/11: Weapons. Eurofighter IPA1 has completed the first of a series of Meteor missile trials, beginning with safe separation across the flight envelope on the Aberporth range in Britain. Eurofighter GmbH.

May 17/11: Leadership. EADS Cassidian Spain has appointed 56 year old Luis Hernández Vozmediano as their new Head of the Eurofighter program. He has spent virtually his entire professional career at EADS, and has been heavily involved in Britain’s A330 Future Strategic Tanker Aircraft (FSTA), and the related American KC-X pursuit. Eurofighter GmbH.

May 11/11: Turkey. Eurofighter has courted Turkey for a long time, despite Turkey’s political & industrial commitment to the F-35 program. Hurriyet reports growing interest in a fighter split-buy, to reduce dependence on the USA.

Naturally, Italy’s government is pushing Turkey to solve that problem by joining the Eurofighter consortium. Turkey might also pick a hi-low approach, and join South Korea and Indonesia in KF-X instead. The real wild card? Turkey’s current account deficit is hitting levels that worry some observers. High levels have been predictors of Turkish economic crises in the past.

April 27/11: India. Fulfilling long-standing rumors that it had gained a leading position in India’s M-MRCA future fighter competition, Eurofighter is confirmed as one of 2 finalists, alongside Dassault’s Rafale. Read “India’s M-MRCA Fighter Competition” for full coverage.

April 2011: Weapons. EADS Cassidian Spain achieves the first 1,000 pound EGBU-16 Enhanced Paveway II precision guided munition release. The EGBU-16 is the selected dual mode bomb for Germany, Spain and Italy, whereas the locally-developed Paveway IV is the dual mode choice for the UK. Eurofighter GmbH.

March 7/11: Weapons. The first ever Eurofighter release of a Paveway IV dual guidance bomb takes place from development aircraft IPA6, in an hour long test flight over the Aberporth Range in Wales. BAE Systems | Eurofighter GmbH, incl photo.

March 10/11: Indonesia? The Times reports that more of Britain’s fighters could be leaving the force, if Indonesia’s interest in up to 24 Typhoons pans out. That could be politically challenging, though. Britain has led the way into attacks on Libya for bombing its civilians, but Indonesia has used its BAE Hawk light attack jets against its own insurgencies, and in East Timor. That triggered a defense export ban 12 years ago. Indonesia continues to operate a large fleet of Hawk jets, but it has since filled its high end air superiority slot with a handful of Sukhoi’s SU-27/30 Flanker family fighters – a cheaper choice with similar capabilities.

The UK MoD says it has “no current plans” to export Typhoons to Indonesia, but that means little to nothing when the statement is carefully parsed. If Indonesia really is interested in adding Typhoons, one option might be to re-export 24 RAF Tranche 1 aircraft that haven’t been given precision ground attack modifications. The Times [subscription-only] | Agence France Presse | The Guardian | UPI.

March 2/11: Britain’s reluctance to invest in additional Typhoon fighters is partly explained by the findings of an NAO report, which notes that:

“The cost of the Typhoon project has risen substantially. Despite the MOD’s now buying 72 fewer aircraft (down from 232 to 160, a reduction of 30 per cent), the forecast development and production cost has risen by 20 per cent to [GBP] 20.2 billion. This is a 75 per cent increase in the unit cost of each aircraft. The cost of supporting each aircraft has also risen by a third above that originally expected. The MOD now estimates that, by the time the aircraft leaves service, some [GBP] 37 billion will have been spent.”

There are concerns that the report might affect the jet’s chances in India. Meanwhile, a report in The Register highlights the importance of paying attention to Tranche buy totals, in an atmosphere of declining budgets. Note that the retirement of the RAF’s Tranche 1 jets will happen long before they reach their service life design limits, raising the possibility of resale:

“Probably the most dismal figure we are given is that the RAF will actually put into service just 107 Typhoons. At the moment it has received 70: the last of the 160 planes ordered by the UK will be delivered in 2015. But, we are told, “by 2019” all the Tranche 1 jets (which were still being delivered to the RAF at the start of 2008) will be “retired” – that is, thrown away. We’ll pay for 160 jets (actually we’ll pay for 232), but we’ll only ever get a fleet of 107.”

