No doubt that the recent NATO Summit in Warsaw was partly overshadowed by the uncertainty of the historic Brexit vote. During the week in the lead up to the Summit the political discourse landmark transatlantic arena was much more focused on what a Brexit would mean for Europe than on NATO’s future. Nevertheless the Summit delivered important if not milestone results for NATO.
The decisions for a new persistent rotational presence of Western European and American military units in Poland and the Baltics is a major achievement for Eastern European members threatened by a re-emergent Russia. Although the size and capabilities of the deployed forces, altogether about 4000 troops, are largely symbolic in light of Russia’s overwhelming military advantage in the region, however, the persistent presence of other NATO troops in the region obviously has a significant political value in terms of demonstrating Alliance solidarity. As for the grounding of the decision, it is telling that Germany, long known to be the most reluctant member to take any military steps which might antagonize relationship with Russia, felt obliged to be one of the framework nations of the units first to be deployed in the East. Nevertheless, keeping NATO’s relations with Russia on dual tracks, adding the possibility of dialogue next to deterrence is essential for European security. The first NATO-Russia Council meeting held just days after the Summit was an important first step in this direction.
The decisions pointing to greater NATO involvement in tackling soft security challenges, including terrorism and illegal migration - stemming from the Southern flank are also significant. The relevant activities and missions, especially NATO’s maritime mission in the Aegean Sea in tackling human trafficking could be highly visible examples of the value of NATO towards the citizens of the member states, who are increasingly concerned of the security threats related to uncontrolled migration and terrorist networks with ties to the Middle East. Of course close partnership with the EU in this as well as in other security domains are critical. One can hope that the new arrangements signed between the two Brussels based organizations will prove to bring valuable practical benefits for the member states, and long standing political obstacles will not shallow out the agreement.
Nevertheless, the possible effects of Brexit looms over all the above mentioned issues. As the UK is set to lose its place in the EU’s CSDP, there will be high ambitions in London to remain a leading actor in the European security arena through NATO. Hence we can expect robust commitments towards Allied operations in and outside of Europe, including streaming UK capacities towards NATO previously tied down in CSDP activities. NATO will remain the most important organization through which the UK will be able to institutionally influence political and strategic developments in Europe. One must note that the Brexit did not alter the age old British strategic objective of fostering a balance of power in continental Europe, that is restraining Germany’s power. However, the possible negative economic effects of the Brexit will likely not evade London’s defense budget, which will obviously put a restraint the UK’s ability to invest robustly in defense. Furthermore, the possible brake up of the UK if Scotland or Northern Ireland succeeds would be a significant blow to Britain’s status as a considerable European power.
Brexit has created new conditions for the EU and its common security and defense policy. With the UK leaving the EU CSDP has lost its most potent military power. As a result CSDP will likely focus even more on low end crisis management operations, not as if during the past ten years there would have been robust EU military missions. But the UK’s departure will further weaken Europe’s potential to be a global actor, whether we speak of actual military capabilities or strategic ambitions. With France alone in the EU with a global strategic outlook but with increasing economic and social challenges, Germany’s influence will grow on the future shape of CSDP as well. This would probably mean a more risk averse approach towards possible crisis management operations and a softer approach towards Russia by the EU. Nevertheless, the chances of greater integration within European security and defense have also grown with the UK exit. However, deeper security and defense cooperation are closely tied with the question of the whole future direction of the European Union, which is rather uncertain at the moment.
A sudden disorderly disintegration of the EU could be fatal for NATO as well. The total loss of solidarity and the will to compromise between EU member states would surely spill over on to the security and defense realm. However, this does not mean that further integration is the only viable path, as the democratic will of the vast majority of European citizens cannot be overlooked. It’s not the question of more or less integration as some European leaders have already suggested but where and how – and even more importantly, with what kind of policy objectives. NATO will only have a strong and capable CSDP by its side if the EU has the firm support of its citizens.
Language Undefined Tag: NATOVarga GergelyCSDPUKBREXITThe European Defence Agency (EDA) and the European Union Satellite Centre (SATCEN) today formalized their close and fruitful cooperation, already in place since 2004, with an exchange of letters between Jorge Domecq (EDA Chief Executive) and Pascal Legai (SATCEN Director) at the EDA premises in Brussels.
