The idea of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) emerged during the 2000s into the “Brussels bubble”. After all this time, during the past plenary session of the European Parliament in Strasbourg, the legislative institution adopted the principle of the creation of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office. This Prosecuting Authority will entry into force in 2019 or 2020 (depends on the comments) and must be approved by the European Council, by the unanimity of this members.
The EPPO will have the power to prosecute all crimes against European financial interests, including money laundering or cross-border VAT fraud (estimated at a total of at least €10 million damage in the European budget). All offences against the Union’s financial interests are defined under the “PIF Directive” adopted in July 2017.
The main goal of this European Prosecuting Authority is to enhance cooperation and collaboration between the member states. Moreover, the Public Prosecutor can participate in harmonizing national regulations to shape a real European policy in the matter of financial justice.
For now, only 20 member states have agreed with the Commission’s proposal. It can be noticed that the UK, Ireland and Denmark have an automatic opt-out from the EU justice initiative. Nonetheless, every member states can adhere to the process at every moment.
This authority will coordinate national law enforcement efforts with the European police and both law agencies Europol and Eurojust, and the anti-fraud office OLAF. The prosecutor will be present in every member states involved, taking the form of a decentralized structure. The European Prosecutors present at national levels will have a double role: acting on behalf of the EPPO and exercising functions as national prosecutors. In order to ensure an effective coordination and a unique European approach, a Central Office would be composed of the European Chief Prosecutor, the College (composed by national European Prosecutors per member states), the permanent Chambers and the Administrative Director.
The vote, which took place this October, the 5th during the European Parliament plenary session, has been applauded by Vera Jourova, European commissioner for Justice.
After the vote, some European experts have already called for the opportunity to add new powers to the EPPO, especially to tackle crimes like trafficking and terrorism.
Jean-Hugue Baraër
For further information:
European Parliament: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/608711/EPRS_ATA(2017)608711_EN.pdf
Politico EU: http://www.politico.eu/article/eus-jourova-wants-funds-linked-to-new-prosecutors-office/
On the occasion of the World and European Day against the Death Penalty, on 10 October, Pier Antonio Panzeri (S&D, IT), Chair of the Subcommittee on Human Rights stated:
"I would like to reaffirm our strong, united and collective stance against the Death Penalty in all cases and under all circumstances. Capital punishment is not a deterrent against crime and renders miscarriages of justice irreversible..."
On Sunday, 24th September were held the latest German legislative elections, where more than 76% of the German population eligible for voting went to the polls to decide on Germany’s future. Not surprisingly, Angela Merkel’s party, the CDU/CSU (Christian Democratic Union) has gathered the largest share of the polls, winning 246 seats in the Bundestag. Even though this was not enough for the party to govern on its own, and therefore making it look for a potential collaborator to be able to rule the country, it allowed Angela Merkel to be the German Chancellor again. Thus, she starts her fourth term as Chancellor, and becomes the longest ruling European head-of-state as of late. While being a significant enough win to be important in German politics and catch the attention of medias (even if this was the lowest score by the CDU since 1949), the CDU’s victory was not the main event of that day. Indeed, the German far-right party AfD (Alternative for Germany) made a breakthrough during these elections, and managed to take the third place in the elections, gathering 12.6% of the votes. With these 12.6%, the AfD actually obtains more than 90 seats within the Bundestag, which represents 13.5% of all seats in the German legislative body. It is then placed right after the CDU/CSU, which gained 32.9% of the votes, and the SPD, which secured around 20.5% of the ballots, getting 153 seats in the German Parliament.
While this could be a bit less alarming in other countries such as France, the Netherlands or Poland, where far-right parties have had their places in Parliament for quite a while, the fact that the AfD got this far into national legislative elections is a rather worrying fact in German politics. In fact, Sunday’s electoral results constitute the first time a far-right party managed to get access to the German Parliament in more than 50 years. This result is especially troubling when considering European politics as a whole. Certainly, after the resurgence of popularity populist movements have witnessed these past years across Europe, both the defeats of the French ‘Front National’ (FN) and of the Dutch ‘Partij voor de Vrijheid’ (PVV) during national elections seemed to announce the “beginning of the end”, or at least an electoral slowdown for far-right parties in the Old World. Even though far-right parties’ results always seem to have shocked public opinions, it felt like their scores were actually starting to decrease. However, with the AfD’s unexpected high score, it almost feels like all hopes of populism fading away have been torn down in the blink of an eye. Indeed, the threat that populism poses to the European Union is that these political movements and groups – which can belong to the far-right political spectrum or not – are promising to answer all issues their countries are facing by appealing to the people and telling them what they want to hear. Right-wing populist parties such as the FN, the PVV and the AfD also thrive because they create a distinction between what they call the ‘real people’ and the political elites, swearing they are representing a new kind of politicians who only want to give the power back to the people. Nonetheless, they appear to all look the same, having similar political agendas, claims and using the same methods to win over people’s confidence and trust. What is it then?