UK NAO report

March 2/11: During high level visits, British officials continue to press the case for the Eurofighter as Japan’s future F-X fighter, over offerings from Boeing (F/A-18E/F Super Hornet or F-15SE Silent Eagle) or Lockheed Martin (F-35A/B/C). One interesting wrinkle is that reconnaissance capabilities could become an important requirement, a move that would give the F-35 family an edge. BAE et. al. are fighting an uphill fight, but they’re not alone: in January 2011, the European Business Council in Japan launched a defense and security committee to promote defense-related business cooperation. Asahi Shimbun | Japan Times | L.A. Times.

Naval concept
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Feb 21/11: Aero India 2011 sees Eurofighter and BAE unveil an interesting wrinkle: an initial design for a navalized Eurofighter than can operate from aircraft carriers, based on an internally-funded set of studies and simulations. In a direct nod to potential Indian sales, they tout the plane as being able to take off from “ski jump” carriers without catapults – a design that describes all of India’s current and planned carriers, as well as the initial design for Britain’s own Queen Elizabeth Class.

Eurofighter GmbH describes the goal as 95% commonality with land-based aircraft, and required changes as “limited… include a new, stronger landing gear, a modified arrestor hook and localised strengthening on some fuselage sections near the landing gear, as well as updates the EJ200 engines,” which could include thrust-vectoring in flight.

India is currently planning to use MiG-29Ks as its naval fighters, but it’s currently the type’s only customer, and the Typhoon is seen as a leading contender in its M-MRCA competition for land based aircraft. Britain is planning to use the F-35C from its future carrier, but further cost increases or delays for the multinational program could open an opportunity for a jet type that the RAF already flies. Eurofighter GmbH.

Naval concept unveiled

Feb 4/11: Bulgaria RFI. Bulgaria issues another fighter replacement RFI, soliciting information from Boeing (F/A-18E/F), Dassault (Rafale, Mirage 2000), EADS (Eurofighter), Lockheed Martin (F-16), and Saab (JAS-39 Gripen) re: 8 new and/or second-hand fighter jets, to replace its existing fleet of 12 MiG-21s.

Bulgaria issued a similar RFI in 2006, for 20 jets, but the global economic crash, and Bulgaria’s own issues in trying to pay for past defense purchases, forced a hold. The Defense Ministry has taken pains to emphasize that this is just an exploratory request, and is not the start of a purchase tender. Nevertheless, November 2010 saw the formation of a National Steering Committee and an Integrated Project Team, to draft preliminary fighter replacement operational, technical, and tactical requirements. That followed October 2010 remarks by Bulgaria’s Defense Minister Anyu Angelov, who discussed spending BGN 1 billion (around $725 million) for the purchase of an uncertain number of new fighter jets to replace its MiG-21s, while modernizing its fleet of 16 MiG-29A air superiority jets. Sofia News Agency.

Feb 3/11: Upgrades. The first Spanish single-seat instrumented production aircraft version 4 (IPA4) completes 500 hours of flight at the EADS Cassidian Spain facility at Getafe, near Madrid. After a functional upgrade from its original Tranche 1 air superiority standard to Tranche 2, this aircraft is testing new technology including a Link-16 MIDS system, as well as integration trials and the launching of precision air-to-ground weapons.

The UK has already upgraded a number of its Eurofighters along similar lines, and added advanced LITENING targeting pods. Eurofighter GmbH believes that this Spanish IPA4 platform may serve as a model for the possible upgrade of the Tranche 1 fleets currently in service with Eurofighter customer nations. That’s the good news. The bad news is that an upgrade program of this type may also be seen as an alternative to ordering the final Tranche 3B set of Eurofighters. Eurofighter GmbH.

