Defence`s Feeds

Boxer MRAV
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Wheeled armored vehicles have become much more common, but the Dutch-German Boxer stands out from the crowd. Its English acronym is “Multi Role Armoured Vehicle” (MRAV), but rather than being a family of different vehicles, the Boxer will use a single chassis, with snap-in modules for different purposes from infantry carrier to command, cargo, ambulance, etc.

The base vehicle has a maximum road speed of 100 km/h (60 mp/h) and an operational range of 1,000 km (600 miles). In its troop carrying configuration, it has a crew of 2 and can carry 10 fully equipped troops. The MRAV is fighting for space in a crowded market, but its principal countries are beginning to give it the front-line credibility it needs to succeed.

Boxer MRAV: The Vehicle Boxer modular concept
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The base 8×8 vehicle provides a load capacity to 8 tonnes (9 tons) and has an internal capacity of more than 14 square meters. The Mission modules fit into the base vehicle’s steel shell, incorporating a primary safety cell with a triple floor and shaped sides to deflect mine blasts. Ceramic modular armor is sandwiched between the vehicle cell and the steel coat, and all three elements are secured by fastening bolts. The shaped sides of the modules also work to deflect mine blasts away from the soldiers inside, while a double-lined hull soaks up critical blast deformation.

The exact maximum weight of a Boxer MRAV depends on the version, and on its add-on armor package. The base is currently about 30 tonnes (33 tons), but its current design allows it to grow to 36 tonnes (39.6 tons) without any additional modification to the drive line. The vehicle and modules are air transportable in an A400M or larger aircraft, and modules are interchangeable in less than one hour.

Boxer MRAV: The Program CV90-35 MkIII
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In mid-2006 the Netherlands decided to remain in the ARTEC consortium’s joint Boxer MRAV modular armored personnel carrier project with Germany. Despite earlier reservations, Dutch secretary of Defense Cees van der Knaap declared to the 2nd Chamber that the country wanted to continue with the project. By June 28th, 2006, a release noted that the Chamber had given the green light; the APC’s price has apparently been reduced to an acceptable level following negotiations with Stork. A formal contract worth up to EUR 1.2 billion (about $1.6 billion) was finally signed in December 2006, clearing the way for both Dutch & German vehicle production.

The Royal Netherlands Army is purchasing 200 Boxer vehicles for transport, engineering, command, and transportation of wounded, replacing some of their YP-408s and all of their M577s (command post version of the M113). The 200 Boxer MRAVs will be delivered in 5 versions – 58 ambulances, 55 Command Post variants, 41 engineer group (pioneer) vehicles, 27 cargo vehicles, and 19 cargo/command-and-control vehicles to replace the current YPR 765 tracked vehicles. Note that this figure is down from initial estimates of 384 vehicles.

In addition to the Boxers, the Dutch Army will also be operating BAE Hagglunds’ CV90-35 MkIIIs as Infantry Fighting Vehicles.

Land trials, with RWS
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Under current plans, Jane’s revised reports indicate that the German Army is due to take delivery of 272 Boxer vehicles in 3 baseline versions: 135 armored personnel carriers (APCs), 65 command post (CP) variants, and 72 heavy armored ambulances. The Boxers will replace some Fuchs 6 x 6 and tracked M113-series APCs currently in service; like the Dutch Boxers, they will fill a middle weight armor role alongside heavier tracked Infantry Fighting Vehicles – in this case, the new KMW/Rheinmetall Puma.

The Boxer program is being managed by the European OCCAR (Organisation for Joint Armament Cooperation) Armaments Agency. Britain was initially part of the MRAV consortium as well, but left in 2003 to pursue its own future armored vehicles project called FRES. The industrial contractor is ARTEC GmbH – acting on behalf of the consortium formed by Kraus-Maffei Wegmann (36%), Rheinmetall Landsysteme (14%) and Stork PWV (50%).

Manufacturing of the vehicles will take place in both countries. Amsterdam-based Stork PWV is the national prime contractor and system integrator for the Dutch Boxer vehicles. As a partner, Stork Special Products is also responsible for assembling of the power pack consisting of a MTU engine, angular gear, transmission, cooling block and over 1,200 minor parts in total. They’re also developing the Environmental Control System, an air-conditioning system with integrated NBC(nuclear, biological, chemical) protection.

Contracts and Key Events MRAV Ambulance
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August 24/16: Lithuania’s Ministry of Defense continues with the modernization of their land forces after awarding a $435.1 million contract to the German-Dutch Artec consortium for the provision of 8×8 Boxer infantry fighting vehicles (IFVs). The group, a cooperation between Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles will deliver the vehicles equipped with Israeli-made turrets and armed with 30 mm cannons and Spike LR anti-tank missiles. This follows a bilateral cooperation between Lithuania and the Dutch government, who are currently in the process of transferring second hand Army land vehicles east to boost Lithuanian military capabilities.

June 25/14: Dutch delivery. Formal delivery of the 1st Dutch Boxer to the 13th NL Brigade’s medical company. The Director of the NL Defence Materiel Organisation symbolically delivers the vehicle by handing over a wrench that serves as an emergency opener for the rear door. Sources: OCCAR, “Formal handover of first Netherlands BOXER vehicle to the customer”.

April 7/14: Update. OCCAR-EA’s BOXER Programme Manager has approved delivery of the first Dutch Boxer, an ambulance variant. The NL AMB BOXER vehicle is the first BOXER vehicle built at the new Rheinmetall MAN Military Vehicles – NL facilities in Ede, The Netherlands. The schedule foresees that the last of the 52 NL AMB will be delivered in January 2015, to be followed with the next NL BOXER vehicle types: Command Post (CP), Engineers Group (GNGP) and Cargo (CAR). The Dutch are getting 8 Driver Training Vehicles (DTV), and 192 Boxer variants for delivery by the end of 2017.

Germany has already received 225 vehicles, built by KMW in Munich and by Rheinmetall in Kassel, leaving just 47 left to be delivered to Germany before the end of 2016. Sources: OCCAR, “Start of The Netherlands’ Ambulance BOXER delivery”.

May 2012: LANCE. Rheinmetall announces that a concept study equipping the Boxer with Rheinmetall’s LANCE medium caliber turret has finished trials at their test center in Unterluss. The firm worked with RMMV Kassel, RLS Augsburg and RLS Kiel, to combine the LANCE turret system with a Boxer module, and modify the mission module.

Jan 24/12: The German Bundeswehr produces a video about the Boxer’s combat deployment in Afghanistan. Deployment is going well, but they may want more storage space. That’s always an interesting challenge with APCs. The Boxer CP variant is set to arrive in theater in February 2012. German Bundeswehr [in German] | Aviation Week.

July 22/11: German Boxer A1 MRAVs ship out to Afghanistan, aboard chartered AN-124 aircraft.

A1 is a modification set designed for ISAF operations in Afghanistan. It includes extra armor, raising the FLW-200 remote weapon station 30 cm/ 1 foot to give it better coverage high and low, and an appropriate camouflage pattern for the ISAF region. FuInfoSys networking between the Boxer and the infantry group equipped with the IdZ-21 Future Soldier system is standard. KMW.