What is the AfD party and how did it become so important in German politics?
The AfD, ‘Alternative für Deutschland’ in German, has been founded in 2013, right after the Eurozone crisis struck the European Union. Originally, its purpose was to oppose the way the crisis was dealt with by German leaders, backed up by a few economists who thought the Euro was more a burden than an efficient currency. Later in 2013, some AfD members started to campaign for the federal elections, but gathered only 4.7% of the votes, which is below the required 5% for getting seats in the Bundestag. This was the heaviest defeat the AfD ever underwent before running for the European legislative elections and winning their first seats in a Parliament.
During the 2014 European elections, the AfD actually succeeded in reaching the EU Parliament’s benches, taking the fifth place in Germany and obtaining seven seats for their members to become MEPs. Following this first political victory, more and more Germans started to assemble around the party’s manifesto. They won several other state elections in 2014 and 2015, getting 14 seats in the Landtag (regional parliament) of Saxony, 11 in both state parliaments during the Brandenburg state election, 8 seats in the Hamburg parliament and finally another one in the Bremen parliament. Finally, during the 2016 state elections, the most salient issue in Germany was linked to migration, which translated into a debate between the main political formations. Alternative for Germany always pushed forward and never hid their anti-migration stances, criticizing the Schengen area and advocating for a better control of Germany’s borders. This way of thinking started to seduce an even larger part of the German electorate. Again, it led the far-right party to increase its share of votes in several other state parliaments, sometimes taking the second place right behind the mainstream parties such as the CDU or the SPD. These victories marked the beginning of the rise for the AfD, which eventually led the party to gather 12.6% of the votes during these latest national elections.
With the increasing of its political influence, the AfD also started to capture the attention of a few other hard-right parties throughout Europe, very extreme ones amongst them. The party had first been integrated within the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, a Eurosceptic and anti-federalist group within the European Parliament, at the beginning of its mandate in the EU legislative body. However, its members eventually got expelled as they started to get closer to the Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ), a political group especially known for its extreme stances on immigration and for its pan-Germanic vision of Austria. As a consequence, AfD MEPs joined other parliamentary groups such as the Europe of Nations and Freedom (ENF) group which already hosts the members of the French FN and of the Dutch PVV, and the Europe of Freedom and Direct Democracy group.
The AfD thus managed to attract more and more German voters, in a very short period of time. When looking at far-right populist parties, there seems to be more than one similarity between them, in terms of their political stances, the way they appeal to the people, or the importance they give to their own nation regardless of international institutions.
The AfD’s ideology and political stances
The party’s beginnings were mainly marked by its economic claims that the Euro and the Eurozone were not appropriate monetary tools and should therefore be removed. At the time, the AfD – which was primarily considered as a centre-right conservative movement – did not encompass the usual populist claims that their nation, and the German people, would be better off on their own rather than being part of something greater, in this case the EU. It was more focused on dismantling the Eurozone, rather than being completely opposite to the EU in general. Still, it was already opposed to immigration and further European integration.
These were the main political stances the AfD fostered before 2015. However, it started to become more and more extreme in its viewpoints, especially considering immigration, its rejection of the European Union and the centrality of Germany and its people. This was the result of a leadership shift, as the AfD undertook a reorganization mid-year 2015 after a disagreement occurred between the two main heads of the movement, Frauke Petry and Bernd Lucke. Consequently, two factions arose, one following Lucke’s economic and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism policies, which led him to found a new party (Alliance for Progress and Renewal, now called the Liberal Conservative Reformers); and Petry’s anti-immigration and German-centred ideas, representing the new AfD.
Following this transition, the political party adopted a more populist and far-right approach. It now shares similarities with other very conservative political groups, such as nationalism, anti-immigration, rejection of modern feminism, denying of global warming and climate change, only to name these ones. Despite this alarming change of direction, what is even more worrying is the greater share of the electorate the AfD is now seducing in Germany.
How did the AfD become Germany’s third-biggest party?
When it comes to hard-right populist parties, what seems to be the most important piece of legislation voters are attracted by is the anti-immigration one. More precisely, as the EU has been facing a massive refugee crisis since 2015, and even before then, refugee hosting and illegal immigration now seem to be even more divisive issues among politicians and populations. As one of many parties thriving on opposing immigration, the AfD has called for the immediate closure of Germany’s borders, and for doing everything that can be done to stop mass immigration. That way, the party has effectively attracted voters who believe putting an end to mass immigration would actually be a good thing for their country. Moreover, as no other party really addresses the issue of immigration – therefore not opposing the deterministic vision embodied by the AfD – German voters seem to have no other choice than to look towards the far-right, which indeed deals with these issues and concerns.