Jan 28/11: Sub-contractors. Premium AEROTEC’s Varel, Germany plant has successfully started assembling structural components for the Eurofighter. EADS Cassidian announces that Varel’s first 3/2b Eurofighter fuselage section, a 3m section that mates with the wings, has been delivered to the Augsburg plant, where the entire fuselage center section will be assembled.

Premium AEROTEC is a spin-off of the former Airbus sites in Nordenham and Varel and the former EADS site in Augsburg. It began operations on Jan 1/09, and in addition to various Airbus passenger aircraft components, it manufactures the fuselage center section for all Eurofighter aircraft, including the 4 program partners (United Kingdom, Spain, Italy and Germany) and export customers Austria and Saudi Arabia. This makes Premium AEROTEC GmbH, with over 6,000 employees and 2009 revenues of EUR 1.1 billion, the largest supplier of structures for the Eurofighter. The company has production plants in Augsburg, Bremen, Nordenham and Varel in Germany; and in Ghimbav, Brasov County, Romania. Premium AEROTEC | EADS Cassidian.

Jan 25/11: Eurofighter GmbH’s CEO sees 2011 as a pivotal year, in order to avoid the end of production in 2015. India’s M-MRCA competition, and hopes of a Tranche 3B from its consortium countries, are the key underpinnings.

Britain has been very clear that there will be no Tranche 3B buy there, and the austerity programs underway (voluntarily or otherwise) in Germany, Italy, and Spain make a Tranche 3B buy extremely unlikely.

100k milestone @ Moron
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Jan 25/11: Eurofighter GmbH announces that the multinational operational fleet of Eurofighter Typhoons in service since the second half of 2003 achieved 100,000 flying hours in January 2011.

As aircraft are delivered and air forces declared their Typhoons to be operational, usage has accelerated. The first 5,000 flying hours was achieved by November 2005, and 10,000 hours was reached in August 2006. May 2007 included the 20,000 hour milestone, and by August 2008 the Typhoon had surpassed 50,000 hours. According to the firm, global operational fleets currently have more than 260 aircraft in service, with 6 squadrons in the UK (4 in Coningsby, 1 in Leuchars and 1 in Mount Pleasant, Falkland Islands); 4 squadrons in Italy (2 in Grosseto and 2 in Gioia del Colle); 3 squadrons in Germany (Laage, Neuburg and Nörvenich), as well as 1 each in Spain, Austria and in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

At present, all 148 Tranche 1 aircraft have been delivered, and Tranche 2 production is in full swing.

100,000 fleet flight hours

Jan 4/11: HMD. BAE announces that its “Helmet Mounted Symbology System” (HMSS) is scheduled to enter service with the RAF in 2011, giving Britain’s Eurofighters the same helmet mounted sighting capability already enjoyed by pilots of competing aircraft, via systems like the Israeli/American JHMCS.

The HMSS does add some advanced wrinkles. A Eurofighter pilot can now look at multiple targets, lock-on to them, and prioritize them by voice-command. This will work even for targets over the shoulder, or targets picked up by the radar but located underneath the aircraft.

HMD at last

2009 – 2010

EUR 9 billion Tranche 3A deal; Tranche 3A sub-system contracts; Tranche 3B offer on table; Private work toward a “CAPTOR-E” AESA radar. CAPTOR-E
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Oct 5/10: Sub-contractors. Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Galileo announces a EUR 242 million (about $333.5 million) contract for 88 Captor-M mechanically scanned phased array radars, as part of the Eurofighter Typhoon Tranche 3A buy. Deliveries would begin in 2012.

The CAPTOR-M is the Eurofighter’ standard radar. Contracts are in progress to develop and field new CAPTOR-E Active Electronically Scanned Array radars for future buys or retrofits, vid. the July 20/10 entry. SELEX Galileo [PDF] | Defense News.