March 3/11: Germany readies to deploy the Boxer. Its driver training school in Dornstadt received 7 Driver Training Vehicles (DTV) in 2010. In February 2011, another 8 Boxer APCs were delivered to 292 Jaegerbattalion in Donaueschingen, in preparation for the vehicle’s deployment to Afghanistan with this unit in August 2011. OCCAR | German Army [in German].

Oct 7/10: BAE Systems announces a $3.6 million contract from Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) to manufacture and deliver SCHROTH brand 4-point harness safety restraint with integrated airbag systems, to equip for 125 German Boxer vehicles. BAE will produce 7 restraint systems per vehicle (875 total), along with replacement parts. As part of the agreement, SCHROTH engineers have also developed a special, self-administered diagnostic tool for soldiers to verify that the systems are in working order. Deliveries of the new restraint system are expected to be completed in 2014.

Airbags to protect passengers are nothing new in civilian vehicles, but they’re still rare in combat vehicles. In the event of a crash, sensors on the SCHROTH harness measure the resulting acceleration, and send signals to gas generators whose micro pyrotechnical charges deploy the airbags in a fraction of a second.

April 27/10: A brief to the Dutch Parliament says that Boxer MRAV “Drive Module” (main body) qualification will not be done by the end of 2010, as scheduled. The vehicle did not fully meet contracted standards, and Germany’s intent to use Boxers in Afghanistan in 2010 has had effects of its own.

An agreement was reached with Germany for post-delivery qualifications in 2010, during so-called “Reliability Batch Trials,” with any changes Germany requires made at the manufacturer’s expense. Agreements were also made concerning post-qualification of some Drive Module sub-components, and alteration of the Logistic Qualification Course.

In contrast, the Dutch absolutely require pre-qualification before they’ll accept delivery. That means delays for series production of Dutch vehicles, and to the future Cargo, Ambulance and Command versions. Extra budget is also being requested to modify the Dutch C2-LAN system to a full C4I system. Kamenbrief [in Dutch]

Feb 8/10: KMW subsidiary Dutch Defense Vehicle Systems (DDVS) opens a new production facility in Helmond, near Eindhoven, NL. The facility will produce all hulls and several mission modules for the German-Dutch Boxer vehicle program, which currently stands at a total of 472 vehicles. Helmond will also be the site for logistics and maintenance service to the Dutch fleet of Fennek reconnaissance vehicles. KMW release [PDF]

Sept 23/09: At a ceremony in Munich, Rheinmetall Defence and Krauss-Maffei Wegmann (KMW) transfer the first serially produced Boxer to the Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en matière d’Armement (OCCAR), which is administering the Boxer project, and Germany’s Federal Agency for Defence Technology and Procurement (BWB). Rheinmetall | KMW [PDF format].

May 8/08: ARTEC’s Boxer MRAV made a dramatic comeback to reach the finals, but lost to General Dynamics MOWAG’s Piranha-V in Britain’s FRES-Utility competition. | UK MoD release | General Dynamics UK release.

June 14/07: Stung by criticism that the MoD has wasted years in order to select off-the-shelf vehicles that may not be survivable enough, Minister for Defence Equipment and Support Lord Drayson fires back in a public forum:

“Yes, the Boxer was a programme the MoD pulled out of when it was known as the MRAV programme. We took that decision in 2002 in light of the requirement at the time. We have since reviewed the FRES requirement in light of recent operational experience in Iraq and Afghanistan. Force protection in theatre now has a higher priority than strategic deployability – I don’t think anyone would argue with that view. When the situation changes our procurement process must be capable of responding to that change… I’m not going to go into the details of the protection FRES will have in a public forum… But to suggest that we are ignoring the threats we face in Iraq and Afghanistan today when we set the requirement for our future vehicles is wrong. And the idea that taking into account the full range of threats FRES will be less well protected than the patrol vehicles you list (such as the Mastiff) is also wrong. Finally, let’s all be clear that FRES is neither a protected patrol vehicle nor a replacement for Warrior…”

Given Canada’s poor experiences with wheeled vehicles in Afghanistan, and the Stryker’s emerging difficulties against new IED land mines in Iraq, this may become a recurring subject.

June 8/07: Britain’s MoD announces the FRES finalists. Surprisingly, the SEP vehicles don’t make that list, nor do other test platforms. All of the finalists are wheeled: General Dynamics MOWAG’s Piranha IV, Nexter (formerly Giat’s) VBCI – and the KMW-ARTEC Boxer, which Britain pulled out of several years ago in order to pursue FRES.

The vehicles will go on to the “trials of truth,” and the MoD says the outcome of the trials will be announced by the end of November 2007. At that point, “one or more utility vehicle designs will go forward for detailed assessment.” UK MoD release | Nexter release | KMW release.

May 23/07: Jane’s Defence Weekly reports that ARTEC expects to deliver the first Boxer 8 x 8 MRAV to the German Army on schedule in late 2009, with deliveries to the Royal Netherlands Army following in 2011.

Dec 19/06: At Bernardkazerne in Amersfoort, the Netherlands, a contract is signed for series deliveries of the Boxer Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle to the Netherlands and German armed forces. The series production contract covers up to 272 vehicles for Germany and the 200 vehicles for the Netherlands, with a total value of EUR 1.2 billion (about $1.58 billion), of which Stork will receive EUR 500 million (about $660 million) from 2008 – 2016. Up to 70% of Stork’s turnover will be subcontracted. Deliveries of the vehicles will start in 2009 and extend for seven years.

The contract for Stork encompasses a continued design for 2 new Boxer versions, the series production of 200 Boxer vehicles in 5 versions and an initial in-service support package. The Netherlands army will use the Boxer in 5 different versions: an ambulance vehicle, command post, engineer vehicle, and two types of cargo vehicles. See Stork release.

Dec 13/06: The Budget Committee of the German Bundestag approves MRAV acquisition. Formal signing of an OCCAR acquisition contract by representatives of Germany and the Netherlands is expected to take place on December 19, 2006. The order will reportedly encompass 400 vehicles, 200 of which are earmarked for the German Bundeswehr. Under this contract, the Germans would also have an option for a further 72 units configured as field ambulances. See Rheinmetall release, also KMW release in German.

Oct 13/06: The Dutch Ministerie Van Defensie issues a release noting that the Council of Ministers has approved the purchase of 200 Boxer APCs for the Dutch Army; the final decision now moves on to Parliament (and see Oct 10/06 entry below). The first Boxer MRAVs will enter service in 2011, and deliveries will be complete in 2016. Defense Aerospace’s translation adds some additional information that doesn’t appear to be in the Dutch release, noting that:

“On the basis of information supplied by industry, the operating cost of the Boxer for 200 vehicles over a life span of 30 years was initially estimated at approx. 1,125 million euros (excl VAT). More recent estimates have allowed the Ministry of Defence to reduce the projected life-time operating cost to 938 million euros (excl VAT), based on the best available data.”

In approximate US dollars, the range would be $1.176 billion – $1.41 billion, or about $5.88 – $7.05 million per vehicle over a 30-year operating period.