In addition, there seems to be a general trend in current Western politics which can explain why far-right populist parties have known such a resurgence in Europe and abroad. To put it simply, people in Western democracies more and more have the feeling that they are left on the side-lines by politicians. They feel like their elected representatives do not care about their well-being anymore, do not address the issues that they are concerned about, and thus are very dissatisfied with the way politics is now handled. These people, who belong to very different social groups and have very different social situations, are united because they do not trust mainstream politicians any longer. This can be seen as one of the main reasons why populist parties have been on the rise for a few years now. And if head of states keep on letting people’s concerns down, not addressing popular issues and forgetting some parts of the population, this trend is not likely to stop.
What is Germany going to do about it?
The rise of a far-right party in Germany has not gone unnoticed and unanswered. When the election results were released on the night of the 24th September, Berlin dwellers, who historically always rejected the hard-right political spectrum, started to gather up in front of the club the AfD was celebrating its victory. No one wanted to believe a populist party, which had already been compared to the Nazis in the past, became the third-biggest political movement in Germany. Thus, protesters began to chant anti-Nazis songs, while the party members and a few selected guests were celebrating and singing the German national anthem. A real division has appeared between supporters of Merkel’s “open-door” policy, which helped welcome more than a million refugees and migrants into the country, and supporters of the AfD, who believe Germany’s biggest challenges are Islam, capitalism and Europe. In the streets of Germany or within the walls of the Bundestag, there should be a real clash of ideas between representatives of these two opposite visions, while protest voters who voted for the AfD as a punishment against government parties might not identify to any claims formulated by these two factions, therefore not supporting either the government nor the opposition.
On the government side, a coalition will have to be reached, as Merkel’s CDU/CSU has not accumulated a large enough share of the seats in the Bundestag to be able to govern without another party by its side. In addition, as Martin Shultz’s party, the SPD, did not do as well as they expected, they already announced their willingness to become the next leader for the opposition to Merkel’s government. This leaves only one choice for the Chancellor, which is to collaborate with both the libertarian Free Democrats party and the Greens, forming a tripartite coalition, called the “Jamaican option”, to rule the country. However, this will not be an easy task to achieve, as a lot of disparities between these three parties may hinder the process of negotiating the coalition. If the negotiations succeed, the “Jamaican” coalition – named that way due to the three different parties symbolized by the black, the yellow and the green, the same colours as the Jamaican flag – will have to face attacks from both the SPD and the AfD. This means that the coalition will need to stay strong in all cases, which is not going to be mean feat.
Raphaël Moncada
For further information:
DW: http://www.dw.com/en/afd-what-you-need-to-know-about-germanys-far-right-party/a-37208199
Euronews: http://www.euronews.com/2017/09/22/the-afd-the-rise-to-power-of-germany-s-far-right
New Republic: https://newrepublic.com/article/144946/alternative-germany-strikes-fear-hearts-germans
Press Release Point: http://www.pressreleasepoint.com/merkel-says-alternative-germany-party-entering-parliament-big-challenge
The Guardian: https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/sep/24/germany-elections-afd-europe-immigration-merkel-radical-right
The Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/09/25/the-rise-of-germanys-far-right-leaves-merkel-stuck-with-the-jamaican-option/?utm_term=.97a0bca86d90
University of Denver: Interview of Professor Donald Abenheim: https://www.du.edu/korbel/ceuce/media/documents/abenheim-afd-full-interview-11-2016.pdf
The EU Commission said the investigation launched on October 2014 on States’ aids to multinational companies has been concluded. The results of this investigation involve the relationship between Luxembourg and Amazon. The Commission has concluded that the US company had to pay €250 millions of unsettled taxes, resulting from the 2003 agreement between the European State and the US company.
The illegal aids were achieved through a system of double company: one operating and one holding. Amazon created two different companies on the Luxembourg territory: the first one, “Amazon EU”, operates Amazon’s retail business throughout Europe – having over 500 employees and buying and selling items for all the national sites of Amazon. The second one, “Amazon Europe Holding Technologies”, acts as an intermediary between the operating company and Amazon in the US. This company holds the intellectual property rights for Europe, and the operating company pays to the holding one annual royalties for the use of the name “Amazon”.
On the press release it can be read: “The Commission’s investigation showed that the level of the royalty payments, endorsed by the tax ruling, was inflated and did not reflect economic reality. On this basis, the Commission concluded that the tax ruling granted a selective economic advantage to Amazon by allowing the group to pay less tax than other companies subject to the same national tax rules.”