Sept 7/10: Sub-contractors. Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Galileo announces [PDF] a EUR 400 million sub-contract from BAE Systems, to supply Tranche 3A fighters with the Praetorian Defensive Aids Sub System (DASS), delivered to the same standard as the Tranche 2 fighters. SELEX Galileo leads the EuroDASS Consortium of Elettronica, Indra Sistemas, EADS and SELEX Galileo, which shares the production of more than 20 major Line Replaceable Items (LRIs) that make up the system. First deliveries are expected in mid-2012.

The Praetorian DASS includes Electronic Support Measures (ESM) to find hostile radars, active Electronic Counter Measures (ECM) to confuse them, and Missile Approach Warning (MAW) systems, tied into an array of defensive subsystems that include chaff, flares, and towed decoy options.

Aug 19/10: Sub-contractors. Northrop Grumman announces a contract from EADS Military Air Systems business unit to deliver 88 inertial measurement units (IMU) for Tranche 3A of the Eurofighter Typhoon. The IMU system is the sole sensor which measures the motion of the aircraft and continuously provides motion data to the flight control computer. In a secondary function, the IMU provides backup navigation data.

The IMUs, which provide motion data for the aircraft, will be built by the company’s German navigation systems subsidiary, Northrop Grumman LITEF, which also provided IMUs for Tranche 1 and Tranche 2 of the aircraft. More than 400 Northrop Grumman LITEF IMUs have been delivered and are already in service on Eurofighters in Germany, Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, Austria and Saudi Arabia

July 20/10: AESA. Eurofighter GmbH and Euroradar announce that they have begun full scale development of an Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar to serve in the Eurofighter, with a target in-service date of 2015. The Eurofighter/Euroradar groups have been conducting preliminary AESA development and flight testing since 2007, and Selex Galileo is already working towards integrating an AESA array with the UK’s Eurofighter (vid. Feb 19/10 entry).

Full-scale development of a CAPTOR AESA successor is a new step that could become a factor in Tranche 3B discussions, or later 3A upgrades. Still, SELEX Galileo CEO Steve Mogford says move represents a standalone offer, and is not linked to the proposed Tranche 3B production phase. The Euroradar consortium has reportedly proposed retaining as much “back-end” CAPTOR equipment as possible, as part of delivering the proposed E-Captor AESA system. The consortium also plans to make CAPTOR-E a mechanically scanned AESA radar, rather than mounting it in a fixed position as American fighters have done. This will expand the AESA radar’s slightly narrower cone, and also make it easier for the aircraft to use “launch and break away” tactics against aerial opponents that are beyond visual range. Eurofighter GmbH | Flight International | Microwave Journal.

June 9/10: Tranche 3B offer. At the ILA Air Show in Berlin, Germany, Reuters relays word from a Eurofighter GmbH spokesman that it has submitted a Tranche 3B offer to the partner nations for 124 more Eurofighters, finishing the planned Tranche 3. Defense industry sources at the Berlin Air Show said the offer was around EUR 10 billion.

To date, Britain, Germany, Italy and Spain have so far taken delivery of a combined 222 Eurofighter Typhoons, out of 473 ordered. Eurofighter says a production decision is needed within a year, in order to avoid the beginning of a supplier shutdown and a production gap. The member countries will face a choice between declining defense budgets, versus the likely need to pay some cancellation costs if there is no Tranche 3B.

Feb 19/10: Finmeccanica subsidiary SELEX Galileo announces [PDF] a GBP 19 million contract from Britain’s defense ministry to install a first of type, multi-function, wide field of regard AESA radar on a British Eurofighter as a technology demonstration program.