Oct 10/06: Jane’s International Defence Review reports that The Netherlands national elections scheduled for November 22, 2006 could lead to changes on the defense front. “With the electorate more or less split down the middle, a change of government from the current centre-right coalition to a new centre-left or even 100 per cent-left coalition is not impossible.” Such shifts would have implications for programs like the Boxer MRAV. As it happens, the Dutch elections produced losses for all major parties and left Parliament in a similar balance.

Additional Readings & Sources

• ARTEC Boxer official site

• Stork NV – Boxer. The subsidiary tasked with production is Stork PWV, who has this Boxer page, and also the Stork Special Products page that includes details re: some of Stork’s sub-projects within the program.

• KMW – Boxer Wheeled Vehicle

• Rheinmetall Defence – Boxer

• Army Technology – Boxer MRAV Wheeled Multi-Role Armoured Vehicle, Europe

• Ministerie van Defensie (June 28/06) – Kamer Steunt Voortgang Boxer

• Janes (May 22/06) – Revised bid aims to put Boxer back in the ring

• Ministerie van Defensie (June 21/06) – Nederland Gaat Door Met Boxer Pantservoertuig

• Janes (Oct 3/05) – Boxer misses key pricing deadline

Indian and French authorities will launch an investigation into the reported leak of documents related to Scorpene submarines.

North Korea (DPRK) has reportedly fired a KN-11 ballistic missile from a submarine towards Japan.

Huntington Ingalls Industries' (HII) Newport News Shipbuilding has been contracted by the US Navy to conduct nuclear propulsion and complex modernisation work on the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier, USS Harry S Truman (CVN 75).

Norway has published the first comprehensive evaluation of one country’s contribution to the international intervention in Afghanistan. The evaluation was conducted by a government-appointed commission led by Bjørn Tore Godal, a former foreign and defence minister. However, most commissioners were independent researchers. The ‘Godal report’, as it has become known, is a candid and sharp assessment, says AAN advisory board member Ann Wilkens. It finds that only the domestic goal of the mission, to prove Norway a trustworthy US and NATO ally, was fully achieved. It was far less successful in its ‘Afghan’ goals – preventing Afghanistan from lapsing back into being a haven of international terrorism and contributing to state-building. The report includes the first, comprehensive account of Norway’s early talking to the Taleban and its role in peace diplomacy, as well as important insights into applying the Laws of War.

At the time of writing, the report, “A Good Ally, Norway in Afghanistan 2001-2014”, was not yet available in English (an official translation is under way). All page numbers in the text refer to the Norwegian document and all quotes have been translated by the author. The full report in Norwegian can be found here: 

A summary in English is available here.

Goals and costs

The Godal report, published in June 2016 evaluating the diplomatic, military and aid-related aspects of Norway’s mission, is an official government document. It is long (over 200 pages), but written in clear and accessible language and richly illustrated with graphs, timelines and photos. It starts with a summary, and already in its second paragraph it delivers a devastating conclusion: “On the whole, Norway has not made a great difference.” (p 9)

The Norwegian intervention was guided by three overarching objectives. Of the three goals, the commission deems the wish to be recognised as a trustworthy supporter of the USA and a good NATO ally to have been the most important one – and the only one to have been fully achieved. The second goal of preventing Afghanistan from relapsing into a haven for international terrorism is found to have been only partially reached, and the third goal – to contribute to state-building in Afghanistan – the commission deems not to have been achieved. In practice, this third goal referred mainly to the Norwegian contribution through a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Faryab, which turned out to be a much more extensive and complicated engagement than originally envisaged.

One explanation offered for this limited outcome is the “partly conflicting goals” of the intervention: military considerations had a decisive influence on state-building and development assistance, with a preference for short-term security objectives, which benefitted local power structures connected with abuse and corruption. The report also points out that the prolonged, international military presence contributed to a feeling among parts of the Afghan population that they were under occupation, which strengthened groups that the military intervention was meant to combat. (p 10)

While the results were meagre, the cost has been high. First of all for the Afghan people – the total number of Afghans killed during the intervention is estimated at “maybe over 90 000” – but also for Norway, with 10 soldiers killed and many more seriously injured. In financial terms, the Norwegian expenditure is estimated at around 20 billion Norwegian crowns (approximately 2.4 billion USD), corresponding to 0.26 per cent of the total international military expenditure and 2.3 per cent of the total international civilian expenditure in Afghanistan. (p 10) As these figures indicate, Norway was a small actor on the ground in Afghanistan – but in Norway, with a little over 5 million inhabitants, the intervention in Afghanistan was one of the largest international undertakings ever carried out.

History of the international intervention

In its first, main part, the report details the history of the international intervention. In the massive literature on this subject, the little over 20 pages of the report stand out as a concise summary of events, with little diplomatic fuzz. The way robust contributions in Afghanistan were welcomed by several European countries as a possibility to compensate the United States for their reluctant positions on the Iraq intervention is clearly reflected: “[Not only for Norway] but also for other European countries, contributions to a NATO-led and expanded ISAF operation presented themselves as a possibility to maintain a good bilateral relationship to the USA without sending troops to the war in Iraq.” (p 26)

The report describes how, already in its early stages, the international intervention was fragmented, due to “lack of coordination between donor countries and Afghan authorities, weak formal Afghan institutions and donors´ need for political visibility.” One example of this was the distribution of areas of responsibility within the security sector to different lead nations. (p 24) Norway was not part of that division of tasks, but it did eventually get involved in one of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) that were established by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) across the country.

PRT commitment

The report describes the problems linked to the choice of PRTs as the instrument for ISAF´s expansion: the approach of dividing Afghanistan into different areas of responsibility allotted to different foreign actors with little knowledge of the local political economy and power struggles served to “undermine rather than obtain the goal of building a centrally managed Afghan state.” (p 199) In addition, the military dominance of the PRTs led to a military bias in aid-related interventions. As some countries ploughed considerable development resources into ‘their’ provinces, development in Afghanistan became uneven, often with a preferential treatment for unstable areas. (p26)

The Norwegian armed forces were not in favour of engaging in a PRT, as it was deemed to be an overly extensive and risky commitment. However – under pressure from NATO, as well as the UN – the government still decided take on the task. Under the circumstances, the Norwegian government considered such participation an unavoidable consequence of Norway´s NATO membership. The government was also anxious to support the US and cooperate with the United Kingdom, which wanted to move its troops from the north to the south of Afghanistan. (p 113) In order to minimise risks, the (then) relatively peaceful north-western province of Faryab was selected.

In its PRT engagement, Norway applied a specifically ‘Norwegian model’, based on development cooperation principles which aimed to separate military and civilian contributions. Military PRT leaders were tasked to work solely on stabilisation efforts, while aid was channelled through a parallel, civilian structure manned by development experts. The two tracks were supposed to cooperate, but the guidelines for this collaboration remained unclear and the arrangement led to frustration and misunderstandings between the two strands of personnel on the ground, as well as vis-à-vis Afghan authorities and ISAF partners. (p 199) Apart from the period 2005-2006, when the PRT leadership used Norwegian development funds to carry out minor development projects (p. 120), this separation was maintained throughout the intervention – causing increasing difficulties.