Both organisations perform complementary roles and activities in the space-based earth observation domain and more generally in the space and security sector. Whereas the EDA’s work is focused on the harmonisation of requirements and the promotion of appropriate schemes for future capability development, SATCEN’s activity supports the decision making and actions of the EU by providing products and services resulting from the exploitation of space assets in particular in the CSDP field.
Since 2004, EDA and SATCEN have collaborated on projects as important as GISMO (Geospatial Information to Support Decision Making in Operations) and GISMO 2, SULTAN (Persistent Surveillance Long Term Analysis) and REACT.
With today’s exchange of letters, the EDA and SATCEN establish a more structured cooperation meaning that they will even more focus on activities of mutual interest, such as studies, workshops, projects and programmes. The new enhanced relationship will also see the nomination of Points of Contact on both sides to facilitate communication and cooperation.
Jorge Domecq, the EDA Chief Executive, hailed the exchange of letters as an important step and said he was “confident that, through our cooperation, EDA and SATCEN can bring a significant added value to their respective Member States by reducing administrative burden, facilitating common action where possible, supporting better planning, as well as contributing to the best use of our respective resources”.
Specific cooperation areas and joint roadmap
EDA and SATCEN have also identified specific cooperation areas such as imagery exploitation, geospatial analysis and applications, future space-based earth observation systems, cyber defence, Big Data exploitation in the space and security domain, space situational awareness or maritime surveillance. The two Agencies will also develop a joint roadmap for cooperation detailing the activities of common interest as included in the respective work programmes (3-year Planning Framework for EDA and annual Working Programme for SATCEN). The roadmap will be updated annually.
Background
The European Union Satellite Centre, which is based in Torrejón de Ardoz (Spain), was established by the Joint Action 2001/555/CFS on the establishment of a European Union Satellite Centre repealed by Council Decision 2014/401/CFSP of 26 June 2014. The Centre supports the decision making and actions of the Union in the field of the CFSP and in particular the CSDP, including European Union crisis management missions and operations, by providing products and services resulting from the exploitation of relevant space assets and collateral data, including satellite and aerial imagery, and related services.
More information:
will take place on Monday 5 September, 15:00-18:30 in room Paul-Henri Spaak 5B001 in Brussels.
NATO Summit in Warsaw- outcome and main decisions
On 5 September, the Subcommittee will exchange views on the outcome and main decisions of the NATO Summit in Warsaw with representatives from NATO and the EEAS.
The Alliance is faced with an evolving complex threat environment. NATO and its Members States rely on strong and resilient cyber defences to fulfil the Alliance's core tasks of collective defence, crisis management and cooperative security.
NATO needs to be prepared to defend its networks and operations against the growing sophistication of the cyber threats and attacks it faces. NATO Summit in Warsaw is expected to recognise cyberspace as an operational domain, in addition to air, land and sea. Treating cyberspace as an operational domain will enable the Alliance to better protect its missions and operations, with more focus on training and military planning.
I was on the Blog Talk Radio show Midrats today, talking about the Russian Navy, the coup in Turkey, Russian relations with China, and the like. The recording is now available on the show’s website. The show description is as follows:
Episode 341: Russia in 2016 with Dr. Dmitry GorenburgFrom the sacking of the Baltic Fleet leadership, fighting in Syria, to developments from Central Asia to the Pacific – Russia in 2016 is on the move.
Today (16 July 2016), the EU training mission of the Central African Army (EUTM RCA) was launched, with a two-year mandate.
The mission is to provide advice and training but also to bring its military expertise to the EU Delegation, in particular to set up more general projects. Its role is defined according to three priorities:
1.) strategic advice to the Ministry of Defense, military personnel and the armed forces of the CAR;
2.) Lessons for FACA officers and non-commissioned officers and FACA training.
3.) It also brings "expertise in the military field, in the field of security and the rule of law" to the EU delegation in the Central African Republic "within the limits of its means and capabilities".