In fact, the Junker’s Commission notified that the 2003 agreement between the Junker’s government of Luxembourg and Amazon was poorly applied and had generated harm to both Luxembourg and the competition in the EU Single Market. Still in the press release, the Commission clarifies that the investigation did not question Luxembourg’s general tax system as such. In the next months, the Luxembourg’s tax authorities must decide the precise amount of taxes unpaid by Amazon on the national territory. This amount must be determined on the basis of the Commission’s decision, but it should be around € 250 million, plus interest.
If Luxembourg does not fulfil its duties, it may incur an infringement procedure, exactly like what has happened yesterday to Ireland, which never required Apple to pay €13 billions of taxes, unpaid because of a similar agreement that in 2016 the Commission considered as illegal aids. And for that, “The Commission has therefore decided to refer Ireland to the Court of Justice for failure to implement the Commission decision, in accordance with Article 108(2) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).”
Tancredi Marini
For further information:
Commission’s release press:
Luxembourg: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3701_en.htm
Ireland: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3702_en.htm
Agenceurope: Bulletin Quotidien Europe 11876 – 5/10/2017
L’Espagne est maître chez elle et l’Union européenne n’a nullement l’intention de se mêler de ses « affaires intérieures » en lui proposant une médiation, de crainte de légitimer davantage les sécessionnistes catalans. Dans un communiqué publié ce lundi, la Commission s’est rangée clairement aux côtés de Madrid : « en vertu de la Constitution espagnole, le scrutin organisé hier en Catalogne n’était pas légal (…) Il s’agit d’une question interne à l’Espagne qui doit être réglée dans le respect de l’ordre constitutionnel de ce pays ». En d’autres termes, Mariano Rajoy, le Premier ministre espagnol, a carte blanche pour régler ses problèmes domestiques et Barcelone ne peut compter sur aucun gouvernement européen pour la soutenir, ceux-ci craignant l’effet de contagion que pourrait susciter une déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance.
Même les violences policières qui ont émaillé le « presque référendum » de dimanche ne suscitent guère de condamnations dans les capitales européennes en dépit de l’émotion des opinions publiques. Ainsi, l’Élysée n’en a pas soufflé mot en annonçant qu’Emmanuel Macron avait eu un entretien téléphonique lundi avec le Premier ministre espagnol au cours duquel le chef de l’État l’a l’assuré de « son attachement à l’unité constitutionnelle de l’Espagne » et qu’il « n’avait qu’un seul interlocuteur en la personne de M. Rajoy ». Seul le Premier ministre belge, Charles Michel, qui gouverne avec les indépendantistes flamands de la NVA, ce n’est pas un hasard, s’est illustré en condamnant dimanche la gestion de la crise par Madrid sur Twitter : « la violence ne peut jamais être une réponse. Nous condamnons toute forme de violence et nous réitérons notre appel au dialogue politique ».
Les institutions communautaires, chargées de veiller au respect des valeurs européennes, se sont montrées plus pressantes pour appeler Madrid à retenir sa matraque. La Commission a souligné que « la violence ne peut jamais être un instrument politique » et a appelé « tous les acteurs concernés à sortir au plus vite de la confrontation pour revenir au dialogue ». Donald Tusk, le président du Conseil européen des chefs d’État et de gouvernement, a, lui aussi, demandé à Rajoy de « trouver des chemins pour éviter l’escalade et l’usage de la force ». Le Parlement européen, en pointe dans la lutte contre les « démocratures » polonaise et hongroise, ne pouvait être en reste. Il a organisé aujourd’hui un débat à Strasbourg sur la crise catalane : lancée par les socialistes et les libéraux, l’initiative a été endossée par les conservateurs du PPE, le groupe auquel appartient le PP de Mariano Rajoy… Le discours du roi d’Espagne, mardi soir, particulièrement violent, montre que Madrid n’a manifestement pas entendu les appels au calme.