When the counter-insurgency policy (COIN) was introduced as the main ISAF approach in 2009, Norwegian PRT leaders were squeezed between national and international guidelines. In fact, Norway applied double standards, approving the COIN approach in the NATO Council, while at the same time preventing its PRT leaders from applying it on the ground. (p 36) While this ambivalence reflected Norwegian principles, the COIN approach in itself is also deemed to have been problematic: “The COIN doctrine rests on a prerequisite which was fulfilled only to a small degree in Afghanistan. An anti-insurgency operation cannot be better than the regime it is meant to support. If the authorities were perceived as a bigger problem than the Taleban, there was not much Western military power could do to persuade the population to the contrary.”

The report comes very close to declaring the Faryab PRT a failure: “In an Afghan national perspective, the Norwegian PRT and the Norwegian model made little difference. … There were several reasons why, in practice, the possibilities to make a difference in Faryab were minimal.” The report lists three such reasons: “Fundamental circumstances linked to Afghan power constellation were difficult. The Norwegian contribution was also small in relation to the size of the province. No coherent Norwegian strategy was formulated, linking goals to means….” (p 136) In its final conclusions, the commission states that, in the future, “Norway should not take responsibility for sizable, integrated interventions (state-building, development and security). Within the framework of comprehensive, international commitments, Norway is best served through the development of special capacity in areas where there is a long-term need and a clear role.” (p 204)

Peace diplomacy

Part two of the report deals with a number of specific themes, some of them of mainly internal Norwegian interest (such as media response and personnel policy). However, two subjects stand out as relevant for an international audience: Norwegian peace diplomacy and the discussion on problems related to international law.

As a country outside the European Union, Norway did not have to adhere to EU sanctions and felt free to take initiatives towards a dialogue with the Taleban at a relatively early stage. At the time, these initiatives were surrounded by the usual secrecy, as well as overshadowed by a host of similar efforts by other actors – so their history may have been written for the first time in the Godal report. (p 138-156) Norway saw its peace diplomacy role in Afghanistan as threefold: to prepare the ground and transmit messages, to mediate between the parties and to promote dialogue between them. (p 138)

Grounded in an earlier project aimed at promoting intra-religious dialogue in Pakistan, direct Norwegian contacts with the Taleban were established during the beginning of 2007. During the first phase of 2007-2010, the Norwegians communicated with representatives of the Quetta shura, which eventually led to a meeting planned in Oslo for 28 February 2010, between representatives of the Taleban and the Afghan government. Among the enlisted participants was Taleban leader Mullah Barader whose arrest in Pakistan shortly before that date may or may not have been linked to the meeting, which in any case did not come about. A renewed effort in August 2010 stumbled on a late cancellation from the Taleban side. After that, Norway stepped back but continued its bilateral, thematic dialogue with the Taleban. In this context, it provided technical assistance in various ways. For instance, Norwegians helped the Taleban to formulate a political platform on election participation and organised a meeting with the UN in Oslo in late 2010. (p 151)

The ‘Quetta track’ was later replaced by the ‘Doha track’, where Norway initially worked in the shadow of German-American cooperation. When the German-American track floundered in 2012, Norway took on a more central role in trying to re-establish the dialogue with the Taleban; in the winter of 2012 and the spring of 2013, Norway, Qatar and the UK were the main go-betweens in negotiations between the US, the Taleban and Afghan authorities. In November 2012, a Taleban delegation visited Oslo and a meeting was held between the Norwegian minister for foreign affairs and Tayyab Agha, the leader of the Taleban political commission in Doha. (p 152) After the problem-ridden official opening of the Doha office in June 2013, Norwegian diplomats continued their dialogue with the Taleban on a bilateral level, again reverting to specific themes, most importantly the position of women, international laws of war, and the Afghan constitution. In parallel, the Norwegian government started to direct more of its efforts towards Afghanistan´s regional surroundings. During 2009-2011 it promoted and partially financed a series of regional dialogue meetings, leading up to the Heart of Asia process. (p 155)

The Norwegian peace diplomacy was related to two of Norway’s overarching goals for its participation in the intervention: to strengthen the relationship to the US and to contribute to state-building in Afghanistan. Again, the goal unrelated to Afghanistan was the most successful. According to the report, high-level US representatives showed interest in the Norwegian initiatives, especially after the Obama administration came to power. Norwegian contacts with the Taleban provided a recurring agenda point in meetings between the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, and US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton. These US-Norwegian discussions may, according to the Godal commission, have played a part in the emerging US acceptance of a negotiated end to the conflict. (p 151-152) Whether this was the case or not, they did again put Norway solidly on the map of international diplomacy. As a side effect, the report found, efforts in Afghanistan also contributed to the professionalization of Norwegian peace diplomacy and helped develop the country’s understanding of the role of intelligence services in this context. (p 156)

The second goal – the intended contribution to state-building through a dialogue between Afghan authorities and the armed opposition – obviously has yet to materialise. It also remains be seen whether Norwegian representatives have managed to do much with regard to their secondary intention within that goal, i. e. to influence the Taleban when it comes to “humanitarian and political issues, among them women´s rights” (p 138), even if the commission lists such influence as one of the achievements. (p 156)

International law

The Norwegian tradition of standing up for international law was put to test during the Afghanistan intervention, which challenged existing rules on several scores. One example was the legal basis for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) after the establishment of the Afghan transitional government in June 2002, when the situation in Afghanistan no longer involved a conflict between states. The commission criticises the government for the lack of clarification at the time on how it arrived at its conclusion that the legal basis of collective self-defence, as described in article 51 in the UN Charter, was not affected by this change. If, for instance, the commission points out, Norwegian pilots had been taken prisoner, they would not have been able to claim treatment according to the Third Geneva Convention (which applies to international armed conflict). (p161) The commission is also critical of the Norwegian government’s explicit interpretation that the self-defence doctrine applied not only in Afghanistan, but also for operations across the border in Pakistan (where Norway had no government consent). Norwegian fighter planes were engaged in operations close to the border and could easily have been drawn into cross-border operations. (p 159)

Lack of legal clarity also surrounded the Norwegian participation in ISAF, particularly during the initial years: Were Norwegian troops involved in war or just an operation to maintain law and order? Even at the later and more kinetic ISAF stages, the Norwegian government was, according to the commission, unnecessarily reluctant to use the word ‘war’ when talking of the engagement in Afghanistan. (p 161-162) The blurred dividing line between war and policing became particularly tricky when, from 2006 onwards, international forces also started targeting the drug trade as a source of financing for the armed opposition. (p 170-171) Police officers were sometimes tagged on to military patrols with no attention paid to the fact that they, unlike military personnel, had no immunity from judiciary consequences that could have resulted from these military operations. (p 162-164) Another grey zone arose as Afghan interpreters were armed and given uniforms when participating in operations together with Norwegian ISAF troops, as happened from time to time in spite of instructions from Oslo to the contrary. Here also, the commission points out that, had judiciary consequences followed, the interpreters (unlike Norwegian soldiers) would have been unable to rely on the immunity bestowed on combatants. (p 172)