The AESA TDP will focus on Day/Night All Weather targeting, high resolution Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR), air to air targeting, and communications. It’s designed to raise the technology readiness levels of the enabling hardware, de-risk the capability and demonstrate maturity of concept. Following ground and antenna range testing, the radar is planned to fly on a Royal Air Force Typhoon around 2013.

Future weapons array?
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July 31/09: NETMA (NATO Eurofighter and Tornado Management Agency), Eurofighter Jagdflugzeug GmbH and EUROJET Turbo GmbH signed the Tranche 3A contract, a EUR 9 billion (about $12.96 billion) order for 112 aircraft and 241 EJ200 engines (224 engines to equip 112 planes, plus 17 spares). This new contract also sets the baseline for subsequent support contracts.

BAE cites a work value of GBP 2 billion (EUR 2.35 billion), Finmeccanica cites EUR 3 billion worth of work from Tranche 3A, divided between subsidiaries in Italy (EUR 1.6 billion) and the UK (EUR 1.4 billion). Rolls Royce values its 37% share in the EUROJET order at GBP 300 million (EUR 352 million). The EJ200 includes advanced integrated Health Monitoring, and is already supported by availability-based contracting terms. Eurofighter GmbH | UK MoD | BAE Systems | EADS | Finmeccanica | Rolls Royce | BBC | Deutsche Welle | Financial Times | Hamburg Local | Reuters says last buy for Britain | London Telegraph | Times Online | UPI Asia.

Tranche 3A

Additional Readings

Readers with corrections or information to contribute are encouraged to contact editor Joe Katzman. We understand the industry – you will only be publicly recognized if you tell us that it’s OK to do so.

• Eurofighter GmbH. Official site.

• Eurojet Turbo GmbH.

• SELEX Galileo – CAPTOR-M radar [PDF].

• Eurofighter GmbH – Eurofighter Typhoon Helmet. Includes Quicktime video.

Official Reports

• German Bundesrechnunghof (April 30/14) – Press release [in German] | Eurofighter summary, incl. link to full report: 2013 Bemerkungen – Weitere Prufungsergebnisse – Nr. 09 “Kostentransparenz beim EUROFIGHTER herstellen [in German] | Full Report: Langfassung der Bemerkung Nr. 09 [PDF, in German].

• UK National Audit Office (March 2/11) – Management of the Typhoon Project. See also The Register.

News & Views

• The Aviationist (Feb 11/13) – No way an F-35 will ever match a Typhoon fighter jet in aerial combat.

• The Aviationist (Dec 10/12) – How does the F-16 perform against its adversaries in dogfight? “….above FL100 the Typhoon becomes quite difficult to beat since its superior aerodynamics give the Eurofighter can out maneuver the Viper at every engagement.”

• Smithsonian Air & Space (May 21/12) – Under the Eurofighter’s Hood: Europe’s frontline fighter is a marvel of technology.

• Aviation Week Ares (March 1/10) – JSF – Mid Year Check. Includes a detailed anecdote covering serious aerodynamic issues with the Typhoon, which delayed its entry into service until 2005, when its automatic low-speed recovery system was qualified.

• Defense et Securite Internationale (May 2006) – Rafale et Typhoon: Les Europeens auraient-ils tort d’avoir… raison? [PDF, in French].

Other Eurofighter Contracts

• DID – The 2006 Saudi Shopping Spree: Eurofighter Flies Off With Saudi Contract.

• DID – Eurofighter’s Rough Ride in Austria.

• DID – UK’s Eurofighters Fly To Availability-Based Contracting .

• DID – Spain’s Moron Maintenance: EUR 150M to EADS for Typhoons.

• DID – Eurofighter GmbH Signs EUR 600M+, 5-year Support Contract for Italy.

• DID – BAE Wins Big PBL Support Contracts for European & Saudi Eurofighters.

• DID (July 5/05) – $1.5B for Eurofighter Electronic Warfare Suite. Part of Tranche 2 production.

tag: typhoonfocus, eurofighterfocus

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