Si la gestion madrilène de la crise catalane, que l’Union n’a pas voulu anticiper encore une fois, suscite, un fort malaise, sur le fond, les Européens soutiennent Rajoy sans barguiner. Pour eux, seul un processus référendaire accepté par l’État central, à l’exemple du Royaume-Uni avec l’Écosse, est acceptable. Et encore. La Commission n’a ainsi jamais caché son hostilité à une telle indépendance, du moins jusqu’au Brexit. Ainsi, en 2004, l’exécutif européen, alors présidé par l’Italien Romano Prodi, avait affirmé sans que l’on sache très bien sur quelle base juridique il se fondait, qu’une Écosse indépendante devrait réadhérer à l’Union. Une position répétée hier afin de faire comprendre aux Catalans qu’il n’y aura pas de lendemains qui chantent : « si un référendum était organisé d’une façon qui serait conforme à la Constitution espagnole, cela signifierait que le territoire qui partirait se retrouverait en dehors de l’Union européenne ». La menace est claire pour toutes les régions tentées par l’indépendance (notamment Flandre et Lombardie). Et pour être sûre d’être bien comprise, elle a ajouté : « dans les temps actuels, nous avons besoin d’unité et de stabilité et non de division et de fragmentation »…
Le problème est qu’il n’y a en réalité pas de réponse juridique certaine, aucun précédent d’une sécession interne à l’Union n’existant. Jusqu’à présent, les États se sont scindés, parfois les armes à la main, avant d’adhérer, ce qui n’a posé aucun problème à l’Union qui a reconnu tous ces nouveaux pays : Estonie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Tchéquie, Slovaquie, Slovénie, Croatie. Mieux, Jean-Claude Juncker, le président de la Commission, et Emmanuel Macron se sont prononcés en faveur de l’adhésion du Monténégro, de la Serbie, du Kosovo et de la Macédoine (ainsi que de l’Albanie qui, elle, ne s’est pas scindée). Interrogé sur la différence entre le Kosovo, qui s’est séparé en violant la Constitution serbe, et la Catalogne, Margaritis Schinas, le porte-parole de la Commission, a admis que l’appartenance à l’Union changeait tout.
Mais, à la différence de l’Écosse, la Catalogne est membre de la zone euro. Comment justifier aux yeux des marchés l’expulsion de l’une des régions les plus riches de la zone alors que la Commission a tout fait pour éviter l’expulsion de la Grèce dont le PIB est bien inférieur, et ce au nom d’un risque de contagion ? Si après la Catalogne, l’Union expulse d’autres régions qui auraient la mauvaise idée de se déclarer indépendant, peut-on avoir confiance en la pérennité de l’euro ? Aucune réponse de la Commission qui préfère sans doute ne pas anticiper le problème…
N.B.: article paru dans Libération du 3 octobre
N.B.1: Sur les raisons de cette crise, relire mon reportage paru en septembre 2016 dans lequel j’annonçais de possibles violences...
Voici ma chronique consacrée à la com’ d’une Commission qui, décidément, a du mal à comprendre qu’elle n’est pas au service d’elle-même... Chronique pour «La faute à l’Europe», l’émission hebdomadaire de France Info télé.
For a few years now, the European Union has found an interest in unifying the different national digital markets and fostering a European data economy which would allow the free movement of data within the EU. A digital market is an economic concept referring to a market where the action of buying and selling goods is done through digital tools, such as the Internet. Data are also at the centre of this concept, since a typical online customer actually represents a set of data that is used by businesses and public services to improve their efficiency. Since 2015, the European Commission developed a Digital Single Market strategy (DSM strategy) which aims at uniting individual digital markets across the Union. The strategy encompasses 16 initiatives which have been divided up into three overarching pillars. Potential gains from a fully unified digital market have been estimated at €739bn by the Commission, which would represent a 4% increase in the entire EU GDP by 2020. Nevertheless, in order to achieve this stunning increase, all the objectives stated in the DSM strategy must be met.
The Digital Single Market strategy analysed
Therefore, the Digital Agenda composed by the three pillars that have previously been mentioned must be respected. Indeed, each of these pillars represent a stepping-stone toward a completely unified digital market. The first pillar, simply entitled “Access”, seeks to enhance EU citizens’ access to digital goods and services. It notably strives to coordinate the different national VAT regimes, overhaul and harmonize national copyright laws to reach smoother digital sales across borders, only to mention these. Moreover, the Commission wants to ease cross-border e-commerce, and it bolsters a new approach to competition between European businesses offering similar digital goods and services. This new method should be fairer and ensure trust between all partners. Fulfilling the conditions encompassed in the first pillar would offer both citizens and businesses a clearer understanding of how they can digitally buy and sell assets on a European scale. Thus, it could help generate more benefits and participate to the EU GDP’s 4% increase.
With the second pillar, named “Environment”, the Commission looks for improving digital networks and Internet services so that everyone can benefit from an equal access to services and goods available online. It also wants to create a suitable environment for digital businesses to thrive and offer their services to the largest audience. This should be achieved by rendering broadband connections faster at all national levels, by instigating public and private entities to invest in their development. There is also an entire section within the second pillar dedicated to personal data protection and cybersecurity partnerships, to ensure that all users of online services stay safe from malwares and hackers. Developing high-speed broadband and guaranteeing Internet users’ safety are therefore two main issues that the EU Commission is determined to tackle.