The report points to the treatment of prisoners-of-war according to humanitarian norms as yet another area where Norway´s commitment to international law was difficult to uphold. Individuals captured by ISAF forces were handed over to Afghan authorities in spite of the fact the Afghan National Directorate for Security (NDS) was known to systematically break international rules. Like several other ISAF participants, Norway, in October 2006, signed an agreement with Afghanistan on the follow-up of prisoners’ treatment, stipulating monitoring by Norwegian personnel in order to ensure that prisoners were treated correctly – an alternative made possible by the limited number of individuals involved. When, in October 2011, UNAMA published a report showing that torture was routinely applied in Afghan prisons, ISAF stopped all transfer of prisoners. In its assessment, the commission still underlines the importance of having a formal agreement in place in any future operations with similar problems, but stresses that it should be more consistently followed up than was the case in Afghanistan. (p 169)

The commission´s reflections

In the third and final part of the report, which contains reflections on Norwegian goals and results, experiences and lessons learned, the commission points out that, by and large, the domestic political unity surrounding Norway´s participation in Afghanistan was never seriously challenged, in spite of the fact that opinion polls showed that the population was divided in its assessment of the military part of the engagement. (p 194) When it came to the maintenance of popular support, the growing emphasis on development assistance and state-building during the course of the international intervention played into the hands of the government. An implication that the commission chooses not to elaborate on is that the parts of the intervention most welcomed by the Norwegian population – contributions to state-building, aid to the Afghan people – were, in fact, the parts where results were the worst.

For the government, on the other hand, a consistent and central goal for its security policy since 1949 has been “to cultivate a good relationship to the USA and to ensure the relevance and strength of NATO.” For Norway’s participation in the intervention in Afghanistan, this goal was, in fact, more important than reflected in the public discussion. Indeed, the report points out, it was the raison d´être for the intervention in Afghanistan: “To appear as a competent partner in Washington D.C. and Brussels was more important for Norway´s decisions than evaluations of the effect that Norwegian contributions might have in Afghanistan.” (p 194) In this context, the Norwegian refusal to send troops to southern Afghanistan involved a degree of risk-taking. However, the commission concludes, it had “no serious or long-term consequences for Norway´s relation to its allies or for Norway´s position in NATO.” (p 196) As the commission speculates, a contributing (albeit unforeseen) factor in the limited fall-out of Norway’s position may have been the gradually worsening security situation in Faryab, which increased the risk for Norwegian troops in relation to those who had accepted more dangerous locations. In addition, contributions from Norwegian Special Forces and intelligence units in Kabul from 2007 onwards were much appreciated and the innovative way in which these units tightly collaborated was particularly noted. (p 196)

For domestic reasons, it was important for Norway to match its spending on the military component of the intervention with funds allocated to development assistance in Afghanistan. This goal was never reached, even though Norway´s civilian contribution was relatively higher than that of most ISAF partners. (1) However, this may have been just as well, since neither the Afghan absorption capacity, nor the Norwegian administrative capacity was sufficient even for the reduced proportion. “Thereby,” concludes the report, “Norwegian development assistance became part of an international picture of large assistance and weak follow-up and control. Gradually, [international] development assistance contributed to an extensive corruption problem. While Norwegian authorities had a clear picture of this, political ambitions to contribute a large volume of assistance were more important than professional evaluation of the consequences.” (p 199)

Reception of the Godal report in Norway

In June 2016, when the report was published, Norway had just engaged with the US to send special forces to Syria – ostensibly with a mandate limited to capacity building of Syrian opposition forces in Jordan. However, it soon became clear that Norwegians would, in fact, also be present inside Syria. In the midst of the discussion caused by this commitment, the publication of the Godal report, by providing opponents of military undertakings in unfamiliar surroundings with solid arguments, further complicated the government´s task to ensure public support. It all made for a lively public debate, more about Syria than about Afghanistan, but, in the end, did not change the government´s decision. Nor did the Godal commission´s call for increased openness around commitments of this kind appear to have had much of an influence on the process.

Not so much for Afghanistan

In altruistic terms, the three Norwegian goals for the Afghanistan intervention are hardly on the same level. In substance, the primary goal – to be a good supporter of the USA and a good NATO ally – is different from the other two goals – to prevent Afghanistan from relapsing into a haven for international terrorists and to contribute to state-building in a war-ravaged country. While it may be good for Norway that the first goal was actually achieved, it is sad for the world that the two other goals did not fare as well. By the same token, it may have been good for Norway´s international prestige that its peace diplomacy with regard to the Taleban brought it positive attention in Washington and other capitals, but one could wish, of course, that more had come from Norwegian efforts. The most successful aspects of the Norwegian intervention in Afghanistan remain those which have to do with Norway, not with Afghanistan.

The report does not weigh the goals along these lines, but it laudably refrains from presenting the number of schools built and clinics opened as achievements justifying a military intervention at astronomic cost. Already on its first page, the report delivers a frank explanation of the failure of the state-building exercise: “To a small degree only has the international engagement, including that of Norway, been based on knowledge of Afghanistan and local conditions, culture and lines of conflict. State-building directed from outside – built on grand military investment, massive transfer of money and weak Afghan institutions – has proved to be a very demanding undertaking. In Afghanistan, a society marked by 23 years of war, it was impossible within the given framework.” (p 10)

Norway, of course, was not the only country that was led into Afghanistan by its own international and security priorities, more than anything else. However, no other country has, so far, had the political courage to analyse just that. This is all the more remarkable as Norway is a small nation with a close-knit population which lost 12 citizens (10 soldiers and two civilians in related attacks) during the intervention. If nothing else, by its own report the Godal commission has set a good Norwegian example.

 

 

(1) As mentioned in the first section of this dispatch, Norway spent close to 20 billion NKR (approximately 2.45 billion USD) on the intervention, corresponding to 0.26 per cent of the total international military expenditure in Afghanistan and 2.3 per cent of the total international civilian expenditure in Afghanistan. In monetary terms, 11.5 billion NKR went to the military component and around 8.4 billion NKR was used for civilian purposes.

 

Americas

• The US Missile Defense Agency’s (MDA) plan to equip unmanned, high-endurance, long-endurance aircraft with high-power electric lasers in order to shoot down ballistic missiles in their boost phase will see a proof of concept test between 2020-2021. It’s been reported that this fall, the agency plans to award contracts to two industry teams for preliminary design and fabrication of flying laser testbed aircraft beginning in 2018. One of the two teams is Lockheed Martin, who is rumored to be contemplating the use an unmanned version of the Cold War-era U-2 Dragon Lady as one of its potential platforms.

• Pictures have surface on Twitter unveiling the first glimpse of Northrop Grumman’s offering in the USAF T-X competition. The trainer prototype, Model 400, was snapped on a runway in Mojave, California during a high speed taxi test, and sports a prominent, single vertical fin and a nose section similar to the T-38.

• A court in Miami has sentenced a California woman to 4 years in federal prison after being convicted of illegally exporting US military gear to China. Wenxia Man said she colluded with a spy who specializes in copying foreign military equipment for the Chinese government. In June, a jury convicted Man of conspiring to export and actually exporting military equipment without the proper license, which involved engines used in F-35, F-16 and F-22 fighter jets as well as an MQ-9 Reaper UAV.