Finally, the third and last pillar – “Economy and Society” – stands for the EU’s wish to promote and grow its digital economy (also called data economy). This ultimate pillar might represent the most important aspect comprised within the DSM strategy. Indeed, this pillar includes an initiative which seeks to develop a new kind of freedom of movement within the European Union: the free movement of data. Currently, there are four kinds of movement, which are the free movement of goods, capital, services and labour. With this fifth one, digital data, which can be either personal or business-related data, will be freed from currently existing restrictions. These latter are geographical restrictions; for instance, access to new services is now limited because they might be located in another country than the one the individual who seeks to use them is. Removing these digital barriers will ensure that someone can have an equal access to goods and services, even though he is living in a different country than the one the provider of these goods is in. This will also work for job opportunities, as the Commission indicated its wish to develop an “e-government” action plan, which should be able to connect citizens and businesses across Europe. The establishment of a European Cloud service, that would allow citizens to save their data into a centralized European database, is also on the agenda. Fostering the European data economy through the freeing of data flows would truly permit the creation of a unique and single digital market between all Member States.
The Commission’s renewed vows toward a unified DSM
This year, in the State of the Union Address Jean-Claude Juncker gave on September 13th, the President of the European Commission reasserted the fact that the Commission was supporting the Digital Single Market plan, and even saw it as one of EU’s top priorities. Cybersecurity was also at the centre of his declaration, when he announced that:
“In the past three years, we have made progress in keeping Europeans safe online. But Europe is still not well equipped when it comes to cyber-attacks. This is why, today, the Commission is proposing new tools, including a European Cybersecurity Agency, to help defend us against such attacks.”
Thus, developing the European digital market, as well as improving Internet services’ security were two main elements Juncker addressed during the State of the Union speech. He particularly put the emphasis on cybersecurity during his address, and tried to justify this choice by indicating that he thought cyber-attacks could be as damaging as any other physical attacks. While economic gains are one the main drivers for DSM to be implemented, the EU Commission has clearly voiced its intentions to increase cybersecurity, notably through the reinforcement of the European Cybersecurity Agency, also called European Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA).
While everything seems easy enough to accomplish on paper, a lot will need to be accomplished to achieve a completely unified Digital Single Market. Andrus Ansip, the European Commission vice-president as well as EU’s digital chief, is in charge of tackling the issues that might appear along the road to setting up this new single market. He stressed on several occasions his wish to move forward with the 16 initiatives and to make progress after the 2015 Commission’s strategy. He notably said that:
“Data should be able to flow freely between locations, across borders and within a single data space. In Europe, data flow and data access are often held up by localisation rules or other technical and legal barriers. If we want our data economy to produce growth and jobs, data needs to be used. But to be used, it also needs to be available and analysed. We need a coordinated and pan-European approach to make the most of data opportunities, building on strong EU rules to protect personal data and privacy.”
Once again, it can be underlined that when they refer to the Digital Single Market, EU officials usually link it to cybersecurity issues and the protection of personal data. However, the freeing of data flows should not harm Internet users’ privacy in any way. It should on the contrary help businesses and customers get in touch more easily and help transferring data across borders, according to the EU Commission’s plan.
To this day, a few stages have already been achieved toward the DSM, that were incorporated within the Commission’s strategy. The most notable ones are the end of roaming charges that has been adopted in the EU Parliament the 15th June 2017, and the discussions that are currently going on in the Commission for an EU Cybersecurity Strategy. Concerning roaming charges, the Commission had pledged to make telephone operators stop paying among them for network services abroad. In other words, when a user would go in another EU Member States and use his mobile phone, he would most likely have to pay additional fees on his bill at the end of the month. This was the result of EU operators having to pay for these services among themselves, therefore echoing the price difference on the customer’s bill. To remedy this issue, the Commission proposed a legislation back in 2013 to end roaming charges, which led to a co-decision between the Parliament and the Council to set up the 15th June 2017 as the deadline to end them. Since then, European mobile phone users can use their devices in every single Member State without having to pay that extra fee for roaming.
In terms of cybersecurity within the Digital Single Market, the DSM strategy is mainly focused on stopping data fraud or theft, by regulating different aspects of digital transactions. In this case, cybersecurity has been defined by the EU as:
“the safeguards and actions that can be used to protect the cyber domain, both in the civilian and military fields, from those threats that are associated with or that may harm its interdependent networks and information infrastructure. Cybersecurity strives to preserve the availability and integrity of the networks and infrastructure and the confidentiality of the information contained therein”.
According to the World Forum in its Global Risks Report of 2016, data fraud and theft are both among the most likely global risks that are looming over Europe and the world. Moreover, the EU itself has registered more than 4000 ransomware attacks in 2016 only, showing the urgency of the situation and the need to take action against cyber-attacks. Thus, if the EU truly seeks positive externalities out of the Digital Single Market, putting the emphasis on security and cyber protection of data truly is an essential element.