Middle East & North Africa

• A deal has been struck between the Algerian government and Leonardo for the sale and home-made production of a number of the helicopters, including the AW101. The move is being viewed by analysts as a way of both increasing Algerian defensive capabilities and domestic job creation as well as potentially preventing an Arab Spring type event among its population’s youth. Algeria is all too familiar with security threats following a number of attacks on its oil and gas facilities by Jihadist militants in recent years; most notably 2013’s In Amenas hostage crisis, which left 39 foreign hostages, an Algerian worker, and 29 militants dead.

Africa

• Nigeria is to import a number of Mi-35M attack helicopters and the UAE-made Yabhon Flash-20 UAV. The purchases will boost the government’s capabilities against the Jihadist insurgency of Boko Haram in the country’s north-east, as well as attacks against its Niger Delta oil installations in the south. Delivery of the hardware is expected to start arriving later this year and continue into 2017.

Asia Pacific

• Incheon-class frigates operated by the South Korean Navy are to be armed with Haeseong II ship-to-surface cruise missiles. Six of the vessels have already been produced as part of the first batch with 18-24 planned in total. While Seoul had initially scheduled the missiles to be incorporated on all vessels from batch two onward, it was decided to retrofit the first six as well, with work scheduled to commence next month. To accommodate the new missiles, the ships will have angled canister launchers installed on their decks.

• With a national-record breaking defense budget on the cards for Japan next year, upgrades to increase the country’s air-superiority capabilities are being rolled out by the government. With Japan’s F-35 deployment not due until the end of 2017, plans are underway to upgrade and upgun its current F-15J fleet. Among the changes are plans to double the number of air-to-air missiles the F-15J can carry to 16 as well as an expansion of the jet’s lifespan.

• Plans to deliver Russian-made equipment to the Afghan Armed Forces has been delayed by India. The cause, a lack of spare parts for an Mi-25 helicopter. New Delhi has already transferred three of the attack helicopters to Kabul and has received pleas by some in the US military to increase its supply of Russian weapons and parts. An embargo imposed on Moscow has seriously hampered the availability and access to spare parts for Afghanistan, which operates a hodgepodge selection of various military vehicles.

Today’s Video

Iran unveils its indigenous Bavar-373 air-defense system:

Historic England has produced a digital model of the UK Royal Navy’s Town-class light cruiser HMS Falmouth, which was sunk by German U-boats during the First World War Battle of Jutland.

Australia’s Queensland and the US Navy have signed a cooperation agreement to support and advance projects and initiatives related to alternative fuels development.

The US Navy’s Freedom-class littoral combat ship USS Fort Worth (LCS 3) has set sail towards its homeport in San Diego, California, following the completion of repairs to its propulsion systems at Changi Naval Base in Singapore.

British / American M777 Lightweight Towed Howitzer

Indian MR-SAM Medium-Range Surface-to-Air Missile System

Raytheon has been contracted to manufacture Norwegian-developed naval strike missile (NSM) launchers at its production facility in Louisville, Kentucky, US.

Construction work on the new navigation light towers in Portsmouth harbour for the UK Royal Navy’s two Queen Elizabeth Class (QEC) aircraft carriers is set to be completed soon.

The US Navy has christened its new expeditionary fast transport vessel as USNS Yuma (EPF 8), at Austal’s Mobile, Alabama shipyard.

Three of the eight remaining Afghans detained by the United States in Guantanamo have been transferred to the United Arab Emirates. The three had each spent 13 or 14 years in detention. None were captured on the battlefield, but detained after tip-offs or were handed over to the US by Afghan forces. Their files reveal multiple mistakes in intelligence, mistakes in Afghan geography and history, and cases largely made up variously of hearsay, secret evidence and confessions. One of the three was almost certainly tortured and another probably was. AAN’s Kate Clark, who has read through the US military and court documents, says the cases against two of the men were without evidentiary basis, while the third detainee looks to have possibly been a low-level insurgent.

AAN will be releasing a report, “Kafka in Cuba: The Afghan experience of detention in Guantanamo,” based on a study of the cases of the eight last Afghans to be held there, three of whom have now been transferred. This dispatch is based on research for that report.

Afghans were, by far the largest national grouping held in Cuba: more than a quarter of the total detainee population – 220 out of 781. (1) Three Afghans died in Guantanamo (2) and after the transfer of three men this week, just five Afghans remain. They include Muhammad Rahim, the last man to be tortured and rendered to Guantanamo by the CIA (see here).

The three now transferred (announced on 15 August 2016) are Mohammed Kamin and Obaidullah, both from Khost, and Hamid al-Razak (aka Haji Hamidullah) from Kabul. Along with 12 Yemenis, they are now in the UAE, which the US thanked for it “its humanitarian gesture and willingness to support ongoing U.S. efforts to close the Guantanamo Bay detention facility.” The Wall Street Journal reported that, although US officials would not discuss specific security arrangements, “people familiar with the matter said the U.S. typically conducts electronic surveillance of former detainees, while local authorities keep physical tabs on them.” A senior official also told the paper that the 15 men would enter a rehabilitation facility designed to ‘de-radicalize’ former detainees and would “be held indefinitely until authorities decide they can be released at a minimum of risk.” It is not yet clear if the men will eventually be allowed to return home.

Mass detentions

Kamin, Obaidullah and Hamidullah were all detained in the early years of the intervention when US Special Operations Forces (SOF) and the CIA were detaining people en masse in their hunt for ‘Taleban remnants’ and to try to get intelligence on what they feared might be the next al-Qaeda plot against America. Some Taleban were detained, but Afghan commanders working with US forces in 2001 were also able to denounce factional or personal enemies as ‘terrorists’ and get them killed or detained. The US practice of giving money for information helped fuel the denunciation of innocent individuals. In trying to fathom why a particular individual was detained, rather than trying to figure out their links to the Taleban or al Qaeda, it often makes more sense to look at the local allies of US forces and their relationship with the detainee. Understanding the particular tribal and factional context, and factoring in the opportunities there were to make money can clarify otherwise bizarre detentions.

In Kunar, for example, the anti-Taleban, Salafist leader, Haji Rohullah Wakil, had been chosen to represent Kunar in a national gathering, the Emergency Loya Jirga in June 2002. Two months later, in August 2002, he was detained and taken to Guantanamo. It seems a rival, keen to scoop up logging business and contracts for counter-narcotics work and the building of US bases, had told the US he was a terrorist. In the south, Uruzgan’s first post-Taleban governor, Jan Muhammad, a man with close, long-standing ties to the Karzai family, “used his relations with US Special Forces and his reputation as an effective Taliban hunter to target a wide range of tribal leaders and former Taleban officials, particularly from the Ghilzai and Panjpai tribes.” (3) In Kandahar, “entire tribes, like the Ishaqzai in Maiwand, a district west of Kandahar City,” reported van Linshoten and Kuehn were systematically targeted and denounced as Taleban.” (4) The tribes in Maiwand, Kandahar, had indeed supported the Taleban when they first came to power in 1994, but, said Gopal (5), “US forces were unable to recognize when those same tribes switched allegiances in 2001.” This, he said, was precisely what made Maiwand so lucrative in the eyes of the new US-allied governor, Gul Agha Shirzai, and his men, “There were weapons to be requisitioned, tribal elders to be shaken down, reward money to be collected—boundless profits to be made.”