Following Juncker’s declaration on cybersecurity, the European Commission unveiled its new cybersecurity strategy to the public on September 19th. Again, economic and security issues are intertwined in the Commission’s plan. In fact, one of the first proposal put forward by the task force which is in charge of tackling cyber issues, led by Andrus Ansip, Julian King (European Commissioner for the Security Union) and Mariya Gabriel (European Commissioner for Digital Economy and Society), is to combat fraud and counterfeiting of digital means of payment. In addition, as mentioned earlier, a reorganization of the current European Cybersecurity Agency, ENISA, should be underway soon. This will mainly affect the number of employees within the Agency, which should double, and broaden the type of missions undertaken by this organism. ENISA will also have to come up with “cybersecurity certificates” for digital products and services. The certificates will need to ensure that there is no threat in using these products and services, by labelling them as if they were usual goods. Alongside this reshaping of the European Cybersecurity Agency, the Commission has planned to create a European Cybersecurity Research and Competence Centre by 2018. Its role will be to work with EU Member States and help them develop the most advanced countermeasures to cyber-attacks, ensuring the protection and security of millions of Internet users at the EU and national levels. The last most important measure announced by the Commission about cybersecurity is related to cooperation among EU countries. A proposal has indeed been presented, asking both Member States and the EU to swiftly react to large-scale cyber-attacks, and on a more coordinated manner than before.
A difficult legislative process
After two years trying to fulfil its initial 16 initiatives, the Commission also appeared to have met some issues along the way. Even though it already managed to implement some major elements, bringing the EU a bit closer to a functional and fully unified digital market, there still are problems which need to be resolved.
First, it seems that the extent of the reforms that imply the DSM have been underestimated by the European Commission. Indeed, the different projects initiated by the latter to homogenize national legislations, especially in terms of copyright laws and security regulations, sound rather complicated to settle upon. For instance, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which is one of the cornerstones for the entire DSM project, has been debated and adopted by EU policymakers on the 14th April 2016 in the European Parliament. The aim of this regulation was to replace independent national regulations on personal data protection, to unify them and introduce a simplified version at the European scale. Nonetheless, the running of this legislative proposal through both the EU Parliament and the Council of the EU has known a lot of turmoil. Thousands of amendments have in fact been put on the table during the parliamentary sessions, and even though the regulation has been adopted, it has been intensely criticized for creating additional limitations on new information and communication technologies (ICT). Every step of the way, it seems that difficulties and unexpected issues have come up and hampered the Commission’s strategy for a unified Digital Single Market.
Second, while the intentions to create a Single Digital Market appear noble, and the DSM strategy that was initially proposed feasible, some observers have pointed out that what has come out of the legislative process so far seemed more complicated than it needed to be. For others, it is distinctively off-course to what the Commission had originally intended. For example, several measures are thought to be inadequate, or imposing too much restriction especially on companies thriving on e-Commerce, only to mention these businesses. The EU’s legislative work has already been criticized for creating new regulations which may not be appropriate to a given situation in the past, and it is now creating new rules which are obstructing several enterprises’ competitiveness. With DSM legislations, some experts have denounced the burden some measures would represent for several companies across the Union, which will need to adapt to these new EU regulations, and will therefore lose potential customers because they would have to set the same prices in all EU Member States. However, it is widely known that incomes are unequal among EU citizens, who would still have to pay the same price for a product or service bought on the Internet. The reason behind this price standardization is linked to the Commission’s wish to end price differentiation between EU countries, which is achieved by online retailers which can locate where a customer is, and accordingly adapt prices to his location. If this trend goes on, it might even lead to opposite outcomes to what was initially intended, according to these same observers.
Finally, one of the main concerns that has been raised about a fully digitalized and technologically advanced single market is related to job opportunities, more precisely job losses. Indeed, entire industries and employment sectors are currently being reshaped because of digital technologies and automation, which is furthered by digitalization. Automation is accentuated by new means of communication and the fastening of data transfer from point to another. In terms of employment, the DSM should be creating new opportunities for qualified workers, but digitalization itself threatens jobs which do not require as much skills as other tasks do. According to the last Bruegel think tank’s estimations, which dates back to 2014, 40 to 60% of jobs within the EU Member States might be endangered because of digitalisation-induced automation. It could also lead to job reallocations all around the world, rendered easier by cloud technologies that make data available everywhere in Europe. These concerns do not make policymaking any easier, as policymakers sometimes need to overregulate businesses and international companies so that jobs can be saved. This however appears to be a temporary solution, as digitalisation looms large over the entire world, not only Europe. We will need to be ready for it, particularly by developing the DSM framework, which will need to tackle tomorrow’s challenges efficiently.
Potential gains highlighted
In terms of employment, a Digital Single Market might also bring new job opportunities in the EU. If the Digital Single Market is truly managed the way the Commission forecasted in its 2015 strategy, technological advancement should be able to create millions of jobs, and balance out job losses digitalization and automation will engender. On the one hand, technology is going to create new products which were not on the market before, then developing new offers and demands which will produce economic gains. Alongside the development of these new products and services, labour will be required to meet customers’ demand. Jobs will thus be created, especially in terms of digital entrepreneurship, IOS and apps developing, industries which barely existed a few years ago. On the other hand, these new jobs will require new machines and infrastructures in order to develop, which will have to be produced by workers, generating new jobs as well. Finally, thanks to new technologies, and by using them properly, economies of scales can be realised, lowering the cost of production to build one product. As a result, competitiveness is increased in the sector in which those economies of scale are achieved. Increased competitiveness also means lower prices for products and services, and again new jobs should spawn out of it. It has been projected that around 8.5 million new jobs should be created after the DSM is fully functional. In an official study for the European Parliament, it has been pointed out that most newly created jobs will require knowledgeable and high-skilled workers, such as managers, technicians and engineers. It has also been estimated that other kinds of job which are more less demanding in terms of high-skilled workers should increase by about 2 million.
The current EU data economy’s value, taking into account all digital sales and services, has been estimated at about €300bn. In the case the flow of data would be freed from the main cross-borders restrictions, notably localisation restrictions, the European data economy could phenomenally increase to more than €739bn by 2020. This growth would be similar to the increase which was expected from the establishment of the Single Market in 1992. On a broader level, the DSM is also a key element in what is called the “High Growth Scenario” of the European economy. Fulfilling all that has been promised in the DSM strategy should take Europe a bit closer to this case scenario, where the main drivers for economic growth are innovation, digital technologies and ICT. Adequately framed, these elements could steer the EU’s economy toward more investments and an even bigger increase in the EU’s GDP. However, before ending up at this point, all the guidelines set up by the Commission must be respected by the Commission itself, which should not drift away from its original intentions. Then, the Commission’s proposals must go through the two co-legislative bodies of the EU: the Council of the European Union and the European Parliament.
Raphaël Moncada
For further information:
European Parliament, “The cost of Non-Europe in the Single Market”: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2014/510981/EPRS_STU%282014%29510981_REV1_EN.pdf
European Parliament, “Employment and Skills Aspects of the Digital Single Market Strategy”: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/569967/IPOL_STU(2015)569967_EN.pdf
European Commission, “Facilitating cross-border data flow in the Digital Single Market”: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/facilitating-cross-border-data-flow-digital-single-market
European Parliament, “Performance-based Full Policy Cycle for the Digital Single Market”: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/document/activities/cont/201307/20130701ATT68944/20130701ATT68944EN.pdf
Audrius Puksas, “Interaction between big data and competition law in digital single market”: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Andrius_Puksas/publication/309090791_INTERACTION_BETWEEN_BIG_DATA_AND_COMPETITION_LAW_IN_DIGITAL_SINGLE_MARKET/links/5803d86408ae23fd1b68a0ca.pdf?origin=publication_list
European Commission, “A digital single market in Europe: Bringing down barriers to unlock online opportunities”: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/priorities/digital-single-market_en
European Commission, “Cybersecurity in the European Digital Single Market”: http://www.cybersecobservatory.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/UE_sam_cybersecurity_report.pdf
European Parliament, “Ubiquitous Digital Single Market”: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/aboutparliament/en/displayFtu.html?ftuId=FTU_5.9.4.html
European Parliament, “Digital Single Market: boosting e- commerce and combatting consumer discrimination in the EU”: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/579003/IPOL_STU%282016%29579003_EN.pdf
European Commission, “E-Communications and the Digital Single Market”: http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en/data/dataset/S2062_84_2_438_ENG
European Commission, “What does Economic Research tell us about Cross-border e-Commerce in the EU Digital Single Market?”: http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/publications/pub.cfm?id=6079
Herbert Zech, “A legal framework for a data economy in the European Digital Single Market: rights to use data”: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/306040809_A_legal_framework_for_a_data_economy_in_the_European_Digital_Single_Market_rights_to_use_data
European Commission, “SMART 2013/0063 European Data Market”: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/smart-20130063-study-european-data-market-and-related-services
European Commission, “A Digital Single Market Strategy for Europe – Analysis and Evidence”: https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/digital-single-market-strategy-europe-analysis-and-evidence-swd2015-100-final
European Commission, “Why we need a Digital Single Market”: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/dsm-factsheet_en.pdf
EUobserver, “Clock ticking for EU to fix the digital single market”: https://euobserver.com/opinion/137956
European Commission, “State of the Union 2017 – Cybersecurity: Commission scales up EU’s response to cyber-attacks”: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-17-3193_en.htm
European Commission, “Questions and Answers on the Communication on a Fair and Efficient Tax System in the EU for the Digital Single Market”: http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-17-3341_en.htm