The pattern of arbitrary detentions was seen across the border, as well. Those detained by Pakistan and handed over to the US included some senior Taleban, including ambassador Abdul Salaam Zaeef and governor of Herat, Khairullah Khairkhwa (see AAN reporting here) (both civilian members of the regime), but also many ordinary Afghans. Former Pakistani president, Pervez Musharraf, revealed in his memoirs, for example, that Islamabad had “earned bounties totalling millions of dollars” for such handovers.

The search for information

The Bush administration insisted the detainees in Cuba were all dangerous men who had been “picked up off the battlefield,” had been trying to kill American forces and were “terrorists, bomb makers and facilitators of terror,” “trainers… recruiters, financiers, [Osama bin Laden’s] bodyguards, would-be suicide bombers, probably the 20th 9/11 hijacker.”(6) It was difficult to dispute this at first, as the US government kept details of the detainees secret. The first inkling of how arbitrary many of the detentions actually were came in December 2002 when military officers at Guantanamo (see here) complained about the ‘poor quality’ of detainees being sent:

At least 59 detainees – nearly 10% of the prison population… – were deemed to be of no intelligence value after repeated interrogations in Afghanistan….None of the 59 met U.S. screening criteria for determining which prisoners should be sent to Guantanamo Bay, military sources said. But all were transferred anyway, sources said, for reasons that continue to baffle and frustrate intelligence officers nearly a year after the first group of detainees arrived at the facility.

The paper said classified intelligence reports described dozens of Afghan and Pakistani detainees who were “farmers, taxi drivers, cobblers and labourers. Some were low-level fighters conscripted by the Taliban in the weeks before the collapse of the ruling Afghan regime.” Eventually, after many years of legal challenges, determined investigations by journalists and human rights groups, better information came out. The names of the prisoners were eventually released in 2006 after a Freedom of Information Act request and litigation by the Associated Press. However, it was WikiLeaks’ publication in 2011 of secret assessments of the detainees which revealed just how disingenuous the Bush administration has been: the evidentiary basis for its allegations of terrorist activity was frequently hearsay, secondary hearsay (X told Y that Z was a terrorist), unverified intelligence reports, confessions and detainee testimony. The assessments were also rife with basic factual errors about Afghanistan.

The secrecy also worked against the US administration. They released senior Taleban commanders, not knowing who they were, including Mullah Shahzada, against whom there was detailed evidence of his command role in the 2001 massacre of civilians in Yakowlang. “U.S. officials were apparently unaware of the commander’s past record,” the Afghanistan Justice Project said, “which indicates either a serious intelligence failure or indifference to war crimes that do not fall under the official designation of ‘terrorist acts.’”

Generally, though, it was difficult to get out of Guantanamo. The Bush administration had decided detainees would not be covered by either criminal or military law, including common article 3 of the Geneva conventions. There was little protection, then, against arbitrary detention. As the three cases of the men now transferred show, the various military boards eventually set up to screen detainees at Guantanamo frequently failed to uncover the many glaring mistakes and improbable narratives in detainees’ files.

As for the courts, it turned out to be even more difficult to obtain a release through habeas corpus – when the state has to justify its detention of a person in court or free them. Judges have generally accepted the state’s version of events, including allowing secret evidence and at times, testimony obtained by detainees who had been tortured. They also accepted hearsay and pieces of evidence which were individually weak, but together produced a ‘mosaic’ of (apparent) culpability. US justice has moved immensely slow in these cases. Another Afghan still being held, Wali Mohammed who filed a habeas petition in 2005 waited until 2013 for his hearing and then another three years for the judge to rule; she decided he should stay in custody.

The chances of release are now higher since a new review body, the Periodic Review Board, started hearing cases. It is made up of military and non-military personnel, one senior official each from the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice and State and the Offices of the Joint Staff and Director of National Intelligence. In about two thirds of the cases it has heard so far, it has recommended transfer. Of six Afghan cases heard, it has decided that five men be transferred and one should stay in indefinite detention.

One might have thought that, by now, there would only be genuinely dangerous people left in Guantanamo. Republican chair of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Ed Royce, also appeared to assume this. He criticised the Obama administration for the transfers, portraying those freed as “hardened terrorists.” Yet, a reading of the cases of the three Afghans released this week at least shows no such thing.

Summaries of the allegations and evidence against the three can be read below. Readers can also see the full details, with sourcing, of each case by clicking on the relevant link. As names and the spellings of names vary in different documents, each detainee’s unique Internment Serial Number (ISN) is also given.

A note on sourcing:

The New York Times’ ‘Guantanamo Docket’ website has gathered together all the documents from Guantanamo for each of the 771 detainees known to have been held there. Here can be found summary sheets and transcripts for the military boards which assessed whether detainees were enemy combatants, the Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CRSTs) and the boards which, every year, assessed whether detainees were still a danger to the US, the Administrative Review Boards or (ARBs). On the same website are secret Joint Task Force Guantanamo Detainee Assessments which were published by WikiLeaks in 2011. They give information about a detainee’s capture, mental and physical health, reasons for his continuing detention, the allegations against him, something of his side of the story and usually the nature of the sourcing on which allegations were based (detainee’s testimony, other detainee’s testimony, Intelligence Information Reports, which are unverified and unprocessed, and reporting by the CIA and FBI. Analysis of the cases also used documents from the Periodic Review Board hearings, habeas petitions and Military Commission trials (these were brought in twice, in 2005 and 2006, during the Bush administration, and declared illegal twice by the Supreme Court, in 2006 and 2008; they were re-introduced in 2009, by President Obama).

Obaidullah, from Khost (ISN 762) 14 years in detention

In July 2002, a ‘walk in’ source, ie a previously unknown informant, told US forces in Khost that Obaidullah was a member of an al-Qaeda bomb-making cell. They raided the shopkeeper’s house and found two dozen anti-tank shells buried on his land which Obaidullah said had been left by PDPA communist government forces in the 1980s. They also found a notebook with bomb-making instructions on Obaidullah’s person. He has given various explanations for this and one interrogator, at least, said Obaidullah did not understand what was written there. However, this remained the strongest piece of evidence against him. Every other piece of evidence, however, has had to be discounted or seriously questioned.

Much of the case against him is made up of his own testimony: under interrogation, he had admitted to being a member of al-Qaeda and also implicated several other men, notably Bostan Karim, his former business partner, who is still in Guantanamo, but also cleared for transfer (all other members of the alleged cell were released years ago). Obaidullah withdrew both confession at the first chance he had to speak publically, at a military review board in 2004, saying he had spoken under torture:

When the Americans captured me… they began punishing me. They put a knife to my throat, tied my hands and put sandbags on my arms. At the airport in Khost I was walked around all night with the sandbags on my arms. They took me to Bagram where the interrogation and punishment increased. I was very young at that time, so whatever they said, I agreed to.

Obaidullah’s testimony is consistent with reports by human rights groups, the media and official US investigations looking into CIA and US interrogations in Khost and Bagram at this time. (7) The US state chose to drop his confession as evidence, rather than contest the accusation of torture in court during Obaidullah’s petition for habeas corpus.

In Obaidullah’s petition for habeas corpus, judges ruling on his petition and its numerous appeals accepted the state’s accusations, even as much of its evidence fell away, shown to be questionable or wrong. Most significantly, the judges did not question the assertion that Obaidullah was a member of al-Qaeda. This was critical as a ‘freelance insurgent’ would not be covered by the US president’s legal authority to detain. Instead, judges deemed retrospectively that the walk-in source’s original accusation that Obaidullah was al-Qaeda must have been correct because his tip-off had led to the note book and anti-tank mines being found on Obaidullah’s property. That informant was the lynch pin on which the state’s case against Obaidullah rested. Obaidullah tried to discover his identity and whether the US paid him money for the information. However, the courts accepted the government’s stance that information about this source is too sensitive for even Obaidullah’s security-cleared counsel to read.

Obaidullah appeared at most to have been a low-level insurgent; if he had been captured a few years later, he would have been sent to Bagram, or even let off with a guarantee from elders for good behaviour. The rationale for holding him in the high security detention camp in Cuba was never apparent.

Mohammad Kamin, from Khost (ISN 1045) 13 years in detention

A dispatch about this case was published after the Periodic Review Board recommended his transfer from Guantanamo (in September 2015).

US documents said that Kamin, a 25 year old imam, was detained in Khost city on 14 May 2003. They do not specify who captured him, but from court documents, it seems he was probably picked up by Afghan forces who may have beaten him prior to US interrogation (the most likely force would have been the then 25th Division of the army, which was made up of former PDPA communists from Kamin’s home area – it still operates, as the Khost Protection Force under CIA command). Kamin was allegedly detained with a GPS device which had grid points for the Afghan/Pakistan border stored on it. If he did possess this GPS, the evidentiary chain is missing.

The US accused Kamin of being a member of, or affiliated to, five different terrorist groups, Afghan, Arab and Pakistani: “Al-Qaida, the North African Extremist Network (NAEN), Taliban, and Jayshe-Mohammed (JEM) terrorist Organizations and leaders; furthermore detainee has admitted ties to the Harakat ul-Mujahidin (HUM).” NAEN is not an actual group; it only exists as a US intelligence acronym. Such lists are common in detainees’ files, although nowhere does the US explain why or how one man could be affiliated with so many groups. Like Obaidullah, Kamin was supposed to have been working with the al Qaeda commander, Abu Leith al-Libbi. Looking through his documents, however, it becomes apparent that, apart from the alleged GPS device and his possession of a model of watch which is used in bomb-making – and which is also a global best-seller (the Casio F_91W), all the allegations against him come only from his own testimony. He was never accused of any actual attack. 

Hamidullah, from Kabul (ISN 1119) 13 years in detention

The case against Hamidullah was always one of the strangest of all: he was accused of working as a terrorist with multiple Afghan factions, including ones which are enemies of each other, and of working with the “extremists” of Mahaz-e Milli (the National Islamic Front). Derided as being Westernised ‘Gucci guerrillas’ by its Islamist rivals, the monarchist Mahaz was famously the most moderate mujahedin group and laid down its arms in 1992. Many of Hamidullah’s alleged co-conspirators are pro-US intervention, establishment figures, either pro-government or members of the government. Hamidullah is accused, among other things, of scheming to bring back the former king, although the US does not explain why this should be controversial or require his removal to Cuba.

His documents are littered with gross factual errors and misunderstandings, with dates, factions, alliances and whole countries wrong. Moreover, like all three of the Afghans now released, he is accused only of planning attacks or meeting alleged co-conspirators, not of carrying out any actual attack. Explanation for his detention, however, is clear. He actually comes from a prominent Hizb-e Islami family in Kabul. When Hezb-e Islami’s historical enemy, Jamiat-e Islami, the dominant force in the Northern Alliance, captured Kabul after the fall of the Taleban, it took control of the security ministries, including the intelligence agency, the NDS. Hamidullah’s detention, made in 2003 by Afghan forces then under Jamiat control, looks to have been motivated by factional enmity. Less clear, however, is why a series of military boards over many years did not realise how absurd the accusations were against him or question a case riven with factual errors. A Periodic Review Board did, however, reveal in 2016 that it was the NDS which had asserted his links with extremists. His main enemy, his lawyer contended, had not been America, but “the Northern Alliance.”

 

 

(1) Men from 49 nationalities have been held in Guantanamo. The largest contingents have been Afghans (220), Saudis (135), Yemenis (115) and Pakistanis (72).

(2) They were: Inayatullah, ISN 10028, a 37 year old who committed suicide in 2011, Abdul Razzaq Hekmati, who died of cancer on 30 December 2007, and Awal Gul, who died on 2 February 2011 after exercising.

(3) Martine Van Bijlert ‘Unruly Commanders and Violent Power Struggles: Taliban Networks in Uruzgan’, Chapter 7 in Antonio Giustozzi (ed) Decoding the New Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field, Columbia University Press/Hurst, 2009.

(4) Alex Strick Van Linschoten And Felix Kuehn, An Enemy We Created: the Myth of the Taliban-Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970–2010, Hurst, 2010.

(5) Anand Gopal, No Good Men Among the Living Men: American, the Taliban and the War through Afghan Eyes, Metropolitan Books Henry Holt, 2014.

(6) All quotes are from 2005 from (in order) President Bush, the White House press secretary, Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defence Rumsfeld. Stuart Taylor ‘Falsehoods About Guantanamo’ The Atlantic, 27 June 2005 from. The same ‘worst of the worst’ assertions were also made early on and still continue.

(7) See human rights investigations, including “‘Enduring Freedom’ Abuses by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan’”, Human Rights Watch, March 2004, and Globalizing Torture: CIA Secret Detention and Extraordinary Rendition’, Open Society Foundations, February 2013; and official US investigations, including, ‘United States Senate Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees in U.S. Custody’, Committee on Armed Services, 20 November 2008, and ‘Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program’, The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 12 December 2014. (the International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) lists other government investigations up till 2008, ‘Research Brief: Selected examples of Defence, Intelligence and Justice Investigative Reports into detention and interrogation practices’, 2 November 2008). There was also numerous press reporting, including an investigation by the author for the BBC’s ‘The World Tonight’ (audio no longer available, but cut-down text version available here: Kate Clark ‘Afghans tell of US prison ordeals’, BBC, 21 July 2005) and two reports into Khost by Craig Pyes and Kevin Sack, ‘Two Deaths Were a “Clue That Something’s Wrong”’ The Los Angeles Times, 25 September 2006, and ‘U.S. Probing Alleged Abuse of Afghans’, The Los Angeles Times, 21 September 2004.

(8) Kamin was charged with “providing material support to terrorism” in March 2008. Charges were dropped, without prejudice, on 11 December 2009 and were not re-filed. The charge of ‘providing material support to terrorism’ was thrown out as non-indictable in a 2012 ruling by an Appeals court which said it was not a war crime and new laws could not retrospectively punish actions not illegal at the time.

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